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Abstract 
The thesis examines the relationship between Britain and Malaya in the post-war 
period from 1945 to 1960. It provides a development of existing accounts in the 
literature that either acknowledge the importance of Malaya to Britain but do not 
provide any details of the relationship, or provide only historical accounts of 
Malaya’s changing importance over the same period. The thesis argues that there is 
a clear continuity in this relationship, conditioned by the nature of capitalist social 
relations, and this relationship should be characterised as imperialist. The thesis 
adopts an archive-based analysis of the period, using an open Marxist theory of 
imperialism. This approach argues that the state is an inherent feature, or 
manifestation, of capitalist social relations and acts to regulate the circuit of capital 
in order to avoid or resolve the crises that beset it. Imperialism then is understood 
as this action undertaken internationally, through the domination of one state by 
another, to improve conditions for capital accumulation nationally, and in the 
interests of capital generally. Imperialism is then seen very much as an action 
undertaken by the state, rather than an historical or necessary stage of capitalism. 
The thesis argues that the over-production crisis that characterised the inter-war 
period continued after the war, finding expression in the trade disequilibrium 
between Eastern and Western hemispheres resulting in a global dollar shortage. 
Malaya remained important to the Sterling Area through its large surplus of dollar 
earnings, which it contributed to the Area’s dollar pool and were earned through its 
rubber and tin exports to the United States. The thesis charts the expression of 
imperial relations through British use of colonial import restrictions, the 
sequestration of dollar earnings, and the imposition of exchange controls to 
minimise the dollar deficit, and attempts to develop Malaya’s economy for eventual 
independence. However, the thesis argues that even independence does not see a 
significant shift in the fundamental relations between Britain and Malaya, with the 
Sterling Area still providing a mechanism through which the imperial relationship is 
enforced. The thesis does not argue that Malaya’s dollar earnings were the only 
defence against economic collapse but, rather, without Malaya, Britain would have 
had to impose much more austere measures both domestically and on the Sterling 
Area in order to survive the post-war crisis, making the task of reconstruction after 
the war much more difficult.  
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Introduction 
Britain and Malaya 
The purpose of the thesis is to characterise the relationship between Britain and 
Malaya during the period 1945 – 1960. The relationship is understood through the 
medium of the Sterling Area, as the means through which foreign exchange reserves 
were gathered and pooled. As such, the relationship is to be understood as an 
imperialist one. After the war, Britain suffered a severe shortage of dollar reserves. 
This came as a threat to post-war reconstruction and restructuring, as Britain was 
required to import most commodities for this purpose from the dollar area, 
particularly the United States. Without net dollar contributors to the Sterling Area’s 
dollar pool, Britain would have found it exceedingly difficult to maintain its economic 
position and would have to resort to domestic austerity measures, severely 
impacting the quality of life of the British citizen and the health of the British 
economy. 
Malaya was a net exporter to the dollar area during the post-war period, 
generating large trade surpluses from the sale of rubber and tin to the dollar area, 
and so receiving large numbers of dollars in payment. As a member of the Sterling 
Area, a preferential trading bloc, Malaya would pool its foreign exchange reserves at 
the Bank of England. Britain, as the managing agency of the Sterling Area, would 
handle these reserves, providing foreign currency for other members of the Sterling 
Area to pay for imports but also able to demand of the Area’s members austerity and 
stringency with regard to import policy so as to maintain reserve levels. 
 Malaya’s importance to the Sterling Area and Britain has been well 
established in the literature, and some authors have even attempted to identify how 
that importance changed in the immediate post-war period. These latter accounts 
are both rare and limited; the relationship between Britain and Malaya has not been 
subjected to a rigorous or sustained critical analysis, leading to simplistic 
characterisations of the relationship and impressionistic conclusions. This thesis 
intends to argue for a strong continuity in Britain’s relationship with Malaya after the 
Second World War, dominated by the logic of imperialism. Britain used Malaya as a 
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prop for its own economy, through the mechanism of the Sterling Area, itself an 
imperial institution intended to dominate the economic and monetary policies of 
other states in order to alter international trading patterns and currency flows to 
favour conditions for capital accumulation in the British state. With the advent of the 
post-war consensus, Britain’s reserves became the focal point of the stresses and 
strains of economic policy and crisis. 
 It is generally accepted that Britain was not suffering from ‘economic 
paralysis’ at the time and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement (AAFA) and the 
European Recovery Program (ERP), as well as the measures undertaken in the 
Sterling Area, were not ‘last ditch’ attempts to resolve the problem but were more 
concerned with preventing domestic austerity measures in Britain (or seriously 
affecting the British quality of life). Indeed, they were actions in support of the British 
post-war consensus on economic policy, to support a Keynesian economic policy. 
However, little analysis has been undertaken as to the consequences if the dollar 
drain had been unresolved. While Malaya only ameliorated the problem of the dollar 
shortage, providing no long-term resolution to the deeper structural problem, it was 
crucial in the short term to prevent a total cessation of dollar imports and the 
exacerbation of the prevailing crisis. The dollar problem, in fact, is not speedily 
resolved and continues to be a major factor in global trade until the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. 
While the size of Malaya’s dollar contribution to the Sterling Area does not 
match up to the ERP or to the AAFA, Malaya’s contribution was still substantial, 
amounting to the equivalent of 25% of Marshall Aid annually over the period 1945 – 
1960. Furthermore, having no large dollar contributor within the Sterling Area would 
seriously jeopardise the raison d’être of the Area itself as perpetual rationing and 
stringency of dollar imports would limit the value of the Sterling Area, as the dollar 
area was the source of the vast majority of the world’s goods at this time. The 
Sterling Area was not just crucial to the maintenance of the British economy at this 
point in time but also essential, as the largest trading area in the world, to the 
resurgence of world trade after the War and so the maintenance of the global 
economy. 
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The development of the Sterling Area occurred in the inter-war period, and 
achieved its ‘final form’ on the eve of the Second World War with foreign exchange 
controls being adopted within the Area. The creation of the Sterling Area, initially as 
a preferential trading bloc, was as a response to the interwar overproduction crisis 
and this is the same purpose to which it was used in the post-war period also. Facing 
a continued overproduction crisis, with the United States producing more goods than 
could be consumed globally, the Sterling Area was used simultaneously as a means of 
collecting foreign exchange with which to purchase dollar goods, and as a means of 
avoiding exacerbating the overproduction crisis further through the use of import 
restrictions, dollar saving and commodity substitution measures. Malaya particularly 
was crucial to this endeavour as it was by far the greatest dollar earner of the Sterling 
Area. The analysis of Britain’s relationship with Malaya has been highlighted many 
times within literature on British history, post-war reconstruction and the Sterling 
Area; however, this relationship remains under-studied and has never been 
characterised or critically assessed. 
Imperialism and the British-Malayan relationship 
The thesis seeks to position itself within the broader British politics literature, with 
specific relevance to British imperial history and foreign policy, the Sterling Area, and, 
of course, Malaya. The thesis also wishes to contribute to the continued empirical 
application of open Marxism, which has had only few empirical applications. As such, 
the thesis seeks to provide a contribution to the above literatures by offering a 
critical and theoretically robust account of the British-Malayan relationship, 
emphasising continuity in the relationship through the medium of the Sterling Area. 
Hitherto, accounts of the relationship have been brief, stressing its importance but 
providing no further analysis and have also lacked theoretical rigour. Dedicated 
accounts of the relationship have tended to provide fragmented narratives, and 
impressionistic analysis. Literature on open Marxism has tended thus far to be 
entirely theoretical; however, empirical applications do exist though these have all 
utilised the concept of depoliticisation and provided analysis of domestic relations. 
The use of imperialism then provides an opportunity for open Marxists to theorise 
certain relations between states within global capitalist relations. 
  4 
The thesis argues that the relationship between Britain and Malaya is best 
characterised as imperialist in nature. The thesis asks the question: ‘What does 
imperialism mean, and how is it manifest in this relationship between Britain and 
Malaya?’ The answer comes directly from the theoretical framework. Malaya is 
dominated by Britain for the purposes of regulating capital social relations. This is 
manifest quite clearly in Britain’s policy towards Malaya; through the import policy 
required of Malaya, the dollar sequestration, the control of Malaya’s rubber and tin 
markets, the actions undertaken to develop the Malayan economy for eventual 
independence and successful insertion into the global capitalist economy. The thesis 
stresses that this overriding logic provides continuity for British-Malayan relations 
from 1945 – 1960, even after Malaya has declared formal independence from Britain. 
The theoretical approach adopts an open Marxism that characterises the 
Britain-Malaya relationship as imperialist. Open Marxism conceives of the state as a 
form of social relations; that is, not as a species of social relations but a mode of 
existence – a manifestation of social relations. This avoids the unnecessary ‘bridging’ 
concepts required by the historical periodisation of the state into ‘epochs’ or ‘stages’. 
This then allows a rejection of accounts that characterise imperialism as a historical 
period, or a species of state, or stage of capitalism. Imperialism is instead seen as 
actions undertaken by the state to ensure reproduction of capitalist social relations, 
or the perpetuation of the circuit of capital, through the domination of one state by 
another in order for the imperialist state to be better able to manage capitalist social 
relations. This is particularly apparent in this period as the interference in the 
markets of the Sterling Area, particularly the colony of Malaya. The Sterling Area is 
understood as a manifestation of imperialism, an institution for the successful 
application of imperial policy.  
This account of imperialism is not reductionist. On the contrary, the account 
of imperialism set forth in the thesis is diverse in its analytical scope. Indeed, there 
can exist a hierarchy of states that dominate other states to greater or lesser degrees, 
which may entail any number of specific applications: resource extraction, the 
manipulation of important international commodity markets, control of another 
state’s economic, monetary and foreign policy. However, it does not necessarily 
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require that this is the untempered exploitation of another or that it is a strictly ‘one-
way’ street – a dominated state can potentially benefit from an imperial relationship 
and Malaya does benefit from this relationship. Britain was particularly mindful to 
ensure Malayan development so that, when independence did occur, Malaya was 
well positioned to support itself. Indeed, the relationship between Britain and 
Malaya, as an imperial relationship, is characterised by opportunities and constraints. 
These elements need to be taken together to develop a theory of imperialism, rather 
than attempting to reduce imperialism to a single concept, whether it is the more 
contemporary ideas of imperialism as simply global capitalism (without theorising 
the state) or classical theories of imperialism that instrumentalise the state.  
The value of this account of imperialism lies in open Marxism’s broader 
analysis of social relations. Firstly, open Marxism rejects a dichotomising position on 
key concepts. As such, it views dichotomies such as foreign and domestic, and 
political and economic, as false, instead arguing for the inherent unity of these 
concepts. Therefore it avoids separating concepts such as the state and the market 
from another, acknowledging that one can only be understood in terms of the other 
and so permitting a more complete and sophisticated analysis of social relations. 
Secondly, and building upon the first point, an emphasis on class struggle 
provides a critique of the orthodox understanding of imperialism, that one state can 
exploit another. The understanding of capitalism as an inherently global social form 
and of states as processing ‘nodes’ for the global circuit of capital allows the 
conception of an imperialism that is ontologically prior to more orthodox accounts of 
imperialism; this conception of imperialism requires no bridging concepts such as the 
reification of a state as an extant ‘thing’ that can actually be exploited. The idea of 
states as ‘processing nodes’, or ‘moments’, within global capitalist social relations 
allows the thesis to conceive of imperial relations then as the international 
expression of capitalist social relations. One node effectively co-opts the capacity of 
another node in order to better improve its own processing potential, to stress the 
metaphor; though this is not necessarily detrimental to the co-opted node. 
The thesis touches upon issues of genuine relevance to contemporary politics. 
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Imperialism and crisis are of particular importance, with the global economy 
undergoing its most major crisis in a hundred years and recent imperialist wars, in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, providing an excellent comparison for the main focus of this 
thesis. Both reveal the fundamental tendencies of capitalist social relations towards 
crisis and violence. Without critical analysis of these tendencies, and an 
understanding of the nature of capitalist social relations, they will certainly continue. 
While analysing British-Malayan relations might seem quite divorced from the 
current economic crisis of the 21st Century, the issues are consonant and will 
continue to resonate due to the inherent instability of the capitalist social form. 
Methodology 
As the thesis seeks to understand the behaviour of British state managers, the most 
valuable source of information on the daily activity of running the state lies in 
government archives. The thesis used archival documents from the National Archives 
at Kew, London and the Bank of England Archives at the Bank of England, London. 
The method utilised to record the documents required four weeklong trips, 
photographing documents and analysing them once I had returned from research 
trips. As I do not live in close proximity to the National Archives, regular trips were 
prohibitive. The sheer scale of the National Archives in London presents a difficult 
task in actually discerning where the information for the thesis’ empirical focus lies. 
This is generally mitigated somewhat by the helpful staff at the National Archives, as 
well as the ability to search for documents using the National Archives website prior 
to a research trip. However, this merely provides information on the title of the 
document, with only limited explanation of its content, though the website itself 
does host some scanned documents for download. 
The Bank of England provides no such facility, either to perform an online 
search of the archives or to download any of their documents. The small size of its 
Archive department is a further limit to the quantity and quality of research that can 
be undertaken at the Bank, as the four-member staff of the Bank of England Archives 
provide requested documents at set times. A research trip to the Bank of England 
Archives also has to be booked in advance due to the limited number of places 
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available for researchers at the facility, and the competition for these places. The 
short opening hours of the Bank (10am – 4pm, Monday – Thursday) meant that time 
spent at the Archives was limited, so significant amounts of research have to be 
squeezed into a short timeframe. This made the photography of Archives for analysis 
at a later date especially necessary; however, the sole photography stand at the Bank 
made it difficult to pursue this method due to the competition for this single spot. 
The thesis uses the dates 1945 – 1960 as the chronological boundaries for the 
empirical focus. These dates allowed the thesis to analyse a particularly acute 
episode of the dollar crisis in the late 1940s, as well as the still-chronic but less-acute 
1950s. The thesis ends in 1960 as the point in which the Malayan Emergency is 
declared as ended, allowing for analysis of three years of Malayan independence 
from Britain and to provide some comparison between Malaya as a colony of the 
British Empire and as an independent member of the Sterling Area to further 
highlight continuity in the relationship between Malaya and Britain. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One provides a review of the literature on British foreign policy and imperial 
history, British post-war reconstruction, the Sterling Area and Malaya. This chapter 
argues that, while a great deal of literature identifies the importance of the Britain-
Malaya relationship during this period, only a few engage this subject directly. Those 
works that do focus on this specific bilateral relationship tend to be atheoretical, and 
descriptive. 
Chapter Two gives an account of the thesis’ theoretical framework. Chapter 
Two builds upon the critique of Chapter One to develop an approach that provides 
an understanding of the organisation and function of the state within capitalist social 
relations. The chapter develops a theory of imperialism from open Marxism that 
takes the state to be a form of social relations, and argues that imperialism is 
fundamentally the domination of one state by another to improve conditions for 
capital accumulation within its own territory, and to benefit the interests of capital-
in-general. 
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Chapter Three provides a historical background to Malaya, the Sterling Area 
and the British pre-war economy. It argues that the interwar period saw Britain’s 
continued relative economic decline, and the emergence of a global overproduction 
crisis. The Sterling Area grew out of these conditions, slowly, as a trading preference 
bloc and gradually took on the functions that characterise its use in the post-war 
period. The chapter then provides an account of Malaya’s history within the British 
Empire and shows that its role as a top dollar earner within the Sterling Area is 
historically based. 
Chapter Four details the immediate post-war period, from 1945 – 1950, 
providing accounts of the dollar drain, colonial import policy to staunch the dollar 
deficit, as well as efforts by the British government to make ERP loans available for 
Colonial development, and the devaluation of Sterling. This Chapter argues that 
Malaya was a key bulwark in maintaining the Sterling Area and that Britain’s 
relationship with the colony was essentially imperial in character. Britain strictly 
limits Malaya’s imports, sequesters the dollar earnings from Malaya’s rubber and tin 
industries, attempts to use ERP dollar aid for use in the development of Malaya’s 
economy. The purpose of this direction was to alleviate the acute phase of the dollar 
drain on the Sterling Area and the British economy. 
Chapter Five focuses on the period 1950 – 1955: the dollar deficit, seemingly 
diminished by the injection of US capital through ERP dollar aid, becomes acute once 
more. British state managers, once again, emphasise the great value of Malaya in 
supporting the Sterling Area and the British economy during this trade imbalance, 
and currency shortage. The chapter stresses continuity with the preceding chapter by 
arguing that the fundamental relationship has not changed: Britain continues to pool 
Malaya’s dollars in the Sterling Area dollar pool to support Sterling and the Area; 
Britain’s commitment to Malaya is also realised through its efforts to find capital for 
the development of the Malayan economy, identifying that independence is not far 
away. Furthermore, the Emergency becomes particularly intense in this period, and 
Britain’s resolve in prosecuting the campaign against the insurgents is clear. 
Chapter Six provides an account of the negotiations for and lead up to 
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Malayan independence, as well as the consequences of Malaya’s independence to 
the relationship between Britain and Malaya from 1955 - 1960. The chapter argues, 
again, that there is strong continuity in this relationship due to the Sterling Area’s 
role in managing this relationship, and Malaya’s particular value to Britain and the 
Area. Despite the intuitive notion that independence would provide a ‘watershed’ 
event, nothing profoundly alters the relationship between Malaya and Britain. 
Malaya’s assumption of ‘full membership’ of the Sterling Area does not 
fundamentally changes the relationship with Britain and this remains an imperial 
relationship: Britain still maintains control of Malaya’s foreign exchange, for the most 
part; its very basic role within the Area does not alter either (as holding a deficit with 
Britain, and a surplus with the US – so its Sterling balances do not rise greatly while it 
generates large dollar surpluses for the Area).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: British Post-War Reconstruction, Imperial Economic 
Policy and Malaya 
This chapter intends to provide an overview of British post-war international history, 
with particular reference to the political economy of post-war reconstruction and 
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imperial relations. British international history after the Second World War is broadly 
understood in terms of decline, and strategies to arrest it, in terms of power, 
prestige, economic might, and international influence. Particular themes that 
dominate in the literature include Anglo-American relations and the development of 
the ‘special relationship’, decolonisation and the end of Empire, and the move 
towards European integration. British imperial relations during this period also tend 
to be understood in terms of the move towards the independence of Britain’s 
remaining imperial possessions, either due to the expense of keeping these colonies, 
or the difficulty in maintaining imperial control with growing movements for 
independence in the colonies. 
 Britain’s relationship with Malaya is mentioned throughout the literature on 
British post-war international history. Indeed, the importance and pertinence of the 
political and economic relationship between Britain and Malaya in the immediate 
post-war period is already well established. These accounts tend to exist primarily in 
the literature on British imperial relations and imperial economic policy. However, 
these tend to be either brief, as their focus of study is the broader scope of empire 
and its institutional arrangements, or engage with the relationship in terms that 
analytically separate the political and economic, which leads to understandings of 
the relationship that emphasise discontinuity. Indeed, British imperial history, 
including imperial economic policy, is dominated by accounts that argue for regular 
cleavages and discontinuity. Furthermore, while the importance of Malaya to Britain 
after the Second World War is broadly accepted, only one text engages directly in 
trying to understand this importance. 
The broad context of the relationship between Britain and Malaya, and 
indeed the situation which dominated British imperial relations immediately after 
the Second World War, is characterised by the acute phase of the dollar deficit in the 
immediate post-war period, to which Malaya was vital due to its large trade surplus 
with the United States thereby generating significant quantities of dollars for the 
Sterling Area’s dollar pool. Britain was reliant on Malaya’s contributions to the dollar 
pool in order to maintain the Sterling Area, the largest multilateral trading and 
monetary bloc outside of the dollar area, as well as Sterling itself. Without this 
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support, the resurgence of global trade would have been significantly retarded and 
the task of post-war reconstruction, both in Britain and globally, would have been 
made much more difficult. From 1948 until 1960, three years after the independence 
of Malaya, Britain fought a counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya against 
communist guerrillas; this was termed ‘the Malayan Emergency’ and has been 
broadly understood in terms of the threat posed by communist expansion after the 
Second World War. 
 The imperial relationship between Britain and Malaya features in four groups 
of literature, with varying levels of specificity. The broadest group contains the 
literature on Britain’s international relations during the 20th century; more specific 
studies feature the relationship as part of British post-war reconstruction; the 
relationship also features in works dedicated to understanding the Sterling Area and 
British imperial economic relations during the 20th century; and there also exists a 
small literature that focuses on Malaya itself. This chapter will argue that the 
literature surrounding and specifically dedicated to the Britain-Malaya relationship 
during the post-war period has two principal flaws. Firstly, the relationship is 
characterised in simplistic terms. The relationship is seen as simply a one-way 
process: Britain harvested dollars from Malaya during a period of dollar shortage. 
There are few examples of sustained analysis of the relationship between Britain and 
Malaya during this period; these exist in the ‘Malaya-specific’ literature set. Secondly, 
what few examples exist of an analysis of the Britain-Malaya relationship lack 
sophisticated or sustained theoretical engagement. What theoretical engagement 
exists is impressionistic and limited, and offers either no conceptual understanding of 
imperialism, or an understanding that separates state and market. This too leads to a 
lack of nuance in the characterisation of the relationship. 
The chapter is organised according to the broadest literature and narrows 
down towards the literature that focuses exclusively upon imperial economic 
relations and, finally, relations between Britain and Malaya itself. The first section of 
the chapter deals with the literature of British imperial and foreign policy in the 20th 
Century. This literature generally focuses on Britain’s involvement in the Cold War, 
relations with the United States and Europe, and the process of decolonisation. As 
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such, while Malaya does feature in this literature, the reasons for its importance vary 
with the author. Some texts do indeed mention Malaya’s contribution to the Sterling 
Area dollar pool, however these are in the minority and do not provide detailed 
critical analysis of this fact, only stating it as a reason for British military 
commitments to the colony. The bulk of the literature focuses on the Malayan 
Emergency, often as a part of decolonisation, and places Malaya within the context 
of the Cold War and the strategic paradigms that governed that period. 
The second section will then focus its analysis by providing an overview of the 
literature on British post-war reconstruction. The chapter will also look briefly at the 
literature on US involvement in efforts of post-war reconstruction. This literature, 
while recognising the value and importance of specific economic relationships after 
the war, and like the broader literature on British post-war history, does not engage 
in detailed analysis of these relationships.  
The third section focuses on the literature of the post-war Sterling Area and 
British external and imperial economic policy. This literature is very successful at 
studying the intricacies of Britain’s trading and monetary bloc. This genre also 
provides excellent critique of the existence and history of the Sterling Area and, 
especially in the post-war period, this literature group is generally very critical of the 
retention of the trading bloc both in the short- and long-term. However, it shares the 
same gap as the literature on post-war reconstruction. While it recognises the value 
of specific relationships within the Sterling Area and the British Empire, it is these 
institutions more broadly that are the principal unit of analysis rather than any 
bilateral relationship within them. Furthermore, these accounts tend to reify the 
Sterling Area and the Empire as extant and existential ‘things’ that exist on their own 
basis, rather than trying to understand them as manifestations of relations between 
states. 
The fourth and final section will provide an overview of texts that specifically 
cover the relationship between Britain and Malaya. This literature is sub-divided into 
two further groups. The first sub-division features literature on the Malayan 
Emergency. These accounts focus on the Emergency as a military and political-
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imperial phenomenon to the exclusion of economic factors. Any mention of 
economic issues within these texts tends to be a limited account of the threat posed 
to Malaya’s rubber and tin resources by the insurgents. As such, this literature, while 
certainly providing an account of British-Malayan relations, can be considered quite 
limited in its analysis and scope. The bulk of this literature focuses primarily on the 
prosecution of the counter-insurgency campaign, either in strict military terms or in 
terms of the propaganda used by both sides. 
The second sub-division is much smaller. These accounts concentrate on 
Britain’s political and economic relations with Malaya. This literature is historical in 
approach and provides little critical engagement with the nature of imperialism, 
either as a theoretical problem or in terms of the relations between Britain and 
Malaya. As such, conclusions tend towards being impressionistic and limited. These 
accounts emphasise discontinuity and change in the relationship over continuity.  
1.1 British International History  
The literature on post-war British international history has a number of key 
identifiable themes. These accounts are, by their nature, very broad and their 
chronological scope limits the level of analysis that can be brought to bear on 
particular bilateral relationships Britain maintained with other states, other than the 
United States.1 This is not so much a criticism but an identification of the explanatory 
aims of the broader literature on post-war British international history. Its intent is to 
provide a narrative history of British international relations, society, politics and 
economics. As such, Britain’s relationship with Malaya, and indeed any of its imperial 
relationships, receives only cursory mention. When Malaya is mentioned, it is either 
due to its importance to the problem of the dollar drain in the immediate post-war 
period, or in reference to the Malayan Emergency; however, these mentions are 
cursory and tend to portray the relationship between Britain and Malaya during this 
period as exploitative and thus can be considered simplistic in characterisation due 
to either their brevity or indifference in studying this relationship.  
                                               
1
 See, inter alia, Bartlett (1989), Bernstein (2004), Childs (1997), Coates (1994), Hollowell (2003), 
Tiratsoo (1997), Young & Tomlinson (1997). 
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 The value provided by these approaches lies principally in their capacity to 
historically contextualise British foreign policy and British bilateral relations. 
However, the breadth and historical scope offered by this literature means that it is 
difficult for it to, as Robert Cox (1981, p.129) put it, “*stand+ apart from the prevailing 
order of the world and *ask+ how that order came about”. The approach within most 
literature on British international history tends to follow the paradigm of Cox’s 
“problem-solving theory”; its framework of analysis is the reality with which it is 
presented.2 The vast majority of the literature on British foreign policy sticks to this 
paradigm that Cox identified quite clearly in that it provides a “simple, direct 
response” to the problems arising from the reality with which it is faced and this 
response is an attempt to solve these problems. While they may not offer a critical 
approach to the understanding of British policy, or even in most cases provide 
archival documentation to support their arguments, it is the understanding of British 
policy within a broader context which provides an academic value to their work. For 
the purposes of this chapter, specific focus has been placed upon British Foreign 
Policy and British Imperial History within this broader literature group. 
1.1.1 British Foreign Policy 
Given the change in Britain’s international role after the Second World War, analysts 
of British foreign policy have followed this shift in Britain’s international position and 
it has become the dominant conception of post-war Britain. The consensus within 
the literature is that Britain underwent a sudden and, in some ways, severe reduction 
in its power and prestige in the post-war years. Thomas Paterson (1979, p.23), inter 
alia, argues that Britain, “nearly bankrupt, dependent, and unable to police its 
empire, was reduced to a resentful second-rate power”. Indeed, the empirical basis 
of this assertion is widely accepted even outside of academic circles, as Dean 
Acheson famously said in 1962, “Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a 
role”. This view predominates in the literature and is also the title of one of the major 
works of the subject (Sanders 1990). This perspective found substantial purchase 
                                               
2
 Indeed, this is also recognized by McAnulla (2006, p.33), who points out that pluralist models of 
British politics have been criticized on the basis that they focus too much on agential factors and “are 
at best partial in their analysis” and, at worst, obfuscate the organization of politics and society both 
domestically and internationally. 
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within the discourse on British foreign policy. The notion of decline thus needed to 
be contextualised: how did Britain cope with decline? What was Britain’s new 
international position?  
David Sanders’ work (1990) on British foreign policy since 1945 is one of the 
few accounts that explicitly engages with a theoretical framework to understand 
British international relations, though the concept of British decline requires a realist-
mercantilist understanding of the state. Sanders’ argument throughout his work is 
predicated on the basis that Britain underwent a relative economic decline after the 
Second World War; furthermore, given Britain’s global commitments, Britain 
overextended itself significantly (ibid., p.290). Sanders describes his theoretical 
framework as “structural Realism”. He defends his approach on two levels: firstly, he 
states it is the most accurate theory for understanding the workings of international 
politics; secondly, the worldview of British foreign policy-makers is a fundamentally 
Realist one (ibid., p.265).3  
 Sanders identifies the British state as making calculations based on zero-sum 
logic, according to a Realist theory of international relations. He argues that the 
economic and political “dimensions” of British foreign policy, and its international 
position, are best described by Realism but can be complemented by different 
theories (ibid.). He maintains that Realism is useful for the political dimension, 
although Marxism can aid in describing the economic. He remarks that Marxism is 
useful for identifying the structural constraints “in the economic sphere” but proffers 
a critique of Marxism. Sanders points out that a Marxist would acknowledge the 
value of the Realist analysis offered in the book but they would also argue that “such 
a decision-making approach merely concerns itself with the ‘surface features’ of 
foreign policy and that its underlying determinants could only be uncovered through 
                                               
3 David Reynolds (1991) also attempts to provide a theoretical framework for his analysis of post-war 
British foreign policy; however, unlike Sanders, Reynolds initially attempts a more thorough analysis 
of the basic premises of his theoretical approach. Reynolds (ibid., p.1) begins with the statement “For 
the student of international relations few concepts are more important than that of ‘power’.” While 
Reynolds is right to acknowledge power as an important concept to students of international 
relations, that concept is valueless if not properly analysed and critiqued. Reynolds' idea of the state 
is also treated in a similarly impressionistic manner. This understanding of power ignores more 
nuanced understandings of domination and exploitation and also intrinsically forms a sense of 
autonomy for the state, reifying the rigidified social relations the state creates and divorcing the state 
from its existence within the global economy, and as a social phenomenon. 
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a more sophisticated (and Marxist) structural analysis” (ibid., p.281). However, he 
suggests this is a fallacious claim. An example he gives is the possibility of “capital 
flight”, referencing the mobility of certain forms of capital, which he claims a Marxist 
would be unable to explain.4 
This analysis reveals a fundamental political-economic dichotomy and so 
reifies an idea of the state as a unique and separate political entity that ‘possesses’ 
an economy. This is certainly the reality with which Sanders is presented; the daily 
language of the state is such that it also reifies the political-economic dichotomy as 
well as the foreign-domestic dichotomy. Sanders operates fully within these 
parameters; his approach is positivist and does not question the existence, form or 
origins of the institutions and patterns of behaviour that he analyses. Sanders’ 
account is very much within the problem-solving type in Cox’s paradigm. Indeed, 
Sanders (ibid., p.282) admits this by saying “the analyst’s initial theoretical position 
strongly influences both his characterisation of ‘that which is to be explained’ and 
the explanations that he offers for it”; however, he does not allow this admission to 
affect his analysis. 
 Sanders’ inclusion of Malaya in his analysis, in keeping with his Realist 
approach, is geo-political in character. Indeed, this portrayal of Malaya is common in 
the literature, with David Reynolds (1991, p.83) also arguing that Malaya was being 
defended against international communist expansion; he also asserts that the 
Malayan Communist Party was being given material support by China (however, this 
claim is not borne out in more specific analyses or by archival evidence).5 
These texts characterise Britain as struggling to cope with its relative deterioration in 
the international system. This type of literature is historical and, its largest group of 
contributors tend to be historians, though with a realist-mercantilist account of the 
state either implicitly or explicitly presented to explain the idea of British post-war 
decline. Krozewski (2001, p.207) makes an excellent point that the declinist trend in 
British imperial relations literature is highly problematic. The idea that healthy 
                                               
4
 This is untrue, as can be seen from the literature on British post-war reconstruction in the next 
section of this chapter, particularly Burnham (1990) 
5 Kaplan (1990), Curtis (2003) and Hack (1996) contend that there is no evidence to support this claim. 
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economies retain and build empires, while sickly ones shed them is not borne out 
empirically or rationally. Similarly, the idea that peripheral crisis, such as the Malayan 
Emergency, is necessarily a crisis of the imperial relationship is also problematic. 
Rightly so, Krozewski criticises a number of authors for these mistakes.6 This 
literature tends to swap between broader structural levels and agential levels 
frequently and interchangeably to describe the same events and with little reference 
as to why the focus of analysis has suddenly shifted. The texts mentioned in this 
section are broadly representative of the existing literature on historical trends in 
British foreign policy..7 
An alternative view to the idea of British decline is presented by George 
Bernstein’s counterintuitive work ‘The Myth of Decline’ (2004). He posits that Britain 
has in fact become a more dynamic and important state since 1945, and so departs 
from the consensus in the literature. Bernstein takes a broad approach to the 
changes in Britain after the Second World War, challenging the orthodox account of 
British decline by focusing on the social, cultural and even economic and political 
progress made in Britain in the latter half of the 20th Century. Bernstein also relates 
these changes to Britain’s international position. Bernstein’s book characterises 
Britain’s attempt to develop a ‘special’ relationship with the United States as a means 
of arresting a declining influence in world affairs. Bernstein characterises the 
Malayan Emergency as being fought in the context of the Cold War. The dollar-
earning capacity of the colony is only mentioned as a footnote to this (ibid., p.107). 
Bernstein’s book provides an overview of Britain’s international strategic 
position, as well as a summary of Britain’s political institutions. However, as with 
many of the texts in British foreign policy analysis, it does not bring into a critical light 
the concepts or issues that it analyses, as it is ultimately a historical narrative rather 
than a critical examination of the origins of British upheavals over the past 50 years. 
As such, issues such as the ‘national interest’ are taken as objective concepts, with 
which Bernstein chooses not to engage critically or to demystify any reference to. 
                                               
6
 For the latter, see, for example, Holland (1985) and Low (1991). For the former, see, inter alia, 
Northedge (1973), Allen (1979), Gamble (1985). 
7
 For further texts within this group, see, inter alia, Reynolds (1986), Young & Tomlinson (1997), Croft 
et al. (2001), Clarke (2004), Darwin (2009; 2006; 1988), Childs (2006) 
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There is a clear divide between ‘inside’ the state (domestic) and ‘outside’ the state 
(foreign). Furthermore, Bernstein understands the economy as performing an 
ancillary role to the state due to its maintenance of the conceptual division between 
the economic and the political. There is no theoretical development or exposition of 
the concept of the state, or how states interact. Similarly, Bernstein’s conception of 
the British Empire follows very much in keeping with other British historians, such as 
Hobsbawm (1999), in thinking that the Empire as a whole was a drain on the British 
economy and on British power (ibid., p.6). Indeed, he argues that losing the Empire 
was “a decline only in how much of the map was coloured red” (ibid., p.8). 
 The texts that deal with Britain’s international history in the 20th century then 
can be considered too broad to offer a sophisticated analysis of the specific 
relationship between Britain and Malaya. Certainly, this is not their explanatory goal, 
nor their analytical focus, and therefore this cannot be considered a criticism but a 
description of this literature. Furthermore, these texts for the most part do not 
explicitly engage with British imperial history other than to emphasise how the 
decline of empire is synonymous with the relative decline of British power. However, 
due to the lack of sustained theoretical engagement, particularly in terms of the 
conceptualisation of the state and imperialism, these texts do little to relate their 
accounts of British international history to the nature of global social relations more 
broadly. 
1.1.2 British Imperial History 
Within this broader literature on British international history is a group of texts more 
specifically dedicated to the analysis of Britain’s relationship with its colonies. This 
literature tends to focus on the process of decolonisation during the latter half of the 
20th century and attempts to understand the relationships between Britain and its 
colonies in these terms. 
 R.F. Holland (1984) is a particularly good example of the writing in this 
literature.8 His work covers a variety of topics related to Britain’s decolonisation but 
                                               
8
 Though other works include, inter alia, B.R. Tomlinson (1982;), Stockwell (1984), Poter & Stockwell 
(1987), Tomlinson (1991; 2003), Cain & Hopkins (1993), Dumett (1999), and Darwin (2006) 
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also the process of decolonisation as experienced by other European powers and 
their colonies. Holland characterises the Britain-Malaya relationship only briefly, and 
does not mention it by name at all in his 1984 work. Rather, in this text, he talks 
about the broader trends of decolonisation and the value provided by the colonies to 
post-war reconstruction. Indeed, from this text derives an often-used and particularly 
influential idea in the literature on British post-war imperial history – that of the 
“phases” of British post-war empire (1984, p.183). These phases saw the colonies 
become economically vital to Britain immediately after the Second World War, 
followed by a period in which the colonies grew increasingly irrelevant to Britain in 
the 1950s, with Britain eventually consolidating its new position in the world with 
increased political, economic and strategic multilateralism with its Western allies and 
finally divorced itself from its empire in the late-1950s and early-1960s. (ibid., p.184). 
This is a common understanding of British post-war imperial relations and finds 
common expression in a number of subsequent works on the topic.9  
This idea of the phases of British post-war empire has much in common with 
the prevailing notion of decline present in the literature on British post-war history 
and foreign policy. Indeed, the emphasis on discontinuity is a major theme within the 
literature on British imperial relations and stems from not only an intuitive 
understanding of empire as a monolithic institution of domination implicit in the 
literature, but also a scarcity of focused analysis upon the specific individual relations 
between Britain and its colonies.  
 Holland does refer to the Britain-Malaya relationship directly in his 1985 
work. However, the analysis provided by this account focuses entirely on the political 
dimension of managing decolonisation: namely, creating political institutions to 
manage conflicts and to make sure of the success of the Emergency as to “smash the 
*Malayan Communist Party+ as a presence in Malayan life” (1985, p.112). As such, 
Holland, and indeed the texts that focus on British decolonisation, tends to ignore 
the economic role played by the colonies, or to portray it in simplistic terms. The 
relationship between Britain and Malaya, as in the literature on British foreign policy, 
is characterised principally through the Malayan Emergency and the need to make 
                                               
9 See, inter alia, Kaplan (1990), White (1996), Krozewski (2001), Hinds (2001) 
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Malaya ‘safe’ from communism.  
The connection between the Emergency and Malaya’s economic importance 
to Britain is further investigated by Mark Curtis (2003; 2004). His work on British 
international interventions is best understood within the literature of British foreign 
policy analysis during the late 20th century, and particularly in terms of Britain’s 
imperial history. Most of Curtis’ case studies are, or were, British colonies.  Curtis’ 
polemical zeal is directed at the prosecution of the whole counter-insurgency 
campaign, which he argues was undertaken to protect British capital. 
“*Britain+ also used chemical agents from which the US may again 
have drawn lessons in its use of agent orange. Despite the 
standard portrayal of the war as one fought in a noble cause 
against ‘communist terrorists’, the secret files reveal that the 
Foreign Office understood it as ‘very much as war in defence of 
*the+ rubber industry’, then largely in the hands of British 
companies. It was the threat to British commercial interests, in 
Malaya and in the wider Southeast Asia, that was the primary 
concern of planners.” (2004, p.5) 
Curtis does not reveal from which “secret files” he is quoting, the speculation 
that the US may have derived lessons from British counter-insurgency strategy is 
perhaps an interesting one but remains speculation in Curtis’ work, and the 
invocation of “British commercial interests” is particularly opaque. While Curtis’ work 
is polemical to a fault, his work does provide value through its focus on the interplay 
of economic and political reasons behind Britain’s relationship with Malaya. 
Moreover, one of Curtis’ goals is to highlight that British academia has tended to 
gloss over British misdeeds, and less savoury motives, during the 20th century.10 
Curtis offers a very simplistic account of the instrumentalisation of the state, as the 
                                               
10 Curtis is particularly critical of Ovendale (1984) and Clutterbuck (1967) for their only brief mentions 
of Malaya as an important economic component of Britain’s empire and their focus on the successful 
prosecution of a counter-insurgency campaign, securing South-East Asia from communism. He 
characterizes this type of approach as justifying the crimes of the British and Malayan forces; 
however, Curtis is generally disparaging of British foreign policy literature (and academics) as seeking 
to justify (or at least willfully ignorant of) the unethical and exploitative behavior of Britain during the 
20th century. See both Curtis (2003) and Curtis (2004). 
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rubber industry was split evenly between large European estates and subsistence 
smallholders and so, while this does not invalidate his account, it requires that he 
make a more sophisticated theoretical argument than he does. Indeed, White (1996) 
argues that there is no evidence in the Archives to support an instrumentalist 
approach. 
 The literature on British post-war foreign policy and imperial history can be 
seen, due to its broad character, as historical in tone; thus, their conclusions can tend 
to be caricatured versions of more sophisticated processes, particularly issues of 
exploitation and subordination, the state, and relations between states. This is not 
meant to disparage these works, rather that due to their large scale, they are unable 
to delve deeply into specific episodes in British history and thus the relationship 
between Britain and Malaya tends to be glossed over, with only cursory mentions. 
Furthermore, this literature, while not entirely lacking in theoretical engagement, 
does not provide a sophisticated theoretical understanding of either imperialism or 
Britain’s interactions with other states. Indeed, there is little analysis either of the 
specific international political economic conditions confronted by Britain after the 
Second World War, or the specific nature of the crisis confronting the British state 
and the global economy at that point, or from where it derived. As such, these 
accounts tend to focus on the broader scope of British history and foreign relations 
after the Second World War without explicitly theorising key concepts or relevant 
ideas. Indeed, as Stuart McAnulla (2006, p.34), notes, literature on British politics has 
been characterised by the “dominance of liberal democratic assumptions among 
scholars… combined with a general antipathy towards grand theorising. 
Consequently, theories of British politics remained a neglected area of enquiry, 
leaving ever more outdated perspectives… to hold influence beyond their shelf-life.” 
1.2 Post-war Reconstruction 
The literature on British post-war reconstruction, however, offers an extremely 
comprehensive analysis of the nature of the economic crises that befell the British 
state, and the global economy, after the Second World. The broader literature on 
post-war reconstruction is included in this literature review since its scope provides 
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the context within which the relationship between Britain and Malaya has a 
particular relevance. The relevance and importance of Malaya to this moment of 
British (and global) economic instability is well established in the literature on post-
war reconstruction; however, it is not analysed in any specific detail, nor is the nature 
of the relationship between Britain and Malaya elucidated beyond that of a major 
source of dollars during the ‘dollar drain’. This literature is also valuable in the 
diversity of approaches available within it. 
An inductive approach is favoured by this literature, and it tends towards a 
lack of theory and an attempt to analyse the period in a positivist fashion. This is 
particularly true of Thirlwall and Gibson (1992), and is a point made also by Burnham 
(1990). They (1992., p.230) focus on the British balance-of-payments during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, as a case study for a text on ‘balance of payments theory’. Their 
study recounts the position of Britain’s international balance of payments during 
post-war reconstruction; however, their account of this period is generally 
impressionistic and only covers the existence of the balance-of-payments deficit, 
along with a brief mention of the dollar deficit, superficially. While there is an 
analysis of the figures related to the deficits, there is little analysis of the 
fundamental causes of these deficits – why did a dollar deficit occur? Why was it 
important that Britain maintain large reserves of dollars and gold? Why did Britain 
agree to convertibility given its precarious position? These questions are left 
unanswered, by their own admission.11 Thirlwall and Gibson (1992, p.219) 
acknowledge that their chapter on the history of Britain’s balance of payments will 
emphasise “discussion of the statistics rather than… events and policies”. Indeed, 
they do not use archival evidence and adopt a positivist approach to their analysis, 
using statistics and figures from the period, tackling the subject in an inductive 
manner, inferring theory from the figures rather than using theory to interpret them. 
As such, their efforts are valuable in the data they use but their approach is 
economistic and thus does not engage with the social relations within which, and 
from which this crisis occurs. 
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 Clift and Tomlinson (2008, p.612) note that this is actually in recognition of the arbitrary nature of 
measuring balance of payments. 
  23 
While it is possible to consider Kindleberger’s (1950) contemporary account12 
of the dollar shortage in the same vein as Thirlwall and Gibson, his analysis of the 
problem provides value in that it recognises the disequilibrium that gave rise to the 
currency shortage. While written before the period of the dollar deficit strictly 
finished, Kindleberger seems well aware of the “structural disequilibrium” that 
precipitated the shortage of dollars in the international monetary system (ibid., 
p.158). However, Kindlerberger’s analysis is essentially problem-solving and appears 
to be policy-oriented. As such, the analysis is self-limited and seeks only to answer 
the question of how a disequilibrium, in this case a “fundamental” or “structural” 
disequilibrium (as opposed to a price disequilibrium), might be avoided or resolved in 
the future (ibid., p.166).  
Kindleberger’s solution rejects the idea that disequilibrium is a permanent 
tendency of the international monetary system. He argues that “the economical 
course would be to finance the deficit in some fashion, or limit it, until forced 
investment could restore productivity and permit balance to be achieved at some 
satisfactory level of production and trade” (ibid, p.166). This was a policy that the 
British government were adopting at the time. However, this is the limit of 
Kindleberger’s analysis; it does not delve any further into the cause of the 
disequilibrium than simply acknowledging that there was one; as such his analysis 
limits itself according to the terms it initially provided.13 Kindleberger does not 
examine, for example, the nature of the international economic system; his work 
simple accepts its function. Further, while he proclaims that “the economist must be 
a political economist explicitly as well as implicitly”, this assertion only manifests 
itself in the link between economic stability and political stability (ibid., p.270). His 
work in fact creates a dichotomy between the political and the economic, as well as 
between foreign and domestic (ibid., p.271).14 This is perhaps the only option 
                                               
12 For other contemporary accounts of post-war reconstruction, see Mallalieu (1956) and Gardner 
(1956) 
13 His analysis can thus be summed up as: a trade disequilibrium has caused an international dollar 
shortage, how can this be prevented in the future? 
14
 As with the international economic system, he provides no critical analysis of the international state 
system, though that is not to say he treats them as the same thing; on the contrary, his analysis 
strongly reifies the political/economic dichotomy present in most non-critical IPE. It exists in what 
Burnham (1990) characterises as the ‘Realist-Mercantilist’ approaches to post-war reconstruction. 
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available to Kindleberger given that he had no access to archival documentation – his 
work is limited by the figures and he is thus unable to conclude (or even examine) 
anything about the political process within which these economic decisions occurred. 
The policy-oriented and problem-solving approach is best revealed in Kindleberger’s 
conclusion, 
“The very great difficulty of restoring multilateralism in trade and 
convertibility in currencies lies in the fact that practically all 
countries must be somewhere in the vicinity of equilibrium and 
must be possessed of reserves sufficient in size to meet the 
probable scale of deficits, before any considerable number can 
open their markets to all causes and render their currencies 
convertible.” (ibid., p.254) 
Kindleberger’s final word on the matter is, effectively, to outline a policy 
priority for governments that had already been implemented by the time of 
publication (something which he acknowledges later in his conclusion). Furthermore, 
while Kindleberger offers a broad analysis of the post-war trade disequilibrium, and 
he does indeed include analysis of the British struggle with its dollar deficits, his 
analysis stops short at the measures that the British state took to curtail its deficits 
with the dollar area. Further, as with Thirlwall and Gibson, it includes no mention of 
the Sterling Area, Britain’s use of the Sterling Area’s dollar pool, or the importance of 
Malaya to Britain during this period to support its reserve position, or in its post-war 
reconstruction. Thus, ignoring one pivotal element of British strategy to overcoming 
this crisis. 
Kindleberger focuses principally on the United States’ experience during this 
period, with substantial reference to European economies, so too does Kolko. Gabriel 
Kolko (1972) provides an analysis of the efforts of the United States to restructure the 
global economy after the Second World War. Taking a rather polemical tone, his 
analysis is ambitious and wide-ranging. His argument maintains that America’s post-
war struggle to arrange the world economy to suit its own economic and political 
ends was doomed to failure and so caused a “profound trauma” to the United States 
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in political, social and economic terms (ibid, p.716). Specific “moments”, such as the 
ERP and the AAFA, are instances of American attempts to reconstruct the world 
according to its own desires and failing (specifically, to create a politically and 
economically unified Europe, and to eliminate Britain’s imperial preference system 
and open up the Sterling Area for US goods). As such, Kolko characterises the United 
States as attempting to create a hegemonic international system.  
Certainly, in his account of the post-war economic situation, the United States 
is the ‘prime mover’ to which other states ‘react’. Within his account, Britain is 
characterised as, in effect, a ‘victim’ of US political objectives and is presented as 
“Washington’s most vulnerable and principal target” (ibid, p.456). Further, the United 
States wished to dismantle Britain’s trading network (the imperial preference system 
and certain elements of the Sterling Area) and wrested certain concessions upon 
Britain’s willingness to accomplish these goals, particularly evident in the Washington 
Loan Agreement stipulating the end of the Sterling Area dollar pool. 
  Where Kindleberger and Thirlwall and Gibson make no reference to the 
Sterling Area, or to Malaya, Kolko refers to both. Kolko asserts that Britain’s economic 
crisis arose from a lack of dollars with which to buy much needed American goods for 
the purposes of restructuring and reconstructing the British economy after the war. 
Actions intended to address the dollar drain, such as the devaluation of Sterling in 
1949, did, in the short term, help to renew British reserves of US dollars and gold; 
however, these measures generally met with limited success and, as Kolko (ibid., 
p.459) maintains but does not elaborate upon, the more noticeable increase in the 
dollar supply was due to increased sales of raw materials from the Sterling Area, 
particularly rubber from Malaya, to the Dollar Area. Again, though, this portrays the 
relationship, between Britain and Malaya, and the nature of imperial relations more 
broadly, as a purely ‘one-way street’ and is not subject to any analysis or critical 
engagement. 
 Kolko’s account has hints of hegemonic stability theory throughout. However, 
as with Kolko’s other works15, his language generally lacks any overtly Marxist 
                                               
15 See Kolko (1969; 1968) 
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nomenclature but the essential argument remains. While America attempted to set 
up a hegemonic system by increasingly violent and desperate means, it was doomed 
to failure and this failure led to the instability of the international system throughout 
the mid- to late-20th Century. While it may be inaccurate to characterise Kolko’s 
approach as hegemonic stability theory, his work does use the logic of the argument, 
to show that, since the United States tried and failed to create a hegemonic world 
order, there was subsequent political and economic instability.  
Burnham’s (1990) analysis of Britain’s post-war reconstruction is a 
comprehensive account of the political economy of the successive crises faced by 
Britain in the period immediately following the Second World War. While Burnham is 
only one of many authors on British post-war reconstruction, his account of post-war 
reconstruction is included in this chapter since his approach provides an excellent 
critique of other approaches.16 
Burnham notes, in addition to invisible earnings, the pre-war tendency of the 
UK to use its imperial relations in order to reduce “trade deficits with the US by 
earning dollars in third markets such as… Malaya” (ibid., p.21). Simon Clarke (1988, 
p.253), too, recognising that the problem of the dollar deficit dominated British post-
war reconstruction, acknowledges that the means of combating this problem was to 
increase exports beyond the pre-war level (by recovering old markets and 
penetrating new ones). Further, Burnham (1990, p.254) notes the commitment of 
the post-war Labour government to the development of the colonies was “motivated 
more by the need for dollar-saving and dollar-earning than any concern for the 
destitution of the colonial populations.” While Burnham mentions this point only 
briefly, it is an interesting point to be made about the inherently dual aspect of 
imperial relations. Burnham also acknowledges that this not only continued after the 
war but actually increased and “whilst the major nations of Western Europe engaged 
in vigorous intra-European trade, Britain concentrated on renewing its traditional 
trading links with the Commonwealth” (ibid., p.11). However, this provides only a 
                                               
16
 For further accounts of British economic history, see, inter alia, Burnham (2003), Coates (1994), 
Cairncross (1992), Dintenfass (1992), Matthias (1990), Alford (1988), Aaronovitch & Smith (1981), 
Shonfield (1958) 
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limited look at Britain’s relationship with Malaya and is only used to contextualise 
Britain’s broader strategy of post-war reconstruction. 
Burnham’s account of post-war reconstruction is particularly valuable in that 
it characterises the post-war economic crisis, a shortage of currency, as being the 
result of a trade disequilibrium. Similarly, he eschews fractionalist Marxist accounts 
of economic policy17 in favour of an approach taking analytical precedence over 
them, utilising the concept of capital-in-general to explain the actions of the British 
state. The value of the concept of capital-in-general lies in the fact that it is entirely 
abstract yet remains a prerequisite for concrete capital accumulation to occur. In 
contrast to the fractionalist approach, capital-in-general avoids instrumentalising the 
state, which mirror pluralist approaches and so, in essence, fractionalist approaches 
conceive of the state as a tabula rasa awaiting the interests of a particular ascendant 
group to be written upon it, and then acts accordingly. This, as Burnham (p.180) 
notes, provides no useful explanation of the function of the state since its logic is 
circular: “powerful interests are those that prevail and they prevail because they are 
powerful”. Similarly, it simply reduces the state to a neutral tool or instrument, 
wielded by a particular fraction of capital at any given moment. This theoretical 
framework can lead to an overly agent-centric approach. As such, any fractionalist or 
instrumentalist analysis of the role of the state cannot be considered to have 
adequate analytical purchase. Thus, Burnham’s approach to post-war reconstruction 
is valuable in that it seeks to ascertain the state’s role and organisation in terms of 
capitalist social relations more broadly. 
The abstractions required by Burnham’s approach – those of the circuit of 
capital and capital-in-general – are very helpful in understanding the problems that 
beset governments and state managers; however, these can only be revealed by 
close analysis of state managers at particular moments in history, particularly with 
reference to archival documentation. Indeed, as Burnham (2006, p.81) notes, ‘the 
value that a Marxist approach can bring to such a historical analysis… is that it can… 
construct and reconstruct the circuit of capital, abstracting and recombining 
elements of the circuit to ultimately relate an abstract discussion of state and capital 
                                               
17 For example, inter alia, Aaronovitch (1961), Crouch (1979), Van der Pijl (1984), Gill and Law (1988). 
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to the activities of say the Overseas Finance [Division] of the Treasury in February 
1952’.  
This approach is also evident in Burnham’s later work on Operation ROBOT, 
British external economic policy and the move towards Sterling convertibility in the 
1950s. Burnham (2003), as with Schenk (1994) makes the point that de facto 
convertibility occurred in 1955, which heralded more of a movement towards trade 
liberalisation than anything else. Indeed, as both Burnham (2003, p.14) and Schenk 
(1994) note, both de facto and de jure convertibility in 1958 had little effect on the 
members of the Sterling Area as full convertibility in the Area itself would have made 
it totally redundant, yet it persisted until the 1970s. Furthermore, as Burnham (2003, 
p.174) notes, de jure convertibility in 1958 imposed “little or no new discipline on 
the British economy. The underlying problems, identified with clarity by Otto Clarke 
in 1952, remained and although convertibility had been achieved the government 
had seemingly failed to enlist the support of the exchange rate in helping to grapple 
with the long-term position.” In fact, Burnham (ibid., p.17) makes clear that the basis 
behind which Sterling convertibility was attained in 1958 was by reducing the global 
dollar shortage; however it was not eliminated and thus dollar-earning states, such as 
Malaya, remained valuable to the Sterling Area to support Sterling and its continued 
convertibility. Indeed, as Burnham (ibid., p.185) remarks, 
 “no solution to the problem of declining exports, falling 
productivity, balance of payments deficits, exchange crisis, or 
inflation had been found by the end of the 1950s. In this sense, the 
problems of the British economy, and the world economic crisis of 
the late 1960s, had their roots in the policies pursued a decade 
earlier, in the guise of ‘steady as she goes’.” 
This characterisation of the ‘dollar drain’ and the persistent dollar deficit as 
symptomatic of a trade disequilibrium hints at a more profound post-war 
overproduction crisis. Burnham further characterises the nature of the post-war 
trade disequilibrium by providing a history for the dollar deficit in pre-war 
conditions, as well as providing a brief analysis of the Fordist mode of production in 
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the United States that was absent from Western Europe. As such, Burnham’s work 
provides a critical approach that seeks to identify the inherent structural features of 
global capitalism that might give rise to a currency shortage. Indeed, considering the 
notion that disequilibrium is not simply an imbalance of trade (and thus production) 
but, due to the contradiction between exchange-value and use-value, it can be best 
presented and understood as an incipient, or burgeoning, crisis of overproduction. 
However, while Burnham’s approach to post-war reconstruction is enlightening, little 
analysis is provided of the relationship between Britain and Malaya and, as with 
other texts, the relationship is characterised purely in terms of the dollar drain. 
The literature on British post-war reconstruction, as well as global post-war 
reconstruction focuses on crisis, currency deficits and, in the most critical instances, 
explodes the dichotomy between the political and economic. This literature’s focus is 
not on imperial relations or imperial strategy but on the broader nature of post-war 
reconstruction. That is, its broad focus prevents a specific analysis of any individual 
relationship between Britain and its colonies; as such, Malaya only receives cursory 
mentions. This literature is much richer in terms of theoretical frameworks and 
accounts of the state. Indeed, there are a variety of approaches within this field with 
a similar variety of pitfalls and problems, which are well presented by Burnham, 
whose account of post-war reconstruction, despite also only providing a brief 
mention of the relevance of Malaya, and so of a particularly important case study in 
the resolution of a major crisis, provides an excellent framework of analysis for any 
further research related to the field. 
1.3 Imperial Economic Policy 
This section provides an analysis of British foreign economic policy, with particular 
reference to British imperial relations and the Sterling Area. This section is split 
between an overview of the literature on the Sterling Area and its relevance to 
British economic performance, and the literature on British imperial economic 
relations as understood as relations between Britain and its colonies within the 
British Empire. 
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1.3.1 The Sterling Area 
The purpose for having a review of Sterling Area literature within this chapter is to 
provide a context for understanding the British-Malayan relationship. With the 
Sterling Area acting as the trading bloc through which all international transactions, 
both monetary and trade, between Britain and Malaya took place, it seems essential 
to provide an overview of this literature given that the Sterling Area, and an analysis 
of its functions and processes, will feature prominently in the thesis itself. 
The literature on the Sterling Area can be grouped into two broad areas, the 
‘contemporary’ literature18, that is, accounts of the Area that were written in the 
early 1960s and the more recent literature19. In general, it is the earlier literature that 
exists in the greater quantity despite the lack of archival data, which is a significant 
problem for these texts. While later texts do have access to archival information, 
they suffer from similar problems as the earlier works. Accounts of the Sterling Area 
tend to summarise the operations of the Area in a discrete or continuous historical 
moment; for examples, devaluation in 1949, or during the process of imperial 
decline. As is to be expected, accounts of the Area take the operation of the trading 
bloc as a whole unit, examining the behaviours of the institutions and practices 
within the Area, rather than by looking at specific bilateral relations within the Area. 
As such, while they do provide excellent analyses of the Sterling Area from an 
institutional perspective, there is little theoretical scope beyond this and certainly 
none that applies to any of the specific relationships Britain maintained within the 
Sterling Area. Indeed, the literature on the Sterling Area touches upon Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya only very briefly and characterises it in the same way as the 
literature on British post-war international history, and post-war reconstruction. 
Susan Strange’s work (1971) on the Sterling Area and on Sterling is considered 
one of the major texts within this literature. Strange (ibid., p.7) begins her analysis of 
the Sterling Area and Britain’s monetary policy by characterising currencies into four 
broad groups: top currency, master currency, negotiated currency and neutral 
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 See, inter alia, Strange (1971), Conan (1961), Bell (1958), Greaves (1955), Wright (1954) 
19 See, inter alia, Schenk (1994), Newton (1985) 
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currency. Strange provides an impressive analysis of the Sterling Area, with the thesis 
that the balance-of-payments crisis occurred due to Britain’s problems managing 
Sterling’s shift from ‘top currency’ (that is a currency whose use is effectively 
coterminous with the international monetary system) to a more diminutive role.  
Strange argues that the dollar effectively usurped the ‘top currency’ role that Sterling 
once held (before the collapse of the gold standard), thus relegating Sterling to roles 
as a ‘master currency’ (one which exercises a hegemonic role over a defined 
geographical area) and a ‘negotiated’, or reserve, currency. 
Strange develops an argument that criticises the British retention of the 
Sterling Area as a trading bloc following the war. Arguing that the Sterling Area was 
more a liability than an asset, she maintains that the Sterling Area was in fact 
retained by Britain for the purposes of national pride and a desire to remain as a 
major international power. Schenk (1994, p.6) categorises Strange’s approach as one 
of the earlier accounts of the post-war Sterling Area; these accounts characterised 
the Sterling Area as a severe liability to the British economy and are divided by 
Schenk (ibid.) into two further groups. While one group of early Sterling Area authors 
listed a variety of reasons for how the Sterling Area was a threat to the British 
economy, the other group of authors provided an argument that because the threat 
of economic collapse was never realised the British economy was weakened in the 
longer term due to its reliance on the Sterling Area.  
Bell (1958), as with Strange, provides an examination of the nature and 
functions of the Sterling Area.20 Bell combines this, however, with a look at specific 
members of the Sterling Area (Eire, Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia and British West 
Africa) and what their relations within the Area were like. As with the other writers 
within the Sterling Area literature, Bell pays lip service to the value of Malayan dollar-
earning capacity but does not go into detail regarding the nature of this capacity, 
other than through referencing import/export figures (ibid., pp.54-58).  
Of particular interest within Bell’s work, however, is the analysis of British 
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West Africa and Ceylon within the Sterling Area. These members are of note due to 
the similarity of their economies to Malaya, as both were export-oriented, and were 
net dollar contributors to the Area’s dollar pool. He recognises that these members 
principally exported raw materials and, as such, this made them particularly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices (ibid., p.176). However, it is unclear of 
what relevance this is in the post-war period other than as an issue of currency 
adjustment (that is, in anything other than a ‘mechanical’ role within the institution 
of the Sterling Area) – which is a non-temporal issue: Bell describes the mechanisms 
of the Sterling Area in abstract, in technical detail, using these four countries at that 
specific time as examples of its workings (ibid., p.175). Thus, while providing 
interesting and valuable technical details, the analysis lacks an appreciation of the 
imperial relations of the Area itself, either in terms of the actual relations between 
Britain and other states or in terms of a theorisation of the nature of these relations 
themselves. 
Schenk (1994, p.7) recognises the value of approaches that analyse in specific 
detail bilateral relationships within the Sterling Area. Further, while acknowledging it 
as beyond the scope of her book, Schenk recognises “research into the experiences 
of the [Sterling Area] members will provide some interesting insights into the 
functioning of the sterling area in this period” (ibid., p.135).21 She remarks that the 
general consensus within the Sterling Area literature is that the Sterling Area was a 
net burden on the British economy; however, this consensus has been maintained 
despite the lack of substantial scholarship on the relationships within the Sterling 
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 Both Strange (1971, pp.96-103) and Schenk (1993) provide accounts of the establishment of the 
Malayan Central Bank in 1959. Where Strange argues that Britain was resistant to its establishment 
due to a desire to have Malaya still economically dependent on Britain, Schenk argues that Malaya 
was not entirely enthusiastic about the prospect of full monetary independence from the UK, which 
she argues was due to both the potential political and economic difficulties posed by uniting Malaya 
with Singapore, and the desire to represent institutional continuity after independence to ensure 
Malaya remained an enticing location for foreign investment. While both accounts are very 
interesting, Strange’s account provides no primary sources to support her conclusions, and Schenk’s 
account is historical and ultimately fails to provide a critical explanation behind the logic for Malaya’s 
reticence to enthusiastically pursue monetary independence. For example, there is no reflection upon 
the fact that both Malaya and Britain see continuity within the Sterling Area as a means for economic 
stability – it is merely presented as the reason for Malayan reluctance to pursue monetary 
independence. Furthermore, this thesis, while certainly concerned with economic and monetary 
issues, does not intend to focus at great depth on the establishment of the Malayan Central Bank, its 
origins in the International Bank mission to Malaya in 1954, or the specific nature of the negotiations 
in its setup. 
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Area. That is, the Sterling Area, in the literature on the topic, is taken as a unit and 
the complex of relationships within it are neglected to the favour of the notion of the 
bloc itself. Schenk (1994) does make the point that specific bilateral relationships 
between Britain and the members of the Sterling Area have not been provided any 
scholarly attention. This is a view echoed by Krozewski (1993). While some authors, 
inter alia, Hinds (2001) and Krozewski (2001), do examine Sterling policy and its 
effect on the colonies, their work too is broad and does not seek to look at specific 
relationships. 
Schenk’s argument (ibid., p.136) runs counter to the majority of literature on 
the Sterling Area in that it rejects the notion that the Sterling Area was responsible 
for the myriad of economic problems that plagued Britain from the end of the 
Second World War until 1960. Indeed, while the majority of scholars, argue that the 
only purpose of the Sterling Area was to generate a sense of international prestige 
for Britain and Sterling, she dismisses this claim. Schenk (ibid.) points out, citing 
archival evidence, that both the Treasury and the Bank of England knew that the 
Sterling Area “did not always generate prestige for the British economy and that the 
controls on the use of sterling which defined the system often brought sterling into 
disrepute” (ibid., p.136).  
Furthermore, Schenk (ibid.) argues that the notion that the Sterling Area was 
a burden upon the domestic British economy has been greatly exaggerated by the 
majority of scholars. The regional role that Britain adopted after the Second World 
War (that is, from the leadership of the international economy to the leadership of a 
geographically-defined trading bloc) was followed by Britain losing its role as a 
manager of even this institution since Britain’s means of control for the Area 
gradually become more ineffective throughout the 1950s. While Schenk’s argument 
is very useful in its rejection of the paradigm that had come to dominate the 
literature, it remains relatively uncritical in its scope, and atheoretical in approach. 
Schenk presents the Sterling Area as an institution rather than an aggregation of 
individual relations. However, Schenk herself accepts the analysis of these individual 
relations as an important avenue of research since not all states have the same 
relationship with the British state, nor the same historically developed relationships 
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with the global economy, and therefore they must be considered as having separate 
and unique histories when trying to understand their political economies. 
Scott Newton (1981; 1985) also makes an argument that Britain had 
identified the Sterling Area as crucial to its reconstruction after the war. His 
characterisation of the importance of the Area and Britain’s colonies, as well as the 
importance of the reserve position, is very helpful in identifying the broad contours 
of Britain’s immediate post-war external economic policy and how that affected 
domestic economic policy. Indeed, Newton (1985, p.401) notes that  
“Britain's gold and dollar reserves were not only hers but 
represented the first line of defence for the sterling area as a 
whole. Thus, a threat to the British reserves would threaten the 
continued existence of the sterling area and in doing so jeopardize 
the Labour Government's full-employment policy. In consequence, 
the health of the reserves became the reference-point by which 
the success of British economic policy was judged.” 
However, Newton’s conception of imperialism is under-theorised, offering no 
penetrating analysis of the state or the origins and nature of crisis or imperialism. 
Newton’s works take a broad look at the British relationship with the United States, 
Europe and the Sterling Area, focusing particularly on European integration. His 
chronology is from 1945 to 1950, only providing a very brief idea of how this affected 
future British economic policy. Newton also provides no theoretical framework for 
interpreting this period and, while invoking imperialism, provides no account of the 
content, methods or significance of imperialism as a phenomenon or concept, 
thereby leaving his conclusions underdeveloped (1985, p.179). While Newton’s work 
is interesting and provides an account of Britain’s basic relationship with the Sterling 
Area in this five-year period, it does not provide a coherent narrative structure for 
British policy after this period. Furthermore, his works take a broad approach and so 
do not seek to characterize beyond generalities the relationships within the Sterling 
Area and, while specific relationships are mentioned, they too are generalized (e.g. 
“the African Colonies”, “the Far East”) and thus there is no development of the 
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specific nature of the complex of relationships within the Sterling Area. This is 
something that Krozewski (1993) is particularly critical of in Newton’s work, though 
this is something of which Krozewski (2001) is also guilty. 
 The literature on the Sterling Area then can be understood as providing an 
overview of the workings of the Area as a trading mechanism and means of 
implementing British international monetary policy. While most literature written on 
the Sterling Area was during the 1950s and 1960s, modern scholarship has tended to 
reject the tendency of these earlier authors to condemn the Area as a British folly; 
however, modern scholarship too is generally limited in scope. The literature’s focus 
on the broader nature of the Sterling Area means that specific bilateral relationships 
within the Area are neglected. While accounts of specific relationships within the 
Area do exist, they provide no archival evidence that might elucidate these 
relationships in any great depth; they are in fact used to describe the workings of the 
Sterling Area as a currency area rather than to understand the relationships 
themselves. Indeed, notable authors in this field make clear that analysis of bilateral 
relationships within the Sterling Area is specifically lacking in the literature and is 
necessary in order to fully understand British post-war external economic policy.22 
Finally, these accounts also lack explicit theoretical engagement and tend to 
understand the Sterling Area in terms of its own particular institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms. There is, again, no theorisation of imperialism and no specific 
relationship within the literature to which to apply it. 
1.3.2 Imperial Economic Policy and Relations 
The literature to date on British economic and financial relations with its imperial 
possessions has followed a similar pattern to that of the literature on the Sterling 
Area, focusing on the Empire as an institution for the management of these relations. 
Certainly this is a valuable and important focus for research, the principal feature of 
which is the institutional nature of the British Empire and the Sterling Area as a 
means of regulating British international financial and economic policy. However, 
what these authors do not provide is an analysis of the particular contours of specific 
                                               
22 See, for example, Schenk (1994, p.6) and Krozewski (1993, p.260). 
  36 
relationships within the British Empire, and, furthermore, provide only limited 
theoretical analysis of the nature of imperial relations.  
The two major works on British post-war imperial economic relations were 
published at the same time and largely overlap, providing very similar approaches, 
analysis and conclusions: Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001). This is an amusing 
coincidence also pointed out by Darwin (2002, p.1177). 
 Krozewski (2001, pp.191-193) identifies four stages of the post-war British 
Empire. Firstly, a juncture in 1947 with a shift towards the Empire away from 
liberalisation due to the Convertibility Crisis. Secondly, in 1949, with the devaluation 
of Sterling and the Korean War, Britain became even closer to the Empire. Thirdly, 
1953 saw “the economic relationship between Britain and the empire diverge” and, 
finally, 1957 saw the end of any meaningful relationship between Britain and its 
empire (ibid., p.194). Indeed, as Krozewski (ibid., p.196) notes, “British policy forged 
an imperial protectionist bloc between 1947 and 1953 as an alternative to a closer 
association with the United States or Europe. From the early 1950s, Britain moved 
deliberately towards convertibility and a liberalised Sterling Area.”23 However, what 
Krozewski’s analysis fails to identify is that the British state had no easy alternative, 
due to its choices in the pre-war years, but to rely on an imperial strategy following 
convertibility. Actual alternatives that were considered, such as ROBOT, were 
believed so radical as to be not worth serious consideration. 
Krozewski’s (2001, p.209) central point is that economic and financial 
relationships between Britain and its empire be “placed at the centre of studies of 
the international relations of the end of empire”. His central argument is that the 
financial relationship between Britain and its empire, based upon Sterling, first led to 
strengthening of ties and then to their rejection, and ultimately to the end of the 
British Empire  (Krozewski 2001, p.186). Certainly, Krozewski’s point is a laudable one: 
the role of political economy is essential in understanding international relations. 
                                               
23 Krozewski (1996b, p.15) also argues in an earlier work that British economic and monetary links 
with its empire converged immediately after the war up until 1951, due to repeated crises and strains 
in this period. Subsequent to this, with Britain attempting to integrate into the liberal world order, 
links with empire began to diverge until 1958, when Britain’s relationship with its empire was 
effectively severed. 
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However, Schenk (1996, p.869) makes two criticisms of Krozewski’s (1996a) analysis 
of British imperial monetary policy in the 1950s, which are both present in his later 
work. Firstly, she points out that Krozewski conflates the issue of the Sterling 
balances with Britain’s commitment to convertibility and the liberalisation of trade, 
arguing that the Sterling balances posed a serious constraint on the policy of 
liberalisation undertaken in the 1950s (Schenk 1996, p.869).24 However, the 
convertibility to which Krozewski refers is not ‘full convertibility’ but only to the 
convertibility of current account transactions. ‘Full convertibility’, total freedom of 
payments and for movement of capital to outside of the Sterling Area was not 
considered by the British state (ibid.). Convertibility also referred to extra-Area 
convertibility (i.e. ‘external convertibility’) – available for those outside of the 
Sterling Area but not those within it (ibid.). 
 Schenk’s second criticism of Krozewski lies in his characterisation that this 
conception of convertibility actually occurred in 1958, pointing out that controls on 
Sterling were gradually removed between 1953 and 1955, leading to a de facto 
convertibility in 1955 (Schenk 1994, p.128; Schenk 1996, p.870). De jure 
convertibility, as Schenk refers to the move towards official convertibility in unison 
with European states in late-1958, merely “formalised the status quo” (ibid.). 
 To Schenk these two confusions about the nature and timing of convertibility 
crucially undermine Krozewski’s argument that the issue of the Sterling balances had 
a significant impact upon the policy and process of trade and payments liberalisation 
in the Sterling Area. Schenk (ibid.) points out that if the freedom to convert Sterling 
balances was not affected by the gradual shift to convertibility in 1955, then how was 
it possible that the liberalisation of trade in the 1950s rested on the reduction of the 
Sterling balances? To Schenk, these create neither a contradiction nor a dilemma for 
British state managers. 
                                               
24 Schenk (1996, p.871) points out that the general consensus among state managers was that the 
Sterling Balances were not particularly important to government policy, especially by the end of the 
1950s, as the benefits (their existence was a manifestation of Sterling’s use as an international reserve 
and transactions currency) and disadvantages (Britain could not redeem these liabilities all at once 
due to their size and function) they provided could not be easily reconciled. Indeed, when analysing 
the archival documentation, the Sterling Balances do not feature with much frequency or importance 
in terms of Britain’s relationship with Malaya. 
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 Schenk raises one further problem with Krozewski’s article, noting that there 
is an implicit assumption in his work that Britain forced the Sterling Area countries to 
act against their own interests by requiring them to maintain their Sterling balances, 
and keep their link with Sterling. However, as Schenk (ibid., p.871) adroitly points 
out, independent countries within the Sterling Area had limited choices: either stay 
with the Sterling Area or shift to another reserve currency, the only alternative being 
the US dollar. However, shifting allegiance was by no means a reasonable alternative 
since US investment in colonial markets was not forthcoming; thus the only viable 
choice was to maintain reserves in Sterling as investment and capital was only likely 
to come from the UK and Europe. 
 Krozewski (1997:850), in direct response to Schenk’s criticisms, identifies a 
cleavage in the literature between two separate explanatory aims. Krozewski, and 
also Hinds, seek to understand post-war interstate relations, while Schenk’s work 
belongs to a desire to understand British economic performance. This cleavage, he 
proffers, explains why he places such importance upon the 1958 date, and Schenk on 
the 1955 date (ibid.). It seems particularly unusual that these two explanatory goals 
are separated in the literature, given the obvious relevance of one to the other. It is 
crucial that these two explanatory aims be unified. Britain’s relations with other 
states cannot be understood without also understanding Britain’s economic 
performance, nor can Britain’s economic performance be understood without 
understanding Britain’s relations with other states, particularly the Sterling Area, an 
imperial institution intended to manage the external economic policies of its 
constituent states to the benefit of the British economy. The acceptance of this 
distinction broadly maps on to the dichotomy between states and markets, politics 
and economics. From this distinction derives a capacity to accept at face value 
cleavages and discontinuities in economic relations and political relations, and 
indeed Krozewski and Hinds argue that a number of cleavages occur in the 
relationship between Britain and its Empire.  
 Hinds’ argument is perhaps even stronger than Krozewski’s in that he 
disregards the continuity provided by the Sterling Area with regard to Malayan 
independence.  
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“By 1954 it was clear that Britain had become resigned to the 
independence of Ghana, Nigeria and Malaya. These were still its 
three most important dollar-earning colonies. As a result, Britain 
accepted the destruction of a critical part of the structure upon 
which it had built its economic relations with its colonial territories 
in the postwar era. The economic questions governing colonial 
preparedness for independence were now totally irrelevant to 
political reform. However, without Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria, the 
colonial surplus in transactions with the Dollar Area was not very 
substantial. The independence of these states therefore was going 
to leave Britain with an empire devoid of its most valuable assets.” 
(Hinds 2001, p.200) 
 Malaya’s independence had no impact whatsoever on its contribution to the 
Sterling Area dollar pool, to which it continued to contribute even after 1957. Where 
Krozewski, Hinds and Schenk all agree is that there is a distinct moment of change in 
British imperial relations and with the Sterling Area. While Schenk states this is in 
1955, de facto convertibility, Krozewski (2001, p.186) and Hinds (2001, p.200) argue 
that this occurs throughout the 1950s and particularly in 1958, with de jure 
convertibility. This approach is best understood in terms of historical contingency, 
while this literature provides an excellent historical basis for understanding how and 
when this occurred, it does not provide an account of why this occurred. To 
elaborate, while this literature explains, delineates and analyses the events of 
themes of imperial relations and the Sterling Area in this period, it does not provide 
an account of these relations in terms of a theoretical understanding of the state, the 
market or imperialism. Certainly these themes are implied in their work but they are 
not made explicit and their analysis suffers as a result. In making these themes 
explicit, we can question whether these apparent discontinuities in British imperial 
relations are just that, or is there, in fact, a stronger continuity running beneath them 
to which these cleavages are mere contingency and, therefore, not to be given 
analytical precedence? 
Krozewski and Hinds’ understanding of the state and imperialism seem 
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broadly similar. However, where Hinds’ understanding of the state, empire and 
imperialism is not given any explicit critical analysis, Krozewski’s conception of 
empire undergoes limited theorisation. Indeed, he argues in support of his broad 
approach that “imperial relationships hinged on the nature of the imperial state… 
The British empire… showed remarkable coherence in terms of economic 
institutions” (Krozewski 2001, p.7). There is a level of homogeneity to Krozewski’s 
argument concerning his understanding of imperialism; this is also apparent in his 
characterisation of Britain and its colonies according to “core” and “periphery” 
positions in the international economy (ibid., p.8). Certainly this characterisation of 
imperialism is evident in his analysis of British imperial relations as featuring 
moments of holistic discontinuity, which is to say that discontinuity affected the 
whole empire simultaneously and that Britain had a broad and all-encompassing 
understanding and approach to its entire empire. 
While Krozewski does analyse the relationship Britain had with its empire, his 
analysis seems peculiar in some regards. While he argues that a discontinuity occurs 
in 1957, with the move to Sterling convertibility, and this marks a genuine caesura in 
imperial economic relations, he also notes how Britain continued to rely on its 
former empire to support its external economic policy, and the viability of Sterling as 
an international currency. Particularly, he makes mention of how Britain continued to 
rely on the allegiance of the political elites in newly independent territories, such as 
Malaya and Ghana, to support British international economic policy (ibid.:201). 
However, this then raises the question: what is the fundamental difference in a 
relationship prior to and then after 1957, when both states seek to perform in the 
same fashion relative to each other, to the same end? Certainly the imperial 
relationship needs to be analysed and theorised before an adequate assessment of 
such a relationship can occur, for which Krozewski provides no account. Furthermore, 
Krozewski’s point about the role of elites in the relationship between Britain and 
Malaya is problematic. This obfuscates the historically developed relationship 
between Britain and Malaya, and leaves neglected an analysis of the social conditions 
within which this relationship existed, and instead invokes an idea that the state is a 
mere instrument of an elite with a specific agenda and ignores other structural 
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considerations. 
Indeed, analysis of Britain’s economic and financial relations with its Empire is 
very much a ‘political economic’ analysis. There is little sense of the interaction and 
relationship between Britain and its colonies in any specific sense, as such Schenk, 
Hinds and Krozewski reify the broader relationship and tend to ignore the fact that 
the Empire itself was not an institution in any meaningful sense but a term used to 
describe an aggregate of relationships between Britain and a number of other states. 
This literature then, while extremely valuable in characterising the key moments and 
events of British post-war imperial economic policy, provides little scope towards 
understanding the relationships between Britain and its imperial possessions as 
fundamentally and essentially relationships between states. 
 Given the nature of this analysis, the conclusions they reach tend to be ones 
that favour periodization and disjunctions in British imperial policy. Hence, Krozewski 
and Hinds, and, to a lesser extent, Schenk also, argue that British imperial economic 
policy alters substantially after the war. They both argue that the immediate pre-war 
period sees discontinuity from after the war, and discontinuity after 1958 
(convertibility) – though Schenk disputes the importance of this de jure 
convertibility. Hinds (2001, p.200) also finds a discrepancy after 1953, when Britain 
no longer found its dollar-earning colonies as valuable previously; though, he too 
marks most particularly 1958 as the moment we see a clear disjuncture in British 
imperial policy.  
 This view is clearly falsifiable and depends on how much changes in the 
relationship between Britain and its specific colonies after this point. This thesis 
makes the argument that, even after 1958, we see a clear continuity in British 
imperial relations with Malaya from the Second World War and therefore we have 
clear reason to question the prevailing discourse on British imperial policy after the 
Second World War.  
While these approaches to British imperial economic and monetary policy are 
not without their advantages and explanatory value, particularly their ability to 
contextualise British economic policy and relate it to the relations with the British 
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Empire and the Sterling Area, their capacity to explain British imperial relations 
remains limited. Furthermore, while each approach has its own specific limitations, 
there is a broader methodological critique that can be commonly levelled against 
them, that is their understanding of social form. Kettell (2004, p.14) makes a similar 
point in regard to the literature on British exchange rate policy-making that can also 
be levelled towards approaches to British imperial economic policy 
“This concerns their failure to address the question of ‘social form’, 
namely that of why society itself should assume the specific 
pattern of organisation that it does. Instead, existing approaches 
treat the present form of society and its associated ‘components’, 
such as its division into separate public and private spheres, 
political and economic structures, and sectoral interest groups, in 
an unquestioned, ahistorical, and taken-for-granted manner, as 
prima facie given facts of social life.”25 (ibid.) 
1.4 Malaya  
This section is split between the literature on the Malayan Emergency, which is 
covered mainly by military and intelligence historians, and the literature on Malaya’s 
political and economic relationship with Britain. 
1.4.1 The Malayan Emergency 
The vast majority of the literature on Malaya focuses on the Emergency itself, 
                                               
25
 Kettell (2001, p.20) further develops this point in the unpublished version of his thesis by identifying 
more specifically the problems inherent to such approaches towards exchange rate policy-making: “In 
addition to their individual and specific difficulties, the approaches to exchange rate policy-making 
outlined above are also open to challenges on broader methodological grounds. In particular, these 
approaches can be criticised for their failure to address the more fundamental and logically prior 
question of why society itself takes the form that it does. Whilst attributing causal importance to the 
relation between public and private actors, the political and economic characteristics of individual 
countries, and the role of interest groups, traditional approaches make no attempt to understand why 
these social phenomena themselves should exist, but instead treat them in a taken-for-granted, 
ahistorical, positivist manner. The key difficulty this poses for an understanding of exchange rate 
policy-making is that there is no means of tracing any internal connection between the aims and 
motivations of policy-makers and the characteristics of the wider society in which they operate. The 
relation between political behaviour and socio-economic factors has thus to be derived in an 
exogenous and speculative fashion, leading to systematised accounts that are more descriptive than 
analytical, and which ignore the fundamental constraints that are imposed upon exchange rate policy-
making by the structural composition of society itself.” 
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adopting a military historical perspective. Broadly speaking, these accounts focus on 
the specifics of the counter-insurgency (or ‘anti-bandit’ campaign), the propaganda 
war fought between both sides, and the intelligence efforts during the Emergency.26 
While these efforts are well researched, using substantial archival material to 
substantiate their claims, they remain focused on the military and political aspects of 
the period in the Malayan peninsula, avoiding tackling the specifics of the British-
Malayan political-economic relationship. 
 Often, these accounts provide a causal explanation for the prosecution of the 
Malayan Emergency campaign by British and Commonwealth forces. These causal 
explanations are the closest these accounts come to a critical rendition of this period. 
However, within these accounts, the Malayan Emergency tends to be placed within 
the context of the Cold War; that is, safeguarding Malaya as a source of raw materials 
and as a dollar-earner from Communist insurgents, as well as preventing communist 
expansion throughout South-East Asia.27 However, causes of the Emergency are 
generally mentioned only briefly as a part of the ‘contextualisation’ or historical 
background of the Emergency (with the exception of Kaplan 1990).  As such, the 
focus is principally on providing a military-historical narrative of the Malayan 
Emergency and, whatever examination of the causes of the Emergency exists within 
this literature, these narratives provide only an impressionistic account of British-
Malaya relations. 
One exception is T.N. Harper’s (2001) work on the creation of a post-colonial 
Malaya, which does focus on economic issues and their relevance to the creation of 
Malaya as an independent state. Harper’s analysis of Malaya is quite holistic, 
discussing ethnic and social issues, and the construction of a post-colonial 
constitution. However, Harper’s inclusion of the economic component to Malaya’s 
eventual independence is handled in such a fashion that divorces it from the political 
component. In effect, the large part of Harper’s analysis of Malaya’s economy only 
bears relevance to Malaya’s future (that is, post-colonial) economic viability.  
                                               
26
 See Stubbs (2004), and Carruthers (1995) 
27
 For example, see, inter alia, Ramakrishna (2001), Hack (1999), Coates (1992), Short (1975), Barber 
(1972), Clutterbuck (1967) 
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Harper does include a brief aside as to the purpose of the Malayan 
Emergency, which hints at an almost neo-colonial argument; he states that the 
Emergency was fought to “make Southeast Asia safe for British business” (ibid., 
p.200). As with Caldwell and Amin (1977), this argument (which is well critiqued by 
White 1996) relies on close cooperation between business and government and this 
also implies a high level of agential cooperation, which can be considered as an 
implicitly fractionalist/instrumentalist account of the state. However, Harper only 
mentions this briefly and he provides no further account of the economic aspect of 
the British-Malayan relationship. 
1.4.2 Malaya and International Political Economy 
Due to the small size of this literature and its very obvious relevance to this thesis, 
this section will examine each of the texts in the literature individually, though with a 
clear purpose to creating a typology among them. 
Amin and Caldwell (1977) provide an extremely polemical account of the 
colony of Malaya of which only the final chapter focuses on the Malayan Emergency 
and the simultaneous post-war economic situation. Indeed, this work is in many ways 
quite similar to Mark Curtis’ polemic on British post-war foreign policy. Amin and 
Caldwell are included in this literature review since there are very few accounts of 
Malaya’s political-economic relationship with Britain, as such it would seem remiss 
not to provide some detailed analysis of the text. The first part of a planned two-
volume book28, the argument put forward is that Britain spent the period of 
decolonisation forging Malaya into a ‘neo-colony’, which would act according to 
Western imperialist interests without the need for a military or imperial government 
presence, as Caldwell puts it, like a “Vichy-style regime” (ibid., p.234).29 
                                               
28
 Caldwell was murdered in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge a year after this book was published. 
29 A much later response to Amin and Caldwell was provided by A.J. Stockwell (1998) who argued 
strongly against the use of the concept of neo-colonialism to explain British policy before and after 
independence (though Stockwell is mainly concerned with post-independence policy) in Malaysia. 
Stockwell (ibid., p.152) argues that British officials were not as obsessed about British investments, or 
Malayan dollar earnings as is generally understood but were mainly concerned with regional security, 
and a “grand design” to unite Singapore and the Federation. This is not an entirely convincing 
argument mainly due to methodological considerations: Stockwell relies entirely on Prime Ministerial 
and Cabinet documents to make his case and his work does not use any Treasury or Bank documents 
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While lacking archival evidence to support their conclusions, Amin and 
Caldwell contextualise the Malayan Emergency within the post-war economic crises; 
however, this context is provided very briefly and contains little critical analysis of the 
relationship between Britain and Malaya. Caldwell includes some brief analysis of 
rubber figures during the Korean War (and the subsequent commodity price boom) 
but he does not go into detail of why being the principal dollar earner of the Empire 
was important, or what this means for the circumstances facing Britain and Malaya 
during this period (ibid., p.242). The account rests on the nature of British 
“reactionary repression” (ibid., p.225), detailing the specifics of the counter-
insurgency campaign; however, the specifics themselves are limited. Due to the lack 
of archival evidence, Caldwell relies upon anecdotal evidence and secondary 
materials (including accounts by people who might have had access to “the official 
records”) to support his claims of terror, massacres and other moral turpitudes by 
the British.  
Nicholas White’s (1996) analysis utilises significant archival sources. He  
focuses on government-business relations in Malaya before, during and after the 
Second World War, specifically the period 1942 – 1957.30 White characterises this as 
beginning with an era of pre-war planning, through the occupation of Malaya by 
Japanese forces, to the independence of the colony as the Federation of Malaya. 
White’s study is a rejection of neo-colonialist and instrumentalist approaches to the 
British-Malaya relationship, such as by Amin and Caldwell. White criticises both 
approaches on the basis that the requisite cooperation between state and business 
                                                                                                                                      
to support his argument. As such, there is no account of Malaya’s role in and value to the Sterling 
Area, or convincing argument (or proof provided) for ignoring the economic factors in Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya. This criticism is also made by Schenk (2008). 
30
 White (2000; 2003) provides further analysis of British involvement in Malaysia after independence, 
from 1957 to 1970. While that time period is largely irrelevant to this thesis, the thesis does look at 
the first three years of independence; however, White’s analysis is atheoretical and, despite referring 
to Darwin’s (1988) thesis on British decolonization, does not engage with the literature on the Sterling 
Area despite its crucial role in providing the basis for Britain’s international economic policy. This is 
also true of Pathak (1988), whose analysis of British foreign policy towards Malaysia from 1957 to 
1967 is also atheoretical by his own admission, arguing that to use theory is “tantamount to the quest 
for utopia” and instead relies on what he calls ‘historical method’ (ibid., pp.271-271). Pathak relies 
very little on archival analysis, using only a handful of documents but depending mainly on interviews 
and secondary sources. His ultimate conclusion (ibid., p.273) is that Britain turns from an ‘empire’ into 
an “ordinary state”, thereby creating a typology of states but does nothing to substantiate how an 
abstract ‘state’ can change form from an ‘imperial state’ to an ‘ordinary state’. This concept of the 
‘ordinary state’ is also not critically reflected upon. 
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that these two arguments rely on simply did not occur. As such, his argument 
maintains that the interests of imperial and colonial governments, and business 
interests coincided more through luck than judgement. White’s purpose is to analyse 
the relationship between business and government. His focus is principally on British 
business and investments in Malaya during this period and he argues that these 
investments decrease in importance from the mid-1950s, and shows a policy of 
British disengagement with Malaya rather than neo-colonialism. However, White’s 
analysis only covers up to 1957 and it does not feature the important role Malaya 
played in supporting Britain’s post-war economic policy, even up until 1960. 
While White is correct that instrumentalist and neo-colonialist approaches, 
with their strong focus on the role of agency to perform the task of maintaining the 
circuit of capital, require evidence to support their premises of active agential 
cooperation between state managers and business elites, and he does indeed show 
that the evidence for such strong cooperation is lacking within the National Archives, 
he does not attempt to explain why the state acted in the interests of capital-in-
general. Effectively, in dismissing an instrumentalist approach, White has entirely 
neglected an opportunity for an alternative explanation. His approach then is simply 
a negation of one possible theoretical explanation among many.  
Jung Yung-Joo (2002) offers a similar focus to White: a broad analysis of links 
between the British government and business in South-East Asia. While adopting a 
similar approach to White, Yung-Joo’s geographical area is much wider, 
encompassing the whole of South-East Asia. While White and Yung-Joo do engage in 
analysis of political and economic factors, they both reject an agential focus on the 
relationship between Britain and Malaya during this period. Specifically, they focus 
on government-business links between the Colonial and Imperial governments and, 
as such, develop an instrumentalist account of the state as a foil to respond to. White 
(1996, p.266), despite rejecting the “gentlemanly capitalist” approach31, does not 
                                               
31 This is the phrase White uses to describe the instrumentalist account of the state. It is generally 
well accepted in the literature as a way of describing the manner in which British business operated in 
the colonies, see Dumett (1999) for further discussion on the concept, and dominates accounts of 
relationships between business and state in the literature on Malayan business. See, inter alia, Jomo 
(1988), Jen (1955), Puthucheary (1960). 
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consider alternative approaches explaining government-business links (or their 
absence) during this period. In essence, these two authors argue that if there was no 
direct collusion between British and colonial governments and the business interests 
within the Malayan peninsula, then any notion of a state acting in the interests of 
capital must be rejected in its entirety. Indeed, White (ibid., p.275) goes so far as to 
say that “colonialism and capitalism were never married”, arguing instead that British 
policy towards Malaya was simply concerned with disengagement.32 
Of course, White and Yung-Joo both offer accounts of government-business 
links between Britain and Malaya in the post-war period and so, while their focus is 
Malaya in the relevant period, their specific focus is somewhat divorced from that of 
this thesis. Thomas Kaplan (1990) offers direct analysis of the relationship between 
Britain and Malaya from 1948 – 1955. Kaplan (ibid., p.iv) poses, as his guiding 
research query, the question, “Why Malaya?” Kaplan presents this in the context of 
Britain’s costly counter-insurgency in the colony, as well as in regard to the general 
trend of decolonisation within the British Empire. As such, he continues (ibid., p.4), 
implicit in the first question is another question, “Why not India, or Egypt?” – what 
was so intrinsically valuable about this colony that forced Britain to engage in a war 
to keep it, when other, more ostensibly valuable territories were rapidly 
decolonised? 
 The answer that Kaplan (ibid., p.5) provides is chronologically divided into 
three ‘waves’: firstly, Malaya was kept as a component of the Empire and Sterling 
Area due to its ability to provide dollars to the Sterling Area’s dollar pool, which was 
vital to maintaining Britain’s post-war reconstruction; the second wave posits that 
Malaya experienced an economic boom due to greatly increased demand for rubber 
and tin (and the high prices of primary goods) during the Korean War, thus making 
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 White (1997) also provides an analysis of development policy within Malaya from 1945-1957 and 
this focuses upon debates within the literature on Malayan development and rubber policies by 
authors such as, inter alia, Bauer (1973; 1957) and Rudner (1976; 1975; 1972; 1970). White’s account, 
as with his broader work (1996), focuses principally on relationships between government and 
business and argues that there was no collusion between the two, thereby rejecting an 
instrumentalist account of the state, which had been provided by Rudner (1976) that White (1996, 
p.119) characterizes as an “anti-development conspiracy” before 1955 (after which elections occurred 
in Malaya) to keep Asian producers of rubber and tin undeveloped compared to European producers, 
to whom the Colonial State was subservient. 
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the colony a valuable addition to the British political-economic domain; thirdly, the 
increasing threat to South-East Asia posed by clashes between the superpowers in 
the region led to a perception that Malaya was a vital security interest against the 
backdrop of the Cold War.33 These three waves owe a great deal to Holland’s (1984, 
p.183) similar description of the three phases of decolonisation. Holland (ibid., 
p.184) too argues that the first phase showed the colonies as economically 
significant; the second phase was characterised by decreasing economic significance 
and an increasing reliance on other allies for security; and the third phase saw a 
policy of harmonising security policy with the Western allies. 
Kaplan’s three “waves” are not provided with any notion of internal 
coherence; in essence, they are three separate reasons, at three separate times, for 
retaining Malaya as a colony, or for fighting a costly insurgency in the peninsula. 
Kaplan’s approach, while an engaging narrative, lacks a sense of unity. The three 
periods are presented as unrelated to one another and, as such, a critique can be 
levelled of historical periodisation; the three moments of Kaplan’s study are reified 
by his analysis, creating a partition where none occurs. Further, there is a clear 
distinction between political and economic reasons. The first and second waves are 
characterised as economic, while the third wave (and the more substantial part of 
the thesis) concerns the political and security concerns of the Cold War, with no 
attempt to synthesise the two. Kaplan also relies entirely on documents from the 
National Archives at Kew for primary sources, with no inclusion of Bank documents 
to support his argument despite the Bank of England being the de facto ‘manager’ of 
the Sterling Area, through which Malaya’s dollars were pooled. 
The second critique, which supports the first, is that Kaplan does not provide 
a sustained theoretical basis for his argument. While he does make reference to 
Britain’s “post-war imperial strategy” (ibid., p.6), this is not developed into a 
coherent theory of imperialism; rather the reader is left to infer a theory of 
imperialism within the thesis. Kaplan (ibid., p.95) further represents the relationship 
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 Kaplan’s chronology is also peculiar in that it ends in 1955, despite the Emergency officially ending 
in 1960. Kaplan’s reasoning is that the Emergency comes to a de facto end in 1955, even though 
violence continues for some time after that though at a much-diminished rate. 
  49 
between Britain and Malaya as purely exploitative with the post-war Labour 
government seeking to make Malaya “an even more efficient contributor to the 
Sterling Area” through its policies towards the colony. Thus his argument comes 
across as a rather cartoonish characterisation of an imperialist relationship: that of 
pure exploitation since “as the leading dollar earner, Malaya was also the most 
exploited” (ibid., p.368). This would be an interesting conclusion if it had a rigorous 
theoretical foundation upon which to base ideas of exploitation, imperialism and the 
state; however, this is absent and so the relationship between Britain and Malaya, 
despite being directly examined by Kaplan, is presented in a descriptive fashion, and 
emphasises perceived discontinuity. 
Kaplan’s thesis then, while presenting an interesting history, can be critiqued 
on the basis that it is simplistic in its characterisation of the Britain-Malaya 
relationship, there is no evidence provided on the role of Bank officials in policy 
towards Malaya, and that there is no unifying narrative to explain the relationship. 
Indeed, the relationship appears to work according to different logics at different 
times. It has strict frames of reference that are not themselves open to reflection 
and, as such, the thesis is very limited in its ability to provide a holistic analysis of the 
relationship between Britain and Malaya. Furthermore, Kaplan’s study is, ultimately, 
an argument to explain Britain’s commitment to the Malayan Emergency. It is not 
intended to analyse the nature, contours and specific details of the Britain-Malayan 
relationship. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to create a typology of the literature and, in so doing, create 
a gap within which this thesis will rest. Given the scope of the thesis, the chapter has 
reviewed the literature on British imperial history and foreign policy, post-war 
reconstruction, the Sterling Area, and the literature specific to Malaya itself in this 
period. 
 The British imperial history and foreign policy literature, broadly speaking, 
provides an overview of Britain and its international relations during the 20th century. 
The narrative approach offered by this literature is helpful in understanding the 
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broadest trends in British policy over the course of the century. Furthermore, while it 
may recognise the importance of Malaya to the post-war period, it generally 
understands it in military-strategic terms, rather than from a perspective of political 
economy and when Malaya’s economic significance is mentioned, it is only briefly. 
 The literature on post-war reconstruction also recognises the value of Malaya 
to the process of post-war restructuring and reconstruction to Britain though none of 
the accounts within this type offer an in-depth analysis of the British-Malayan 
relationship. Indeed, the British-Malaya relationship is only mentioned prior to 1950, 
with no mention of it beyond this point and certainly no analysis of it. This literature 
group provides a diverse range of approaches with which to tackle the subject of 
post-war reconstruction and provides a context for understanding the post-war 
crises, and particularly ways of thinking about post-war economic policy. The most 
useful approaches avoid reductionist approaches such as a fractionalist analysis of 
the state, or hegemonic stability theory, and adopt a critical analysis of the 
international capitalist system as their framework for analysis. 
 In continuing with the tightening of focus in this chapter, the next literature 
group contained texts on the Sterling Area and imperial economic relations after the 
Second World War. This group was helpful in understanding the mechanisms of 
Britain’s trading bloc and currency area as well as the context in which British 
imperial policy was undertaken, and also consistently highlighted the value of Malaya 
within the Area and Empire after the Second World War. However, analysis within 
these accounts tends to be theoretically limited, providing little theorisation of vital 
concepts to such studies, namely the state, imperialism and crisis. Furthermore, and 
even more importantly, none of the accounts within the literature focus on specific 
relationships within the British Empire or the Sterling Area, though a number of 
authors do point out the need for this research. Such a gap in the literature seems 
unusual and the conclusions of the literature currently, emphasising discontinuity 
throughout the Sterling Area and British Empire regardless of the historical and 
economic basis of these individual relations, seem somewhat unreasonable. Indeed, 
this idea of imperialism rests upon an implicit conception of Empire as an extant 
‘thing’ rather than merely an aggregation of the complex of relationships that 
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comprise it. 
Finally, the literature on Malaya itself was divided into two further groups. 
The literature on the Malayan Emergency concentrates on the prosecution of the 
counter-insurgency itself (either militarily or through the use of psychological 
warfare), or on a broader history of Malaya (detailing ethnic, cultural, national issues 
within the country). Again, while there is some analysis of the causes behind the 
Emergency, this tends to be dealt with briefly and is clearly not the principal concern 
of this literature. As such, while Malaya is portrayed as important to the British 
Empire, the focus of this literature group is distinctly security-based, with little focus 
or analysis on the political-economic relationship between Britain and Malaya.  
The literature that focuses on the political-economic relationship between 
Britain and Malaya tends towards historical narrative and lacks theoretical accounts 
of this relationship. This is particularly true of Kaplan, whose work lacks a narrative 
unity and thus provides three separate explanations for three different periods to 
explain British relations with Malaya. This is also true of White, whose work, while 
valuable in the critique of instrumentalist and neo-colonialist approaches, does not 
provide an alternative approach and, as such, seems more like a critique of explicitly 
theoretical explanations than of those two approaches themselves. However, the 
focus of White’s work is specifically on the links between business and government 
and so does not really share a significantly similar focus to this thesis, where Kaplan’s 
does. 
 What is necessary then for a thesis that seeks to explore the relationship 
between Malaya and Britain during the post-war period is a critical exploration of the 
relationship, using a wide array of archival sources to support an argument for a 
more nuanced relationship than the simplistic account of colonial exploitation within 
the current literature. This necessarily requires a sophisticated understanding of 
imperialism, which must be theoretically engaged and founded. This theory of 
imperialism must be based upon a sophisticated and comprehensive understanding 
of the state in terms of its organisation and function in social relations. It will also 
seek to avoid prior understandings of imperialism and empire as monolithic 
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organisations, as this can lead to problematic and misleading conclusions regarding 
the actual relations between states. 
 Furthermore, the thesis will need to provide a well-grounded understanding 
of the importance of Malaya to Britain, the Sterling Area, and to the global economy 
in the context of British post-war reconstruction, and the nature and origins of the 
crises that beset this project. The thesis will also be required to avoid dichotomising 
politics and economics, as well as the reification of historical periods. The next 
chapter will seek to synthesise these ideas into a lucid theoretical framework. 
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Chapter Two: Imperialism and the State 
The previous chapter identified conceptual problems within the literature on Malaya 
and its relationship with Britain. Namely, there is little theorisation of the state or 
imperialism. Where that analysis does occur it is confined to pluralist and Realist 
accounts of the state, which are problematic, descriptive and provide no critical 
insight into the Britain-Malaya relationship. 
 It would be valuable then to understand the nature of the Britain-Malaya 
relationship, the trade deficit and the Sterling Area in terms of the characteristics of 
the society in which they existed. In the literature on the topic, as it stands, this is 
not available. Indeed, within social theory, only Marxism provides an approach that 
avoids the problem of accepting the foreign/domestic, as well as the political-
economic, dichotomies. It rejects the reification of the state and avoids treating it as 
something exogenous to society. Furthermore, a theory of imperialism is necessary 
if we are to fully understand Britain’s relationship with one of its colonies, and 
theories of imperialism find their most numerous expression and most concrete 
analytical grounding in Marxist thought. 
Marx (1992c, p.956) said, as a critique of vulgar economics, “all science 
would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with 
their essence”. Given the current state of the literature as reviewed in Chapter One, 
it would be worthwhile to continue an examination of the taken-for-granted 
concepts within this period. As outlined within the first chapter, this thesis focuses 
on an imperial relationship between two states during a period of economic crisis. It 
is therefore the intention of this chapter to outline the theoretical approach of this 
thesis, one that critically analyses three key concepts: crisis, the state, and 
imperialism. Marxism is particularly well placed to analyse these concepts. 
The chapter will begin with an introduction to the most basic elements of 
Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production, also exploring the role of crisis 
in relation to Marx’s conception of capitalism, particularly focusing on the crisis of 
over-production. The next section will engage with the Marxist literature on state 
theory, providing a basis for a critique and arguing for an open Marxist account of 
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the state, as a form of social relations. Finally, drawing on the open Marxist 
understanding of the state, the chapter will provide a critique of the literature on 
imperialism, and then offer its own account of imperialism. 
2.1 Capitalist Production 
The manner in which labour is organised in the means of social production 
comprises the essence of social form. The features of society as they are presented 
(such as the state, the market, dichotomies such as foreign and domestic, public and 
private, political and economic) can be understood as forms assumed by social 
production (and hence the forms through which labour achieves existence). Marx’s 
Capital can be understood as much as a critique of bourgeois theory as the nature of 
capitalist society; that is, as Holloway (1992b, p.150) puts it, “the apparent 
neutrality and fragmentation of the forms” such as the state, rent, money, profit, 
etc. deny the interconnectedness of the forms taken by the antagonistic social 
relations of capitalism.34 Marx in Volume III of Capital explains this: 
"The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is 
pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of 
rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, 
in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, 
however, is founded the entire formation of the economic 
community which grows up out of the production relations 
                                               
34 Richard Gunn offers an even stronger critique of scientific or bourgeois social theory, turning it on 
Marxism itself. Gunn (1992b, p.20), writing in a core text of open Marxism, argues that Marxism’s 
historical materialist approach is actually a contradiction in terms as, rather than being a totalising 
approach, its “general-theoretical form” is a general social theory, a type of “sociological Marxism.” 
Gunn (p.9) declares this problematic, in a manner similar to Holloway (1995, p.161), as Marxism is 
not simply a critique of society but a critique of ‘theories of’ and ‘societies’ simultaneously; arguing 
that these two ideas are only possible when the unity between theory and practice has collapsed. As 
Gunn (p.32) concludes, “general theory stands back from its object and reflects upon it, Marxist 
theory situates itself within its object… and construes itself as constituted through its object” and 
this necessitates the subsequent conclusions that Marxism is the “critique of general social theory 
rather than its confirmation; therefore Marxist sociology, along with historical materialism, should 
be condemned if not ignored”. This leads Gunn (ibid.) to the question, if Marxism is not historical 
materialism, then is it unadulterated idealism? His response is to invoke the open Marxist definition 
of form as mode-of-existence; with this idea of form in place a unity between abstract and concrete 
is possible and so a fluidity of forms is permitted by this conception while a general theory “takes 
‘form’ as something fixed, or at any rate fixable”. However, for the purposes of this thesis, we have 
to consider the practicalities of applying an extremely abstract notion of Marxism to an empirically 
focused thesis – while it is certainly possible, it is beyond the scope of this work. 
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themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is 
always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of 
production to the direct producers… which reveals the innermost 
secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure.” (Marx 
1992c, p.721) 
As such, capitalism is understood as a fundamentally class-based social form 
developed from the “exploitative relation arising from the process of social 
production” (Kettell 2004, p.23).  
It is the manner in which production is organised that is the defining 
characteristic of the organisation of society. As such, it is the acquisition and 
conservation of control over the means of production that organises society along 
class lines and, according to Marx (2005, p.6), “the history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggle”. The concept of class, of course, is not to be 
understood in terms of which individual belongs to which class. As Bonefeld et al. 
(1992b, p.xiii) assert, “the notion of classes as pigeonholes or ‘locations’ to which 
the sociologist must assign individuals ultimately invokes static and struggle-
disconnected structures”. As such, this sociological definition of class is to be 
rejected and class must be understood instead as a social relation that is inherently 
antagonistic and contradictory – a form “in and against which social conflict obtains” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the idea that class struggle and antagonism is somehow alien 
to capitalism, or rather distinct from it, should also be rejected; indeed, “traditional 
Marxist dichotomy as between ‘structure’ and ‘struggle’ is surpassed because class 
struggle is informed while, at the same time, class struggle forms and informs the 
conditions which it either takes on board, reproduces, or explodes” (ibid., p.xvii). 
The particular process in capitalist production by which class exploitation 
occurs is through the extraction of surplus value by means of the circuit of capital. 
Marx, detailing this process at great length (and in far greater detail and complexity 
than can be provided here) in Volume II of Capital (1992b, p.109), initially 
summarizes the circuit of capital as the following:  
M – C…P…C’ – M’ 
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Where M is Money Capital, it is transformed into Commodity Capital (C). This then 
undergoes the Production process (P) and is transformed into Commodities of a 
greater value (C’) which are then sold and transformed into Money (M’) once more 
(though now of a greater quantity). This process can be broken down further, as 
follows: 
M – C(lp + mp)...P…C’ – M’(M + m) 
Here the initial Commodities (C) which the Money Capital originally purchases can 
be broken down into the commodities of Labour Power (lp) and Means of 
Production (mp), they are then set to work in the form of Productive Capital (P). The 
cycle then enters the phase of Commodity Capital and is transformed back into 
Money Capital to be put back into the circuit again. It is the productive phase of the 
cycle in which surplus value is extracted through the exploitation of labour power.35 
 Marx defines capital, in its most general form, as self-valorising value (1992a, 
p.252). It is only when capital has completed the whole circuit, having been 
transformed into a whole series of ‘phases’ of capital, that it self-valorises, that it 
increases its own value. This circuit, once complete, is then undertaken repeatedly; 
though ideally on ever larger scales to accumulate surplus value of ever greater 
levels. The expansion of capital is necessitated through the inherently competitive 
nature of capitalist production; for example, by seeking to reduce the cost of labour 
power or the time required for the production process, capital is able to generate a 
greater level of surplus value than it would otherwise and thus expand greater than 
it would otherwise. This dynamic is transmitted to all other capitals through the 
means of the value form: the increase in productive capacity leads to changes in the 
exchange value of the commodity, thus forcing other capitals to imitate. If this is not 
possible for a competing capital, then its relative decline in productivity will result in 
a decline of surplus value extraction, thus leading eventually to the destruction of 
capital. 
                                               
35 The capitalist purchases the labour-time of the worker but the worker provides a greater labour-
power than his wage would suggest. For example, if a worker sells his labour for a wage of £20 per 
hour yet in that hour he produces £60 worth of finished commodities, the remainder (minus the cost 
of the means of production) is surplus value. 
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 The circuit of capital is both abstract and particular. The circuit exists as a 
general process of capital production and self-valorisation as well as a multitude of 
individual circuits throughout society. Co-existence of these phases of capital is only 
a result of the completion of the circuit in its entirety (Marx 1992b, p.183). 
Furthermore, capital exists in and only through the forms it takes – capital only 
exists in perpetual movement.  
 Burnham (2006, p.77) notes an important aspect of the circuit is the variety 
of problems that may affect the reproduction of this process – it is crisis prone. As 
Marx (1992b, p.183) points out, “every delay in the succession brings the 
coexistence into disarray, every delay in one stage causes a greater or lesser delay in 
the entire circuit, not only that of the portion of the capital that is delayed, but also 
that of the entire individual capital”. If a delay occurs in one phase of the circuit then 
the entire circuit is brought to a halt. A halt in the first phase (M – C), would lead to 
a hoarding of money capital with no productive application; in the productive phase, 
labour and the means of production cease to be employed; and in the final phase, 
produced commodities form unsaleable stockpiles. 
 John Holloway (1992b, p.145), invoking its use in antiquity as an analogy to 
its social usage, refers to the medical origins of the word; that is, a turning point or 
crucial moment in the course of an illness. As such, he proffers (p.146), the notion of 
crisis focuses attention on dissonant moments in time as instances in which 
transformation can occur, and emphasises that society is not predictable, or a steady 
progress towards a specific point.  The idea of crisis is essential to Marxism. Indeed, 
Holloway (ibid., p.147) goes on to remark, 
“Marxism is [sic] a theory of crisis, a theory of structural social 
instability. Whereas other radical traditions focus on the 
oppressive nature of capitalist society, the distinguishing feature 
of Marxism is that it is not just a theory of oppression but also, 
and above all, a theory of social instability” (ibid.). 
Crisis arises from the fact that capitalism is an inherently unstable social form, and 
that it is unstable because of its class antagonisms. It is the antagonistic relationship 
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between producers and the owners of the means of production that provides the 
foundation for the conflict within capitalist society (Marx 1992c, p.791). Indeed, as 
Holloway notes (1992b, p.149), this is the fundamental arrangement of capitalist 
social relations: if the owners of the means of production ceased exploitation, then 
society would disintegrate. 
Further, crisis should not simply be seen as economic, this is merely the 
manner in which it is immediately apparent. Rather, rejecting the political/economic 
dichotomy, crisis “expresses the structural instability of capitalist social relations, the 
instability of the basic relations between capital and labour on which the society is 
based” (ibid., p.159). As Simon Clarke (1994, p.79) also notes, it is within the notion 
of surplus value that the implications for the understanding of the tendencies of 
capitalist accumulation towards crisis are revealed, as it leads us “to identify the 
driving force of capitalism as the insatiable appetite of capital for surplus value”. An 
element of the instability inherent to capitalism, as Clarke (1992a, p.135) argues, is 
not only that the “driving force of accumulation, imposed on individual capitals by 
the pressure of competition, is the tendency for capital to develop their productive 
forces without limit” but also that the compulsion for the extraction of ever more 
surplus value leads to the removal of barriers to accumulation wherever they exist, 
and so leads to the expansion of the capacity of production without limit, and so 
leads to the crisis of over-production. 36 
 The circuit of capital is fraught with the possibility of crisis at each stage. 
Each stage is prone to a variety of crises that will cease the process of self-
valorisation, ranging from crises affecting the money form of capital (manifest as 
inflation), to labour discontent (this could take the form of strikes or disputes over 
working conditions), and over-production crises (Burnham 2006, p.78).37 The 
                                               
36
 As discussed previously in this chapter, it is difficult at best and foolish at worst to break down the 
circuit of capital into its component phases since they function together and cannot be understood 
separately. Indeed, it is only an analytical conceit that allows it to be divided at all. However, the 
circuit is still a series of transformations “as capital clothes itself in its different stages, alternately 
assuming them and casting them aside”, and if a crisis occurs at any point in the cycle, then the 
whole circuit ceases to operate (Marx 1992b, p.133; Burnham 2006, p.78). 
37
 Clarke (1994, p.171) points out that these crises are merely proximate expressions of the most 
basic contradiction upon which capitalist production is founded, between the production of use-
values and the production of exchange-value and the supremacy of the latter over the former. 
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overproduction crisis as “the fundamental tendency of the capitalist mode of 
production” (Clarke 1999, p.71) embodies capitalism’s most basic contradiction. 
Continued accumulation relies on the continuing capacity for the market to 
purchase the commodities produced while providing a sufficient rate of profit; 
however, this capacity is limited by the purchasing power of the working class, 
which generates more surplus value than it receives (as wages), and so “the 
inherent trajectory of the capitalist system is to therefore generate a large mass of 
commodities in excess of the consumptive limits of the market”, so causing a crisis 
of commodity over-production (Kettell 2006, p.26).38 
The disproportionalities39, or crises, of the circuit of capital can manifest 
themselves fetishistically. An example of relevance to this thesis would be in the 
manifestation of an overproduction crisis as a currency shortage. As Simon Clarke 
(1994, p.136) explains about the over-production crisis, “the crisis itself arises when 
the commodity capital which emerges from the process of production cannot be 
transformed into money. This happens because elsewhere somebody is holding 
money, which they do not immediately transform into commodities, so it is the 
existence of money which makes crises possible.” Indeed, it is only through the 
separation of production and circulation inherent to capitalism that allows this crisis 
to occur. This is often seen as a ‘trade disequilibrium’, and was the fundamental 
cause of the ‘dollar drain’, which Simon Clarke (1999, p.71) also terms a 
‘disproportionality’. During the post-war period, where the productive power of the 
US led to a world shortage of dollars, since US goods were in great demand while 
non-US goods were not competitive enough to be sold in the US, therefore few 
dollars were exchanged for non-US goods.  As such, while there were plenty of 
goods to be purchased, there was no money with which to purchase them thus 
leading to a global crisis that could be only be resolved through the intervention of 
                                               
38 One aspect of this is the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. As the capitalist seeks to increase 
overall production, the growth of constant capital will increase relative to the growth of variable 
capital. Since the only source of surplus value derives from labour, the rate of profit (understood as 
the ratio of surplus value to total capital expended) will fall (Marx 1992c, p.317) 
39 This term is also used by Hilferding to refer to the crises that serve as the impetus for international 
capitalist expansion, and is used generally to refer to any kind of crisis. Indeed, it is intended to refer 
to the uneven development and progression of different circuits of capital that are still essentially 
interlinked, thus causing a general disproportionality (Clarke 1994, p.170) 
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the state. 
2.2 The State 
This section provides discussion of Marxist accounts of the state. As Robert Cox 
(1981, p.127) wrote about the condition of state theory within international 
relations, “a state was a state was a state”. His intent was, of course, to show the 
meagre analysis of the state within the field, provided mainly by Realism and other 
conventional accounts, and that it was a perfect example of the “taken-for-granted 
assumptions” that exist within pluralist accounts of the state (ibid.; Bieler & Morton 
2004, p.86). 
The state is often established as a pre-ordained object within the greater 
number of political theories; frequently, it seems a theory may start in media res, 
with the state pre-defined according to some unknown criteria. Indeed, as John 
Holloway (1994, p.24) remarks,  
“In the tradition of political science, the state is taken as a basic, 
and largely unquestioned category. The state’s existence is taken 
for granted before any discussion begins… In the study of 
contemporary politics, the determinants of state action, the 
relations between states, the changing forms of government, and 
so on, are analysed, but all on the basis of an assumed starting 
point, the ‘state’”.  
As such, we must ask the questions, “What is the state?” and, perhaps more 
pertinently, “Why does it exist?” As with all critical theory, we must return to the 
most primitive element and so question why the state exists at all. Fortunately, and 
famously, this question has been asked before by Evgeny Pashukanis (1978, p.139),  
“Why does class rule not remain what it is, the factual 
subjugation of one section of the population by the other? Why 
does it assume the form of official state rule, or – which is the 
same thing – why does the machinery of state coercion not come 
into being as the private machinery of the ruling class?; why does 
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it detach itself from the ruling class and take on the form of an 
impersonal apparatus of public power, separate from society?” 
Marx and Engels (2005, p.8) famously described “the executive of the 
modern State” as “but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie”. However, Marx never provided what could be called a sustained 
theoretical analysis of the state and there was little theorising of the state until 
relatively recently (Jessop 1990, p.29; Poulantzas 1977, p.291). Marx does refer to 
the state on occasion, providing a brief insight into how he might have approached a 
rigorous analysis of the state. Marx (1992c, p.721) does note however that “ it is 
always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the 
direct producers… which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire 
social structure and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and 
dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state.” Burnham (1994, 
p.6) too points out that the state can be seen as a “form taken by the fundamental 
class antagonisms on which each class-divided society rests”, the state being an 
organisation of society which legitimates and enforces the established order. 
 The value of Marxist thought is not simply to highlight something that is not 
considered important in most other theories (class, exploitation, etc.). Rather, as 
Burnham (2006, p.80) states, its value lies in its “conceptualisation of the circuit of 
capital from which it is possible to theorise the state and the limits of state action”. 
It is the totalising and sequentially relevant nature of Marxism that provides the 
theory with its analytical value. 
It is in the writing of subsequent Marxist theorists, rather than Marx himself, 
where the vast majority of work on state theory lies. The dialogue between Nicos 
Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband, following the publication of Miliband’s book ‘The 
State in Capitalist Society’, characterises the principal debate within Marxist state 
theory between ‘structuralist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ approaches. However, as Colin 
Hay (2006, p.71) remarks, the importance of the debate does not lie in its 
theoretical contribution, or its historical significance, but rather in its exposition of 
problems within the Marxist understanding of the state at the time. The essence of 
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the debate lies in Miliband critiquing Poulantzas’ position as ‘Structuralism’ and 
Poulantzas critiquing Miliband on his ‘Instrumentalist’ approach to state theory. 
Despite the importance that Hay assigns to this debate, he regards their positions as 
living up to the caricatures they have presented of each other (ibid.). 
 Their main point of contention is over the relationship between the 
dominant class and the state. Poulantzas (1973, p.298) argues that the relationship 
is entirely objective and that the state is relatively autonomous from the ruling class. 
He further suggests that the state acts in the interests of the ruling class due to this 
objective relationship: only through the maintenance of this relationship can the 
state maintain social cohesion and enable the reproduction of capitalist social 
relations (Poulantzas, p.299). 
The Miliband-Poulantzas debate can be best characterised as the 
fundamental contention between ‘the state in capitalist society’ (Miliband) and ‘the 
capitalist state’ (Poulantzas). Miliband and Poulantzas later shifted from these 
opposed positions to more proximal theoretical approaches; both theorists perhaps 
realising that the separate positions do not individually explain the behaviour or 
organisation of the state in an adequate fashion. Miliband (1983, p.72) developed a 
model describing the relationship between the dominant class and the state as an 
equal ‘partnership’ (though the state will become increasingly dominant as the 
instability of capitalism becomes more apparent). Miliband (1977, pp.73-4) 
concedes that there must also be relative autonomy between state and ruling class; 
he also maintains that a proper analysis of the state will include a consideration of 
“the character of *the state’s+ leading personnel, the pressures exercised by the 
economically dominant class, and the structural constraints imposed by the mode of 
production”. 
Poulantzas (1980, p.25) still maintained that the relative separation of the 
state from the relations of production is the foundation for its organisation and also 
provides the structure for its relations with social classes and class struggle. 
However, while instrumentalist approaches focus on confronting liberal approaches 
to the state with, as Jessop (1990, p.29) puts it, “the facts” of agential collusion, 
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common values and shared backgrounds, structuralist approaches can deny the 
state any independence of action at all, making its activity entirely determined by 
structural constraints. 
Structuralist and instrumentalist approaches to the state provide excellent 
criticism of each other; however, both approaches tend to focus more on the 
political and ideological aspects of the state, which can lead to a de facto divorce of 
the concept from its essential unity with the capitalist social form. This can also raise 
criticisms of the acceptance of the political/economic dichotomy, as well as charges 
of reifying the state as a thing-in-itself. The relative autonomy debate became the 
keystone for Marxist theory on the state for many years and found numerous 
expressions.40 
Attempts to develop more sophisticated accounts of the state to resolve 
problems common to Structuralist and Instrumentalist conceptions sprang from the 
development of Gramscian accounts of the state.41 The neo-Gramscian approach 
offers the potential for a critical insight into the relationships between states 
through the examination of ideas, institutions and the material dimensions of the 
world order (Bieler & Morton 2004; Bieler 2001; Cox 1981; Pozo 2007). However, it 
fails to provide any profound revelation of this world order. Burnham (1991, p.90) 
argues this is because the neo-Gramscian approach “simply offers a pluralist analysis 
of global capitalism which overemphasises the role of ideology in economic policy 
and regime formation, illegitimately invokes the dominant ideology thesis and fails 
to specify its implicit fractionalist theory of the state.”  
With its emphasis on the (unfalsifiable) existence, interests and actions of a 
trans-national elite as the motivating factor and origin of state behaviour, state 
policy becomes the outcome of a decision made by a ruling fraction of capital (Bieler 
                                               
40 See Block (1977; 1980), Skocpol (1985), Skocpol and Weir (1985) for accounts of the relative 
autonomy perspective. Also see Habermas (1973) and Offe (1974; 1984) for functionalist accounts of 
the state that also argue for the state’s autonomy from capitalism. Their accounts of the state can 
also be seen as ones that see the relationship between state and capital as an external relationship 
(Clarke 1991 p.7). 
41
 Criticism of Fractionalism is best condensed within the critique of the neo-Gramscian analysis of 
the state For further examples of fractionalist accounts, see, inter alia, Crouch (1979), Longstreth 
(1979), Jessop (1983), Ingham (1984), Van der Pijl (1984; 1998) 
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& Morton 2003, p.470; Tsolakis 2010, p.388; Gill 1990, p.94). This then generates an 
idea of the state that is autonomous from the society within which it exists, a state 
that is “content empty” (Cox 1987, p.5). Burnham (1991, p.89), invoking Marx, 
makes clear that state policy cannot be the result of the decisions made by a 
fraction of capital “since the state embodies the power of capital-in general against 
the direct demands of particular capitals”.42 As such, the neo-Gramscian approach, 
and hence Fractionalism, provides an account with a limited capacity to explain the 
“systematic connection between values, social relations and institutions” and makes 
it difficult to argue that the state is a capitalist state, thus requiring additional 
information to be provided to explain the state’s existence (which is not 
forthcoming) and therefore denies the holistic and transformative nature of 
capitalism to incorporate all social relations within itself (ibid., p.78). Therefore, the 
neo-Gramscian approach is best criticized as a form of pluralist empiricism, which 
lacks critical insight and falls foul of a base/superstructure reductionism – separating 
the political and economic – which is an inherent problem with all Fractionalist 
accounts of the state (ibid.; Clarke 1978). 
A more recent development, and an attempt to create a relational approach 
deriving from an organisational account of the state rather than a functionalist 
account, is provided by the strategic-relational approach (Jessop 2002; 2008).43 This 
account is valuable in that it begins from an understanding of the capitalist social 
relation; however, it is problematic because the focus is not class struggle and the 
state as a form of this class struggle. Furthermore, the approach is over-politicised, 
to the exclusion of the mode of production as the fundamental determinant of 
social relations. Finally, the strategic approach is a very sophisticated way of 
conceiving of states in terms of typology rather than attempting to come up with a 
totalising approach that understands states as essentially unified. The strategic-
                                               
42 Burnham (1990; 1991) has challenged this claim empirically too, by critiquing Fractionalist claims 
that the British state acted in the interests of the financial establishment (the City) in the post-war 
period.  
43 Jessop was also influenced by the Regulation School, whose account of the state periodises social 
relations according to ‘regimes of accumulation’ and ‘modes of regulation’. This periodization, while 
problematic in itself, also leads to a typology of crisis, which necessarily divorces the abstract concept 
of crisis from its concrete form. For further accounts of the Regulation School, see, inter alia, Boyer 
(1990), Lipietz (1992), Jessop & Sum (2006). 
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relational approach, while helpful in its relational analysis, still remains a means of 
creating a typology of states.  
“A state could operate principally as a capitalist state, a military 
power, a theocratic regime, a representative democratic regime 
answerable to civil society, an apartheid state, or an ethico-
political state” (Jessop 2008, p.8) 
However, this understanding requires bridging concepts to understand the 
distinction between one type of state and another, and so creates a dichotomy 
between the political and the economic, thus reproducing distinctions between 
base and superstructure that exist in less credible Marxist theories and stands at 
odds with the relational approach. Indeed, Clarke (1991, pp.44-45) characterises 
Jessop’s approach as an ultimately structuralist-functionalist approach and prone to 
the same problems. 
The state, of course, does not exist as a physical entity. It is a fetishised and 
reified concept that has taken on a fantastical meaning. There is no physical edifice 
that one can point to and declare to be ‘the state’. Ontologically speaking we can 
accept the state as a notion that has a physical manifestation in reality, despite itself 
being an abstraction of sorts: a noumenal entity, which we understand through 
corresponding phenomena. The use of open Marxism allows us to understand the 
state, and the international state system, as both an abstraction and as a real thing 
simultaneously, through the use of the concept of form, and through the application 
of a capital relation approach (Burnham 1991, p.90; 1994) 
2.3 Open Marxism 
Bieler and Morton, who are otherwise critical of open Marxism, characterise it as a 
“critical theoretical questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions about the social 
world and the practical conditions of dominance and subordination in capitalism” 
(Bieler & Morton 2003, p.468).44 While it seems likely that all varieties of Marxism 
                                               
44 Bieler and Morton write a great deal on the subject of open Marxism, more so than many open 
Marxists, and so spend many words characterizing and describing the approach. I have used their 
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would make claim to the same critical credentials, open Marxism’s value lies in its 
starting point and its critical reappraisal of the class antagonisms between capital 
and labour. Open Marxism’s greatest contribution to the discussion of capitalist 
social relations is its conceptualisation of the state, providing an account of the 
state that is more sophisticated and more reliable that either instrumentalist or 
structuralist accounts of the state (Tsolakis 2010, p.390). 
Open Marxism returns, in a sense, to the position of Marx that, by analysing 
the relationship between capital, the state and labour, the distinction between 
political and economic is exposed as an illusion. This conclusion enables critiques of 
positivistic approaches; theories that reify the state, and consider the market an 
external phenomenon: both exogenous to ‘society’ and a thing-in-itself (Bieler & 
Morton 2003, p.470). Open Marxism therefore deems it necessary to take the social 
relations of production as a starting point. It is then accurate to say, either fairly or 
unfairly, that open Marxism attempts to develop a totalising paradigm. 
The term ‘open Marxism’, first coined by Ernest Mandel and Johannes Agnoli 
(1980) though with intellectual origins preceding the term by some years, 
characterises the approach in opposition to an analytical ‘closure’, by which two 
things are meant (Bonefeld et al. 1992a, p.xvi). Firstly, closure can refer to an 
acceptance of the boundaries of a “given world” as its own theoretical boundaries. 
Secondly, it can also refer to a determinism, either in a causalist or teleological 
sense of the word. These two faces of closure are interconnected as “acceptance of 
horizons amounts to acceptance of their inevitability and because determinist 
theory becomes complicit in the foreclosing of possibilities which a contradictory 
world entails” (ibid.).  
Form is an important issue for definition in open Marxism, in this instance, 
due to its relevance to the concept of the state. More often than not, form is 
understood as a type, or genus, of a thing; for example, a pear is a form of fruit. Or, 
more pertinently, a state can be seen as a fascist state, or a Fordist state, and so 
forth. However, the concept of form, as understood by open Marxism is seen as the 
                                                                                                                                     
accounts here as they are generally accurate and represent the basic ideas of open Marxism very 
well. 
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“mode of existence: something or other exists only in and through the form(s) it 
takes” (ibid., p.xvii). The concept of species-form requires intermediary concepts in 
order to bridge the gap between the abstract and the particular; for example, how 
does ‘the state’ become ‘a fascist state’, etc. However, form as a mode of existence 
avoids this analytical trap as it “makes it possible to see the generic as inherent in 
the specific, and the abstract as inherent in the concrete, because if form is 
existence then the concrete can be abstract (and vice versa)” (ibid.). 
Open Marxism has been criticised on the basis that it undertakes exactly that 
which it criticises in this instance, in that it abstracts the state and posits its 
substance to be ‘capital’, “declaring differences in state form to be inessential and 
irrelevant” (Bieler et al. 2010, p.34). This critique has basis in Marx’s response to the 
use of what he terms ‘speculative philosophy’: 
“My finite understanding supported by my senses does of course 
distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but 
my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences 
inessential and irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the 
pear, and in the pear the same as in the almond, namely ‘Fruit’. 
Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true 
essence is ‘the substance’ – ‘Fruit’. By this method one attains no 
particular wealth of definition. The mineralogist whose whole 
science was limited to the statement that all minerals are really 
‘the Mineral’ would be a mineralogist only in his imagination. For 
every mineral the speculative mineralogist says ‘the Mineral’, and 
his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as 
there are real minerals.” (Marx & Engels 1975, p.68) 
However, this critique neglects that the ideas of, for example, the Fordist state and 
even the state itself are abstractions. Even the concept of the pear is an abstraction 
to which we compare every – what we term – pear we sensually encounter. The 
intuitive point that Marx raises, that the essence of an apple is to be an apple, is 
only true in the abstract sense and not the concrete. Indeed, the only account of the 
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differences between different states, allowed by the logic of this critique45, would be 
simply to describe them in every detail, avoiding the relation of similarities to each 
other due to the abstraction and fetishisation that this requires.  
This returns us to the fundamental starting point of an open Marxist analysis 
of capitalism, which is class struggle; as such, unlike other accounts of the state, the 
open Marxist account requires no ‘bridging concepts’ and remains parsimonious in 
its account of the state as a form of social relations, that is a manifestation of 
capitalist social relations. Further the critique that it is ‘capital’ which remains the 
substance of the state is false and represents a misunderstanding, or at the most an 
uncharitable interpretation, of the concept of form as used by open Marxism. Social 
relations are manifest as the state, the state is a mode of existence of social 
relations which is capitalist, that is not to argue a deterministic account of the state 
that it is inherently and inextricably a manifestation of ‘capital’. However, Marx 
develops this critique of form in his attack on speculative philosophy as well. Marx 
characterises the retort as such: 
“The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my 
sensuous understanding, but also for ‘the Fruit’ itself and for 
speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different 
manifestations of the life of the ‘one Fruit’; they are 
crystallisations of ‘the Fruit’ itself. Thus in the apple ‘the Fruit’ 
gives itself an apple-like existence, in the pear a pear-like 
existence. We must therefore no longer say, as one might from 
the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is ‘the Fruit’, an apple is 
‘the Fruit’, an almond is ‘the Fruit’, but rather ‘the Fruit’ presents 
itself as a pear, ‘the Fruit’ presents itself as an apple, ‘the Fruit’ 
presents itself as an almond; and the differences which 
distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another are the 
self-differentiations of ‘the Fruit’ and make the particular fruits 
                                               
45 There is no particular reason to halt at this abstract ‘middle ground’, that of the analysis and 
reification of ‘different forms of the state’, such as the developmental state, the neoliberal state, the 
absolutist state, et al. as argued by Bieler et al. (2010). In fact, there is little critical analysis of this 
point in their work and therefore constitutes a possible ad temperiantam fallacy. 
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different members of the life-process of ‘the Fruit’. Thus 
‘the Fruit’ is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is 
oneness as allness, as ‘totality’ of fruits, which constitute an 
‘organically linked series of members’.” (ibid., p.69) 
His critique of the above characterisation is that the speculative philosopher 
“on the one hand apparently freely creates its object a priori out of itself and, on the 
other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational and 
natural dependence on the object, falls into the most irrational and 
unnatural bondage to the object, whose most accidental and most individual 
attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general” (ibid., p.72). 
However, Marx’s point here applies more readily to the critics of open Marxism than 
to open Marxism itself. By adopting species-form instead of form-as-existence, one 
necessarily becomes tasked with construing the characteristics of ‘a state’ as 
characteristic of a species of states. This retains the problem pointed out above – 
that all thought requires abstraction to some degree but the point of ‘over-
abstraction’ is not made clear and, indeed, this critique can be levelled against all 
forms of abstraction whether it is against ‘mystery’, ‘fruit’, ‘mineral’, ‘apples’, ‘human 
beings’, or anything that does not exist solely in the realm of the senses. Adopting a 
‘golden mean’ approach is as fallacious as adopting an approach from either 
extreme, suggesting that a synthesis of approaches is required. 
It is not ‘capital’ which remains the substance of the state but rather that the 
state is a form of social relations, a manifestation of how, specifically in capitalism, 
people interact with each other and how society is constituted. While it may seem 
almost redundant to point this out, this is a basic point of open Marxism that the 
national form of the state is a mode of existence of (global) capitalist social 
relations. Furthermore, the account given by Bieler et al. (2010) provides a 
functionalist approach to the state (focusing on the specific capacity and purpose of 
the state) rather than the organisation and constitution of the state as a form of 
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social relations (Burnham 1994).46 
A further retort to this problem is the emphasis on the dialectical approach 
of open Marxism, in that it actually seeks to synthesise the abstract and the 
concrete. What Bieler et al. (2010, p.34) consider “epistemological austerity” is 
actually an attempt to avoid the extreme fluctuation between abstract and 
concrete, which characterises other accounts of social relations. By rejecting the 
superficial differences between states, or at least leaving these accounts to area 
specialists, open Marxism avoids the trap of reifying and fetishising these 
differences. 
In order to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the state, the 
concept of the state needs to be contextualised and also abstracted. As Burnham 
(2001, p.106) argues, the nature of the state, as a capitalist state, needs to be 
understood in the context of the intrinsic contradictions of the global economy, 
namely the capitalist mode of production. 
To understand the state in terms of the ‘traditional’ theories of International 
Relations would simply reify the fetishised and fantastical social relations that the 
state propagates (such as the political-economic or internal-external dichotomies); 
the state must be seen in terms of its unity with other states, as “political nodes” 
within the global capitalist economy (Kettell 2004, p.22). Thus, as Holloway (1994, 
p.36) argues, “Understanding the development of the state cannot be a question of 
examining internal and external determinants, but of trying to see what it means to 
say that the national state is a moment of the global capital relation”. 
 The state can be conceived of as a form of capitalist social relations 
“predicated upon the reproduction of antagonisms and exploitation within the 
                                               
46
 While this point is not crucial to the argument presented in this chapter, it still remains relevant as 
an issue for the conceptualization of social relations. If the organization of the state takes ontological 
precedence over its function then emphasis can be placed on the open and fluid nature of not just 
the state but also of social relations more broadly (of which the state is a form). If a functionalist 
approach is adopted then the nature of the state is delimited and closed, providing no conceptual 
room for class struggle within its formulation. Similarly, functionalist approaches are teleological in 
scope, providing a further aspect of closure to the approach. This point also has relevance in making 
a distinction between relational approaches to the state, and other approaches such as a 
fractionalist or instrumentalist approaches, which focus on the function of the state. 
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crisis-ridden development of capitalist society” (Bieler & Morton, p.472). The form 
and existence of the state are necessarily intertwined with the reproduction of the 
capitalist system; the economic and political “actually comprise a dialectical 
‘separation-in-unity’ rather than two distinct institutional spheres” (Jessop 2001, 
p.85). Though, as Burnham (2006, p.80) notes, this relationship is complex and one 
cannot declare a simple causal explanation for state activities based on its 
relationship with capitalist social relations. Critiquing theories that separate state 
and market, the political and economic, open Marxism suggests that to do so 
obscures class antagonisms.  
Class antagonism is inseparable from the reproduction of capitalist social 
relations. However, “the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist relations, then, 
is not something that is automatically ensured, but involves continual action by the 
state in order to regulate class struggle and to address the various crises that 
emerge as a result of the instability of the capitalist social form” (Kettell 2004, p.22). 
So, capitalism is a fractious and unstable social form, with many specific capitals 
ostensibly competing among themselves, yet the state’s role is to regulate this 
fractiousness and act on behalf of capital-in-general; this is the only method through 
which capital expansion can occur generally (ibid.). Indeed, as Holloway and 
Picciotto (1977, p.80) observe,  
“the survival of the political institutions and hence of capital 
depends on the success of that struggle in maintaining this 
separation, by channelling the conflicts arising from the real 
nature of capitalist society into the fetishised forms of the 
bourgeois political processes. Thus the very separation of 
economics and politics, the very autonomisation of the state form 
is part of the struggle of the ruling classes to maintain its 
domination”. 
The nature of the state then is not to act on behalf of specific capitals, or fractions of 
capital, but rather on behalf of capital-in-general, as Burnham (2001, p.110) notes, 
“As political nodes in the global flow of capital, states are 
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essentially regulative agencies implicated in its reproduction but 
unable to control this reproduction or represent unambiguously 
the interests of ‘national capital’. Rather, state managers seek to 
remove barriers to the capital which flows in and through their 
territories. The fundamental tasks of state managers (from 
welfare to the management of money, labour and trade, etc.) 
therefore relate directly to ensuring the successful rotation of 
capital both nationally and internationally.” 
As Marx (1992a, p.170) noted, a peculiarity about capitalist social relations is 
that they “assume a fantastic form different from their reality”. Holloway continues 
with this logic. The state as a form of social relations also follows this pattern: “it is a 
relation between people which does not appear to be a relation between people, a 
social relation which exists in the form of something external to social relations… 
This is the starting point for understanding the unity between states: all are 
rigidified, apparently autonomous forms of social relations” (Holloway 1994, p.27). 
It is necessary to understand states not as separate political entities but through 
their essential unity; the state is a form of social relations within the capitalist social 
form, which is itself an inherently global phenomenon (Holloway 1994, p.26). 
Historical periodisation can be a manifestation of a causal or teleological 
determinism in regard to the state. That is, it can reify the particular and alienate 
the abstract, thus creating a conceptual void between the two. A quote from Francis 
Herbert Bradley, although ostensibly nothing to do with open Marxism, is a good 
way to describe this problem.47 
“Say that the present state of the world is the cause of that total 
state which follows next on it. Here, again, is… self-contradiction. 
For how can one state A become a different state B? It must 
either do this without a reason, and that seems absurd; or else 
the reason, being additional, forthwith constitutes a new A, and 
so on forever. We have the differences of cause and effect, with 
                                               
47 Bradley’s references to ‘states’ here are not intended to refer to the national state but rather a 
condition of existence, or ‘state of reality’. 
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their relation of time, and we have no way in which it is possible 
to hold these together. Thus we are drawn to the view that 
causation is but partial, and that we have but changes of mere 
elements within a complex whole.” (Bradley 1930, p.194) 
As such, following from Bradley’s point, that state A and state B are entirely illusory 
and the distinction between the two is fantastical, there is a fundamental unity 
between all historical periods: distinctions between historical periods are false. 
Indeed, as Clarke (1992, p.149) notes, “the basis of comparison of successive epochs 
is the permanence of their contradictory foundations, in the contradictory form of 
the social relations of capitalist production”; in essence, periodisation is, at best, a 
historical contingency and therefore capitalism can only be understood as a complex 
totality (ibid.). 
The next section of the chapter will analyse one of the traditionally held 
‘stages’ of capitalism not as a historical period, or species, of capitalism but rather as 
a strategy undertaken by the state to resolve crisis conditions. The importance of 
analysing imperialism is to ensure that the relationship between Britain and Malaya 
is properly characterised. It must not simply be declared an imperial relationship – it 
must be understood in a manner consonant with the analysis of the state previously 
undertaken in this chapter. 
2.4 Imperialism 
This section will provide an examination of the literature on imperialism. Beginning 
with the work of ‘classical’ imperialists, such as Hobson and Marxist authors on the 
subject, the section will then briefly look at ‘second’ and ‘third’ wave theories of 
imperialism, before drawing out an open Marxist approach to imperialism, one 
which avoids the problems of prior theories and authors. 
While Marx himself never put forward a systematic theory of imperialism, he 
did write numerous articles on the colonial relationship between Britain and India, 
and how this also had repercussions for China. Marx put forward the notion that 
due to the manner in which capitalism had developed, colonies had now become 
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essential to the maintenance of that system. For example, England had developed a 
trade surplus with India (cotton), which enjoyed a trade surplus with China (opium), 
which had a surplus with Britain (tea, silk). Since opium was the lynchpin of the 
whole trade circuit, this market had to be expanded by force and so England 
involved itself in the Opium Wars with China (Brewer 1990; Harvey 2003, p.118). 
This basic model of imperialism is echoed throughout the three waves of theory on 
imperialism. 
Hobson (1902), like many authors on imperialism, has a three-level 
explanation to the idea: a domestic economic problem emerges, a foreign solution is 
then sought, and the state intervenes to resolve the problem. Classical imperialisms 
tend to focus on the notion of monopoly capital and it can be seen in the works of 
Hilferding (1981), Bukharin (2003), and Lenin (1934). It is worth analysing these 
authors for their contribution to the field of Marxist theorising of imperialism; 
however, there are great similarities in the work of the above authors. A key 
distinction, however, between authors, rests on their divergent notions of the 
causes of imperialism: in Hobson’s account, for example, an elite conspires to force 
the state into enacting an imperialist policy; thus, imperialism was seen by Hobson 
as a perversion of a well-functioning social form, capitalism. However, in the 
accounts of certain Marxist authors, like Lenin, systemic factors, inherent to the 
capitalist mode of production, initiate a pre-determined imperialist ‘stage’. As such, 
‘classical’ theories of imperialism can be divided according to “structural” and 
“agential” approaches, though this distinction can also be considered as being 
between understanding imperialism as a historical period or as an action of the 
state. 
Hobson (1902, p.11) characterises imperialism as a perversion of both 
nationalism and capitalism, and even of colonialism, which places it in contrast to 
internationalism. Colonialism, Hobson argues, can be seen as the migration of part 
of the people of a nation to an empty or sparsely populated land. Imperialism then, 
according to Hobson, is an aggressive form of the state geared towards “territorial 
and industrial aggrandisement” which transforms the “wholesome stimulative 
rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires”. 
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While Hobson’s definition here goes some way towards characterising imperialism 
in normative terms – which is where Hobson’s main critique of imperialism lies, it 
does not provide much of a sustained conceptual analysis of imperialism. Hobson, 
while not a Marxist, still maintains an analysis with a tendency towards 
characterising imperialism as a commercial and capitalistic enterprise. 
Hobson’s analysis of imperialism suffers from a form of fractionalism, which 
instrumentalises the state. Hobson’s fractionalism, following in the same vein as 
Adam Smith’s attack on mercantilism, maintains that imperialism is actually “bad 
business” and that the only reason that the nation embarks upon this course of 
action is due to sectional interests that usurp the state for their own ends (ibid., 
p.46).48 Hobson, as with Hilferding, Kautsky and Lenin, names and shames these 
sectional interests as the financiers of capital.49 
Hobson’s theory of imperialism rests principally on his development of the 
notion of under-consumption: 
“Everywhere appear excessive powers of production, excessive 
capital in search of investment… The growth of production… 
exceeds the growth in consumption, that more goods can be sold 
at a profit, and that more capital exists than can find 
remunerative investment” (ibid., p.81) 
Hobson emphasises the fact that it is specifically a problem of under-consumption; 
that it is the refusal of those with “consuming power” to use that power in the 
consumption of commodities (ibid., p.82). Hobson emphasises it is a steadfast 
refusal to consume (and, in fact, a strong desire to save and invest) rather than a 
                                               
48 Interestingly, Hobson characterises all forms of government as suffering from this “commonest 
disease”; that is, fractionalism. As such, it can be argued that Hobson provides an instrumentalist 
understanding of the state. However, since most theories of imperialism stem from theories of the 
state, they tend to provide structuralist or fractionalist/instrumentalist understandings of 
imperialism. 
49 Again, quite interestingly, Hobson’s description of those who control financial capital is overtly 
anti-Semitic. 
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systemic quality of capitalism to tend towards over-production.50 
“It is, of course, possible that an excess of producing power may 
exist in particular industries by misdirection… But no one can 
seriously contend that such misdirection explains the recurrent 
gluts and consequent depressions of modern industry” (ibid.) 
Hobson makes a point that if labour is limited, and if saving is unresponsive 
to changes in the rate of interest, and if production methods remain static, then it is 
possible for the excessive saving, as a part of under-consumption, to lead to a 
depression. Therefore, imperialism is the natural product of a domestic pressure 
from capital to find foreign markets in which to invest and sell commodities, using 
the resources of the state to secure these markets (ibid., p.79). It is this 
manifestation of some form of over-accumulation which characterises both 
‘classical’ and newer theories of imperialism, whether it takes the form of Hobson’s 
under-consumption (which is rather a reflection of an over-production) crisis or 
Luxemburg’s (1963) notion of the lack of effective demand, or even Harvey’s (2003) 
acknowledgement of the need to provide ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ to capitalism’s 
tendency toward over-accumulation (whether it take the form of surplus money, 
commodity or productive forms).  
Hobson’s analysis rests on two main problematic concepts. Firstly, his 
fractionalist approach instrumentalises the state and so treats the state simply as a 
tool of the interests of a particular section of the dominant class; in this case, the 
financiers of capital. This approach ignores the structural aspects (being agentially-
focused) and so can be critiqued that it divorces the state from the society within 
which it exists. 
Secondly, Hobson’s understanding of the crisis that drives an imperialist 
agenda as one specifically of under-consumption is erroneous. While under-
                                               
50 Under-consumption, in this instance, is best understood as a choice made by consumers not to 
purchase but to save their money and therefore it is not inherent to capitalist social relations. 
Overproduction, on the other hand, is understood as an inherent tendency within capitalist social 
relations to produce more goods than can ultimately be consumed. This therefore further 
characterizes Hobson’s conception of under-consumption as a crisis exogenous to capitalism. 
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consumption may well be a feature of a crisis, it is symptomatic of, and reflects, a 
more fundamental crisis, that is an over-production crisis. Indeed, the notion that a 
crisis is inherently one of under-consumption is criticised by Hilferding (1981, p.256) 
who notes, “It does not follow at all, therefore, that a crisis in capitalist production is 
caused by the underconsumption of the masses which is inherent in it. A crisis could 
just as well be brought about by a too rapid increase in consumption, or by a static 
or declining production of capital goods.” Rather, Hilferding developed the notion of 
disproportionality to explain the development of the latest ‘phase’ of capitalism. 
Perhaps the originator of the Marxist approach to imperialism was Rudolf 
Hilferding who, although not developing a paradigm of imperialism, laid the 
foundations for Marxist understanding of the concept.51 Hilferding’s imperialism was 
inextricably linked to the notion of monopoly; a very small group of producers of a 
certain commodity within a single market (nationally constituted), as well as the 
unification of fractions of capital: financial, commercial and industrial capitals into 
‘finance capital’ (controlled mainly by bankers). This was generally the framework 
from which all subsequent authors on imperialism would develop their approaches. 
Hilferding (ibid., p.319), describing the ultimate expression of monopoly 
capitalism, and in fact the latest phase of capitalism, suggests that it is capital’s 
reliance on the state to remove barriers to accumulation that provide the basis for 
imperial expansion: 
“As has always been the case, when capital first encounters 
conditions which contradict its need for valorization, and could 
only be overcome much too slowly and gradually by purely 
economic means, it has recourse to the power of the state and 
uses it for forcible expropriation in order to create the required 
free wage proletariat” (ibid.) 
Hilferding also maintains that while capitalism, as a social relation, may exist 
                                               
51 While Hilferding’s approach certainly laid a foundation for a thorough analysis of imperialism, his 
approach focuses principally on the unification of capital within the ‘metropolis’ rather than on an 
analysis of relationships between states. It is perhaps Bukharin and Lenin who truly develop 
‘theories’ of imperialism, though their reliance on Hilferding’s work is abundantly clear. 
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everywhere, it is only when the state associated with an ‘export capital’ is in control 
of a territory that the process of surplus value extraction is at its most efficient. 
“This explains why all capitalists with interests in foreign countries 
call for a strong state whose authority will protect their interests 
even in the most remote corners of the globe, and for showing 
the national flag everywhere so that the flag of trade can also be 
planted everywhere. Export capital feels most comfortable, 
however, when its own state is in complete control of the new 
territory, for capital exports from other countries are then 
excluded, it enjoys a privileged position, and its profits are more 
or less guaranteed by the state. Thus the export of capital also 
encourages an imperialist policy.” (ibid., p.320) 
It is this concept of ‘export capital’ that binds Hilferding’s concept of 
imperialism together. It is a little unclear how capital can feel ‘comfortable’ in 
Hilferding’s work and he also seems to be referring to individual capitalists. This hint 
of an elite theory, bordering on instrumentalism, is a strong theme within 
Hilferding’s work. Indeed, Hilferding makes it very clear that the unification of 
capital is only made possible through the “personal union” of influential capitalists. 
“A circle of people emerges who, thanks to their own capital 
resources or to the concentrated power of outside capital which 
they represent (in the case of bank directors), become members 
of the boards of directors of numerous corporations. There 
develops in this way a kind of personal union, on one side among 
the various corporations themselves, and on the other, between 
the corporations and the bank.” (ibid., pp.119-120) 
Subsequent to this personal union, and the creation of a new ‘ruling class’ of 
capitalists (with unified interests), Hilferding, although not going so far as 
subsequent authors52, did also note a change in the relationship between capitalists 
                                               
52 Bukharin (2003) and Lenin (1934), for example, see the state as more or less an instrument of a 
very small group of monopoly capitalists. 
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and the state, in that it became much more intimate and direct (Brewer 1990, 
p.106). 
While there are a great number of similarities and overlaps within the works 
of authors on classical imperialism, it is possible to characterize Marxists like 
Hilferding, Lenin and Luxemburg as historical periodisers, in that they identify 
imperialism as a necessary stage in capitalist development. However, Hobson, along 
with Marxists such as Kautsky avoids this problem in that he considers imperialism if 
not a ‘perversion’ of capitalism, then at least a policy undertaken by states, and, in 
fact, not a pre-determined form of capitalism. Indeed, Lenin (1934, p.142) quotes 
Kautsky on this very issue, 
“Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, 
ultraimperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation 
of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of 
the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new 
phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? 
Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this 
question.” 
Lenin vehemently disagreed with Kautsky on this point, arguing that it was 
inconceivable that Kautsky could be right since states developed unevenly in 
capitalism and, therefore, national interests were constantly shifting and there could 
be no stable ‘ultraimperialist’ policy, only the conflict of the imperial stage of capital 
(ibid.). Hobson can be accused of the same error as all of the Marxist authors. While 
he espouses an instrumentalist view of the state (one controlled by the financiers of 
capital), Marxist authors also accept this analysis. However, while Hobson has a 
strictly political approach, one that focuses more on the political causes of 
imperialism (though acknowledging an economic ‘taproot’ to imperialism), the 
Marxist authors can be accused of being overly structuralist, focusing on economic 
factors to the exclusion of political ones, and developing a deterministic and 
systemic view of imperialism. 
 The ‘second wave’ of theories of imperialism occurred in the 1970s and is 
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generally synonymous with Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory (Brewer 
1990, p.161), and developed from Leninist ideas of uneven development.53 These 
theories characterised the world economy according to zones of development: core, 
semi-periphery and periphery with surplus value being channelled from periphery 
to core states. As with many other Marxist theories of imperialism, this second wave 
was systemic in approach and focused on the structural causes of imperialism rather 
than any agential reason. The value of these approaches lies in their 
conceptualisation of capitalism as an inherently global social form and the emphasis 
upon understanding the state as a part of this system; however, it is the system that 
finds the focus within second wave theories of imperialism with the state 
analytically subordinate to the structure of international capital. This 
conceptualisation of the state and the teleological/determinist notion of 
development accept a species-form understanding of the state. 
The most recent wave of thought on imperialism has occurred within the last 
twenty years. The ‘New Imperialism’54, as it has been termed, focuses solely on 
developments within the current configuration of the international state system, 
particularly the behaviour of the United States. While there are a variety of 
approaches within this new wave of imperialism, they tend to agree that 
imperialism as it exists today is qualitatively different to the imperialism of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries and that there now exists a new stage of imperialism, 
historically distinct from those that preceded it – one that eschews conquest and 
the seizure of territory traditionally associated with imperialism in favour of soft 
power and the adherence to shared values.55 Unusually with this new wave of study 
on the topic, there are divided normative approaches to imperialism. While classical 
imperialism and dependency theories both viewed imperialism as immoral, there 
exists division in ‘New Imperialism’ as to whether this is the case. Particularly 
noteworthy is the work of Michael Ignatieff (2003) whose idea of the “humanitarian 
                                               
53 See, inter alia, Cohen (1973), Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1989), Amin (1974), Frank (1978; 1980), 
Frank & Gills (1993), Arrighi (1994). 
54 See, inter alia, Harvey (1999; 2003), Ignatieff (2003), Hardt & Negri (2000) 
55
 There is a lack of clarity in the literature over where the novelty of ‘new imperialism’ actually lies: 
is it a description of a qualitatively different imperialism as it exists today, a new approach to the 
study of imperialism, or both? (Kettell, forthcoming). 
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empire” leads him to argue that such imperial escapades as the 2003 Iraq War were 
a good thing. Such approaches tend to overemphasise the ideological factors of 
imperialism and so ignore, or at least, diminish the economic factors of imperialism. 
Harvey’s account (2003, p.116) of the ‘new’ imperialism provides an 
excellent understanding of how states seek to avoid or resolve blockages within 
circuits of capital, and how states act to resolve these problems. Harvey argues, in 
line with other imperialist scholars, that if surpluses of capital cannot be put to 
productive use then they must be sent to another region or state to be valorised 
there, else capital is destroyed. However, the same logic dominates in sending 
capital elsewhere: the ‘receiving’ region/state must possess means of payment or 
commodities to exchange. However, if this is not the case then other options must 
be sought. 
“If the territory does not possess reserves or commodities to 
trade back, it must either find them (as Britain forced India to do 
by opening up the opium trade with China in the nineteenth 
century and thus extracting Chinese silver via Indian-grown 
opium) or be given credit or aid. In the latter case a foreign 
territory is lent or donated the money with which to buy the 
surplus commodities generated at home… Market and credit 
transactions of this sort can alleviate problems of 
overaccumulation within a particular territory, at least in the 
short term. They function well under conditions of uneven 
geographical development in which surpluses available in one 
territory are matched by lack of supply elsewhere.” (Harvey 2003, 
pp.116-118) 
 Harvey’s presentation of the multifarious nature of state action within global 
capitalism is useful in developing a theory of imperialism, and goes some way 
towards presenting an open understanding of capitalist social relations. While 
Harvey’s account here suggests that imperialism, as a strategy of state intervention, 
is timeless and not periodisable, his account of capitalism entering a post-modern 
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‘phase’, and of contemporary examples of imperialism being somehow qualitatively 
‘new’ are difficult to reconcile with an open Marxist approach to imperialism. 
Hardt and Negri (2000) term the new imperialism as simply ‘Empire’ and 
criticise the American-centric approach of both Harvey and Ignatieff.56 To Hardt and 
Negri (p.xii), Empire is a decentralised and deterritorialised global power structure 
and is a new form of sovereignty within which no state, not even the United States, 
can adopt the mantle of the imperial power, or be the centre of an imperial system 
(although they consider the United States to occupy a privileged position within 
Empire). To them, “imperialism is over” (ibid., p.xiv). Their conception of Empire has 
four key points: firstly, Empire encompasses the entire world, it has no territorial 
boundaries; secondly, Empire represents itself as existing in perpetuity and, as it has 
no spatial borders, nor does it have temporal boundaries; thirdly, Empire operates 
on all levels of society; fourthly, Empire is an extremely bloody business but 
represents itself as a perpetual peace (ibid., p.xv). While Empire offers a compelling 
argument for a contemporary understanding of imperialism, it offers little to work 
with. Empire is, in effect, a synonym for capitalism and offers very little beyond that 
– other theories accept capitalism as having these features and provide theoretical 
accounts of the state, which is entirely lacking in Empire. Furthermore, Hardt and 
Negri’s conception of this capitalism seems based on an acceptance of David Harvey 
(2003) and Fredric Jameson’s (1991) arguments that capitalism has entered a 
postmodern stage, which is problematic for reasons of historical periodisation. 
The literature on the nature of inter-state competition within open Marxism 
does not explicitly discuss imperialism, other than to dismiss traditional approaches 
as indulgences in historical periodization (Clarke 1992, p.149). For example, Lenin’s 
conception of imperialism as the “highest stage” of capitalism is considered and 
critiqued on this basis. As with the state, the issue between form-species and form 
as mode-of-existence can be applied to the concept of imperialism. As other Marxist 
                                               
56 Antonio Negri has written within open Marxist scholarship, and is a proponent of autonomist 
Marxism with which open Marxism is associated. His work in Empire represents a genuine continuity 
with certain themes within open Marxism, particularly notions of capitalism as an inherently global 
social form, but significantly dissonant in other regards, particularly his rejection of the state as a 
unit of analysis in imperialism. 
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authors have used the concept of imperialism, they have often understood 
imperialism as a ‘species’ of capitalism, thus turning it into a ‘stage’ of capitalism, or 
even into a ‘type’ of state. Open Marxism, in its application of form as mode-of-
existence, avoids this dilemma: 
“Once the relation between structure and struggle is seen in 
terms of form as mode-of-existence one can never return to ideas 
of the development of capitalism on the basis of distinct stages… 
(as in Lenin)… Dialectics comes into its own as the critique of, 
precisely, such a division into stages. Critique comes into its own 
dialectically, as inherent in the movement of contradiction and, 
so, an open Marxism is able to demystify the notion of times in a 
forceful way” (Bonefeld et al., 1992a, p.xvii) 
However, the language, logic and argument are present within the literature 
to easily draw out an idea of imperialism that is very much in keeping with open 
Marxist theory. It is necessary to understand the relations between states in order 
to typify and understand the phenomenon of imperialism as it is to be used within 
this thesis. 
Imperialism is manifest through the international behaviour of the state and 
its competition with other states. If we take the state to be a form of capitalist social 
relations, then we can conclude that its survival requires the continuation of these 
relations, “it is therefore not just a state in a capitalist society, but a capitalist state, 
since its own continued existence is tied to the promotion of the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations as a whole” (Holloway 1994, p.28). However, it is not the 
case that a national state can exist simply on the reproduction of global capital, 
capital reproduction must occur within its territory (ibid., p.34). The emphasis, in 
this regard must be placed on the relation of capital to the national state, as 
Holloway (ibid., p.33) observes, this “is a relation of a nationally fixed state to a 
globally mobile capital”. Since capital is inherently mobile, states must seek it out in 
order to immobilise it, they must actively promote conditions favouring the 
reproduction of capital. This is the basis for the phenomenon of imperialism. 
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Certain notions of imperialism conceived of states exploiting each other, thus 
creating ‘classes’ of states: core and periphery states.57 This is a conclusion that 
stems from an analysis that takes the superficial view of states as political entities 
exogenous to capitalist social relations – the state in capitalist society; in essence, 
this divorces the political from the economic and denies the logic of the state as a 
capitalist state.58 Through understanding the essential unity of the capitalist social 
form, and the state as a political moment within the capitalist mode of production, 
it becomes clear, as Holloway (ibid., p.34) notes, that the competition between the 
specific, national forms of the state is not, as previous theories of imperialism have 
characterised them, as competitions between ‘national capitals’ but rather it is a 
contest to attract and then immobilise capital within their territories so as to retain 
a share of global surplus value. This can take the form of acting to develop 
conditions that favour the reproduction of capital within the boundaries of a state 
but, also, “capital may accumulate in the territory of one national state as the result 
of the exploitation of labour in the territory of another state – as in the case of 
colonial or neo-colonial situations” (ibid., p.35). Ultimately, this is how relative 
positions within the inter-state system are formed; relationships of supremacy and 
subordination are founded upon a state’s ability to attract and immobilise capital 
within its territory (by whatever means). 
Imperialism then is the action of one state to dominate another to its own 
advantage. It is not a historical period of capitalism, nor a type of state, nor, as 
Gallagher and Robinson (1953, p.1) have shown, is it something that can be 
constituted only as a formal ‘empire’. The origin of imperialism lies in the crisis-
                                               
57 For example, Lenin (1934), Wallerstein (1974), Frank (1979) 
58 To understand state competition in terms of states exploiting other states would be erroneous. 
While states seek to deprive other states of surplus value by attracting and immobilising capital 
within their own boundaries, this is not a fundamentally exploitative relationship despite the 
historically developed inequalities of the inter-state system. Indeed all states are fundamentally a 
part of the global capitalist mode of production. Without this mode of production, the national form 
of the state could not exist, nor without the state could the capitalist mode of production exist. The 
very nature of this competition ensures the existence of the circuit of capital (the reproduction and 
self-valorisation of capital) and thus the existence of the state; therefore, the notion of inter-state 
exploitation is difficult to reconcile with an open Marxist understanding of the state. As Holloway 
(1994, p.35) notes, “exploitation is not the exploitation of poor countries by rich countries but of 
global labour by global capital, and the bipolarity is not a centre-periphery bipolarity but a bipolarity 
of class, a bipolarity in which all states, by virtue of their very existence as states dependent on the 
reproduction of capital, are located at the capitalist pole.”  
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prone nature of capitalism, as an attempt by one state to improve conditions for 
accumulation within its own territory, as a means of removing barriers to 
accumulation by ‘foreign adventure’, whether this is through the extraction of raw 
materials, access to cheap labour, as a means of controlling markets, or to open 
markets for domestic goods. Its use in this thesis is to explain the relationship 
between Britain and Malaya, to explain how Britain used Malaya to limit, if not 
resolve, the effects of a global economic crisis manifest as a currency shortage. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to develop an approach that would fit within the gap 
provided by the first chapter of this thesis. That is, a critical approach able to avoid 
the problems faced by positivistic approaches, and able to conceptualise the key 
elements of the empirical focus for this thesis: crisis, the state and imperialism. The 
most appropriate theory that takes into account all of these ideas is Marxism, and 
provides a unified and totalising account of these ideas within one paradigm. 
 An account of the capitalist mode of production was provided and argued, 
referencing Marx and Marxist authors, that capitalist social relations are inherently 
crisis prone, tending especially towards crises of overproduction, and ended on the 
point that these crises have to be tackled by the state. The section on the state 
provided a broad overview of the literature on Marxist state theory, covering the 
debate over the form, function and organisation of the state. This section showed 
that conceptions of the state provided by structuralist, instrumentalist, fractionalist, 
or strategic-relational accounts were limited and ultimately superseded by a more 
sophisticated and robust conception of the state. 
 The chapter then offered an overview of open Marxism, which provides an 
account of the state as a form of social relations, best understood in capitalist 
society as a concentration of bourgeois society, or as a political ‘moment’ within 
global capitalist social relations. This conception of the state sees the state act to 
resolve crises and blockages within the circuit of capital, acting in the interests of 
capital-in-general. The state acts to reproduce capitalist social relations, as this is its 
essential being and the constitution of its form. 
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 Open Marxism’s means of achieving these conclusions prohibits the 
understanding of the state by any means that alienates the abstract from the 
concrete or the political from the economic, thus avoiding ‘typologies’ of states. This 
use of the concept of form also prohibits the division of capitalism into stages. 
Therefore notions of imperialism cannot depend on references to concepts like ‘the 
empire’, or ‘the imperial state’, or consider imperialism as a stage of capitalism. 
 Imperialism is then best understood as a policy of a state intended to resolve 
crises emerging from the unstable and fractious nature of capitalism. While it is 
possible to consider imperialism as the exploitation of one state by another state, 
this is to reify the state, conceiving of the state as something that can be exploited. 
This is erroneous and this chapter rejects the idea that one state can exploit 
another; however, certainly, this chapter does accept that one state can dominate or 
influence another’s policies and affairs to benefit its own, and to resolve the crises 
that beset the circuit of capital. This does not entail a ‘one-way’ understanding of 
imperialism and makes room for the notion that a state can benefit from being 
dominated by an imperial power. Indeed, this provides a broad account of 
imperialism that does not offer an austere conception of imperial activity.59 As such, 
while conditioned by the task of state managers to ensure the success of capital 
valorisation both domestically and internationally, an imperial relationship still 
remains an open and dynamic relationship that is characterised by both 
opportunities and constraints that condition the behaviours of all states involved. 
Thus this chapter concludes that an open Marxist analysis of the state and 
the contradictory nature of capitalist social relations, cultivating elements of 
imperialism from within open Marxism, can provide a sophisticated framework for 
this thesis. Indeed, it is the examination of exactly these factors that provides 
analytical value for this thesis. Furthermore, given the gaps within the literature, 
argued in the first chapter, it can also be concluded that there exists room for open 
                                               
59 As such, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that an open Marxist theory of imperialism can account 
for the variety of manifestations of imperialism that currently exist: holding territory, influencing 
political and economic decisions, extracting resources, a means of resolving crises, preparing states 
for absorption into global capitalism through development, as a location for the consumption of 
unproductive capital, and the control of particularly important markets and goods. 
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Marxism to provide a contribution to an issue in British history that had previously 
lacked a sustained critical analysis.60 
 The following chapter will provide a background to the main narrative of the 
thesis, featuring historical accounts of British relative economic decline, the Sterling 
Area, and Malaya’s historical relationship with Britain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Pre-War British Economy, the Sterling Area and 
the Colony of Malaya 
The chapter will provide an overview of the political economy of Britain during the 
first half of the 20th Century, focusing on Britain’s position in the global capitalist 
                                               
60 It is worth mentioning that there are very few sustained empirical applications of open Marxism. 
These studies using open Marxism tend to focus solely on the British state in the 20th century and 
use the concept of depoliticisation to apply the abstract ideas of open Marxism to a case study 
(Burnham 1994, 2003; Kettell 2004; Rogers 2012, forthcoming). This has been the subject of 
comment by Bieler, Bruff & Morton (2010) but seems more of an opportunity than a criticism. 
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economy and its continued relative economic decline. The chapter will also provide 
historical accounts of both the Sterling Area and Malaya. This chapter intends to 
provide a historical background to, and so contextualise, the thesis’ main narrative 
in the subsequent chapters. In so doing, it is the intention of this chapter to avoid 
the periodisation of history into artificial (and arbitrary) epochs, as well as to 
illustrate that the nature of the post-war relationship between Britain and Malaya 
finds its origins in Britain’s relative economic decline. 
The chapter will begin with an overview of Britain’s relative economic 
decline since the end of the 19th century. The chapter will then provide a summary 
of the Sterling Area, its origins in Britain’s economic problems, and as an attempt to 
remedy them in the inter- and post-war periods. This will include elaboration of the 
Sterling Area as a discriminatory trading block, the existence of the ‘dollar pool’ 
within the Area, and Britain’s position as ‘treasurer’ within this organisation. 
The final section of the chapter will give a summary of the historic 
relationship between Malaya and Britain from Malaya’s incorporation into the 
British Empire in the 19th century. This portion of the chapter will focus on Malaya’s 
place in the Sterling Area, the role of Malaya as an exporter of high value 
commodities, and, principally, Malaya’s status as the principal net dollar contributor 
to the Sterling Area dollar pool, and its subsequent importance during the global 
dollar shortage. 
3.1 Relative Economic Decline 
Britain’s economic problems after the Second World War were the continuation of a 
pre-war trend, a fundamental capitalist crisis; an overproduction crisis within the 
global economy. In the immediate post-war period, this began to manifest as 
disequilibrium in production and trade between Western and Eastern hemispheres, 
and then taking the form of a foreign currency (dollar) shortage. Britain sought 
dollars through US aid, and also from the Sterling Area. Specifically, the dollars from 
the Sterling Area were earned mainly through the sale of Malayan rubber and tin to 
dollar markets. As such, Malaya was crucial not to solving Britain’s currency shortage 
but, rather, to ameliorating it until a more durable means of resolving the global 
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crisis of overproduction could be put into place.61  
 However, Britain itself was suffering from a more long-standing economic 
problem than the broader global crisis; one that had, in fact, characterised the 
British economy since the end of the 19th century. Britain was suffering from relative 
economic decline due to a reliance on heavy industry and a lack of global 
competitiveness in those industries. While the dollar shortage that characterised 
the immediate post-war period was one of Britain’s foremost economic concerns at 
the time, it would be improper to exclude from this chapter an overview of the 
chronic economic ailment from which Britain suffered during the late 19th century 
and onwards which provided the conditions for the postwar currency crisis. 
The economic situation Britain suffered after the Second World War can be 
traced back to the relative economic decline of Britain, beginning in the late 19th 
century. David Coates (1994, p.249) acknowledges three features of British 
economic decline: “the dwindling competitiveness in world markets of UK-based 
manufacturing industry; the diminished capacity of many of those industries for 
technological and organisational dynamism and innovation; and the resulting loss of 
manufacturing employment of a ‘negative’ kind”.62  
  Kettell (2004, p.5), emphasising the role of the state and labour discontent, 
contends British relative economic decline can be best characterised by “a growing 
dependency on industries of diminishing international importance, and a 
progressive rise in labour dissatisfaction and radicalism.” Further, he argues that 
these problems were exacerbated by the First World War, leading to “a politicisation 
of economic conditions and policy-making, and which raised the expectations of 
capital and labour as to what the postwar state could be expected to achieve” 
(ibid.). 
Hobsbawm (1999), while noting that relative decline was inevitable as a 
statistical phenomenon (Britain was bound to decline relatively as other countries 
industrialised rapidly), argues that the ensuing loss of impetus and efficiency was 
                                               
61
 That is, the reconstruction and restructuring of the British economy. 
62 By ‘negative’, Coates means that unemployment has been caused not by improved production 
methods but through a loss of market share by British firms. 
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not inevitable. Britain failed to adapt to new conditions not because it was unable 
but because there was no desire to do so. Indeed, as Hobsbawm (ibid., p.156) 
argues, while there may have been innovation and entrepreneurial drive in other 
industrialising countries, “however strongly the winds of change blew elsewhere, as 
soon as they crossed the Channel to Britain they grew sluggish”. How and why this 
economic malaise occurred (that is, why Britain fell behind its rivals) is a significant 
question in British economic history and, while it is possible to characterise the 
relative decline, explanations of the phenomenon remain generally unsatisfactory.63 
The conservatism of British capital has been attributed to the peculiar 
character of the English ‘bourgeois revolution’ or, as Nairn (1964, p.20) has declared 
it, the revolution “which did not happen” in England. As argued by Nairn (1964) and 
Anderson (1964), due to this “ incomplete revolution” and a subsequent 
amalgamation between feudal aristocracy and capitalist bourgeoisie, the “English 
capitalist class… was conservative from the outset” (Nairn 1964, p.21). While this is 
a predominantly elitist model of British economic malaise (as well as of the British 
state and society), it is an argument based on the ideology of that elite. Dintenfass  
(1992) concurs with this point, arguing that British capitalists had always held a 
fundamentally aristocratic set of values: they preferred the country club to the 
factory. Dintenfass (ibid.) provides the statistic that in 1904 88% of newly registered 
companies in Britain were privately (not publicly) registered and from 1911-1913, 
the figure was 83%, providing about 80% of economic output by 1914. As such, he 
suggests that the lack of close links between financial and industrial capital as 
existed in Europe was indicative of an absence of entrepreneurial spirit in the British 
bourgeoisie. This anti-entrepreneurialism can also be attributed to the aristocratic 
values adopted by the bourgeoisie. However, this also tends towards an argument 
for British exceptionalism that goes beyond that of the ‘first starter’ problem, which 
led E.P. Thompson (1965, p.312) to accuse both Nairn and Anderson of “inverted 
                                               
63 Both Dintenfass and Hobsbawm acknowledge that current accounts of British relative economic 
decline remain incomplete and unconvincing. Dintenfass (1992, p.71) himself states, “There is a 
great deal of work to be done”. For further accounts of British political economy in this period, see, 
inter alia, Elbaum and Lazonick (1987), Langan and Schwarz (1985), Youngson (1960). 
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Podsnappery”.64 However, a charitable interpretation of the Nairn-Anderson thesis 
would be that it offers an account of how capitalism developed in Britain, rather 
than arguing that Britain is characterised by a peculiar species of capitalism.65 
Bearing that in mind, Perry Anderson (1987, p.71) emphasises Britain’s problems as 
a first-starter: 
“The fundamental origin of the decline of British capitalism lay in 
its initial priority. As the historical first-comer, British 
industrialisation arrived without deliberate design, and triumphed 
without comparable competitors. British manufacturing acquired 
its shape unawares, from modest immediate constituents: just as 
it won world hegemony with no strategic plan, but simply from 
the spontaneous force of its own chronological lead – within the 
framework of an English commercial imperialism which preceded 
it. The easy dominance that British industry achieved in the first 
half of the 19th century laid down certain durable lines of 
development… *which+… once set… became progressively greater 
handicaps in competition with later industrial economies.” 
Nairn and Anderson’s arguments also served to explain the alleged 
corporatist ideology of the working class. Due to the amalgamation of aristocracy 
and bourgeoisie, the emergent working class had no distinct class or rival ideology 
to ‘oppose’ and so had never developed a comprehensive ideology of its own. As 
such, Britain’s working class had remained disunited and limited to craft-trade 
unionism. However, Thompson responded that this was false: working class 
consciousness had actually found expression through the election of Labour 
governments. Indeed, Poulantzas (1967, p.74) goes some way towards agreeing with 
Thompson in this regard by suggesting that anybody wishing to study the British 
working class would be better off looking towards an analysis of the Labour party 
                                               
64 While Nairn and Anderson can both be accused of exceptionalism, this also leads to a further 
accusation of idealism. That is, their arguments for British exceptionalism rest on an ideal-typical 
conception of the development of capitalism. 
65 Poulantzas (1967) defends Nairn and Anderson’s work from Thompson on this basis, as both 
historicist and subjectivist. 
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rather than any conception of a dominant class-consciousness. An open Marxist 
approach of course, would welcome emphasis on class struggle in an analysis of 
British political economy but the sectional interests of Trade Unions and the Elitist 
model required by an analysis of the Labour party would not necessarily constitute 
class struggle as understood by open Marxism; however, this is a contentious 
claim.66 
With a commitment to the liberal state model still dominating political 
discourse in Britain, and therefore with state intervention extremely limited, 
unemployment became a serious concern with the rate not dropping below 10% 
from 1921 to 1939 and reaching a peak of 22.1% in 1932, at almost 3 million 
workers (HMSO 1940). A report by Edward Hilton-Young, the Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury, to the Cabinet in 1921, identified the global nature of the economic 
problems at the time but also noted the specific problems that affected the UK. 
“The most important immediate influence in Great Britain is the 
relatively high cost of production caused mainly by the higher 
rate of wages. There is no short cut for avoiding the necessary 
process of adjusting costs to those of our competitors. 
Readjustment however may be expedited by more widespread 
understanding of the economic situation, and it is of fundamental 
importance that no scheme of relief should hinder this process.” 
(TNA CAB23/27, Cabinet Meeting Conclusions, 6th October 1921) 
 Labour dissatisfaction and a lack of international competitiveness in British 
industry were key factors in the relative decline of the British economy. By the 
beginning of the 20th century, Britain’s share of global manufacturing had fallen from 
around a third to only a sixth, its share of world trade had gone from 25% to 14%, 
and it was rated 9th in the world for economic growth and 10th for productivity 
(Kettell 2004, p.42). Labour unrest reached a peak of 160 million working days in 
1926, during the General Strike of that year, with 90% of that from work stoppages 
                                               
66
 See Bonefeld et al. (1992a; 1992b; 1995) for elaboration on the open Marxist account of class 
struggle. Further, see Kettell (2004) for an open Marxist analysis of exchange rate policy-making in 
this period, with an emphasis on class struggle and trade union activity. 
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in the coal industry alone (British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1886-1968; 
HMSO 1940). Furthermore, between 1918 and 1921 GDP per capita fell by 24% and 
in 1926 GDP per capita was lower than it had been in 1906 (HMSO 1940). However, 
British decline was also manifest in an area that had previously seen Britain 
maintaining an absolute advantage over other countries: international finance. 
While Britain’s financial system was investing in the industries of competitor 
countries, competition for Britain’s financial dominance was also emerging. By 1870 
Britain’s annual investments has begun to exceed her net capital formation at home: 
the City was making more money from the UK’s industrial competitors than from 
the UK itself. Furthermore, Marcello de Cecco (1974, p.103) notes that the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries saw Britain’s hegemonic financial role diminishing and, 
despite London’s unchallenged dominance in the international financial system prior 
to this, “the general characteristic of the period is the cumulative loss of importance 
on the part of Britain” to emergent financial centres such as Paris, Berlin and New 
York. 
               Coates (1994) and Stafford (1989) both emphasise the problem of 
cumulative causation with regard to British relative economic decline – that the 
origins of weakness and strength lie at some earlier point – and so, while it is 
necessary to understand the origins of relative decline, it is also necessary to 
emphasise change. Coates (1994, p.266) uses this to invoke a Marxist analysis of 
British relative economic decline. By stressing the contradictions within capitalism, 
he argues, in a similar fashion to Anderson (1987), that it was within Britain’s own 
early successes as a first-starter that led to its relative economic decline. 
 The dominance of the liberal state model prevented the state from 
intervening in the processes of capital to resolve the barriers to accumulation that 
had occurred. However, this began to change between the two world wars. The 
immediate post-war response by British state managers was to reassert the liberal 
state model. By bringing Britain back onto the Gold Standard in 1925 at an 
overvalued rate (at the prewar rate of $4.86), state managers sought to impose 
deflationary discipline on Britain’s economy and so (was the intention) to “put 
pressure on capital and labour engaged in the staple trades to reduce wage costs, 
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adopt more efficient methods of production, and to move into newer and higher 
quality lines of production more attuned to the changing demands of the world 
market” (Kettell 2004, pp.77-80).67  
However, the purpose of the return to the Gold Standard was not simply to 
place competitive rigour on the British economy but also to maintain the liberal 
state model. Even after the final collapse of the Gold Standard, British state 
managers sought to return to the liberal model, characterised by desires to “contain 
class unrest within politically safe limits, to provide favourable conditions for capital 
accumulation while sustaining pressure for improved competitiveness and economic 
adjustment, and to minimise the state’s directly visible involvement with the 
economy” (ibid., p.117). 
The interwar period was characterised by “the most fundamental tendency 
of the capitalist mode of production”: commodity overproduction (Clarke 1999, 
p.71). As Burnham (1990, p.26) notes, the relative lack of productivity in Western 
Europe, the vast productive capacity and growth of North America and the 
subsequent demand for US goods led to a trade and a monetary crisis. Indeed, as 
Burnham also notes, this was not a shortage of foreign currency reserves per se, but 
rather a manifestation of disequilibrium in global production and trade (and the 
continuation of a crisis of overproduction).68 
 The origins of the disequilibrium in global trade and production that 
precipitated the shortage of dollars lay not solely in the structure of the British 
economy but cause also lay in the modes of capital accumulation. Before the war, it 
was clear that the UK and Western Europe were increasing their imports from the 
markets of North America, particularly the United States. This is in part due to the 
                                               
67
 This measure was also intended to impose discipline on financial capital too since the higher 
interest rates were intended to limit excessive lending, forcing the City to adopt more cautious 
practices (Kettell 2004, p.80) 
68 There is some question about the term ‘disequilibrium’ in this instance. If we consider the 
manifestation of this disequilibrium, or disproportionality, as a shortage of means of circulation, then 
we can comprehend the episode presented here as a crisis of overproduction. Given Clarke’s (1994, 
p.140) notion that disproportionality is not simply an imbalance of production but, due to the 
contradictions between value and use value, it can be best presented and understood as a crisis, or 
burgeoning or developing crisis, of overproduction. 
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development of the Fordist strategy of production.69 Characterised by extremely 
efficient mass production techniques, the realisation of the relationship between 
mass production and mass consumption (through the increase in workers’ wages), 
and attempts to homogenise the workforce to ensure an increase in the rate of 
labour exploitation, the Fordist model (in a massive internal market full of eager 
consumers) permitted enormous productivity growth. 
Compared to the prevailing production techniques of European firms, 
whose, as Burnham (1990, p.24) notes, “growth in output encountered recurrent 
obstacles and increases in capital stock did not alter existing production techniques 
thereby resulting in low productivity growth”, the Fordist regime of accumulation 
meant that the US had “an enormous advantage in most fields of industrial 
production” (ibid.). This was one of the factors in the change in the global supply of 
dollars. 
In the inter-war period, there occurred a global shortage of dollars caused by 
changes in the world supply of and demand for dollars: the vast productive power of 
the United States out-competed other economies who wished to purchase US goods 
but were unable to sell their own to the US. This was exacerbated by the Second 
World War, during which the US, isolated from mainland attack and deprived of 
many markets it did import from, expanded its economy to substitute a number of 
goods that it had previously imported. Demand for US manufactured goods (which 
accounted for one half of all US exports) had been stimulated since the US increased 
its competitiveness, in terms of both the quality of the goods and the cost of their 
manufacture, during the war.70 This applied to a very wide range of goods and this 
advantage was self-sustaining, as when new products were developed, they were 
brought into production more swiftly and more cheaply in the US (TNA T230/177, 
‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952). 
                                               
69 See Burnham (1990, pp.16-25), Jessop (1992) inter alia for a more thorough description. 
70 A further reason for the demand of US goods was the elasticity of output in the US and the 
relatively small fraction of output that exports represented to US producers. This meant that 
deliveries for orders were always very prompt. (TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 
1952) 
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World Supply and Use of Dollars 1925-1939 ($ millions) 
 Annual Averages 
Dollars supplied by the United States 1925-1929 1932-1933 1935-1939 
Imports 4331 1427 2554 
Public Financial Resources 11 7 16 
TOTAL of dollars supplied 6951 2030 3345 
TOTAL of other funds -558 455 1077 
TOTAL of dollars used by other countries 6393 2485 4422 
Fig. 1 (Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952) 
By the end of the 19th century, the US balance of payments had turned into 
surplus. From 1914, the balance of US trade had been in surplus every year, the 
smallest of which was $84m in 1936. Europe’s share of US imports had gone from 
50% before 1914 to 30% in the inter-war period to 15% by the end of the Second 
World War. The Americas, in the same time, had gone from 34% before 1914 to 58% 
after 1945. During the 1930s, the US’ overall surplus (due to the current account 
surplus and the influx of capital investment) was financed mainly by gold sales to the 
US.71 However, the net flow of gold to the US in the latter half of the 1930s actually 
exceeded world production, and did not resolve the underlying problem, and was 
therefore unsustainable. (ibid). Furthermore, with the beginning of the Second 
World War, Sterling was fixed to the dollar and the UK started to liquidate its dollar 
assets to support the war effort; however, this too was unsustainable and the 
balance of payments was adverse until the commencement of the Lend-Lease 
programme (BE C43/31, ‘Central Reserves’, 18th January 1951). 
                                               
71 The price of gold to the dollar was significantly increased by the devaluation of the dollar in 1933. 
(TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25
th
 June 1952) 
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The Geographic Distribution of United States Exports and Imports 1905 - 1950 
(%) 
 North America South America Europe Asia 
IMPORTS     
1905-1914 22 12 50 15 
1925-1929 24 13 30 30 
1932-1937 24 14 30 29 
1948-1950 36 22 15* 19 
EXPORTS     
1905-1914 20 4 66 6 
1925-1929 25 9 48 12 
1932-1937 23 8 45 17 
1948-1950 29 12 34 19 
Fig. 2 (Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952) 
The most major development in the global dollar shortage was its 
geographical shift: the period since the end of the 19th century had seen Europe’s 
share of the dollar supply dwindle, and North and South America’s share increase. 
Mainly, this was due to the isolation of the Americas during the two world wars, 
leading to a large degree of self-sufficiency but the US also found alternative sources 
of those primary goods in the Americas for which there still remained a large import 
demand in the US (e.g. petrol, aluminium, iron ore, coffee). Meanwhile, Europe and 
also the Sterling Area produced “goods for which home substitutes are developed in 
the United States or for which United States demand is weaker” (BE C43/31, ‘Central 
Reserves’, 18th January 1951). The Sterling Area, however, also provided to Britain a 
degree of support in the global shortage of dollars, allowing the UK and Area 
members to substitute a large number of goods that had previously been imported 
from the US, as well as providing the collective benefit of pooling convertible 
currencies in the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) to be rationed out by the UK 
according to need. 
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3.2 The Sterling Area 
The Sterling Area, as described by an unpublished Foreign Office paper, written by 
Allen Christelow, under-secretary to the Treasury, on the ‘official history’ of the area, 
was an institution comprising a group of countries with strong ties to the UK who 
found it “convenient to use the flexible financial mechanisms of the London capital 
market” (TNA FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950).72 Of course, this 
brief definition ignores the historical basis behind the Sterling Area, as well as the 
specific dynamics of the currency bloc. 
The traditional account of the origins of the Sterling Area in this official paper 
holds that they were concomitant with the extension of British sovereignty 
throughout the 19th century and the extension of the area within which Sterling was 
used as a means of exchange, and within which UK banks operated. The 
development of the London Money Market further extended the geographical range 
and purposes of the Sterling Area. Further, the position of Britain in international 
trade also meant most world trade was conducted in Sterling. Indeed, the official 
history of the Area maintained that the Sterling Area grew naturally as a result of 
Britain’s political and economic expansion, and subsequent laws ‘setting up’ the 
Sterling Area were merely official stamps of existence, rather than the genuine 
inception of the Area. (ibid.) 
Certainly, there is an element of truth to this perspective, as Britain 
expanded so were other countries incorporated into Britain’s political and economic 
influence. London banks established branches in foreign countries, mostly in British 
colonies. These branches tended to hold their reserves in London due to a variety of 
reasons (e.g. limited investment opportunities, or inadequate (or non-existent) 
central banking mechanisms). Due to similar reasons, smaller countries held their 
reserves in London also (these earned interest and were generally convertible on 
demand into gold at a fixed rate). In certain colonial cases, of which Malaya was one, 
this practise was formalised and regulated by currency authorities that held reserves 
                                               
72
 An entire list of Sterling Area countries would be exhaustive. The Sterling Area, from its true 
inception in 1939, consisted of the UK, all Dominions, save Canada, Newfoundland and Hong Kong 
(though Hong Kong joined in 1945), and the whole British Empire. 
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in gold but increasingly in Sterling. (ibid.) 
Before 1914, reserves in gold and convertible currencies were very small – 
they were simply an issue of maintaining essential working balances. Trade was 
largely conducted in sterling and it was only due to the UK’s strong trading and 
creditor position, as well as the ability to alter the Bank rate with its effect on the 
cost of lending and the money supply, that the UK could operate on such small 
reserves. If the balance of payments turned temporarily adverse (due to over-
lending or seasonal fluctuations), a rise in the base rate was enough to draw foreign 
funds to London and reduce London lending. This would lead to funds coming to 
London and sterling appreciating above the outward gold point. (BE C43/31, ‘Central 
Reserves’, 18th January 1951) 
Empire exporters generally asked for payment to be made in Sterling from 
foreign transactions. Foreign exchange grew in London; however, traders were not 
particularly conscious of this fact. When foreign exchange was received, it was 
swiftly sold for Sterling. Empire imports worked in a similar way: settlement was 
made through London in Sterling, and London lost foreign exchange or gold. 
“Colonial currencies are purely subsidiary currencies pegged to 
and fully backed by Sterling. The Colonies at present run no 
working balances of any particular size in currencies other than 
sterling and, except for marrying of buying and selling operations 
in other currencies, the banks have to clear transactions in non-
sterling currencies through London.” (BE OV65/4, ‘IMF – Malaya’, 
24th March 1952) 
The First World War brought a de facto end to the Gold Standard and, with 
it, a suspension of the obligation of the Bank of England to exchange gold on 
demand to foreign creditors. This obligation resumed in 1925 when Britain returned 
to the Gold Standard. From 1925-1930 (during the Gold Standard), the UK position 
became much weaker. A great deal of dollar investments had been disposed of, the 
unstable situation in Europe led to an outflow of capital from Europe to America 
(through Sterling), and social measures in the UK increased demand for food and 
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other consumables – most of which had to be imported from the dollar area. 
Sterling was under pressure in this period and was often at the gold point despite 
much less lending abroad. It was still the rule to trade in Sterling however. (BE 
C43/31, ‘Central Reserves’, 18th January 1951) 
Britain’s participation in the Gold Standard was abandoned in 1931, with 
Britain adopting a variable exchange rate, and subsequently this saw the final 
collapse of the Gold Standard. The abandonment of these systems led to the 
“Exchange Equalisation Account”-technique. The establishment of the Exchange 
Equalisation Account (EEA) meant that the Bank of England acknowledged no 
obligation to keep Sterling stable in terms of gold or any other foreign currency but 
would intervene to avoid violent fluctuations in the rate Sterling was quoted, which 
was around $3.50 (Kettell, 2004, p.115). However, Sterling was still freely 
convertible, there was no exchange control, and settlements between central banks 
were still made in gold. 
The decision of 1931 led to an ambiguous ‘Sterling Bloc’. Sterling was 
fluctuating, as were many other currencies and to avoid some of the more violent 
fluctuations, some countries opted to peg their currencies to Sterling (at different 
times and rates). These countries could be divided into two groups: countries that 
had long association with Sterling (the Empire and certain Dominions, Egypt, Iraq); 
and countries which chose to do this due to convenience (there is no clear 
distinction though the first group tended to have large Sterling reserves). (TNA 
FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950) 73 
In 1932, the British government passed the Import Duties Act, which 
imposed a flat rate tariff on all imports to the UK, except on raw materials and 
foodstuffs (McKay 1932). At the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in 1932, 
Britain sought to introduce a formalised Imperial Preference System.74 This resulted 
                                               
73 They had incentive therefore to peg their currencies to Sterling, to avoid depreciation (in terms of 
their own currencies) of their considerable holdings of Sterling. 
74
 This also led to an acceptance of Keynesian policies, as stated by the Conference conclusions: “His 
Majesty's Government nevertheless recognizes that an ample supply of short-term money at low 
rates may have a valuable influence, and they are confident that the efforts which have successfully 
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in a trading area approximating the British Empire and Dominions, which would 
have low, reciprocal tariffs for internal trade and high tariffs for any external trade 
outside of the area, the purpose of which was to ensure access to markets for British 
produce and to stimulate Commonwealth trade (Eichengreen & Irwin 1995, pp.2-
7).75 From 1932 until the start of the Second World War, the monetary system 
remained unchanged, as did Sterling’s role as an international currency, but the 
store of value had shifted. This led to a general favouring of gold reserves rather 
than Sterling, and unwillingness to commit to accumulation of Sterling without limit. 
Variations in the rate of exchange were accepted as a method of avoiding the 
depletion of reserves and preventing excessive accumulation (this was generally 
incompatible with the gold standard). The ending of the Gold Standard also led to 
Britain being forced to bargain bilaterally due to the lack of automatic equilibrating 
force. 
The Second World War led to a further change in definition, formalisation 
and restriction of the store of value, effectively creating what is now understood to 
be the Sterling Area. Britain had persistent budget deficits and so its position in the 
international economy changed significantly between 1914 and 1939. Due to the 
acceptance that Western hemisphere currencies would become increasingly vital 
and scarcer during the war, the first exchange controls were implemented in August 
1939. These exchange controls were copied throughout the Sterling Area and 
resulted in the Treasury maintaining a monopoly of all gold and stipulated foreign 
reserve payments within the Sterling Area (this prohibited payments to all non-
residents without permission of the Treasury, and allowed the Treasury “to exercise 
control over all securities marketable abroad and to compel their registration with a 
view to compulsory requisition by HMG”). This was the creation of the ‘dollar pool’ 
and the exact nature of the Sterling Area after the Second World War until its 
demise in 1972. (TNA FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950) 
                                                                                                                                     
brought about the present favourable monetary conditions can and will, unless unforeseen 
difficulties arise, be continued.” (cited in McKay 1932, p.881) 
75
 Indeed, this did happen; however, whether trade increased because of imperial preference or 
because of growing complementarity within the Empire and Dominions is not entirely clear 
(Eichengreen & Irwin 1995; Scholte 1952; Thorbeck 1960). 
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The introduction of the Defence (Finance) Regulations saw the legal 
emergence of the Sterling Area as a further means of exchange control.76 This gave 
the Sterling Area a formal geographic definition in law as the UK, the Isle of Man, all 
Dominions, Colonies and Mandated Territories save Canada, Newfoundland, and 
Hong Kong; it also included Iraq, Egypt and Sudan and Iceland. However, strictly 
speaking, membership was kept vague as UK law applied only to UK residents. 
Generally, members of the Sterling Area were expected to depreciate their currency 
against the dollar and maintain parity with Sterling; maintain foreign currency 
reserves as necessary; and to continue to buy and sell their gold and foreign 
exchange reserves in London. This was a continuation of an older practise; however, 
the ‘dollar pool’ was seen as new and that it had now become an essential part of 
the Sterling Area. (ibid.) 
There was freedom of payments within Sterling Area and Area members 
could also authorise the transfer of Sterling to non-members.77 A willingness to 
accept “restricted-use” Sterling (this was effectively a readiness on behalf of the 
recipient to accumulate Sterling) led to a “Special Accounts” status for non-SA 
members (e.g. Argentina) and was seen as a greater financial sacrifice than that of 
dollar deficit members (who had fewer restrictions on their use of Sterling). The 
“greatest problem of Sterling Area management” by the 1950s arose from the UK’s 
huge debts with the rest of the Area (ibid.). In 1938, London assets held by Sterling 
Area members stood at £216m, offset by substantial UK assets in members’ 
territories. In 1945, Sterling balances and short-term assets held by Sterling Area 
members were £2674m with much fewer offsetting liabilities. Further Sterling 
balances (to the tune of £600m) were held by countries outside of the Sterling Area 
who held ‘Special Accounts’ status (ibid.). 
 Exchange controls were generally designed to manage how Sterling was 
                                               
76 The legally defined Sterling Area (and its exchange controls) continued after the war; in 1947, the 
Exchange Control Act (ECA) gave the Defence (Finance) Regulations statutory form and the 
Treasury’s powers in the Sterling Area (particularly over British holdings of foreign securities) were 
increased. However, the ECA actually made no mention of the Sterling Area, instead it refers to “the 
scheduled territories” (though this was actually the same thing). 
77
 However, under Regulation 6 of the Defence (Finance) Regulations, it was still illegal to make an 
issue of capital in the United Kingdom without the consent of the Treasury. (TNA T266/53, Letter to 
CA Grossmith from MT Flett, 4
th
 January 1940) 
  103 
transferred (across various exchanges) into dollars. Sterling Area countries, however, 
maintained trading relations with numerous countries not in the dollar area and, as 
such, control agreements with these countries were necessary if exchange control 
was to be maintained.78 These early monetary agreements attempted to unite 
several objectives: 
 fixed rates of exchange, which could only be changed after mutual 
consultation 
 offered overdraft facilities for the financing of current account deficits 
 established freedom of payments within the currency area concerned 
 perhaps most importantly, created a mechanism for consultation on 
all technical questions, particularly with a view to preventing large 
capital flows to the Dollar Area and increasing the area within which 
Sterling can permissibly be used. 
However, the ‘official account’ of the Sterling Area, while generally accurate 
in empirical terms, contains certain elements of interpretation that skew the idea of 
the Sterling Area and, particularly, the origins of the Area. The traditional account 
makes the argument that the Sterling Area had existed for a long time, had served 
the allies well during the war and provided financial and monetary stability after the 
war. Furthermore, the paper argues, the Area should be “protected, strengthened 
and expanded” and that “its existence permits us to look forward to the time when 
Sterling will again be the basis of exchange and we can do so because the machinery 
is there and well nigh intact” (TNA FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 
1950).  
Burnham (1990, p.8) notes “the British state perceived its fundamental 
interests to lie primarily with the Sterling Area nations”. As such, “whilst the major 
nations of Western Europe engaged in vigorous intra-European trade, Britain 
concentrated on renewing its traditional trading links with the Commonwealth” 
                                               
78
 Even by 1950 these agreements were still “the principal legal basis of Sterling Area arrangements 
with non-dollar countries” (TNA FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950). Some 
countries did not conform to this; arrangements were then made on a bilateral basis. 
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(ibid., p.11). Strange (1971, p.75) regards this perception, and the maintenance of 
the Sterling Area, as an issue of status. Furthermore, she argues that the Sterling 
Area lulled Britain “into a false sense of immunity” to the unavoidable changes of 
the contemporary international system (ibid.). However, Schenk disagrees with this 
part of Strange’s argument. 79 
Schenk (1994, p.136) shows, citing archival evidence, that the British 
government was aware that the Sterling Area did not consistently generate 
‘prestige’ for the economy, and that the systems of Sterling management within the 
area in fact often lowered the standing of Sterling. This is particularly evidenced by 
the constant search for means of Sterling convertibility and by the incremental 
disposal of trade discrimination as a tool of Sterling Area policy.  However, Schenk 
does agree with the broad consensus of work on the Sterling Area: that the role the 
Sterling Area played in Britain’s post-war economic policy, agreeing with the general 
consensus that the Sterling Area had, in fact, hindered capital accumulation and 
external economic policy. In fact, Schenk (ibid.) argues that the Sterling Area can be 
viewed as a “mechanism through which large investment flows were sent abroad, 
large short-term liabilities were accumulated and trade discrimination was pursued”. 
Further, the Sterling Area system after the war can be characterised by three 
features:  “members pegged their exchange rates to sterling, maintained a common 
exchange control against the rest of the world while enjoying free current and 
capital transactions with the UK and, thirdly, maintained national reserves in sterling 
which required pooling foreign exchange earnings” (ibid., p.8). The principal purpose 
of the exchange controls, however, should be seen in terms of the post-war dollar 
shortage: these controls were intended to restrict convertibility of Sterling into 
dollars. Without these controls, British gold and currency reserves would have 
swiftly dwindled, Britain and the Sterling Area would have been unable to import 
any goods from the US, exacerbating the fundamental problem (the inability of 
British goods to compete with US exports). Furthermore, the post-war settlement 
required large-scale dollar imports to sustain itself. Indeed, as R.F. Holland (1984) 
                                               
79 As does Newton (1984, p.392), “Britain’s position as banker to the sterling area did involve her in a 
world role after 1945 but there is no need to invoke antiquated imperial ambitions to explain it”. 
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notes, “the nationalisations, medical provision and expansion of education so 
magnanimously legislated by Labour ministers was largely achieved because the 
Bank of England kept the Sterling Area show on the road.” In essence, the Sterling 
Area was essential to Britain’s continued economic vitality and, without it, harsh 
austerity measures would have been necessary, bringing the entire post-war 
consensus into doubt. 
Before the Second World War, Malaya was already earning a huge proportion 
of Sterling Area dollars. On average, over the period 1935-1938, Malaya earned 
US$157m net per year, which amounted to 31.8% of the total dollar earnings of the 
Sterling Area (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’s Contribution to Sterling Area Dollar Income, 15th 
January 1947).80 The average annual dollar deficit for the Sterling Area over this 
period stood at US$230m; however, without Malaya’s dollar earnings, this figure 
would have been US$380m. If the UK had not been included in that figure, the 
Sterling Area would have been in surplus by US$87m (ibid.). 
By the end of the Second World War, only a few colonies were consistent net 
dollar earners for the Sterling Area: Malaya, British West Africa and Ceylon. Malaya 
was the greatest dollar earner of these colonies, earning almost twice as many 
dollars as Gambia, Gold Coast and Ceylon, the next three largest earners, combined 
(TNA FO371/76049, ‘Malaya as a Dollar Earner and Raw Material Supplier’, 30th April 
1949). The British used this money, as well as for other members of the Sterling 
Area, to pay for imports from the dollar area, and to support the reserve position 
upon which the strains of UK economic policy was placed (TNA FO371/82915, ‘The 
Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950). These primary-producing colonies were generally 
unable to benefit from the dollar pool as much as others since the purpose of the 
dollar pool was to act as a central reserve, providing collective support for those 
countries who required dollar goods but were unable to earn dollars through 
exporting to the dollar area. Certainly, by the end of the war, the British were in no 
hurry to dismantle one of the best methods of accumulating foreign reserves, of 
                                               
80 If the UK were not included in this calculation, the figure would 47.4%. Furthermore, Malaya’s 
gross exports to the USA stood at US$164m p.a. on average over this period while her imports from 
the US stood at only US$7m (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’s Contribution to Sterling Area Dollar Income, 15th 
January 1947). 
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which Malaya was a key component. 
3.3 British Malaya 
The British interest in Malaya developed following the seizure of three strategic 
islands in the Straits of Malacca by the British East India Company over a period of 
almost a hundred years. This section of the chapter details that history from 1786 
until the end of the Second World War. 
The British East India Company seized control of the island of Penang in 
1786, followed fourteen years later by the ceding of territory on the Malay Peninsula 
itself by the Sultan of Kedah to the Company for an annual fee.81 The British East 
India Company subsequently sought to expand their interests in the region by 
acquiring the “uninhabited mangrove island” of Singapore in 1818, signing a series 
of treaties with the Sultan of Johore to build factories there until the Sultan 
concluded a treaty with the Company in 1824 that handed Singapore over to British 
control in perpetuity (Winstedt, p.20). A further treaty with the Dutch ceded 
Malacca to the British in 1824. 
 However, with the abolition of the East India Company in 1858, the Straits 
Settlements (Penang, Singapore, Malacca) fell immediately under the authority of 
the India Office. This was not considered a ‘natural’ arrangement and the India 
Office gradually came to the realisation that, not only did the Straits Settlements 
have very little geographical, ethnic or political relevance to India, but that they no 
longer required the surpluses from India to sustain themselves. As such, in 1867, the 
British Government “yielded to local agitation” and the Straits Settlements came 
under the authority of the Colonial Office (ibid.). 
By the end of the 19th century, Singapore had become part of the Straits 
Settlements along with Malacca and Penang; meanwhile, the nine Malay states 
were divided into the Federated Malay states82, within which the Sultans had much 
less power and the British had more influence, and the ‘unfederated’ Malay states83, 
                                               
81
 Province Wellesley for M$10,000 p.a. 
82 Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Selangor. 
83
 Johan, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Terengganu 
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in which the Sultans retained a lot of their power but still had to accept a British 
‘advisor’. However, during this period, the British presence in Malaya, particularly in 
the Federated Malay States, gradually became more powerful and the British 
themselves were hopeful of achieving a central government for the whole region; 
though this period actually saw greater decentralisation in Malaya (TNA CAB24/234, 
‘Visit to Malaya’, 25th February 1933). By the 20th century, Malaya consisted of two 
British settlements: Penang and Malacca, as well as nine Malay states, which were 
ruled by Sultans who governed under a written constitution with advice from a 
council of state.84 Malaya’s excellent geographical position as a trade route through 
to the East substantially contributed to its rapid material development in the first 
half of the 20th Century. (ibid.; TNA CO967/84, ‘Notes on Development in Malaya’, 
August 1950) 
During the Second Word War, Malaya was occupied by Japan from 1942 for 
three and a half years, “during which time practically nothing came into the country 
and practically nothing went out. Industry languished and in most cases came to a 
standstill. Thus on the liberation of the country both Government and Industry were 
faced with an enormous rehabilitation programme” (ibid.). Rubber estates and tin 
mines had deteriorated significantly due to neglect, sabotage as a denial measure by 
anti-Japanese partisans, and appropriations by occupying Japanese forces (ibid.; BE 
OV65/3, ‘Malaya’, 22nd February 1943). It was also in 1942 that the then Colonial 
under-Secretary, Harold Macmillan, famously reminded the Empire of the value of 
the relationship between Britain and its colonies and what they could look forward 
to after the war,  
“The governing principle of the Colonial Empire should be the 
principle of partnership between the various elements composing 
it. Out of partnership comes understanding and friendship. 
Within the fabric of the Commonwealth lies the future of the 
                                               
84 The term ‘Malaya’ is generally taken to mean the entirety of the region today known as Malaysia, 
along with Singapore. However, officially, ‘Malaya’ referred to only Penang, Malacca, and the nine 
Malay states. However, archival documentation shows that both usages of the word are used 
throughout the 20
th
 century indiscriminately. This can be understood on the basis that British officials 
considered Malaya and Singapore both economically and politically inseparable (BE OV65/5, 
‘Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, Trade and Balance of Payments’, 24
th
 January 1957). 
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Colonial territories” (cited in Horne 1988, p.82) 
 During the war, the British were already making plans for the future of the 
colony after the expulsion of the Japanese. Lucius McCausland, an advisor to the 
Governor of the Bank, in a letter to Cobbold, Fisher and Kershaw, identified that the 
high dollar earnings of Malayan rubber and tin exports made the future of these 
industries of great importance to Sterling Area Exchange Control. However, due to 
movements towards increased synthetic rubber production in the US, as a means of 
overcoming the wartime shortage of rubber, the US would be in the sole position of 
deciding the future of the world rubber industry, and therefore had to be appeased 
in some way in order to permit the natural rubber industry to flourish after the war. 
It was also problematic because there was a widespread belief in the US that the 
rubber industry in Malaya was inefficient due to the rush to set up rubber estates 
and plantations there, and the vested interests that maintained them. This was not 
far from the truth and it was believed that the mergers of certain contiguous large 
estates could overcome these inefficiencies. (BE OV65/3, ‘The future of the Malayan 
Rubber Industry’, 2nd June 1942) 
 Certainly, decisive action needed to be taken, as the UK could not simply 
allow pre-war production methods and practices to continue if the US government 
was already very suspicious of UK rubber policy. It was then decided to investigate 
the organisation of the Malayan rubber industry, the companies that managed the 
estates, and the London rubber market in the belief that “a reorganisation designed 
in the combined interests of the backward races who will produce the rubber and of 
the progressive Americans who will consume it would greatly strengthen our hands 
when the future of the industry comes to be considered.” (ibid.) 
 However, even with considerations about the efficiency of future production, 
the priority was simply on restarting the rubber industry and Malaya’s economy as 
quickly as possible. (BE OV65/3, ‘Reoccupation Problems’, 29th December 1942) 
“It will be a prime consideration to recommence the production of 
rubber and tin without delay. Large imports of stores, equipment, etc. 
will be required. Import control over all goods from all sources will be 
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necessary to give exchange priority to essential imports and at the same 
time eliminate remittances for dispensable goods.”85 (BE OV65/3, 
‘Malaya and Hongkong: Reoccupation problems – Exchange Control’, 
20th August 1942) 
As such, stockpiles were made in the Commonwealth for the immediate resumption 
of rubber and tin production (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’, 22nd February 1943).86 The 
rubber and tin industries were instrumental for their dollar earnings and it was 
agreed in a Treasury Committee meeting that Malaya’s reoccupation would lead to 
its immediate reinsertion into the Sterling Area system of exchange control.87 
“Agreed in principle that the re-occupied part of Malaya would at 
once resume its position as part of the sterling area under 
Defence (Finance) Regulations; that transfers from other sterling 
area countries would be free…The policy should be to impose no 
ban on outward transfers to the sterling area or on dealings in 
sterling area currencies.”88 (BE OV65/3, ‘Treasury Committee 
Minutes of Meeting’, 23rd November 1943) 
 The Colonial Office informed the Bank that occupying Commonwealth 
soldiers were to be accompanied by a rubber mission who would co-opt liberated 
rubber planters who would then be immediately put to work on restarting rubber 
                                               
85
 Remittances to businesses were likely to be very high after re-occupation and so the UK had to 
guard against large-scale capital outflows after the war: “The prohibition on the export of currency, 
gold, etc. to the sterling area, and also on dealings in securities, would be covered by a general 
prohibition as formerly. There would be no sterling area exemption.” (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya and 
Hongkong: Reoccupation problems – Exchange Control’, 20th August 1942) 
86 There was even a possibility of annexing a part of Thailand (then Siam) as a punishment for their 
actions during the war, and then including this territory as part of Malaya – there were many 
untouched and operational rubber plantations in Siam and this would have greatly eased the 
difficulty of restarting Malayan rubber production. (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’, 22
nd
 February 1943) 
87 Straits regulations also made clear that residents of Malaya and Singapore were required to 
surrender gold and foreign currency to authorised dealers. The Financial Secretary of the colony 
specified these dealers. Banks and authorised dealers needed special exemption to keep hold of 
them. (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’, 4th October 1943) 
88 However, at this stage before re-occupation, it was uncertain exactly how stringent exchange 
controls would have to be. It was considered to be one of two possibilities: “maintain a complete 
ban on transfers outside the sterling area” or “to re-establish Exchange Control making transfers to 
non-sterling area countries subject to permission.” (BE OV65/3, ‘Treasury Committee Minutes of 
Meeting’, 23rd November 1943) 
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plantations – there was no consideration given to handing over the estates to their 
pre-war owners straight away as the intent was to purchase all the rubber produced 
to create large stockpiles. This was not intended to be long-term policy and the 
British government sought advice from the Rubber Growers Association; however, 
the government still believed that they would have to merge a number of estates 
and plantations in order to improve efficiency in the industry. (BE OV65/3, ‘Rubber in 
Malaya’, 13th April 1943; BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya – Reoccupation’, 17th August 1943) 
 When the rubber and tin industries restarted, there was confidence that 
there would be significant demand for both of these products as long as price 
fluctuations were minimal. Indeed, Malayan tin was considered of the highest 
quality (BE OV65/3, ‘The Views of US Firms interested in trade with Malaya’, 24th 
November 1943). However, with the reoccupation of the country, high 
unemployment, labour unrest and food shortages soon led to a high level of 
discontent among the population, which ultimately resulted in the growth in the 
strength of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). (ibid.) 
 The MCP had split from the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1927 and there was an 
‘underground war’ between the two groups for many years, until the waning of the 
KMT in Malaya led to the MCP becoming the de facto political organisation for 
Chinese Malays (TNA CO537/7285, ‘Military Implications of the Emergency’, 19th 
November 1951). There was a strong continuity between the strength of the MCP 
and the traditional Chinese ‘secret societies’ (known as ‘Triads’) that had existed 
throughout the Orient for many years. Indeed, the Triads in Malaya had been 
virtually the only authority within Malaya’s migrant Chinese population – resolving 
all intra-Chinese disputes, holding criminal and civil courts, and even conducting 
limited conflicts – until 1890 when they were declared illegal. As such, the MCP’s 
importance to the Chinese population in Malaya was not simply as a political 
organisation that provided national, or even ideological, representation but was 
based on traditions of social organisation that were many hundreds of years old 
(ibid.). Indeed, Malaya’s broader politics, and certainly party politics, were 
structured around racial, rather than class, lines and continued to be so for many 
years. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has given a background of the economic situation of Britain from the 
late 19th century until the end of the Second World War. The general consensus in 
the literature is that towards the end of the 19th century and during the early half of 
the 20th century Britain suffered from relative economic decline, characterised by a 
reliance on increasingly uncompetitive industry, a growth in labour unrest, high 
unemployment, and an increasingly beleaguered state. While this remained the 
broader political-economic context for much of the twentieth century, acute 
economic crises beset Britain throughout.  
 Out of the chronic economic problems of the early 20th century Britain began 
to develop a preferential trading bloc, finding ultimate expression in the Sterling 
Area in 1939. While it can be argued that the Sterling Area had existed for some 
time (and the orthodox account of the Area is that it had), the Area only came into 
existence following Britain’s final withdrawal from the Gold Standard in 1931, the 
passing of the Import Duties Act in 1932, and finally with the exchange control acts 
enacted at the start of the Second World War. Britain’s role in the Sterling Area was 
that of treasurer, pooling the Area’s currencies in the EEA (along with Britain’s own 
reserves) and, for all intents and purposes, rationing them to the Area’s members as 
the situation dictated. While this role allowed Britain to manage the trading 
relations of the Sterling Area’s members with considerable ease, it also allowed 
Britain to balance any trading disequilibria that it had developed itself. The EEA was 
a means through which Sterling could be kept within a specific band of exchange 
with other countries, through the large-scale purchasing and selling of foreign 
currencies to maintain the value of Sterling, and a tool by which Britain could sustain 
its own trade deficit. Due to the exchange rate given to Sterling after the exit from 
the Gold Standard, the EEA was required to spend considerable amounts of money, 
draining the reserves. 
 The balance of payments problem, especially with the United States, and the 
ensuing global dollar shortage, meant that the EEA was constantly spending the 
Sterling Area’s dollar earnings as a means of maintaining the value of Sterling. This is 
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not to say that Britain was exploiting other states for the purpose of maintaining its 
own currency but rather that the trading bloc that Britain had set up to favour its 
own markets, and to maintain its own currency, could only be sustained through the 
large-scale expenditure of its reserves. This meant that countries within the Sterling 
Area that had traditionally been high dollar earners became more important to the 
maintenance of the Area, and the chief dollar earner was Malaya. 
 During Malaya’s occupation during the war, the British were very eager to 
resume the rubber and tin trades in Malaya, going so far as to send rubber missions 
along with Commonwealth troops who were securing the country. Officials in both 
the Colonial Office and at the Bank stressed Malaya’s importance and Malaya was 
reinserted into the Sterling Area mechanism as soon as it was liberated. 
 The nature of the crises that affected Britain can be well explained by the use 
of the framework in Chapter Two. Britain’s relative economic decline meant that it 
was particularly poorly placed to weather the global dollar shortage. This shortage 
had been caused by an overproduction crisis, which led the UK to develop an 
imperial preference system, which developed into the Sterling Area at the advent of 
the Second World War. The Sterling Area (and its earlier iterations) were intended to 
aid Britain in managing the crisis through the guaranteed provision of markets for 
British goods, as well as through the pooling of Area foreign exchange reserves to 
allow net earners of dollars, such as Malaya, to support net spenders, such as 
Britain. This mechanism supported the value of Sterling and prevented an even 
more serious crisis from emerging. Indeed, without this mechanism, drastic action 
would have been necessary in order to maintain the circuit of capital, requiring 
particularly stringent domestic economic measures, which would have further 
exacerbated the already high level of unrest in Britain in the inter-war years.  
  The following chapter continues the story of Malaya and Britain’s 
relationship after 1945, charting how this relationship is managed by the Sterling 
Area and used as a means of resolving the economic crises that periodically beset 
Britain. 
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Chapter Four: The Dollar Drain and Colonial Import Policy (1945 – 
1950) 
This chapter will examine British responses to the dollar drain and the convertibility 
crisis with respect to the Sterling Area and, and most particularly, the British 
relationship with Malaya. One aspect of this chapter, as with the other two empirical 
chapters, is to emphasise the reliance of the British state on the Sterling Area, which 
was the sole means of multilateral trade outside of the dollar area89 and, as such, 
vital to the reconstruction of global trade after the Second World War, and to the 
                                               
89 The dollar area comprised: USA, Philippines (and any territory under US sovereignty), Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Equador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Salvador and Venezuela; Canada and Newfoundland (TNA T236/3995, 
‘Import Control Order 1949, Southern Rhodesia’, 5
th
 March 1949). 
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reconstruction of the British economy. 
The chapter seeks to emphasise the continuity in British foreign economic 
policy by showing that the British state sought to aid in the reconstruction of the 
international trading system through its belief that the key to this endeavour was 
the maintenance of the Sterling Area. Due to the nature of the international 
economy after the Second World War, there was a substantial trade imbalance 
between Eastern and Western hemispheres. This arose from the vast productive 
capacity of the United States and the inability of other countries, with their 
economies set to a war footing and substantially damaged by the war itself, to 
provide equivalent goods either at a competitive price or at all. 
This trade imbalance led to a shortage of dollars, exacerbating itself and the 
root overproduction crisis further. Given that the Sterling Area was the only 
multilateral trading system outside of the dollar area, it was crucial in pooling and 
rationing dollar reserves to maintain dollar imports for many countries. Without this 
trading and exchange system, the international trading system would have been 
severely weakened, further exacerbating not only the global overproduction crisis 
but also seriously limiting the British government’s ability to reconstruct its 
economy after the war, and undoubtedly leading to severe difficulties in maintaining 
the British post-war domestic settlement. 
The crisis surrounding the British obligation to make Sterling freely 
transferable into dollars for current account transactions can be seen as a part of 
this narrative. While a number of state managers were not in favour of the 
‘convertibility clause’ of the AAFA, it was agreed to on the basis that it would be 
difficult to refuse convertibility if the United States were providing substantial dollar 
credit for that purpose. The chapter continues with the commencement of the ERP, 
standing as a welcome inflow of dollars from the United States with which Britain 
could purchase much-needed commodities, allowing it to stabilise its economy and 
pursue reconstruction to a much more substantial degree than it had prior. This is to 
be understood in concert with the AAFA as providing the UK with a large line of 
dollar credit and so as a means of altering the contours of international markets, 
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ameliorating the crisis. However, this was temporary, and did not ultimately resolve 
the fundamental crisis besetting the global economy. The chapter ends with the 
devaluation of Sterling and the impact that this has upon the Colonies and Sterling 
Area 
Therefore, this chapter, in concert with subsequent chapters, emphasises the 
continuity in British relationship with Malaya and avoids truncating history 
according to perceived shifts in British policy. While Schenk (1994, p.136) argues 
that the Sterling Area can be viewed simply as a “mechanism through which large 
investment flows were sent abroad, large short-term liabilities were accumulated 
and trade discrimination was pursued”, this chapter will argue that the institutional 
arrangement described by Schenk, and the broader understanding of empire by 
both Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001), actually obfuscates a complex of imperial 
relationships between Britain and other states. The importance of Malaya in this 
context is as a crucial palliative component in this strategy to maintain the Sterling 
Area, which is to say the complex of relationships that comprised it, and hence to 
support Britain’s economic position more broadly. The relationship between Britain 
and Malaya is not an explicitly imperialist one and the archival documents certainly 
contain no evidence of British villains twirling their moustaches at the pooling of 
Malaya’s dollars in the Sterling Area reserve. Rather British state managers clearly 
perceive the importance of Malaya in maintaining the Sterling Area due to its large-
scale trade of rubber and tin with the United States, providing a substantial injection 
of dollars into a trading bloc that was running a huge deficit with the dollar area. It is 
also clear from the Archives that British state managers are well aware that Malaya 
holds an importance directly to Britain, and that its dollar contribution is vital to 
Britain’s post-war reconstruction also. This importance is also made clear through 
efforts by British state managers to develop Malaya’s economy and, as Kaplan 
(1990) has argued, through British commitment to fighting the Malayan Emergency. 
The chapter intends to provide the following context to the Britain-Malaya 
relationship. Firstly, the Sterling Area is understood to be a crucial component of 
Britain’s economic position, as well as being considered essential to the resurgence 
of global trade after the war, and so too the health of the global economy, as 
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perceived by British state managers. Secondly, the dollar deficit, or the dollar drain, 
is to be characterised as a manifestation of a global trade disequilibrium between 
eastern and western hemispheres (particularly between the ‘dollar area’ and the 
rest of the world), itself, necessarily, a manifestation of a global overproduction 
crisis, a tendency of capitalist social relations. Finally, the analysis of the relationship 
between Britain and Malaya is intended to highlight its importance to Britain, 
specifically within the Sterling Area. The value of Malaya to the maintenance of the 
Sterling Area derives from its status as a large net-exporter of rubber and tin to the 
United States, thus earning substantial dollar surpluses from this trade. The status of 
the highest dollar earner within the Sterling Area made Malaya extremely important 
to Britain’s international monetary and economic policy. 
This period marks a particularly acute crisis for the British economy and, 
therefore, for the Sterling Area. Indeed, in this period, it is clear how important the 
Britain-Malaya relationship is to the maintenance of the Sterling Area and, 
therefore, also to Britain. However, while we find that the particular and historically 
developed relationship between Britain and Malaya retains its pre-war character, 
and fulfils a specific role ‘within’ the Sterling Area, this period is characterised by the 
marshalling of the whole Area, the entire aggregation of all relationships within the 
Empire and Britain’s trading bloc, to support Sterling, to make austere cuts to dollar 
spending, and to make substitutions to dollar goods where possible, as well as 
trying to maximise dollar earning  
Malaya’s particular role in this period was, of course, as the largest dollar 
earner in the Sterling Area, which had developed historically and, while it appears as 
if this is as a part of the mechanism of the Sterling Area, it is actually the 
relationship between Britain and Malaya in which this particular benefit exists. 
Certainly, in this period, it is particularly difficult to identify this fact since Malaya’s 
role in the Sterling Area is practically indistinguishable from the rest of the 
relationships Britain has with its other colonies. Indeed, this moment of stress 
confirms the nature of the imperial relationship but actually obfuscates the fact that 
these are unique, particular and historically developed relationships between 
Britain, a dominated state and global capitalism, by virtue of the fact that the acute 
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nature of this crisis, the global shortage of dollars and the global trade imbalance 
stemming from the particular manifestation of the contradictory nature of capitalist 
social relations, is so severe that the whole Sterling Area and British Empire is called 
upon to do the same thing. However, even so, we see that different states have 
different relationships within this Area. 
Most importantly, however, the relationship is maintained to be imperialist, 
mediated by the structures of an international currency and trading regime, the 
Sterling Area. The purpose of the Sterling Area was to act as a preferential trading 
bloc but also to provide a payment mechanism for all extra-Sterling Area trade. As 
such, all external currency was pooled under the control of the British government. 
The British government was thus able to make demands on the trade practises of 
the member countries of the Sterling Area as it was legally permitted to ration 
foreign reserves, and thus limit how much each country was able to spend on extra-
Area imports. The structure of the Sterling Area allowed the UK to manage the trade 
policies of the member countries generally, and so to alter the nature of the global 
economy to its own ends – in this instance, as a means of resolving a global 
economic crisis. Whether this worked to the specific advantage of the UK in each 
case is important but is not the totality of the relationship. While this may have 
been the intent of the British government, it is also important to understand the 
nuance of the relationship. Malaya benefited from this relationship through the very 
nature of the Sterling Area: providing Malaya with access to a very large market and 
the use of a single currency for all trade transactions. Furthermore, Britain also 
sought to provide Malaya with a significant level of aid in order to develop its 
economy; admittedly, this was for improving civil order and Malaya’s capacity for 
dollar income, nevertheless, this was a clear benefit from the relationship with 
Britain.  
4.1 Malaya after the Second World War 
 The war and occupation had left the rubber and tin industries in a parlous 
state: 10% of rubber trees had been lost due to cutting out and neglect, and weeds 
covered sizeable areas of the large rubber estates, requiring a great deal of work to 
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clear away. The tin industry had suffered severe equipment damage due to scorched 
earth policies, Japanese requisitions, and also looting. A great deal of infrastructure 
had been damaged and food was in short supply. (TNA CO1045/177, Visit of Labour 
Adviser to Federation of Malaya, 13th December 1947) 
Malayan recovery was seen as essential to the expansion of Sterling Area 
trade with the dollar area due to its rubber and tin trade with the United States 
(TNA T236/3995,‘Rest of Sterling Area v. USA’, 29th October 1945). In 1946, Malaya’s 
dollar earnings amounted to a net surplus of some US$100m, while the first half of 
1947 saw that increase to US$140m, and the whole of 1948 saw Malaya earn a 
surplus of $117m with the United States alone and with her total net surplus with 
the dollar area standing at around US$172m (TNA FO371/76049, ‘Malaya as a Dollar 
Earner and Raw Material Supplier’, 30th April 1949; TNA CAB129/20, ‘Cabinet Paper 
227(47)’, 5th August 1947). This was despite the fact that rubber prices had fallen 
consistently since the end of the war, from 18p/lb in 1945 to 12.91p/lb in 1948 (Lim 
1967, p.323). 
Indeed, the rubber mission sent along with Allied troops during the 
liberation of Malaya made the process of reconstructing Malaya’s economy much 
more rapid. Certainly, the imperatives given to the rubber mission, and the 
sentiment in London at the time, about the former and future value of the Malayan 
economy to the Sterling Area and the British economy, remained true. While, in 
1945, Malaya’s dollar earnings accounted for only 7% of the Sterling Area total, in 
1946, this had grown to 30% (BE OV65/3, ‘Malaya’s Contribution to Sterling Area 
Dollar Income, 15th January 1947). In a letter to the Colonial Office, the Bank 
underlined how important Colonial development was in terms of its impact upon 
the balance of payments of the UK and the Sterling Area. 
“The pre-war dollar earning capacity of tin would be invaluable to 
us at this time and it does not seem to me that the statistical 
position of the metal or its prospects over a period of years are 
such that, even during the present scarcity, an investment in tin 
mining machinery paid for in dollars would not yield a handsome 
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dividend in dollars also.” (BE OV65/3, ‘Letter to Colonial Office’, 
12th May 1947) 
The rubber industry too required significant rehabilitation. However, a cautious 
policy was necessary since the synthetic rubber industry in America was now 
competing with the natural rubber industry for the same market, and at lower costs. 
Nevertheless, significant effort was undertaken to improve the output of Malayan 
rubber and was realised only shortly after Malaya’s liberation with the rapid 
expansion of dollar area trade (TNA CO1045/177, Visit of Labour Adviser to 
Federation of Malaya, 13th December 1947). 
4.2 The Lead-up to Convertibility 
Immediately after the war, the newly returned Labour government engaged in a 
massive reconstruction programme, which also included substantial domestic 
reforms. This required considerable government expenditure and high volumes of 
imports of vital goods. Burnham (1990, p.vii) remarks, during the Attlee 
government, the Cabinet was convinced of “the necessity to restore international 
capitalist viability to the British economy”.  As such, in order to pursue this policy of 
domestic reconstruction “the state required rapid accumulation which could only be 
achieved if Britain could reconstruct an adequate international payments system to 
facilitate trade and secure regular imports of essential commodities and raw 
materials” (ibid., p.9). However, this was easier said than done, as Burnham details, 
“The British state was facing a severe economic crisis. The origins 
of this crisis, however, did not lie with the convertibility obligation 
or in industrial stagnation. The crisis was one of foreign currency 
reserves which had dwindled because of the expansionist 
programme pursued by the government.” (ibid., p.10) 
In 1946, however, there seemed to be cause for optimism.  Britain surpassed 
pre-war export levels in May of 1946 and, by the final quarter, they were 10% above 
pre-war levels. Simultaneously, imports had been reduced to 72.2% of their pre-war 
level. This resulted in a balance of payments deficit less than half that which was 
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being discussed at the Washington Loan talks for the AAFA (Kaplan 1990, p.5). Hugh 
Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was more than sanguine about the future 
prospects for the economy, 
“I have been able, as Chancellor, to meet all the demands on the 
public purse literally with a song my heart. If we keep together as 
we have since V-J Day, the shortages and frustrations which still 
afflict us will disappear like the snows of winter, and give place to 
the full promise of springtime.” (quoted in ibid., p.6) 
However, these figures were misleading. The markets to which Britain was 
exporting were not the same as those from which Britain was importing.  Indeed, 
the trade deficit was lower than expected; however, Britain was drawing on the line 
of dollar credit (extended by the AAFA) at the anticipated rate. In 1946, Britain 
received 42% of its imports from the dollar area, but only sent 17% of its exports 
there; the share of imports grew in 1947 to 46% (ibid., p.6). In late 1946, however, 
Stafford Cripps told The Times of “the double balance of payments problem”, 
referring to both the trade deficit and the dollar deficit (ibid.). In 1946, the overall 
trade deficit stood at £344m, with the dollar deficit at $1330m, and 1947 saw the 
overall trade deficit at £545m, with the deficit with the dollar area standing at 
$2301m (HMSO 1950). However, the overall trade balance turned into surplus in 
1949, while the dollar deficit remained both large and persistent until the 1960s. 
This deficit was inevitable. As David Eccles MP remarked, “It is no use saying 
that the goods can come from the Sterling Area; they are simply not there” (quoted 
in Burnham 1990, p.43). Indeed, as Burnham (ibid., p. 44) observes, the United 
States held a de facto monopoly on the most important commodities, “the 
attractiveness of the dollar rendered any alternative based solely on the Sterling 
Area as likely to be unworkable and highly unpopular”. Thus, the imbalance in global 
production and trade (between the Western and Eastern hemispheres) manifested 
itself as a balance of payments crisis, principally in finding US dollars to pay for 
imports (ibid., p.14). As such, Burnham (ibid.) concludes, “the need to maximise 
accumulation was thus translated into the need to accumulate world currency”. The 
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key means of accumulating world currency at the time was by cutting down the 
quantity of dollar imports, through the imposition of trading restrictions. 
In 1945, after negotiating the AAFA, Britain was extended a $3.75bn line of 
credit by the United States, and $1.25bn by Canada. However, this generosity was 
premised on four major concessions: the dissolution of the Sterling Area dollar pool, 
an obligation to non-discriminatory trade, the repayment of British war debts, and 
the instigation of general convertibility of Sterling within a year (ibid., p.51). 
However, this line of credit was being rapidly exhausted: in the first half of 1947 
alone, $1.45bn had been spent. However, as was noted by the Cabinet, the crisis in 
dollar reserves was not principally due to an issue of productivity or infrastructure 
but “because we cannot sell our goods in the market from which our supplies alone 
can come” (quoted in ibid.).  
On 3rd July 1946, Lucius Thompson-McCausland, an advisor to the Governor 
of the Bank of England, wrote to the British delegation at the AAFA negotiations (BE 
3A38/1 ‘Footnote to memo on American Loan’, 3rd July 1946). He identified to them 
certain prejudices that the US had concerning the nature of the Sterling Area and 
how this might affect negotiations over the loan, particularly the dollar pool. He 
made clear the British government’s position on the dollar pool. While the dollar 
pool had only been ‘official’ since 1939, it had been a well-established practice of 
the Sterling Area whereby Area members made most transactions for external 
payments in Sterling and then left London to manage any consequent foreign 
exchange. By the end of the Second World War, the practise of pooling foreign 
exchange in such a fashion was at least a century old; however, the particular idea 
conveyed by the term ‘dollar pool’ only become relevant with wartime exchange 
controls and the concentration of purchases from North America (ibid.; TNA 
FO371/82915, ‘The Sterling Area’, 24th January 1950). 
 Thompson-McCausland understood that the Americans believed the Sterling 
Area dollar pool as a ‘wartime innovation’, which required members of the Sterling 
Area to hand over their dollars to London who could then strictly control the Sterling 
Area’s dollar expenditure.  Indeed, he reiterated to the delegates that this was not 
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close to the ‘facts’ but was widely believed by the US negotiators (BE 3A38/1 
‘Footnote to memo on American Loan’, 3rd July 1946). Furthermore, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Sterling Area had nowhere near the amount of dollars for the 
amount of goods the US wished to sell, meaning that while the US might seek to 
dissolve the Sterling Area’s dollar pool as an obstacle to free trade, the 
repercussions of that dissolution would potentially lead to disaster for the Sterling 
Area. Indeed, while dollar reserves in July 1946 were at their highest since 
December 1945, at £121m, this still represented a very low level of foreign exchange 
indeed for the EEA. However, the US still held the idea throughout negotiations and 
so it remained a source of friction. (ibid.). 
 With the date of the Convertibility obligation fast approaching, the Colonial 
Office intended to make clear to the Sterling Area that the upcoming convertibility 
of Sterling would have no impact on Colonial import policy whatsoever. As such, a 
telegram was sent to all Colonies five days before Convertibility, which initially 
stated outright that general Convertibility would have no repercussions for the 
Colonies ability to convert Sterling since “convertibility was purely a financial 
matter” and that “the Colonies have always had full convertibility of their current 
earnings of sterling for approved imports from dollar sources”. (BE OV44/82, ‘Circular 
No.75’, 10th July 1947) 
 While Arthur Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary, was broadly correct and 
the convertibility of the Sterling held by Sterling Area members was not in serious 
doubt, it is the second part of the quotation that is revealing. The dollar drain prior 
to this telegram had already led to strictures on import policy and this telegram also 
reiterates this position. While discussions with the United States were on-going with 
regards to the specifics of import restrictions, the Colonial Secretary emphasised the 
continued importance of limiting imports. 
“Pending receipt of the revised directions please maintain close 
limitation of imports from the United States and other dollar 
sources, continuing to restrict them to the barest essentials for 
the running of your economy. The drain upon the reserves of the 
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United Kingdom and the Colonies is at present much larger than 
had been expected and severe restrictions will continue to be 
required.”(ibid.) 
Therefore the enquiries made by Sterling Area members regarding the question of 
continued convertibility of their Sterling had become an irrelevance. Their ability to 
convert Sterling had been de facto limited by the severe import restrictions imposed 
on them by the United Kingdom. As such, while the Colonies’ ability to convert 
Sterling remained undiminished during this period, the dollar drain led to import 
restrictions that severely curtailed their ability to spend dollars. 
 Sir George Bolton, an adviser at the Bank at that time, was strongly against 
the Convertibility Clause and, prior to 15th July, had argued vociferously against its 
implementation, circulating a note entitled “Economic and Industrial Crisis” to Bank 
officials: 
“When the inevitable monetary crisis develops we shall find 
ourselves hamstrung without means to take measures to save 
Sterling and the British Commonwealth from collapse. The effect 
of convertibility will be to add substantially to the drawings on 
the US dollar credit without giving us any offsetting advantages of 
any kind. The effect of non-discrimination in monetary and trade 
policy will largely prevent us from taking any kind of trading 
measures to enable us temporarily to acquire goods and services 
from those countries who owe us money and/or are willing to 
hold sterling.” (Bolton quoted in Fforde 1992, p.143) 
However, on 23rd June 1947, Bolton, while warning that Convertibility would be 
catastrophic, acknowledged that the suspension of Convertibility before it had 
occurred would be more catastrophic yet and so the Bank would have to look 
beyond 15th July as convertibility was now a fait accompli (ibid., p.59). Indeed, 
Bolton was originally opposed to the details of the AAFA prior to its signing; 
however, the details of the loan were supported by Keynes, Sir Wilfred Eady and the 
Chancellor and so it was approved. (BE 3A38/1, ‘Bonavia from Rickatson-Hatt’, 4th 
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September 1947) 
 On 15th July 1947, the day of Convertibility, an ‘off the record’ Press 
Conference was arranged by Bernard Rickatson-Hatt, the Bank of England’s Press 
Secretary, for Bolton to guide how the story played out in the press. (BE 3A38/1, 
‘Convertibility of Sterling’, 15th July 1947) It was attended by the City Editors of the 
major news agencies.90 Bolton sought to reassure the media that Sterling would not 
only be available for conversion but that it was inevitable; in effect, Bolton, while 
seeking to provide some background to the obligation, sought to bolster confidence 
in Sterling. 
He emphasised the importance placed on this event by the US Government 
and claimed that more was being made of this date in the US than in the UK. He 
underscored the inevitability of Convertibility by claiming that, while the obligation 
to convert rested in the AAFA, an extension of the “multilateral use of Sterling” was 
more than likely as the UK had to trade gold or dollars against the Sterling balances 
accumulated by other countries (ibid.). He claimed the multilateral use of Sterling 
had been developed since the end of the war and London had “recaptured” its 
position as the centre of world trade and was at the time financing more trade than 
could be supported by British resources. While a lot had been made of the current 
“dollar domination”, British state managers regarded New York and the US banking 
system as unprepared to take over the financing of world trade (ibid.). 
Bolton emphasised that the obligation was not to convert Sterling but to 
make Sterling available for current account transactions between countries, as such 
the Bank preferred to use the term “transferability” rather than convertibility. The 
link between the transferable accounts area, the dollar area and the Sterling Area 
was the rate in New York, kept rigidly between $4.02¾ and $4.03¼ as a result of 
British intervention, which was through the support of Sterling in New York money 
markets by the Bank of England. As a result of this, a large proportion of the £3.5bn 
of accumulated Sterling balances would be segregated and unlikely to come back on 
                                               
90 
The Times, Financial Times, Telegraph, Express, Mail, Daily Graphic, Sunday Times and Bankers’ 
magazine, Manchester Guardian, Economist, Banker and News Chronicle, Investors’ Chronicle, 
Reuters, Exchange Telegraph, United Press of America 
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the exchange market. A large number of countries would be short of Sterling and 
Sterling would become, outside of the dollar area, technically, a hard currency. In 
addition to this, an arrangement had been made whereby Central Banks of countries 
outside the Sterling Area could use their Sterling anywhere in the world (ibid.). This 
shortage could then be balanced by an increase in British imports and so the future 
of world trade was closely linked to the position of Sterling (ibid.). In essence, Bolton 
made a public case that Sterling was well placed to benefit from Convertibility while 
privately acknowledging that it would be a catastrophe. 
On 15th July 1947, in accordance with the AAFA, Sterling became convertible 
for current account transactions.  
4.3 The Fallout from Convertibility 
As Schenk (1994, p.59) notes, “the system of quantitative import restrictions devised 
by Britain and copied in the rest of the sterling area discriminated in varying degrees 
against non-sterling imports for the purpose of conserving the central foreign 
exchange reserves.” This resulted in an increase in intra-Sterling Area trade, the 
main beneficiary of which was the UK. Since the principal trading relationship of 
Sterling Area members was with the UK, this policy resulted in an increase of British 
exports to the Sterling Area. Schenk (ibid., p.54) identifies three principal goals that 
Britain hoped to achieve through coordinating trade within the Sterling Area: 
reducing the keenness of the dollar deficit by purchasing more goods with Sterling, 
reducing Britain’s debts with its colonies in the most manageable fashion, and to 
provide a surplus to support Britain’s traditional deficit with non-Sterling countries. 
A report on the Sterling Area by the Foreign Office makes reference to the 
stipulations in the Washington negotiations regarding the Sterling Area dollar pool, 
and reveals the US aversion to the Sterling Area’s discriminatory practices: 
“The Anglo-American Financial Agreement called for the break-up 
of the “so-called sterling area dollar pool”, but as the negotiation 
parties neglected to define what this meant and as the British in 
this particular context were inclined to argue that no such 
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institution existed, no changes have followed” (TNA FO371/82915, 
‘The Sterling Area – A Background Paper’, 24th Jan 1950).  
Indeed, the Sterling Area was the one offsetting factor for the convertibility of 
Sterling. As such, in June 1947, efforts were made to restrict the import of non-
priority items from the dollar area.  However, the situation continued to deteriorate 
and more severe import restrictions were imposed.  These restrictions led to a 
specific limit on dollar imports equal to three quarters of the period July 1948 – 
June 1949 (Kaplan 1990, p.9; TNA T236/3995, ‘Outward (Secret) Telegram no.372 
from Commonwealth Relations Office’, 22nd October 1949). 
 Before the commencement of convertibility the UK had entered into 
agreement with a number of countries to ensure the transferability of Sterling in all 
currency areas for current transactions. By the time of convertibility on 15th July 
1947, practically the whole world was covered by these arrangements. The result of 
this was that countries with Sterling accrued from current account transactions could 
be freely spent in any other currency area for current transactions. (BE OV44/82, 
‘Confidential Telegram no.935’, 20th August 1947) This arrangement held a degree of 
risk for the significant loss of dollar reserves. However, the severity and rapid 
development of the world shortage of dollars coupled with international anxiety of 
Britain’s dollar reserves led to foreign holders of Sterling converting as much of their 
Sterling into dollars as possible (ibid.). 
 Two weeks before the suspension of Convertibility, Creech-Jones sent a 
telegram to all Colonies providing a background to the financial and monetary 
position of the United Kingdom and the Sterling Area. He explained that the 
Government was set to enforce “drastic economies on imports into the United 
Kingdom in view of the very grave shortage of external resources” (BE OV44/82, 
‘Telegram no.84’, 6th August 1947). Furthermore, by this time the adherence to the 
convertibility clause had caused the drastic deterioration of Britain’s reserve 
position, leading the Colonial Secretary to characterise the British exchange position 
in a dim light: 
“the United Kingdom balance of payments position has 
  127 
substantially deteriorated. The underlying shortage of the means 
of external purchasing power, particularly American dollars, has 
therefore become still more acute” (ibid.). 
This deterioration required the implementation of even more draconian 
import restrictions for the Colonies and the Sterling Area. The Colonial Secretary 
then made clear that not only was he considering the adoption of the measures 
being undertaken in the UK now in the Colonial Empire also but, in the meantime, 
new import guidelines would be imposed on the Colonial Sterling Area as a whole: 
“Each Colony should limit its overseas expenditure whether in 
dollars, sterling or any other currencies in such a way as to 
minimise the risk of drawing down of the total overseas assets 
standing to its credit, and, if possible, to build up those assets, 
which, of course, consist predominantly of sterling balances in 
London. In present circumstances it is imperative that Colonies 
should seek to live within the income which each is earning. Not 
only does a drawing down of accumulated funds mean that 
undue pressure is being put upon scarce supplies, but also that 
monetary resources are being dissipated which might be of vital 
importance if prices or primary products become less 
remunerative than they are at present…  Briefly, it means of 
course continuing restriction of imports to minimum essentials, 
including imports from the Sterling Area” (ibid.). 
 Indeed, while no specific import policy was implemented regarding the 
discrimination of trade between the UK and other sources, it was made clear that 
“any economies in hard currency expenditure which can be effected without 
introducing discrimination should be immediately adopted” (ibid.). However, in a 
subsequent telegram, the Colonial Secretary informed the Colonies of the specific 
measures announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons that day, 
which ranged from limiting the import of luxury goods to an increase in points for 
food on basic rations (BE OV44/82, ‘Telegram no.85’, 6th August 1947). 
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Four days before the suspension of Convertibility, a timetable had been 
drawn up for ‘Operation Gearcrash’ – the sequence of action leading up to the 
suspension of Convertibility. In a memo drawn up by the Bank regarding Gearcrash, 
the procedure for the Sterling Area makes clear that, due to the UK controlling the 
reserves and the gross dollar earnings of Sterling Area members, the only course of 
action available was a change in policy. Sterling Area countries would now be told 
that their expendable Sterling would not “now in principle be freely transferable to 
American accounts; that in practice [Britain] shall allow transfers if we are satisfied 
that their dollar expenditure is being rigorously curtailed, and that for this purpose a 
target must be set after discussion” (BE OV44/16, ‘Operation Gearcrash’, 16th August 
1947). 
Operation Gearcrash led to a number of concerns among ‘Agreement 
Countries’91 that Britain appeared to have ‘trapped’ them into freezing their Sterling 
Balances and then immediately restricted their use of their remaining free Sterling. 
Indeed, Britain was very clear to emphasise to Sterling Area countries that “Sterling 
is not just a means of acquiring dollars and that our action in deciding to police the 
use of free Sterling throughout the world is the only way of under-pinning the whole 
edifice of transferability” (ibid.). 
Even with non-agreement countries (such as New Zealand and Australia), the 
UK had made informal agreements that import controls would prevent balances 
from being depleted and that dollar imports in particular would be very strict and 
discriminate to the benefit of the UK and the Sterling Area (ibid.). However, the 
Bank suggested that a close examination was needed of how much Australia and 
New Zealand counted on the UK “for US dollars over and above their current 
earnings from the dollar area since this is the proper point of comparison with the 
cut which we shall be imposing on other countries who do not happen to enjoy the 
facilities of the Sterling Area dollar pool.” Operation Gearcrash also identified that 
Whitehall would need to implement a plan to emphasise to the Sterling Area that 
discriminatory action would be necessary to mitigate the dollar drain, which was to 
                                               
91 Those countries with whom Britain had entered into arrangements concerning the blocking of their 
accumulated Sterling Balances. 
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occur only a few days later (ibid.). 
Two days before the suspension of Convertibility, a conversation took place 
between Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor, Sir Edward Bridges and Ernest Rowe-Dutton, 
the Permanent and Third Secretaries to the Treasury. This conversation revolved 
around the surprise felt by the Chancellor that certain monetary agreements 
remained which obligated the UK to convert Sterling into gold in certain 
circumstances. The Chancellor insisted that these agreements be rescinded but both 
Bridges and Rowe-Dutton underlined to the Chancellor that these agreements were 
not only reciprocal but that the UK had earned substantial quantities of gold from 
them, particularly from France. (BE OV44/16, ‘Note of a conversation with the 
Chancellor’, 18th August 1947) 
They put forward two more points to the Chancellor concerning the 
abrogation of the agreements. Firstly, that it would be difficult to expect European 
Central Banks to support Sterling without indemnifying their purchases against a 
loss and it would also put the Sterling Area into a tricky position as the reciprocal 
nature of the agreement meant that there would be no guarantee of convertibility 
of European currencies into Sterling or gold. This led to their final and most 
convincing point, 
“We also pointed out that the monetary agreements plus the 
Sterling Area system represented the sole remaining international 
monetary system and if this were damaged owing to imprudent 
and hasty action trade would practically come to an end.“ (ibid.) 
The Chancellor was compelled by this statement and agreed with Bridges and Rowe-
Dutton that “apart from the… suspension of the convertibility clauses, every 
attempt should be made to maintain the monetary agreements” (ibid.). The 
Chancellor’s about-turn then hinged on the point that the monetary agreements 
which Britain was party to were essential for the continued vitality of international 
trade. Considering the limited trade occurring between Eastern and Western 
hemispheres at this point, the Sterling Area and the ancillary monetary agreements 
Britain was party to then represented the last bastion of international trade and so 
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to rescind these agreements, or to damage them in some other way, might have 
brought short-term benefits to Britain but would have ultimately led to a cessation 
of a large part of international trade, and would certainly have exacerbated the 
global crisis, much to the detriment of the vitality of global capital. 
On the eve of suspension, Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, tabled in note 
that the press should be told that although Convertibility was being suspended, it 
was only a temporary expedient and that the value of Sterling would be maintained 
internationally. Further, he insisted that Britain was neither seen as “bankrupt nor 
down and out” (BE 3A38/1, ‘Convertibility Announcement’, 19th August 1947). 
A subsequent press conference held by George Bolton and Bernard 
Rickatson-Hatt at the Treasury underscored the themes that the Government 
wished to put across, but principally to boost confidence in the UK’s economic 
position. The run on the reserves had made sure that an atmosphere of crisis had 
existed within both the Treasury and the Bank well before the announcement on the 
suspension of Convertibility (BE 3A38/1, ‘Press Conference at HM Treasury’, 20th 
August 1947). As such, the decision of the Government, to cut off the American 
Account Area and Canada from the rest of the world was a “simple and not 
unexpected” action and was done in cooperation with the US government. While 
Bolton remained upbeat about the US-UK relationship, claiming that both 
governments were in accord over the actions taken, the US government froze the 
loan granted to the UK due to the suspension of convertibility (BE 3A38/1, ‘News 
Summary’, 21st August 1947). However, Bolton maintained that it was impossible to 
refuse convertibility while America provided the funds but since reserves were 
being used it was possible to refuse this obligation (BE 3A38/1, ‘Press Conference at 
HM Treasury’, 20th August 1947). Further, subsequent to this conference, where 
Bolton’s opinion seemed to contradict the one he adopted on the eve of 
convertibility, Bolton now underscored that he never misled, he claimed, the City 
editors – he never believed convertibility was sustainable but he did consider 
Sterling a strong currency and that it was essential that it be maintained as an 
international currency (BE 3A38/1, ‘Bonavia from Rickatson-Hatt’, 4th September 
1947). 
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Treasury Order SR+O No.1785 temporarily suspended Sterling conversion 
into dollars which, Dalton warned, would lead to disruption of trade and so too 
some supplies. Dalton revealed the reasoning behind the suspension of 
convertibility to the public: the dollar drain had become totally unsustainable and in 
the five working days leading up to 15th August 1947 amounted to US$176m, and 
US$66m the Monday and Tuesday following. The decision was disappointing, Dalton 
testified, but they were considered “necessary precautions” to maintain Sterling. 
Dalton emphasised that there was “no crisis” and, so the Bank understood, it was 
generally accepted that the suspension of convertibility was not an issue of policy 
but rather a recognition of the ‘reality’ of the situation, and that the Treasury were 
not seeking to return immediately to convertibility and would not for some time (BE 
3A38/1, ‘News Summary’, 21st August 1947; BE, 3A38/1, ‘Bonavia from Rickatson-
Hatt’, 4th September 1947). 
The Government was still committed to maintaining the Sterling’s official 
rate and so measures were taken to ensure that Sterling was maintained at £4.03 to 
the dollar, as well as to maintain the gold rate (BE OV44/82, ‘Confidential Telegram 
no.94’, 25th August 1947). Indeed, George Bolton made clear that the key issue, 
following suspension, was to maintain the value of Sterling and that, unless 
significant action was taken, Sterling could have been devalued to £2 to the dollar 
and £200/oz. of gold (BE 3A38/1, ‘Bonavia from Rickatson-Hatt’, 4th September 
1947). Crucially, the monetary agreements and mechanisms extant before 
convertibility remained the same. The Sterling Area is specifically mentioned as 
remaining the same in its relations with the rest of the world. This meant that 
certain monetary discrimination would be a necessary consequence of suspension, 
which the US would simply have to accept (BE 3A38/1, ‘Press Conference at HM 
Treasury’, 20th August 1947).92 
                                               
92 Since Convertibility came into effect most countries had used this as an opportunity to convert 
their surplus Sterling and so, from 21st August 1947, George Bolton, the Executive Director of the 
Bank of England, claimed, the world would be in a position where there was a shortage of Sterling. 
Further, the accumulated Sterling balances had been resolved due to intense negotiations: £3.5bn of 
Sterling was no longer a major concern as it had either been set aside or blocked by agreement or 
held by currency boards or by monetary authorities, or else was held in the Sterling Area (where 
mostly tacit agreements were held that this Sterling was not for current account expenditure). As 
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At the press conference announcing the cessation of convertibility, George 
Bolton declared that rationing of dollars for the Sterling Area members might be 
necessary and so there would be interruption of normal trading. However, this did 
not manifest itself directly: in the Sterling Area, the British government committed 
itself to continue to meet all claims by Sterling Area countries for dollars though 
there were provisos made for India, Sudan, Egypt and Iraq (BE OV44/82, 
‘Confidential Telegram no.94’, 25th August 1947; TNA T230/177, Note from JM 
Fleming to L Helsey, 5th March 1948). Instead, trade restrictions found immediate 
realisation in a series of telegrams to the Colonies (BE 3A38/1, ‘Press Conference at 
HM Treasury’, 20th August 1947).  
4.4 Colonial Import Policy 
Creech-Jones, on the day of suspension, sent a number of telegrams to the Colonies 
outlining the procedure for how to deal with the post-suspension situation. He 
characterised the situation as a major economic crisis and believed that the Colonies 
would want to know how to return to a more stable and prosperous situation since 
“the Colonies are so closely linked with the United Kingdom in finance and trade 
that the economic stability of this country must always be of vital interest to them.” 
(BE OV44/82, ‘Unnumbered Telegram to All Colonies’, 20th August 1947) 
Creech-Jones provided further background to the crisis by identifying the 
problem fundamental to the failure of convertibility. Before the Second World War, 
the UK had substantial foreign income but had lost this due to having realised most 
of its investments and incurred large debts in financing the war. It had therefore 
become difficult to pay for imports on current income (and it was impossible to do 
so without substantially increasing UK exports). These difficulties had been 
mitigated so far “and their true character partly concealed” by UK imports being 
financed under Lend-Lease and mutual aid during the war, or by American and 
Canadian credits after the war (ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                     
such, Sterling was quite strong.  Maintaining this depended on the adverse balance of payments but 
HMG has already indicated action to be taken to resolve this (BE 3A38/1, ‘Press Conference at HM 
Treasury’, 20th August 1947). 
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 With the announcement of the suspension of Convertibility to the Colonies, 
Creech-Jones, confusingly, stated to them that they “are not directly involved by this 
action but it is of very great general significance [to them] and will have many 
repercussions” (BE OV44/82, ‘Confidential Telegram no.935’, 20th August 1947). 
 The importance of the Colonies to the United Kingdom is underscored in the 
first of these telegrams: 
 “That is why our present financial position is one of comparative, 
though we believe temporary, weakness. But against that 
weakness can be placed the underlying permanent strength 
which can be drawn, in the interests of both Britain and 
yourselves, from the natural resources and people of this country 
and those of its overseas connections.” (BE OV44/82, 
‘Unnumbered Telegram to All Colonies’, 20th August 1947) 
The Colonial Secretary identified that the problem facing the United Kingdom was 
its balance of payments, particularly its adverse balance with the dollar area caused 
by Britain’s inability to pay with exports for the goods it needed to import. Britain 
also had to balance with repairing war damage, dealing with arrears generated 
during the war, while “undertaking other necessary and desirable developments at 
home and overseas” (ibid.). This had been exacerbated by the high global prices of 
primary products and the global shortage of dollars, 
“This shortage is due to the need of countries all over the world 
to import from the United States more than they can pay for with 
their current exports. As we ourselves are not able to replace the 
US as a source of supply of goods, other countries have been 
driven, in order to acquire the necessary additional dollars to pay 
for these imports from America, to require the United Kingdom to 
pay directly or indirectly in dollars for the goods we buy from 
them. This additional drain on our dollar resources has led to the 
measures just announced limiting the spending in the dollar area 
of sterling held by certain foreign countries” (ibid.). 
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Given this problem and the acute character of it given the recent suspension 
of convertibility, Britain enacted domestic import controls: trying to reduce imports, 
increasing production either as a substitute for goods that would ordinarily be 
imported, or specifically for export. The Government was aware that although these 
were not austerity measures, they certainly required an element of sacrifice from 
the British people and a marked increased in production (ibid.). 
The Colonial Secretary recognised that the role the Colonies would play was 
through Britain’s ability to control their reserves and their import policy as members 
of the Sterling Area. 
“The Colonial territories can help in several ways. They can 
ensure that they do not *sic+ add to the United Kingdom’s 
difficulties by themselves importing more than they can pay for 
with current earnings, since that would involve using up Colonial 
reserves and asking the United Kingdom to export goods without 
any return in imports” (ibid.). 
Not only was there a desire to balance trade generally within the Sterling 
Area but to actually reduce imports substantially below exports to boost the size of 
the reserves. Indeed, the British Government believed that “local action for 
minimisation of dollar requirements is primarily a matter of control of imports (BE 
OV44/82, ‘Telegram no.91’, 20th August 1947). In the meantime, the British 
Government suggested to the Colonies that the granting of all new import licenses 
be suspended. Further, while there was there a drive to limit imports from the dollar 
area, there was also a drive to limit imports from the Sterling Area for goods that 
could be used for export to the dollar area. 
“Secondly, *the Colonies+ can help by confining their imports, 
wherever possible, to a level below that of the actual earnings of 
their exports, thereby adding to their financial balances and 
strengthening the general position of the sterling area. The 
restriction of imports for current consumption has the same 
practical importance in the Colonies as in the United Kingdom 
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itself. It is particularly important that there should no 
unnecessary expenditure in American dollars, but it is also, in 
current conditions, necessary that there should be the greatest 
possible economy in imports from any part of the world, including 
the sterling area itself.” (BE OV44/82, ‘Unnumbered Telegram to 
All Colonies’, 20th August 1947) 
The Colonies, Creech-Jones impressed, could also help by finding substitutes 
for goods that only came from the dollar area (or of goods which could be exported 
and sold for dollars) but the principal help the Colonies could bring to bear on the 
problem was through import restriction, and increased production for export. 
“As in the United Kingdom, only an increase in production can 
afford a satisfactory long-term solution of these difficulties. 
Restriction of consumption must be regarded as a temporary 
expedient which it would be most undesirable to continue as a 
permanent policy. The increase of Colonial production is 
therefore the major long-term contribution which Colonial 
territories can make” (ibid.). 
The general sentiment of the relationship between Britain and its Colonies within 
the Sterling Area is summed up at the end of the telegram, and captures the 
dominant relationship Britain played in altering the markets of the Colonies to suit 
the ends of international trade, the resolution of the acute phase of this crisis, and, 
therefore, the interests of capital-in-general. It also reveals a symbiotic quality to the 
imperial relationship: not only is Britain reliant on the Colonies, particularly Malaya, 
for its strategy for restoring world trade but the Colonies themselves are also reliant 
on the relationship for development and economic growth. 
“The whole-hearted co-operation of the Governments and people 
of the Colonies is essential if Colonial production is to play its part 
in the rehabilitation of a world ravaged by war, in the restoration 
of economic stability in the United Kingdom, and in the 
development of the Colonies themselves” (ibid.). 
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The Government had announced measures to suspend the rights of 
countries outside the Sterling Area to spend their Sterling freely in the dollar area. 
These measures left “perfect freedom for the expenditure of sterling not merely in 
the Sterling Area itself but in all other countries outside the dollar area” and the 
Government attempted to reassure the Sterling Area that the utmost would be done 
to maintain Sterling as an international currency, even in that limited role. (BE 
OV44/82, ‘Confidential Telegram no.935’, 20th August 1947) 
While the British government wanted to reassure Sterling Area members 
that they would always be able to convert their Sterling into dollars and that the 
measures announced suspending the right of countries outside the Sterling Area 
from spending Sterling in the dollar area 
“will not of course apply to *Colonial territories. Their+ position, as 
also that of other members of the sterling area, is that on the one 
hand [they hold their] reserves in sterling and [surrender] to the 
general pool [their] gross dollar earnings and on the other [they 
have] dollars made available to them to meet all their dollar 
requirements subject to an understanding that their imports and 
other policies are such as to minimise their dollar needs” (ibid.). 
On the one hand, a caveat was made concerning measures for severe restrictions on 
all but the most necessary goods on sterling convertibility into dollars, Creech-Jones 
also makes clear that, while the British government did not want to disturb this 
arrangement, it had become even more important that the condition in regard to 
the minimisation of dollar needs was observed with the “greatest strictness” (ibid.). 
The technical effect of the new arrangement meant that all members of the 
Transferable Account Area had their rights to transfer sterling to the dollar area 
suspended. It was hoped to maintain the Transferable Account Area and, in fact, to 
continue to expand this area so that Sterling on Transferable Account would be 
available over as large an area as possible outside of the Sterling Area (and the 
dollar area) for current account transactions (BE OV44/82, ‘Confidential Telegram 
no.94’, 25th August 1947). The gravity of the situation, according to Creech-Jones, 
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could “hardly be exaggerated, nor the reluctance of HMG to adopt these measures.” 
In keeping with the tone of stability and that this was a planned measure, Creech-
Jones emphasised to the Colonies that it was important to realise the suspension of 
convertibility was not simply a return to the circumstances before 15th July 1947 
since the British government still saw Sterling as freely transferable throughout the 
Sterling Area and also throughout the Transferable Account Area. He further 
pleaded that the Colonies themselves emphasise a sense of stability, proportion and 
continuity to their own banking and mercantile communities. (ibid.) 
Some days after suspension, and after some negotiation and the serious 
consideration of the various non-discrimination clauses of the AAFA, a more fleshed 
out import policy had been developed for the Colonial Sterling Area. The AAFA 
required the Colonial governments of the British Empire to avoid discriminating 
against imports from the US or Canada. Since, according to the IMF, the UK and the 
Colonial Sterling Area counted as a single unit with common foreign exchange 
reserves, any expenditure by one member of this group was a strain on the whole 
group’s foreign exchange reserves; therefore it was permitted for them to 
discriminate in favour of other members of the group but not in favour of those 
outside of the group. As such, the Colonies could not discriminate against the US or 
Canada unless in favour of the UK or other Colonial territories; likewise the UK could 
not discriminate other than in favour of the Colonial territories, thus giving the 
British government the opportunity to pursue trade discrimination through its 
import policy (BE OV44/82, ‘Secret Telegram no.98’, 5th September 1947). 
The Colonial Secretary was insistent that “a regime of wartime austerity as 
regards imports must… be reinstituted and rigid standards of essentiality be adhered 
to… and the cutting down of imports from all sources must be regarded as of 
paramount importance” (ibid.). However, Creech-Jones acknowledged the difficulty 
that the Colonies would have to contend with in applying these measures to 
individual commodities (BE OV44/82, ‘Secret Telegram no.99’, 5th September 1947). 
Creech-Jones also lifted the temporary ban on granting import licences, though 
emphasised that most existing import licences would have to be amended to take 
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into account the new rules of non-discrimination.93 Practically, outstanding import 
licenses were left to the consideration of individual Colonial governments but 
Creech-Jones suggested that all licenses should be reviewed, with a particular 
emphasis on considering only the “bona fide” licenses (BE OV44/82, ‘Secret Telegram 
no.98’, 5th September 1947), 
Due to the near-catastrophic drain on the reserves, which by September 
stood at a total of £559m (their lowest post-war level), and with dollar reserves at 
only £21m, Britain had to go further than simply diminishing imports from the dollar 
area. Creech-Jones declared it had become inevitable that, wherever Colonial 
governments found it possible to restrict imports, they must do so even if it were 
from other members of the group or the UK. As such, all Colonial governments were 
to impose restrictions on goods from the UK, other Colonies and foreign countries. 
This required a return to individual import licensing. Creech-Jones, invoking the 
strictures of the Second World War, required that a system would need to be 
implemented which was “at least as strict as that obtaining at the height of the last 
war” (ibid.). Licenses for goods from the UK were, in general, not granted for 
inessential goods and only in restricted quantities for essential goods. Only where 
consumer goods were essential to maintaining production were licenses granted 
(ibid.). Of course, imports from outside the Sterling Area were required to be even 
lower than imports from countries within the Area, as far as was practical. Though 
exceptions were made for goods from “war shattered countries”, with a slight 
preference for these goods even over goods from the UK. This was regarded by 
Creech-Jones “as justifiable and as in the United Kingdom interest on exchange 
grounds” (ibid.). 
Preference was also placed upon goods needed for capital development and 
a specific hierarchy of imports was created to use as a guideline for the import of 
such commodities. 
 “The question will arise how to treat goods only obtainable from 
hard currency sources and needed for capital development. 
                                               
93 The blanket import license ban imposed by the Colonial Secretary on the day of suspension, 20th 
August 1947. 
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Where such imports can be shown to be likely to lead to 
additional production of a dollar earning or dollar saving nature 
to an extent which will more than repay the cost of the imports 
within two years, licenses may be issued. Where such imports will 
not lead to substantial earning of dollar revenue or the saving of 
dollar expenditure, licenses should be refused. Where such 
imports will lead to dollar earning or dollar saving substantially in 
excess of the value of the imports but not likely to arise within 
two years, import licenses should not be issued without reference 
to me” (ibid.). 
Export policy, however, was not similarly constrained and Creech-Jones made sure 
that the Colonies were well aware of their obligations regarding the direction of 
their exports. 
“The urgent need to earn more foreign exchange makes it the 
common interest of the group to ensure that the maximum 
amount of goods available for export in any member country is 
guided not to destinations within the group but to hard currency 
destinations outside the group. The group as a whole is unable to 
earn foreign exchange sufficient to pay for its imports from the 
rest of the world and these imports will therefore have to be cut 
down far more drastically than has recently been contemplated” 
(ibid.). 
Subsequent to these guidelines on import policy, Creech-Jones made a 
request for estimated import and export balances with the Western Hemisphere for 
1948, including any expected payments for invisible earnings. He emphasised, once 
again, the vital importance of these figures and that “it is difficult to overstate the 
critical position which confronts the UK and Colonies as regards their dollar 
reserves, and every possible effort must be made in 1948 to cut dollar expenditure 
to the bone” (BE OV44/82, ‘Secret Telegram’, 16th September 1947). This was 
seconded shortly after by the Dollar Drain committee, which requested from the 
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Board of Trade a three-month forecast of payments on imports and returns of 
expenditure to and from “dollar countries proper” as well as any other countries 
that presented payment difficulties. The request and supply of the information was 
considered essential due to the very tight margins that the British government was 
dealing with at that point: namely, the still dwindling gold and dollar reserves (TNA 
CO537/2009, Dollar Drain Committee, 17th November 1947). By this point in 1947, 
dollar reserves stood at only £27m, with gold reserves their lowest since March 
1946 at £501m (Bank 1970, p.162). 
However, come the beginning of 1948, little had developed to resolve the 
deficits that were draining the dollar reserves.  The Dollar Drain Committee 
acknowledged that goods from the Western Hemisphere were not only still very 
much in demand, they had now become absolutely vital. However, the Dollar Drain 
Committee felt that it was no longer possible to ask the Colonies to undertake an 
import policy of self-denial of vital goods, so restoring the sources of pre-war supply 
to meet requirements was considered a priority. This led to the realisation that the 
British government was faced with altering the pattern of trade yet again after 
wartime distortions (TNA CO537/3095, Progress Report from Committee, 13th 
January 1948). This brief realization by the Dollar Drain Committee highlights an 
interesting point about the nature of imperial relations: that Britain’s relationship 
with its colonies had to be sustainable, and therefore could not be an entirely 
exploitative ‘one-way street’. British imperial strategy then had to be carefully 
balanced to support the colonies while they also supported Britain. 
The Committee itself recognised that there were four aspects to the nature 
of the problem that Britain currently faced. Firstly, that Britain needed to begin 
supplying many of the commodities to the Colonies as it had before the Second 
World War. Secondly, trade connections were not good enough. This was especially 
problematic if production increased and there were no markets available to which 
to export goods. Thirdly, coordination of policy throughout the Sterling Area was 
poor; there was little synergy between policies on production, export and import 
licenses. Fourthly, and perhaps most important, diversion of exports to the Colonies 
was not just more an avoidance of a dollar loss than a dollar save, but it also 
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infringed upon Britain’s capacity to earn dollars itself. This meant that it was vital to 
get the Colonies to economise first and switch later, as it was their demand that 
remained the problem (ibid.). 
4.5 The Beginning of the European Recovery Program 
The production/trade imbalance was ameliorated somewhat by the introduction of 
the ERP, the Marshall Plan. Marshall Aid, as C.S.S. Newton (1984, p.391) puts it, can 
be seen as a response to Europe’s rapidly developing dollar shortage in 1947. The 
first countries to benefit from the ERP were Greece and Turkey in early 1947 but 
Britain received the most substantial share of the Marshall Aid. With ERP, Britain 
expected an end to its dollar deficit by 1951 and freedom from the US aid by 1952 
(Kolko 1972, p.443). However, this expectation did not find purchase; Britain’s dollar 
deficit rose to £157m in 1949 (ibid, p.457). This occurred primarily because of a fall 
in exports due to the US recession in 1948 – 1949. 
Of course, Marshall Aid did not manage to solve the problem of the global 
disequilibrium either. Indeed, this was expressed by Dean Acheson in a memo to 
President Truman in 1950. 
“At the end of ERP, European production will have been restored 
and substantial recovery achieved. But the problem of payment 
for American goods and services will remain. The countries of the 
free world will still require from us a volume of exports which 
they will not be able to pay for if their exports to the United 
States remain at present levels. Put in its simplest terms, the 
problem is this: as ERP is reduced and after its termination in 
1952, how can Europe and other areas of the world obtain the 
dollars necessary to pay for a high level of United States exports, 
which is essential both to their own basic needs and to the well-
being of the United States economy.” (quoted in Newton 1984, 
p.407) 
 Both Newton (1984) and Burnham (1990) disagree with the ‘lifeline’ thesis of 
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Marshall Aid, though in different fashions. Newton (1984, p.408) argues that 
Marshall Aid solved no problems at all for Europe, or the trade disequilibrium. 
Noting that even before the war, Europe had never directly balanced its trade with 
the US, he maintains that, following the cessation of Marshall Aid, the currency 
crisis would quickly resurface. However, rearmament programmes prevented this 
from actually happening.94 Burnham (1990, p.112) argues that Marshall Aid was not 
a panacea since “no overall state of economic paralysis existed”. What Marshall Aid 
did, he argues, was to ease the pressure on dollar reserves so that the British 
government could continue with its expansive domestic reconstruction programme, 
without significantly altering the quality of life of the British subject. The archival 
evidence supports Burnham’s thesis. State managers ultimately considered the 
grants and loans from the ERP more as a support for the British economy and a tool 
for the development of the productive capacity not just of Britain but also its 
Colonies, than a means of resolving the crisis itself (BE OV46/6, ‘General 
Memorandum for OEEC: United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, December 1949). 
 The US saw the UK and its Colonies as a single economic unit, and the official 
feeling in Washington was that the Sterling Area also could not be restricted as it 
was making a “highly important contribution to world trade and… it provides an 
effective, although limited, multilateralism” (BE OV46/5, ‘Sterling Area’, 28th July 
1948; BE OV46/5, Discussion between Governor and Sir Wilfred Eady, 1st April 1948). 
This was a recognition of the UK’s own policy, stated by Baron Catto, the Governor 
of the Bank of England, which accepted that it had an obligation to “look after the 
Colonies”, and therefore it would have been “inconsistent with this policy and make 
no sense to refuse to allow the Colonies to buy essential good from here or, if we 
cannot supply them, to provide the necessary dollars” (ibid.). However, this also had 
some negative repercussions.  
“In general, we obviously wanted the Dominions and Colonies to 
economise in dollar expenditure as much as possible and it 
probably suited us for the Dominions to borrow some dollars if 
                                               
94 However, the Korean War also was only a brief respite from the global dollar shortage and returned 
after the War had concluded. 
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they could from IMF etc., though borrowing dollars and piling up 
sterling balances was obviously not a process which could 
continue indefinitely” (ibid.) 
 As such, given the definition of the UK in these talks, that it also included all 
colonies, dependent territories and protectorates, the US and UK agreed to, 
“adopt such financial and monetary measures as may be 
necessary to stabilise its currency, establish or maintain a valid 
rate of exchange, balance its governmental budget as soon as 
practicable, create or maintain internal financial stability 
(including the adoption or maintenance of appropriate credit 
policies), and generally restore or maintain confidence in its 
monetary system” (BE OV46/5, ‘Economic Co-operation 
Agreement between the USA and the UK’, 12th May 1948). 
Given the great reliance on a broad imperial strategy during this period, this 
required, then, action to be taken in support of colonial development. For Malaya 
this also meant ensuring the successful prosecution of the Emergency that had been 
declared on 16th June 1948. Indeed, in a Cabinet paper on 1st July 1948, Malaya, 
prior to the outbreak of the Emergency, was described as “the most peaceful 
country in South-East Asia and had taken long strides towards the re-establishment 
of stable, prosperous conditions… It is by far the most important source of dollars in 
the Colonial Empire and it would gravely worsen the whole dollar balance of the 
sterling area if there were serious interference with Malayan exports” (TNA 
CAB129/28, CP (48)171, 1st July 1948).95 Certainly then, here we see in Cabinet 
documents that the pre-war relationship between Britain and Malaya remains the 
                                               
95 Certainly Malaya was not a particularly violent colony; however, there had been a number of 
strikes and work stoppages prior to the outbreak of the Emergency but these had dropped 
precipitously before June 1948, with a decline in strikes from 49 in August 1947 to 19 in October and 
the number of man-hours lost down from 97,052 to 19,988. This was mainly due to the increase in 
the price of rubber and employers deciding to restore a cut made in the rate for Chinese contractors 
(TNA CO1045/177, Visit of Labour Adviser to Federation of Malaya, 13th December 1947). The 
declaration of the Emergency was instead a ‘tipping point’ on a spectrum of escalation of violent 
tactics used by the MCP, and a similar escalation of the suppression of radicalism by the Colonial 
government in Malaya (Harper 2001, p.147). There seems to be no direct correlation between 
stoppages and strikes and the development of the Communist insurgency (ibid.). 
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same in this post-war crisis. Indeed, the historically developed and unique 
relationship between Malaya, Britain and the global economy is not only well 
understood by British state managers but clearly distinct from other imperial 
relationships. 
In a letter from Sydney Caine, the Third Secretary to the Treasury to Henry 
Wilson-Smith, the Second Secretary to the Treasury, Caine informed Wilson-Smith 
that he had been informed by William Gorell-Barnes, the Assistant under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, of discussions by the London Committee on European 
Economic Co-operation about the possibility of ERP and International Bank loans for 
the Colonies. According to Caine, the Treasury ideally wanted Britain and its Colonies 
to take all ERP loan dollars on offer and to borrow from the International Bank also. 
However, due to problems in negotiating this with both the International Bank and 
the US, the Treasury sought for the UK to take up the ERP loans, while the Colonies 
would take up the International Bank loans.96 Due to considerable differences in 
interest rates, this raised certain difficulties. Pressure had to be brought on the 
Colonies to accept this agreement, which would not have been made easier if they 
were denied the benefits, provided through the cheaper ERP rate. Indeed, it would 
have been very difficult to persuade the Colonies that they would have to be left out 
of the ERP (because they had enough dollars for their own needs) while 
simultaneously being asked to borrow dollars from the most expensive lender. (TNA 
T232/154, ‘Caine to Wilson-Smith’, 2nd July 1948) 
The Treasury then sought to make this offer reasonable either by working to 
allow the Colonies access to ERP loans or, if possible, by making an internal 
adjustment within the Colonial Sterling Area to equalise interest rates. The letter 
from Caine ends by emphasising that the Colonial Office required the Treasury’s 
agreement on the principle of allowing access to ERP loans or making internal 
adjustments to equalise rates on International Bank loans so as to strengthen the 
case for Colonies signing the agreement over American aid before 6th July 1948. 
                                               
96
 i.e. Colonial governments, the Colonial Development Corporation, the Overseas Food Corporation, 
and also “private undertakings operating in the Colonies” would all seek International Bank loans 
(TNA T232/154, ‘Caine to Wilson-Smith’, 2
nd
 July 1948). 
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(TNA T232/154, ‘Caine to Wilson-Smith’, 2nd July 1948) 
By the 6th July 1948, the Treasury had come to the conclusion that the issue 
of bringing the Colonies into the ERP itself was not even to be contemplated; 
however, there remained a possibility that the Colonies might receive a proportion 
of the first quarter loan received from the ERP. Indeed, the Treasury were happy “for 
the Colonies to receive some of the loan, or to borrow from the International Bank 
and have an equalisation of those interest rates, but they would be brought in to 
that degree only “for the purposes of the supply of raw materials” (TNA T232/154, 
‘ERP loans for Colonies’, 6th July 1948).97 Arthur Creech-Jones telegrammed the 
Colonies to inform them that the British government would not ask the Colonies to 
seek International Bank loans since they were of a high rate of interest that was not 
offset by the potential advantages; furthermore, there was the additional problem 
in colonies such as Malaya, which was a net dollar earner, in asking them to borrow 
dollars at uneconomic rates when they earned significant quantities by themselves 
(TNA T232/154, ‘Circular Despatch to all Colonies from Arthur Creech-Jones’, 20th 
September 1948).98 
Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to Washington, wrote to the 
Foreign Office that the ECA had reached an agreement on the initial loan to the UK, 
$300m from April – December 1948, with the possibility of increasing the loan for 
the subsequent three months to April 1949. While it was claimed by the European 
Cooperation Administration (ECA) that there would be no specific percentage link 
between grants and loans from the programme, the ECA make clear that their 
intention was to make the British government take up the loan obligation of $300m 
as the price for obtaining grant assistance to the ratio of 3:1 (i.e. grant:loan) over the 
whole period. As such the ECA were accepting the percentage link but avoiding 
                                               
97 Another possibility that was suggested by the Bank to the Treasury was for the ECA to distribute 
between all ERP recipients a sum of £150m in dollars earmarked specifically for purchases from the 
Sterling Area (BE OV46/5, ‘Sterling Area – Dollar Deficit’, 21st July 1948). However, the US rejected this 
on the basis that it would lead to substantially enlarged Sterling balances following the end of ERP 
(BE OV46/5, ‘Sterling Area’, 28th July 1948). 
98 If a colony wished to receive a portion of the ERP loan for reconstruction and development, they 
then had to provide a description of the project for funding, the estimated dollar and sterling cost, 
and the duration of the project. With this information, the Colonial Office would approve or deny the 
funds, though this was only to begin in late-1949 at the earliest (TNA T232/154, ‘Circular Despatch to 
all Colonies from Arthur Creech-Jones’, 20
th
 September 1948). 
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admitting that. Franks admitted that while this was not ideal, it was difficult to 
provide an argument that the British government was happy to accept free money 
but not money that curtailed consumption when the whole package is necessary for 
economic recovery. Furthermore, as Franks pointed out, the ECA position was a 
point of policy and likely immovable. The grant:loan ratio was inevitable. (TNA 
T232/154, ‘Telegram no.3312’, 7th July 1948) 
Stafford Cripps, now the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in discussion of Franks’ 
telegram, was very concerned that the grant:loan ratio could no longer be opposed 
and, more importantly, that the US could not see the restriction on the use of the 
loan purely for the purchase of capital goods as valid though he was hopeful that a 
compromise could be sought on this issue, especially since Cripps had recently 
claimed in the House of Commons that the Government would use the American 
loan on capital items. (TNA T232/154, ‘Discussion of telegram no.3312’, 8th July 
1948) In the following telegram from Franks, he urged the Foreign Office to 
authorise him to accept the existing terms of the agreement and move towards the 
final negotiation of the loan itself, as he felt it was as good a deal as they were likely 
to get (TNA T232/154, ‘Telegram no.3370’, 9th July 1948). The American Aid and 
European Payments (Financial Provisions) Bill, published on 14th December 1948, 
authorised payment of UK contributions to the Paris Agreement. It also provided 
statutory authority to and provided the permission for an audit and report to 
Parliament on the “Special Account” and the Intra-European Payments Account. By 
the 20th November 1948, total dollars received from the ERP was $433m: $348m 
was Grant Aid and the equivalent in Sterling was paid into the Special Account. (BE 
3A38/1, ‘EC Aid Accounting Arrangement’, 15th December 1948) 
The aid system of the ERP worked according to a system of need, established 
by a forecast of dollar deficits (which were very difficult to predict accurately). An 
intra-European payments system was also established in which debtor states 
received drawing rights from creditor states, according to a need determined by 
dollar deficit forecasts. Aid was also given, in certain instances, in the form of 
commodities (BE OV46/6, ‘Future of ERP’, 30th September 1949). A Bank of England 
memo on the future of the ERP described the negotiations behind this system as a 
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“sordid wrangle” and was similarly scathing about the principles of dollar allocation. 
“*They+ have highly damaging effects. They penalise countries for 
doing well. Every country’s interest lies in proving that it cannot 
increase its dollar earnings or reduce its dollar expenditure and 
that it cannot balance its intra-European position. If a country 
does well, it loses aid. The better it does, the more its aid is cut. 
There is no incentive for a country to take the difficult decisions 
which are needed to make it viable” (ibid.). 
However, the initial dollar aid was extremely helpful and Stafford Cripps 
defended this aid to the House of Commons. 
“We must underline once more the extent of our dependence at 
the present time on this very American aid. I must remind the 
House of the extract from the Board of Trade Journal of 16th 
October last, which said that without American aid, the present 
position in Britain would be that there would be less meat and 
eggs, there would be cuts in butter, sugar, cheese and even 
bacon, cotton goods would have disappeared from the home 
market, tobacco consumption would have been cut by three-
quarters and house building reduced perhaps to 50,000 a year. 
Unemployment, as we have been told by Ministers, basing 
themselves upon this document, might well have risen to one and 
a half million or more and there would have been a lower 
standard of living resulting in a diminished productive effort.” 
(Hansard Vol.460 cc1111-1230, HC Debate 27th January 1949) 
The Chancellor was keen to emphasise the value of the ERP to the reconstruction 
and restructuring of Britain’s economy. However, Cripps, in the same debate, made 
sure also to emphasise the Sterling Area and the Colonies as vital pillars of Britain’s 
economy. Indeed, he urged that yet more could be expected from the Colonies to 
support the Sterling Area’s dollar deficit. 
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“We must maintain and increase the very valuable contribution 
made by the Colonies through the sale of materials to the dollar 
area. This means continued development of Colonial resources—
a development which has in the past unfortunately been gravely 
neglected. It also means that we have to export goods to the 
Colonies in increasing quantity, both in return for the goods they 
export and in order that these new developments can take place.” 
(ibid.) 
Thus, while ERP was one measure of supporting post-war reconstruction, so 
too was the imperial strategy of wide-scale dollar rationing throughout the Sterling 
Area. Particular within this strategy, and among these relationships, was the scale of 
Malaya’s dollar contribution, standing over and above all other colonies by some 
measure. Throughout 1948, Malaya was estimated to have provided $172m towards 
the Colonial dollar surplus, which stood at, bearing Malaya’s contribution in mind, 
$178m, while the Sterling Area’s dollar deficit stood at $1800m for the same period. 
However, Malaya’s actual contribution was closer to $230m, including Singapore’s 
entrepot earnings (TNA FO371/76049, ‘Malaya as a dollar earner’, 30th April 1949). 
However, concerns were raised that Malaya could become “another Burma”, 
in terms of its civil unrest and so disrupt the pattern of Western economic recovery. 
As Malaya was overwhelmingly the greatest dollar-earner in the Colonies and the 
Sterling Area, there was serious concern that any further development of the 
insurgency in Malaya could affect the rubber and tin industries, diminishing exports 
to the dollar area, and so threaten its dollar contribution to the Sterling Area and, 
therefore, severely hinder the resurgence of global trade (TNA FO371/76049, 
‘Malaya as a dollar earner’, 30th April 1949). Furthermore, while Malaya’s 
importance as a dollar-earner for economic recovery was much appreciated by the 
British government so too was its role as a vital supplier of raw materials necessary 
for ERP, as well as for the American economy (TNA FO371/76049, ‘Letter to UK 
delegation to UN’, 2nd April 1949). However, almost a year later, in a letter from 
Thomas Lloyd, Permanent under-Secretary to the Colonial Office, to John Paskin, the 
Assistant Secretary, the situation in Malaya was still unstable and renewed 
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commitment was required in order to maintain the Malayan contribution to the 
dollar pool (TNA CO537/5996, ‘Lloyd to Paskin’, 28th March 1950; PREM8/1126, 
‘Suggestion by Ministry of Defence’, 19th April 1950). In early 1950, the Prime 
Minister set up a ‘Malaya Committee’ to oversee the stability of Malaya and the 
prosecution of the Malayan Emergency (PREM8/1126, ‘Terms for the creation of the 
Malaya Committee’, 22nd April 1950). 
The relationship between Britain and Malaya required a careful balancing act 
of ensuring that Malaya was providing and saving as many dollars as possible but, in 
order to do this, it needed substantial investment to maintain dollar earnings and 
savings. This required the development of the Malayan economy and the spending 
of dollars to achieve that. The dynamic (which is to say not-entirely ‘one way’) 
nature of imperial strategy is manifest here in the fact that Britain’s relationship with 
Malaya had a particular character and purpose that, while managed by the 
institutional framework and mechanisms of the Sterling Area and the British Empire 
more broadly, can only be understood as a bilateral relationship that had developed 
historically with both Britain and the global economy.  
By this point the Sterling Area still represented the largest multilateral 
trading organisation in the world after the war. By 1948, £5bn of $13.8bn (36%) 
visible world trade conducted was in Sterling. Considering invisible earnings, this 
figure came closer to 50% of international payments that were conducted in 
Sterling. The Foreign Office felt that “these facts stem partly from the ramifications 
of the sterling area itself and partly from the world shortage of dollars”, it was 
nevertheless the de facto principal trading and monetary organisation in the 
immediate post-war period (TNA FO371/82915; Sterling balances in South East Asia’, 
28th March 1950). Indeed, Sir Sidney Caine, the Head of the UK Treasury and Supply 
Delegation to Washington, in discussion with US Treasury officials, diagnosed the 
fundamental division existing in world trade. 
“The world was divided into two broad areas. The dollar area 
where more was being produced than consumed; and the non-
dollar area where consumption was greater than production. Our 
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thinking should be in the direction of determining whether any 
measure proposed would bring about a better balance between 
the two areas” (TNA T230/177, ‘Note of meeting with US 
Treasury’, 8th June 1949). 
Sidney Caine’s characterisation of the problem affecting the global economy 
is an exact description of an overproduction crisis, albeit geographically represented 
as a trade imbalance between two hemispheres. Caine’s statement was in response 
to George Bolton’s suggestion that an open general license import policy was 
required since, he argued, global trade would only revive from large-scale voluntary 
capital investment flows (ibid.). If trading restrictions were eased in the non-dollar 
area, it would lead to a greater willingness in the US to invest in foreign capital. This 
sentiment was echoed by Sir Henry Wilson-Smith, Second Secretary to the Treasury, 
who felt it would also inject competitive rigor into the non-dollar area, thus leading 
to lower prices and improved productivity in the UK and Sterling Area. However, this 
suggestion was not pursued and instead the UK moved closer to devaluing Sterling, 
while maintaining Britain’s important imperial relations. 
4.6 Devaluation 
A Treasury memo in 1948 discussed the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and 
floating exchange rates (TNA T230/177, ‘The Dollar-Sterling Rate’, 30th August 1948). 
The memo identified that, with US inflation rising and primary goods production at a 
low, US goods and raw material prices would continue to rise, and hopefully 
improve the UK’s deficit with the dollar area. However, this did not occur since UK 
prices increased at a greater rate and, despite consistent increases in production and 
export growth, it was clear by early 1949 that exports were not growing as quickly as 
imports, and as such were in relative decline (Burnham 1990, p.127). Given the 
trading of sterling for dollars at a much lower value than the official rate, it seemed 
like one of the only options was a devaluation of Sterling (Kolko 1971, p.458) 
There was significant speculation in the press about the strength of Sterling. 
A piece in the Economist on 3rd September 1949 (p.517) summed up Britain’s 
position very well, emphasising that Britain was no longer facing ‘business as usual’. 
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“The old banker of the Sterling Area is certainly playing his 
traditional part, but today he is playing it on a scale beyond all 
pre-war precedent and doing so without the substance which 
enabled him both to play the part and to thrive on it.” 
On 19th September 1949, Sterling was devalued from US$4.03 to US$2.80. However, 
this did not change the amount of ERP dollars that were available to the UK though 
it did increase the amount of Sterling in the ‘Special Account’ (a counterpart fund to 
the amount of dollar aid the UK received), which actually had a deflationary effect 
on the economy and was hoped by the Bank would minimise the inflationary effects 
associated with devaluation (BE OV46/6, ‘ERP and Devaluation’, 20th September 
1949). However, it was also accepted that devaluation would make the terms of 
trade worse initially though, at the time, the government was unsure how the 
course of events would unfold as devaluation had created a new and unfamiliar 
situation (TNA T230/177, ‘Memorandum from the Foreign Secretary’, 18th October 
1949; TNA T230/177, ‘1949/50 Dollar Export Forecast’, 22nd September 1949). 
 The Governor of Singapore, Sir Franklin Gimson, informed the Colonial 
Secretary that the Colonies had been expecting devaluation for some time now; 
however, there was some annoyance that the value of their Sterling balances had 
been diminished significantly (BE OV65/3, Telegram no.776 (Secret), 12th October 
1949). Furthermore, he relayed that the black market in dollars in Malaya had now 
been eliminated with the reduced rate, exports to the dollar area had already been 
stimulated by devaluation, and he remained confident that imports from the dollar 
area to Malaya would soon shrink (ibid.).  
This sentiment was echoed in a report following a visit by the Colonial 
Office’s South-East Asia Department to Malaya between June and November of 
1949. The report states that, despite the uncertainty over the Sterling-Dollar rate, 
the tin industry in Malaya was well organised and productive, as was the rubber 
industry also (TNA CO1045/177, ‘The Federation of Malaya’, 11th November 1949). 
However, both faced serious problems in the next few years. Both industries could 
only survive if they expanded. The tin industry needed to discover new fields and 
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prospecting was essential, while the rubber industry needed to expand and 
consolidate its current estates and replant them with higher yield rubber trees, as 
the only means of successfully competing with synthetic rubber (ibid.; BE OV46/6, 
‘General Memorandum for OEEC: United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, December 
1949). However, the Communist insurgency and the lack of available capital were 
hampering efforts to develop both of Malaya’s vital dollar-earning industries. The 
insurgency would continue to escalate and the British government still required 
severe import restrictions to keep the dollar deficit as low as possible. 
A telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the Finance 
Ministers of the Independent Sterling Area, sent in late-October, warned that 
inflationary pressures could wipe out the gains provided by devaluation. Indeed, this 
warning preceded a statement by the Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Philip 
Noel-Baker, that the UK would not be meeting the Sterling Area dollar import 
targets for 1949 and to attempt to do so would have meant “the complete reversal 
of the whole process of economic recovery and cancellation of contracts on a large 
scale… The export drive and the re-equipment of British industry would have come 
to a standstill” (TNA T236/3995, “Outward (Secret) Telegram no.372 from 
Commonwealth Relations Office”, 22nd October 1949).99 The import target, set at 
US$1200m (intended to be 75% of the 1948 dollar expenditure), was overshot by 
US$190m, which Noel-Baker justified by arguing that the overspend took account 
“of the urgent need to provide the materials upon which our dollar earning and 
dollar saving export industries depend” (ibid.). 
 Noel-Baker concluded the telegram by insisting that the 1949/50 figures 
would be much improved since more money would be received from the ERP; 
however, he also acknowledges that ERP dollar aid would be much diminished in 
1950/51, which would therefore require renewed dollar economies and the 
                                               
99 The Chancellor also sent a telegram to the Independent Sterling Area the same day, reiterating 
what Noel-Baker had already said and apologizing for the sense of shock and disappointment they 
must be feeling, especially considering that the import targets were set at a Finance Ministers 
meeting only three months earlier (TNA T236/3995, ‘Outward Telegram no.373 Dollar Import 
Programme’ (Top Secret), 22
nd
 October 1949). 
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rebuilding of the reserves (ibid.).100 In a memo for the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Bank echoed this point: even with the 
devaluation of Sterling providing a major incentive to purchase British exports, the 
reduction of dollar imports would still be essential in closing the dollar gap (BE 
OV46/6, ‘General Memorandum for OEEC: United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, 
December 1949). Indeed, the memo states that exports to the dollar area will need 
to cover at least 90% of dollar area imports in order to even approach equilibrium 
and this represented “a completely different trade pattern between the United 
Kingdom and North America from anything which has existed for the last 35 years” 
(ibid.). While the level of US imports increased over this period, the overall global 
supply of dollars fell for the third consecutive year. 
World Supply and Use of Dollars 1946-1950 ($ millions) 
 Annual Totals 
 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Imports 5168 6071 7822 7066 9315 
Public financial resources: 
Grants and other 
unilateral transfers (net) 
2279 1812 4157 5321 4120 
Total dollars supplied 13153 15471 16845 16682 18209 
Total other sources 1968 5274 1159 77 -3628 
Total dollars used by other 
countries 
15121 20745 18004 16759 14581 
Fig. 3 (Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952) 
                                               
100 The import restrictions were extremely severe and even Independent Sterling Area members 
found them particularly difficult to implement. In a letter from the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia to the Chancellor, Stafford Cripps is told how Rhodesia’s surplus of US$12m in 1949/50 had 
led to serious strictures and could not be practicably maintained beyond mid-1950 due to the “real 
hardship” caused by limiting dollar imports. The letter is revealing in that it underlines that the 
purpose of these import restrictions is to rebuild the Sterling Area reserves (TNA T236/3995, Letter 
from Edgar Whitehead to Stafford Cripps, 21
st
 November 1949) 
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 Essential to the development of this new trading pattern over the next few 
years was the Sterling Area, which the Bank saw as crucial to British, European and 
global economic vitality due to the range of Sterling Area goods (particularly 
Colonial goods) being large dollar earners, or dollar savers (BE OV46/6, ‘General 
Memorandum for OEEC: United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, December 1949). 
This required substantial dollar import reductions in the Sterling Area since the 
rebuilding of Sterling Area reserves was of the utmost importance to safeguarding 
trade. As such, the Bank outlined four policy points to achieve this goal: 
 increase the supply of manufactures and primary goods to dollar markets 
and other markets that are dependent on supplies from the dollar area. 
 increase the supply of dollar-earning services (e.g. tourism) 
 to alter the pattern of production to achieve 1 and 2 
 promote conditions designed to help investment of the surplus countries 
(ibid.). 
Malaya was relevant to all points but the second. While dollar saving would account 
for reducing around a third of the dollar gap, the rest would be achieved by 
stimulating exports through development. For Malaya, this meant the development 
of the rubber and tin industries. Since the Sterling Area, in total, was in deficit with 
the dollar area, this made colonies like Malaya even more important than they had 
been in the previous 40 years, when the Sterling Area had provided a surplus to 
balance Britain’s own deficit with the dollar area (ibid.). As such, Britain had an even 
greater need and responsibility to develop its Colonies, which required “above all a 
high level of investment in the Colonies and this, over a period of years, can be 
achieved only by a net financial investment from overseas (principally from the 
United Kingdom) supported by a high level of imports of capital goods and 
manufactured consumption goods” (ibid.). 
 The Bank characterised the relationship between Britain and the Colonies as 
“essentially one of mutual advantage”, since the Colonies relied on the UK for 
development through finance, manufactured and consumer goods, as well as 
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personnel; while the UK depended on the Colonies for raw materials and, in the 
case of Malaya, the hard currency provided by the sale of its raw materials to the 
dollar area (ibid.). Malaya then was doubly important to the British economy as it 
aided in the recovery of Britain’s lost reserves and provided raw materials for 
manufacture – both of which were essential to returning Britain to economic 
viability (ibid.).101 However, Colonial development was intended to improve those 
very factors since development was seen as instrumental in developing a surplus 
with the dollar area.  
 The Bank then outlined to the OEEC a five-step plan for moving towards 
resolving the trade disequilibrium. 
 General domestic policies: deflationary action, devaluation, increasing 
productivity, freeing up trade as widely as possible.  
 Expansion of dollar earnings from trade and services, while maintaining 
imports as much as possible. 
 Elimination of the dollar deficit on other transactions: capital transactions, 
Sterling Area payments, payments of gold and dollars to third countries, and 
the development of existing surpluses. This would require increased exports 
to the Sterling Area and the rest of the world in order to earn and save 
dollars. 
 Recovery of reserves to an absolute minimum of US$2000m by the end of 
the ERP. 
 Strengthening the external financial position as much as possible (ibid.). 
These policies rested, however, on ERP dollar aid remaining as was forecast until its 
predicted end date, and there was little leeway built into these policy priorities. 
                                               
101 Official UK and Colonial financial policy had been to support the continuous improvement of 
standards of living and the resources of the Colonies. A key element of this had been avoiding 
inflationary measures, such as spending financial resources that impeded development by 
multiplying the demand on limited goods. Provisions had also been made for Colonial governments 
to borrow on London markets, as well as to borrow from the IBRD under the UK’s guarantee (BE 
OV46/6, ‘General Memorandum for OEEC: United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, December 1949) 
  156 
“If these external conditions are not fulfilled, it will be impossible 
to carry out effectively the policies indicated above, and the 
United Kingdom position – and indeed that of the whole sterling 
area and of Western Europe – will be correspondingly weaker, 
and the United Kingdom will be less able to play her full part in 
bringing about a ‘one-World’ multilateral trade and financial 
system” (ibid.). 
However, the ERP was not resolving the fundamental problem of the global trade 
imbalance and the UK was still vulnerable to economic upsets due to its low 
reserves, which, by the end of 1949, stood at £603m, with £131m of dollar reserves 
available (BE OV46/6, letter to Sir Edward Bridges, 19th December 1949). This was 
much weaker than the figure indicates due to the devaluation of Sterling. So while 
the reserves grew towards the end of the year, they only reached a similar level to 
that of the past year before they began to fall in April 1949, though the December 
reserves showed a much improved dollar position. In fact, the dollar reserve 
position was higher than it had been since November 1946 but both gold and dollar 
reserves would continue to rise until July 1950, with gold reserves increasing until 
July 1951 (Bank 1970, p.162). 
The reserves flattered the UK’s overall position. The ERP was still supporting 
Britain’s reserve position but not solving the underlying problem. As such, the Bank 
informed the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Edward Bridges, that they 
were not at all optimistic for Britain’s outlook after the end of the ERP (BE OV46/6, 
letter to Sir Edward Bridges, 19th December 1949). Indeed, the Bank informed Sir 
Edward that that they expected a return to an acute world dollar shortage after ERP 
finished due to the “deepseated maladjustments in world trade” that still existed, 
and had not yet been resolved (ibid.). This sentiment was echoed in a letter to the 
UK delegation to the OEEC, emphasising that the only way out of the dollar shortage 
was through investment in UK and Colonial production (BE OV46/6, ‘International 
Investment’, 6th June 1950). Contrasted with the situation before the Second World 
War, when Britain’s reserves were much greater and it could lose many millions of 
dollars without precipitating a crisis, the situation was still starkly pessimistic. 
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Indeed, as a Bank memo pointed out, 
“A nation which is the centre of a multilateral trading and 
financial system which conducts transactions with the dollar area 
alone of $7 billion a year, and which besides that provides the 
currency in which a large part of the world’s international trade is 
carried on, and which is therefore subjected to every ripple in the 
world economy, cannot manage with reserves of less than $2 
billion. It needs much more to move effectively towards ‘One-
World’ objectives” (BE OV46/6, ‘General Memorandum for OEEC: 
United Kingdom Position in 1950-1951’, December 1949). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of imperial relations during the severe post-
war crisis identified as an over-production crisis manifest as a trade imbalance and 
being felt as a global shortage of dollars. British state managers during this crisis 
required both the UK and the Sterling Area to limit imports (either by ‘going 
without’ or finding substitute domestic goods), especially from the dollar area, and 
boosting exports to the dollar area (either by increasing production of export goods 
or finding substitutes for goods that would otherwise be used for domestic 
consumption but could be exported). The dollar drain, and the reserve position, 
dominated the thoughts of British state managers in this period and this is 
particularly apparent in three acute moments: the introduction of convertibility, the 
ERP, and the devaluation of Sterling. 
The Convertibility Clause was catastrophic for the British dollar problem 
even though the raison d’etre for the AAFA was the convertibility of Sterling. The 
demand for dollars was unable to be met by Britain’s line of credit from the USA and 
Canada and so convertibility was suspended. While the United Kingdom may have 
sought to maintain the Sterling Area in this period, this was not because they were 
under the illusion that the Sterling Area could provide all of the goods necessary for 
its own consumption, or that the Sterling Area would remain the preeminent 
conduit for international trade in perpetuity, but rather because the United 
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Kingdom believed that this was the best available means to maintaining 
international trade and Britain’s reserve position under crisis conditions at that time. 
In order to stimulate world trade further, the USA sought to inject an even 
greater quantity of dollars into the world economy through the ERP. This vast 
stimulus, again, sought to fuel world trade, the consumption of American goods, 
and the restructuring and reconstruction of Europe’s damaged economies. However, 
with costs rising in Britain faster than elsewhere in the world, Britain was forced to 
devalue Sterling in the hope that this would stimulate exports to the dollar area; 
however, this was not forthcoming, and crisis conditions remained. 
This chapter contains two important ideas of relevance to British 
imperialism: the mechanisms of the Sterling Area and the value of Malaya to this 
trading area. Malaya remained a very important source of dollars to the Sterling 
Area, which pooled all of its foreign reserves in the UK and under the control of the 
British government.  This was achieved through the sale of Malaya’s two main 
natural resources, rubber and tin, to the United States. During this period, the 
British government imposed stringent measures on the members of the Sterling 
Area. These measures principally took the form of extremely strict import policies 
and a similarly strict import licensing policy, making it very difficult for any Sterling 
Area member to import goods from the dollar area for anything other than the most 
necessary purchases. Furthermore, due to the pooling of all dollars and the 
significant rationing of these dollars (as well as the implied threat that this free 
transferability in the Sterling Area could well be swiftly revoked), the British 
government made sure to keep a very tight lid on all dollar spending. While the 
British government claimed that dollars were always available to Sterling Area 
members, and that no member ever ‘went without’, this was the case because of 
the extremely strict import policies which were set by the Colonial Office. The 
Foreign Office, by 1950, still maintained that the Area should be “protected, 
strengthened and expanded” and that “its existence permits us to look forward to 
the time when Sterling will again be the basis of exchange and we can do so because 
the machinery is there and well nigh intact” (TNA FO371/82915, The Sterling Area – 
A Background Paper, 24th Jan 1950). 
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This machinery was used to alter commodity markets, the terms of trade and 
pool currency to Britain and the Sterling Area’s economic positions. The purpose of 
this manipulation was to limit the drain of dollars from the Sterling Area and to 
maintain the Sterling Area as a cogent trading bloc, and the largest in the world. 
Indeed, if the flow of dollars continued unabated from the Sterling Area, the 
members would inevitably have sought to extricate themselves from the agreement 
and either ‘go it alone’ or reach an agreement tying their currencies to another. 
Neither would have been, as British state managers saw, in the interests of Britain or 
the resurgence of world trade, and thus capital. However, this period also sees 
attempts by British state managers to secure aid for Malaya and the Colonies in 
order to ensure their economic growth and development, which was not only seen 
as an essential part of the strategy of boosting the dollar surplus countries of the 
Sterling Area but was, by its very nature, beneficial to them also. 
The chapter seeks to conclude that this dollar drain reveals an economy in 
crisis, which is best understood as a global overproduction crisis manifest on the one 
hand as a trade imbalance between Western and Eastern hemispheres, and on the 
other hand as a shortage of dollars in the global economy. Indeed, officials at the 
Bank, and Sir Sidney Caine at the Treasury, both characterise the fundamental 
problem as one of overproduction in the dollar area, particularly the United States. 
The British government sought to aid the reinvigoration of international trade after 
the Second World War through the manipulation of the markets of the Sterling Area, 
using import controls and the strict rationing of pooled dollars. 
The AAFA, the suspension of Convertibility, the ERP, and devaluation are also 
pertinent not simply as episodes within the dollar drain, which reveal its acute 
character, but also as further instances of imperial relations between states. With 
the lending and granting of huge quantities of dollars, the United States also sought 
to manipulate markets in a bid to alleviate the crisis which had paralyzed the 
international economy and world trade. Indeed, there is a noteworthy symmetry 
between the actions of the British, on the one hand, in their dealings with Malaya 
and the Sterling Area, and the United States and its dealings with Britain and 
Europe. While the means may vary, the intent and purpose remain the same: the 
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alleviation of crisis conditions, the resurgence of world trade, and the benefit of 
capital-in-general. 
 What remains particularly telling is that, during the period 1945 – 1950, the 
content of the Bank’s Archives on Malaya remain unusually empty, with only a few 
documents that suggest at the nature of the relationship. Indeed, prior to 1945. 
However, particularly full in this period are the documents on the broader Sterling 
Area policy. One can only conclude therefore that, during this period, the series of 
bilateral relationships that made up the Sterling Area and Empire were subsumed 
beneath the overarching institutional framework of the Area, due to the particularly 
stringent nature of the crisis and the measures required to overcome it. Certainly, in 
this period, we see a genuine marshalling of the entire Empire and Sterling Area to 
the purpose of maintaining itself: to support Sterling, to conserve dollars, and to 
ensure the continuation of trade within the Sterling Area and Eastern hemisphere. 
Certainly, this is in keeping with the established literature on the subject 
already (Krozewski 2001; Hinds 2001). However, where this thesis diverges from 
others is in its conception of the Sterling Area. Where other approaches see the 
Sterling Area and the Empire as a formal institution and analyse it as such, 
subsuming the individual relationships of the Sterling Area into an imagined idea of 
the institution of the Sterling Area, this thesis sees this period of time as featuring a 
drive by the British state to force these bilateral relationship to conform to a very 
strict set of criteria due to the crisis besetting the global economy.102 However, even 
then, we see Malaya performing a very specific function in its relationship with 
Britain due to this historically developed relationship with both Britain and the 
global economy, particularly its high dollar earning capacity derived from its rubber 
and tin industries. 
As such, where other authors (see Krozewski, 2001 and Hinds, 2001) see this 
as a confirmation of their implicit theorising of the nature of the Sterling Area and 
British Empire as formal institutions, this thesis actually holds that Britain requires 
the members of the Area to act in specific ways, which manifests itself in different 
                                               
102
 See, for example, Schenk (1996), Hinds (2001), Krozewski (2001). 
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ways with different states – with some states being valuable and a benefit to this 
drive, and other states as drains upon the Area’s reserves. Chief among them, of 
course, was Britain, which was the largest spender of dollars in the entire Area. 
However, the use of these bilateral relationships for a single purpose reveals 
the particular nature of British imperial strategy in this period. Indeed, as mentioned 
by numerous state officials, the acute crises that beset the British and global 
economy were severe and likely to cause the collapse of Sterling and bring the 
British economy into chaos. The only means of avoiding this outcome was by turning 
these bilateral relationships to a single purpose: dollar saving and accumulation. 
What is revealed in this period is the ideal nature of an imperial relationship: 
the dominant state insists on the course of action for the dominated state to follow 
and it is undertaken. We see this undertaken throughout the Sterling Area and 
British Empire holistically through the directives issued to all Colonies and Sterling 
Area members. However, what is obfuscated in this period is how this manifests 
itself particularly outside of the unique crisis conditions of the post-war period. 
Indeed, this becomes abundantly clear post-1950, especially in contrast to the 
orthodox accounts of the Sterling Area and imperial relations. Indeed, in taking the 
orthodox view, which seems to explain this period well, we would come to 
completely different conclusions in analysis of the post-1950 period, especially with 
regard to the relationship between Britain and Malaya. 
The following chapter will look at the period 1950 – 1955 in British-Malayan 
relations. It will focus on the continuation of the dollar deficit, further attempts to 
develop the Malayan economy, and the intensification of the Malayan Emergency. 
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Chapter Five: The Dollar Deficit Continues, the Emergency, and the 
Development of Malaya (1950 – 1955) 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the period from 1950 – 
1955 in the British relationship with Malaya. This chapter, as with the preceding 
chapter, charts continuity in this relationship both within this period, and from the 
last. 
Britain remains suzerain over Malaya, controlling Malaya’s external economic 
policy as well as its internal economic structure. Britain maintains its control over 
Malaya’s resources, particularly its rubber and tin production that attain their 
greatest value in their sale to the United States and their conversion to dollars, 
which Britain controlled through its management of the Sterling Area’s dollar pool. 
Britain remained keen to develop Malaya economically and stabilise it politically and 
socially, looking to its eventual independence, for its ultimate insertion into the 
global economy outside of Britain’s direct dominance. 
The chapter also argues Malaya’s continuing importance to Britain. Malaya’s 
exports to the dollar area continue to support Britain’s reserve position in this 
period, which becomes especially important as Britain’s reserves reach dangerously 
low levels. Malaya remains, as the Sterling Area’s principal dollar pool contributor, 
an important prop not only for the Sterling Area but also for the international 
viability of Sterling itself. This is borne out throughout the archival evidence from 
the period where both Ministers, and government and Bank officials emphasize the 
importance of Malaya, as well as the continued prosecution of the Emergency 
(during a period of intensification) and the attempt to secure significant loans and 
grants for the development of Malaya’s economy. 
This period sees further British efforts to have US dollar aid spent specifically 
on Malaya, highlighting the insurgency and the economic development of the 
colony as reasons for injecting large sums of dollar aid into the colony’s economy, 
with a clear eye to preparing the colony for independence. The reason for this, as 
before with the management of the colony’s import policies, was to salve the 
persistent dollar deficit of the United Kingdom and the Eastern hemisphere through 
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the only then-available means at the UK’s disposal for injecting greater quantities of 
dollars into the world economy given that the European aid programme was 
winding down, the Korean boom had little effect on the long term American 
demand for imported goods, and the aid that was provisioned to European 
economies had been much less effective than was hoped. These efforts show 
continuity with previous attempts by the British state to develop the Malayan 
economy, and the reasons behind it. 
This chapter also seeks to conclude that despite the perceived changes in 
Britain’s relationship with Malaya, which are at most alterations in Britain’s 
approach to resolving a global economic crisis manifest as an imbalance in the 
global balance of trade, there remains a consistent basis behind this relationship. 
This is best understood as an imperial relationship between two states which 
becomes particularly counter-intuitive in this portion of the thesis as, with the last 
chapter, Britain’s imperial relationship with Malaya is clearly understood in the 
classical terms of imperialism in the period 1945 – 1950 as it enforced trade policies 
and stringent dollar spending limits throughout the Empire. However, this chapter 
will argue that despite a change in policy, where the British government was no 
longer imposing such extreme strictures on the Malayan economy, the relationship 
remains an imperial one. 
Above all, the archival material examined by the thesis reveals that no 
significant shift occurs whatsoever in this relationship. This runs counter to 
established accounts of British imperial economic relations, particularly Krozewski 
(2001) and Hinds (2001), though this is a view held widely in British imperial and 
international history literature, as well as in Malaya-specific literature, such as White 
(1996) and Kaplan (1990). 
This discrepancy in view arises from two sources, in the first instance an 
understanding of empire as a strategy undertaken by a state in the interests of 
capital-in general and manifest as a relationship between states. This is an 
alternative to a view of imperialism as an institution, a period of history, or a type of 
state. This allows bilateral relationships ‘within’ an Empire to be understood in their 
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own terms as historically developed and unique relations that cannot be understood 
in aggregation with the whole complex of other relationships within that Empire. In 
the second, this argument derives from an analysis of the specific archival 
documents relating to Britain’s relationship with Malaya themselves, which show no 
evidence themselves of discontinuity and therefore which can best be understood 
cogently in terms of the theoretical framework in the first instance. 
5.1 The Dollar Deficit 
Following American pressures, and in addition to cuts in domestic spending, on 19th 
September 1949, Sterling was devalued from $4.03 to $2.80 (Kolko 1972, p.458). 
The result was claimed by the British government to have solved the immediate 
currency shortage:  by April 1950, dollar reserves had risen above the “minimum 
safe level” for the first time since March 1948 (Burnham 1990, p.134) and were at 
their highest post-war point. Gold reserves continued to rise for some time (until 
1952); however, dollar reserves continued to rise only until July of 1950, reaching a 
peak of £296m but then began to fall, and would not reach similar levels again until 
1958 (Bank 1970, p.163). This also led to concern at the Bank about the next 
allocation of ERP aid: as aid was allocated on the basis of reserve figures (the poorer 
the reserve situation, the higher the allocation), the relative heartiness of the 
reserves might actually have led to a docking of the UK’s allocation but ultimately 
led to the suspension of ERP (BE OV46/6, ‘Gold and dollar holdings’, 3rd May 1950; BE 
OV46/6, Letter from Rowan to Hitchman, 1st July 1950; BE OV46/7 1st November 
1950, ‘MAC – Suspension of ERP’; BE OV46/7, ‘United States Aid to the United 
Kingdom’, 8th November 1950). The Chancellor announced in late 1950 that ERP 
would be suspended from the beginning of 1951, despite the fact that the UK’s 
recovery had been incomplete and the reserves, despite having grown considerably, 
were still inadequate (BE OV46/7, ‘Suspension of ERP’, 15th December 1950). 
This reserve position, while ostensibly improving, was still unstable and this 
was evident from the balance of payments situation in the Sterling Area, particularly 
the independent Sterling Area (RSA) with regard to their gold and dollar deficits. 
Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan all held large deficits in their balances of 
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payments with the dollar area; Ceylon showed a small surplus and Southern 
Rhodesia only held a surplus by virtue of gold sales (TNA T236/3995, ‘Boothroyd to 
Clarke’, 13th January 1950).  
 The unease over the Sterling Area’s unstable position was also raised in an 
Australian Cabinet meeting in early February and the problem of the dollar deficit 
was discussed in depth (TNA T236/3995, ‘Telegram no.87’, UK High Commissioner 
Australia to Commonwealth Relations Office, 7th February 1950). This concern was 
borne out by figures for the combined gold and dollar deficits of the Sterling Area, 
which were $1305m in 1949 and the estimated figure for 1950 was $996m. As such 
the Sterling Area was still suffering from a severe dollar shortage, with the terms of 
trade still heavily weighing against it (ibid.). This was necessarily a burden on the UK 
reserves as all Sterling Area reserves were held centrally within the UK’s reserves as 
part of the EEA. 
5.2 Malayan Development 
While the Sterling Area was in a parlous situation regarding its on-going balance of 
payments problem and the global dollar supply was still very limited, Malaya was 
facing a rise in the intensity of the Emergency. This prompted the Prime Minister to 
create the ‘Malaya Committee’ to provide oversight and discussion on the handling 
of the Emergency and the development of Malaya. The Committee included the 
Ministers for Defence, the Colonies, Commonwealth Relations, War, the Minister of 
State and the Chiefs of the Armed Forces. The terms for the creation of the 
Committee mandated it to “preserve peace and order *for+ the Federation of 
Malaya”.103 (TNA PREM8/1126, ‘Terms for Creating Malaya Committee’. 19th March 
1950) 
The key to winning the Emergency was by winning the support of the local 
population, particularly the Chinese, as Thomas Lloyd, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, wrote to John Paskin, the Assistant Under-
Secretary there, a few days after the creation of the Malaya Committee, following a 
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 Interestingly, these terms were previously “restore peace and order *in+ the colony” though were 
changed since it suggested Britain had lost control in Malaya, and also emphasized Britain’s imperial 
status over Malaya. 
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discussion with Sir John Hay, the Managing Director of Guthries, a major plantation 
company specialising in rubber and palm oil. However, this was only possible 
through success against terrorists and the development of the country’s economy, 
he argued. As such, the immediate plans concerning the Emergency were to 
reiterate commitment to the campaign publicly, liaise more with industrial interests, 
and make propaganda more effective. (TNA CO537/5996, ‘Letter from T Lloyd to 
Paskin’, 28th March 1950)  
Henry Bourdillon, the head of the Colonial Office’s Finance Department, 
following a trip to Malaya in early 1949, reported that, 
“The Federation is now forced by adverse circumstances to make 
provision for development. This is truer of tin and rubber than it 
is of any other Malayan activity, and in the prosperity of tin and 
rubber HMG have a particularly direct and vital interest. In the 
case of rubber the great requirement is new planting of high 
yielding strains, without which the competitive capacity of the 
Malayan product must rapidly deteriorate. A campaign for 
improved grading is also urgently necessary in order to nullify the 
one great advantage which synthetic rubber at present has over 
the natural product.” ((TNA T220/87, ‘Report on a Visit to Malaya’, 
6th April 1949) 
White (1996) and Bauer (1973) disagree with Rudner (1972; 1973; 1976) in their 
characterisation of Britain’s role in Malaya’s development after the war. While 
Rudner argues that Britain adopted a totally ‘hands off’ approach to the 
development of Malaya’s rubber industry, both White and Bauer argue that drastic 
changes occur in development policy with Britain, at certain points, being very highly 
involved in the development of Malayan rubber, with a changing set of policy 
priorities, which ultimately proved unsuccessful (White 1996, p.213). The Rudner 
view of colonial development is also held by Hinds (2001) and Krozewski (2001), who 
maintain that aid was always piecemeal, limited and undertaken with little 
commitment by the British state. Certainly, this is not borne out by a specific analysis 
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of Malayan development, such as those undertaken by Bauer and White. White 
(1996, p.213.) also argues that there is continuity stemming from the British desire 
to maintain dollar earnings from Malaya for the Sterling Area through their 
involvement in Malayan development. While it is undoubtedly true that Britain saw 
Malaya as valuable for its dollar earnings, this chapter intends to argue it is a 
simplistic characterisation of Britain’s intent in contributing to the development of 
Malaya’s economy. Indeed, the British state managers sought to prepare Malaya for 
independence, recognising that development was necessary to stabilise and support 
Malaya, but, of course, the key British interest stemming from development was 
Malaya’s dollar contribution to the Sterling Area dollar pool. 
 In a Colonial Office report on Malayan development in August 1950, it was 
made clear that the intention of development was to build a Malayan nation.104 This 
was recognised as a gradual task though (which was also commonly accepted) and 
neither the British or Malayan governments were seeking a rush towards 
independence at that time (TNA CO967/84, ‘Notes on Development in Malaya’, 
August 1950). Of Malaya’s 51,000 square miles, 80% of the country was jungle, 14% 
was rubber plantations, and 2.4% was rice, while 2.1% was coconuts and oil palms. 
As such, it held a primarily agricultural economy though its tin industry rested on 
valuable mineral deposits. The report characterised Malaya as well suited for world 
trade but not for the production of food crops due to its soil and climate; as such, 
Malaya’s development was limited to certain directions. (ibid.) 
The British government was eager to involve industrial interests in any 
meetings concerning plans for Malayan development, with a view to increasing 
cooperation between government and business. As such, John Higham, Assistant 
Secretary at the Colonial Office, wrote to Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner 
in Malaya, suggesting that meetings be arranged between the Malayan Rubber 
                                               
104 In the report, Jim Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary, stated that 350 major economic projects were 
planned in 1950 for the Colonies, with around £400m being spent. Furthermore, he re-emphasised 
the established view that the Colonial territories were economically interdependent with Britain. 
While the UK provided a large, and growing, market for Colonial goods (around 9.8% of UK imports in 
1949 were from the Colonies), the Colonies remained vital as both dollar earners and dollar savers 
“and so made a further vital contribution to the economic recovery of the sterling area” (TNA 
T266/53, ‘Development in Colonies’, 1st June 1950). 
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Growers Association and the Chamber of Mines with Sir Alec Newboult, the Chief 
Secretary of the Federated Malay States, and the Colonial Secretary, Jim Griffiths. 
(TNA CO537/5996, John Higham to Sir Henry Gurney, 4th April 1950)  
By 1950, the reconstruction of Malaya after the experiences during the war 
had been largely completed; however, this meant that the “next objective *was+ 
planned development, both social and economic” (TNA CO967/84, ‘Notes on 
Development in Malaya’, August 1950) The Malayan government had a seven-point 
scheme for the development of the colony. The plan sought to: 
 Broaden the base of the economy, as Malaya was too reliant on rubber and 
tin, which were prone to severe seasonal and price fluctuations. 
 Emphasise economic activity in which Malaya had a comparative advantage. 
 Increase food production, particularly rice. 
 Promote even development. 
 Pursue development aimed at increasing total wealth of the country 
 Develop the skills of the Malayan workforce 
 And finally, “to aim at making the maximum contribution that its resources 
permit to the attainment of a balance in the external payments of the 
sterling area.” 
The Development Plan also highlighted the desire of the Malayan Federation to help 
smallholders (who, at this point, were responsible for 40% of Malayan rubber 
production) by increasing the yield of their crops through substituting higher 
yielding types of rubber. This was intended not only as a means of competing against 
the high quality and competitive pricing of synthetic rubber but also as a means of 
reducing the support for the Communist insurgents in the country. (ibid.) 
 Particular emphasis was placed upon this expected consequence of (and 
justification for) the Development Plan during a meeting on 2nd August 1950 
between the Colonial Office and the ECA to generate funds for Malayan 
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development. Jim Griffiths called the meeting to discuss the possibility of relaxing 
the rules governing ECA funds for overseas development, particularly with reference 
to South East Asia and with Malaya in mind specifically. (TNA CO967/84, ‘Note on 
meeting with ECA’, 2nd August 1950) 
In the meeting, Griffiths was emphatic about how helpful the ECA funds had 
been domestically but wanted to make ECA funds do even more work, and be even 
more helpful. He was particularly keen to highlight to the Americans that Malaya 
was extremely important to the containment of communism, which resonated very 
well with the purpose of the ECA. As such, he argued that the counter-insurgency in 
Malaya was vital for South East Asia, and the worldwide battle against Communism: 
“The battle against communism in South East Asia could not be 
won without complete success in Malaya and this battle would be 
won not only in the jungle, but also in the fields, farms and 
factories of the country.” (ibid.) 
The Emergency had already been a costly campaign and, when it ceased, its 
cost could be even more fractious upon Malaya’s divided population, he warned, 
with substantial racial tensions existing between 2.5 million Malays and 2 million 
Chinese in Malaya being exacerbated by an economic divide. (TNA CO967/84, ‘Notes 
on Development in Malaya’, August 1950; CO967/84, ‘Note on meeting with ECA’, 2nd 
August 1950) 
The ECA were told that a Commonwealth plan was already being put 
together at the time for development of South East Asia (which would eventually 
become the Colombo Plan), combining all the resources of those involved in the 
area. However, there was a gap in funding that could potentially be plugged by 
funds from the ECA, which, he made clear “by stressing again the importance of 
winning the battle in Malaya in the context of the combined resolve of the free 
countries to contain communism in the Far East. He felt that it was now possible to 
say that we were beginning to get on top in Malaya. Military success must be 
secured by economic development in that country and throughout our territories in 
South East Asia.” (ibid.) 
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 W. John Kenney, the Chief Administrator of the ECA in London, was reticent 
about this suggestion, saying that even the ECA’s funds were not unlimited and, 
furthermore, the ECA would require the Colonial Office to draw up an integrated 
programme for development that could be assessed. However, he did concede that 
the ECA was inflexible in where it could actually allocate funds, though that was not 
something that he could resolve. Kenney, however, reminded Griffiths that there 
were counterpart funds unused at the Bank of England, solely for development 
purposes that could be put to good use. (ibid.) 
After the meeting, the ECA and the Colonial Office agreed that the ECA 
needed to be supplied with more details about Malayan development, and that 
both the US and British had decisions to make regarding the use of the funds 
available to them. However, little seemed to come from these talks in turning 
Marshall Aid towards Malayan development as, shortly after, with the outbreak of 
war in Korea, ECA funds were directed towards rearmament programmes. (ibid.) 
The outbreak of the Korean War was actually good news for Malaya as 
rubber and tin prices shot up in 1950, with rubber prices averaging three times 1949 
prices and tin prices jumping by 25% (Lim 1967, p.317). Not only did this boost 
Malaya’s contribution to the Sterling Area’s dollar pool, it also helped Malaya itself, 
both economically and in terms of confidence for future development, as this 
allowed the Malayan government the opportunity to earn significant tax revenues 
on the export of rubber and tin. However, as Sir Hilton Poynton, the Private 
Secretary to Jim Griffiths, made clear following a trip to Malaya in August 1950, 
there was not much economic collaboration between plantation owners, or 
between mine owners, in Malaya and so there were still gross inefficiencies in 
production. (TNA CO967/84, ‘Visit to Malaya by Sir AH Poynton’, 4th August 1950)105 
The hike in global commodity prices came as a welcome relief for Malaya in 
terms of development, as funds from other sources were hard to come by. With the 
                                               
105 Poynton, during his visit, came under the impression that there was great fondness for the 
Colonial Office in Malaya, with the idea that when things went right it was because of the Colonial 
Office and when things went wrong, it was due to the interference of other departments, particularly 
the Treasury and the Bank. 
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alteration of Marshall Aid funding, and Britain now spending on rearmament, the 
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) was asking for massive returns on any 
investment as it was run almost as if it were a private company. The CDC dismissed 
one investment scheme, as it could not guarantee a return of 20% on its initial 
investment.106 White (1996, p.227) points out that CDC loans and schemes were 
always seen as a last resort. While the CDC was involved in some projects in the 
Federation, it was never relied upon as a major source of investment due to the high 
returns they demanded, and that cheaper sources of money were easier to come by 
through other means. 
Poynton was concerned, however, about a problem in Malaya that inhibited 
the rubber and tin potential for development: exchange control. He related that 
while “exchange control and supply problems were not a burning question in the 
Federation, except in Penang on the subject of exchange control, where it was 
argued that they were losing a great deal of trade both in tin and rubber through the 
inability to spend dollars on buying any tin ore and rubber from Siam” (TNA 
CO967/84, ‘Visit to Malaya by Sir AH Poynton’, 4th August 1950). The need for 
exchange control and economies in foreign exchange was thus inhibiting the ability 
of Malaya to develop its economy, which was inimical to the prosecution of the 
Emergency and Malaya’s dollar earning capacity. 
The early stages of Malayan development in the 1950s then see considerable 
UK involvement through seeking to direct Marshall Aid towards South-East Asia and 
its colonies. With the advent of the Korean War, however, this source of funds was 
curtailed but was counter-balanced by substantially increased revenues from the 
booming commodity prices caused by wartime stockpiling. Through the Malayan 
Development Plan we see the reasons for Britain’s wish to develop Malaya’s 
economy, most notably the resolution of the Emergency, and the maintenance of 
dollar earnings. Whether other priorities can be considered subordinate to these is 
debatable but not provable, though it is made clear in Colonial Office documents 
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 This figure came from the London office of the CDC – the local office in Malaya seemed 
embarrassed by this rate. Though this was due to the high rates at which the CDC was required to 
borrow money from the Treasury and other sources. 
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that the intention is to develop Malaya towards eventual political and economic 
independence. However, what is clear from this is that Britain still remained 
committed to the development of the Malayan economy and still identified clear 
benefits from this relationship. 
5.3 The Impact of the Korean War 
Towards the end of 1950, the UK had begun to consider alternative reserve 
strategies due to the boom in commodity prices. Considering the relatively healthy 
position of the reserves at this time, the UK had options available. The UK had 
begun to consider going above the US$1200m import ceiling agreed at the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting earlier in the year in order to increase 
the dollar allocation for certain imports into the UK.107 (TNA T230/177, ‘RL Hall to Sir 
Herbert Brittain’, 9th August 1950) It was considered vital to maintain dollar food and 
raw material imports even if it took the UK above the dollar ceiling due to the threat 
of war. Indeed, there was even consideration towards converting reserves in gold 
and dollars into stockpiled goods. If commodity prices rose, there was thus a benefit 
to holding reserves in goods rather than gold and if prices fell, there would be 
benefits in other directions to offset the loss on goods (for example, the UK would 
have ready access to large quantities of strategic goods). (ibid.) 
Using this reserve strategy, however, required using dollar pool earnings to 
purchase dollar goods. It was not possible go much above the ceiling without 
explaining to Commonwealth Finance Ministers and, therefore, the UK sought their 
agreement. The solution to attaining the consent of the Commonwealth in allowing 
the UK to import such large quantities of dollar goods was for the Chancellor to 
explain it as a defence measure: changing the form of the reserves rather than the 
ceiling of UK’s dollar import programme. (ibid). 
Rearmament began with a significant increase in spending on defence goods. 
The UK agreed with the US that it would manufacture £800m of finished defence 
material and the equipment for its production. At a meeting to discuss the impact of 
rearmament on the domestic and export markets, it was agreed that the 
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 Tobacco was specifically mentioned as it was considered a good source of tax revenue. 
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rearmament load would be concentrated in under-employed areas and in factories 
where capacity had not yet been met. While some of this spending was attained 
through increases in productivity and efficiency, the vast majority was achieved 
through diversions from home and export markets. The diversions from the 
domestic market meant a reduction in the UK’s total production capacity, 
diminishing Britain’s ability to export, while diversions from export markets 
worsened Britain’s balance of payments (TNA T236/2398, ‘Defence Materials’, 22nd 
August 1950).  
Labour was a highly limited national resource and it was clear that there 
would be substantial difficulties arising from the labour shortage, especially with 
estimates suggesting that the defence programme would require an increase in 
labour by around 250,000 workers at its peak in three years time (TNA T236/2398, 
‘Defence Programme’, 22nd August 1950). It was considered a top priority to engage 
labour in places “where getting labour *would+ do least harm to other national 
interests”, particularly dollar exports (TNA T236/2398, ‘Labour for Ministry of Supply 
Orders’, 22nd August 1950). It so happened that some of the burden of the defence 
programme would land on declining industries, such as shipbuilding, which would 
not affect dollar-earning production; however, it was also necessary to increase 
labour in specialised industries, such as aircraft assembly firms and Royal Ordnance 
factories, which would affect dollar-earning capacity. (TNA T236/2398, ‘Defence 
Programme’, 22nd August 1950) 
 To minimise the effect on exports, it was proposed that defence supplies and 
dollar exports would rank equally and have priority over the supply of other 
goods.108 It was necessary for priority to be kept on North American markets if UK 
exports were to be maintained. It was feared that the UK would then be unable to 
compete with US domestic deliveries and would confirm the then widely held 
suspicion that British suppliers were an unreliable source of goods, thus losing the 
market “for good” (TNA T236/2398, ‘Defence Materials’, 22nd August 1950). Of 
particular importance was equipment for the production of defence materials, 
                                               
108 There was no prioritisation made between the two: equal position was expected to mean there 
would be clashes on occasion but these would be settled on an ad hoc basis. 
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which had to be bought abroad so that domestic production was not burdened with 
their manufacture also. 
“machine tools are at the root of industrial production: a falling 
off in home supplies will, therefore, have a quicker effect on the 
UK’s productive capacity than almost any other shortfall in 
supplies of engineering goods”. (ibid.) 
This was intended to minimise the disruption to home and export markets for UK-
made machine tools and also required the using up of machine tools from Ministry 
of Supply reserves. 
Exports to the Sterling Area were to be maintained and ranked in importance 
immediately only after defence supplies and dollar exports. The Treasury identified 
three reasons for this high priority. Firstly, because some exports to the Sterling Area 
were dollar-saving in that they prevented Sterling Area countries from needing to 
source those goods from the dollar area. Secondly, some exports were essential for 
Commonwealth defence programmes. Thirdly, the Treasury identified the Sterling 
Area and Commonwealth as the UK’s best and most reliable long-term market. 
Furthermore, there was an obligation to the Sterling Area as the UK had recently 
persuaded Commonwealth Finance Ministers to cut dollar imports by 25% and, 
therefore, the UK had a duty to supply the deficiency (TNA T236/2398, ‘Defence 
Materials’, 22nd August 1950). The ultimate aim of industrial policy with regard to 
rearmament was to fulfil the defence obligations of the government by making 
maximum use of labour resources without damaging economic recovery. (TNA 
T236/2398, ‘Defence Programme’, 22nd August 1950) 
Meanwhile, figures on the central reserves seemed very optimistic due to 
the using up of stockpiles of imported goods (particularly raw materials) in the 4th 
quarter, and considerable price rises also. Overall reserves now stood at £1147m, a 
post-war high, though dollar reserves had fallen down to £165m. However, high 
commodity prices were a double-edged sword as it became difficult to import 
certain goods, which affected the UK’s volume of production and its ability to export 
(TNA T230/177, ‘RL Hall to Goldman, UK Overall Balance’, 3rd November 1950). The 
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reserve figures did not show the whole picture though. Increased production that 
had not been used for consumption at home was held responsible for this, along 
with wage stability: the increased prices of imported goods were being borne by the 
consumer, thus freeing equivalent resources for export. However, there was a gap in 
the reserve figures even then, which was due to invisible income. (ibid.) 
The Treasury was then concerned about three factors: would there be a 
sufficient supply of raw materials? Could domestic unrest be contained if the cost of 
living continued to increase? And how could the case be best presented under the 
Nitze plan (ibid.)?109 The immediate response was to suggest a free import policy. 
There was plenty of demand and a willingness to buy but supplies were extremely 
limited. A free import policy would also mean it would be preferable to purchase 
dollar goods if they were cheaper than non-dollar goods.110 (ibid.) This was mainly 
an issue of public presentation: it was considered “a bad bargaining position” when 
import prices were rising, and so too the cost of living, while the balance of 
payments was improving and the central reserves increasing. 
In January 1951, an official memo was written for the Bank to discuss the 
history of reserve policy and the current purpose of the central reserves. It 
maintained that the purpose of the UK’s reserves was for “use in an emergency to 
hold a position pending the effect of corrective measures” (BE C43/31, ‘Central 
Reserves’, 18th January 1951). The recent increases in the standings of the reserves 
were attributed to a combination of Marshall Aid, devaluation, the drive for exports 
and the continuation of domestic rationing, though this did also mean a rise in 
sterling liabilities (ibid.). However, events over the past two years had shown that, 
even with exchange control, currency did not flow immediately into the reserves 
when a depreciation was anticipated. If Sterling seemed weak, “the external assets 
of the Exchange Equalisation Account fall more quickly than the basic trading 
position would justify; when the exchange is strong, assets rise fast.” (ibid). 
                                               
109 The Nitze Plan emerged from NSC-68 in 1950, and argued that the United States needed to greatly 
increase defence spending and financial support to its allies to boost their own defence capabilities, 
in order to combat the supposed threat from the Soviet Union (Casey 1950). 
110
 This was certainly the case in certain ‘home essentials’, like lard and sugar. 
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The memo ends by making a point about the policy governing the 
management of exchange control and the changes in external assets of the EEA. It 
also reveals how important the reserve position was to British government policy, 
and therefore how important net dollar contributors, like Malaya, were. 
 “We must import or die. In order to live, therefore, we must 
export goods, services and so on, to pay for imports. We want 
sterling to be used as a reserve currency by other countries as 
well as a trading currency. A stable rate of exchange (in relation to 
gold) is considered essential to maintain confidence in sterling as 
a reserve currency, and so we are denied the use of exchange rate 
control as a weapon of defence or offence in our external 
transactions. Domestically we try to preserve a fairly rigid low 
interest rate structure – in the interests of Government 
borrowing. Thus we deny ourselves the use of the weapon of a 
moveable interest rate. We must therefore have large 
immediately available external assets and be prepared to see 
wide fluctuation in the amount of those assets because 
everything else being fixed all the strains and pressures are 
concentrated on the Exchange Equalisation Account.” (ibid.) 
The standing of the EEA at that point was £1150m and, while a number of factors 
had contributed to the increased value of the reserves account, its status as the 
‘safety net’ of the British economy meant that it would be perennially prone to crisis 
and, as such, the current strong position of the reserves was only temporary. 
Furthermore, as long as this strategy continued, Malaya would remain important to 
the British economy. 
5.4 British Commitment to Malaya 
In a letter from the Governor of Singapore to the Colonial Secretary, the Governor 
relayed how exchange controls in the whole of Malaya still remained very 
unpopular. (BE OV65/4, ‘Currency Supplies’, 31st January 1951) However, they were 
still entirely necessary for the health of the Sterling Area’s balance of payments and 
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the EEA. 
Robert Hall, the Director of the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, 
noted in a letter to Otto Clarke, at Overseas Finance, in March 1951, the trick of 
running down stockpiles of goods and showing an improved balance of payments 
was working, nobody had yet drawn much attention to this strategy, and Hall felt 
vindicated by how events had worked out as primary good prices were no longer as 
expensive as they had been earlier in 1950. This then meant that a change in 
emphasis could occur, with stockpiles being built back up again. (TNA T230/177, ‘RL 
Hall to RWB Clarke, Fall in Stocks’, 29th March 1951) 
Sir Herbert Brittain, also at the Overseas Finance section, in correspondence 
with Hall, felt that the UK must continue to build up its dollar reserves so that the 
UK’s “policies and dispositions *were+ no more hampered by financial needs than 
*was+ absolutely necessary” (ibid.). However, Hall believed that the raw materials 
situation needed to be taken much more seriously. 
“I think that we ought to hold fairly substantial supplies of 
imported commodities as a permanent object of policy, 
irrespective of what we think is going to happen about prices in 
the short run. But beyond this, I feel strongly that we ought to 
give much more attention to the whole question of our long-run 
supply position. We are still dominated in our thinking by 
experience of the 30s, and are not paying nearly enough attention 
to the implications of a world in which full employment and the 
development of backward areas have become important 
considerations of policy.” (ibid.) 
While there may be an ambiguity over which “backward areas” to which Hall was 
referring in the above statement, it certainly applied to the development of Malaya. 
Independence for Malaya was considered, if not imminent, then certainly not far off.  
The final point made by Hall is very telling. The development of states like Malaya 
and its contribution to the support of the British economy was very important and 
would remain so as long as Britain was committed to the post-war domestic 
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economic consensus. In a joint letter from the major banks of Malaya and 
Singapore111 to the Under Secretary for the Colonies, Sir Thomas Ingram-Lloyd, they 
expressed a concern over the institution of a new Currency Ordinance. They were 
worried that the new legislation would have altered exchange limits from a fixed 
rate to a rate specified by the Currency Commission of Malaya, which might have 
created uncertainty in the Malayan economy and made the Malayan dollar unstable, 
which they felt would be especially worrying considering the UK’s intention of 
granting independence to Malaya soon (BE OV65/4, ‘Malaya Currency Ordinance 
1951’, 19th July 1951). However, in a letter to the Bank of England the following day, 
William Cockburn, Chief General Manager of the Chartered Bank in London, 
moderated this concern, since the Ordinance actually required the Colonial 
Secretary to approve any decisions made by the Malayan Currency Commission. (BE 
OV65/4, ‘Malaya Currency Ordinance 1951’, 20th July 1951) 
 In a subsequent letter in August, which was copied to the Bank of England, 
William Cockburn, wrote to the manager of the Kuala Lumpur branch to notify him 
that the Colonial Office and the Malayan government were seeking a loan for the 
latter and wanted to ask if the Chartered Bank and the Mercantile Bank would 
underwrite the floatation (BE OV65/4, ‘Malayan Loans’, 7th August 1951). However, 
Cockburn was very cool about the possibility of underwriting the public loan as, 
although very confident about the likely defeat of China and North Korea in the 
Korean War, the Chartered Bank was still very concerned about Communist 
influence in the rest of Asia and the continuing Emergency in Malaya. Furthermore, 
the political instability in Malaya, along with increased levies on rubber, and the new 
currency legislation had unsettled the money markets, meaning that the long-term 
loan market in Malaya was very uncertain and, thus, an impediment to borrowing 
for development (ibid.). 
While the Malayan government wanted to borrow from the public rather 
than the Banks to avoid providing inflationary pressure on the economy, the 
purpose of the loan was to increase prospects for employment in Malaya, which 
                                               
111 Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; 
the Mercantile Bank of India; and the Eastern Bank 
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would have led to inflationary pressures. The Colonial Office suggested that the loan 
would go toward long-term projects and this loan was being used so as not to be a 
burden on the current revenues of the Malayan government. Cockburn seemed 
confused by this point, however, since Malayan government revenues were 
booming from tax receipts on rubber and tin. Indeed, in a Financial Times article on 
7th August 1951, Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner in the Federation, stated 
that the Malayan government had a surplus of M$123m (US$14.5m) for 1951. (ibid.) 
In an unattributed Bank memo about Cockburn’s letter, they condemned the 
Chartered Bank’s attitude as overly harsh. The purpose of the loan was 
simultaneously developmental and to resolve the political situation. 
“One of the most urgent needs for the Federation today is to 
combat banditry by removing as far as possible the reasons which 
cause the disgruntled to turn Communist or bandit. This can only 
be done by resettlement of the ‘squatters’ and large-scale 
development works such as drainage, irrigation, water-power, 
housing, etc. The latter have been agreed to be essential 
measures by Malaya, the UK and America. These things must be 
done somehow and therefore because they are not ‘productive’ 
any expenditure on them must in the short run be inflationary.” 
(BE OV65/4, ‘Malaya’, 10th August 1951) 
While this would aggravate an inflation problem caused by high primary commodity 
prices and the large part of export proceeds going directly to the rubber 
smallholders, it was considered both necessary and a good way of setting free the 
money held by smallholders: 
“To tap the surplus funds in the hands of these people the 
Government hopes that premium bonds, lottery bonds, provident 
funds and a Savings Bank drive will prove attractive.” (ibid.) 
This was certainly preferable to the alternative of seeking loan funds from the 
London money market, which was difficult politically, with Malaya having to seek 
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Colonial Office approval for such borrowing, and likely to be much more expensive. 
Furthermore, given that the Malayan Sterling balance had been steadily rising for 
some time now, the Colonial Office and the Bank would have preferred for Malaya 
to spend this cash before seeking a loan. However Douglas Godsall, the Financial 
Secretary of the Federation, felt that Malaya’s capricious economy needed those 
Sterling balances as a safety net: 
“The Malayan Sterling balances are steadily rising and HMG would 
like the Federation to use these balances for their development 
programme without coming on to the London market. Godsall on 
the other hand wishes to build up these balances to a sizeable 
level to constitute a safe budget reserve against the possibility of a 
collapse in revenue… he emphasised how fortuitous the present 
boom had been and how, over a series of years Federation 
revenue comes in fits and starts and how necessary it was to 
budget for a period of years. He was not really comforted by 
HMG’s assurance that if he used up all his fat then in the last 
resort HMG would stand behind them.” (ibid.) 
Given Godsall’s stance on this issue, the Bank felt that, while it was true that 
borrowing from the Eastern Banks would be inflationary, this inflationary 
expenditure was absolutely necessary. The bulk of the loan would be spent locally in 
Malaya, and it was now considered better than the alternative of using the London 
balances for expenditure, as there was no point in risking Malaya’s safety net in this 
instance. (ibid.) 
 The true purpose behind the loan, which had not been yet revealed to the 
Eastern Banks, was that the Federation government needed M$250m for 
involvement in the Colombo Plan and intended to put a M$100m development plan 
before the Colombo Plan Council by the end of the year (BE OV65/4, ‘Eastern 
Exchange Banks’ Participation in Local Loans’, 15th August 1951).112 However, the 
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 The Colombo Plan was an international organization created after a Meeting of Commonwealth 
Foreign Ministers in Sri Lanka in 1950 for the purpose of cooperation in economic development and 
the raising of living standards in the Asia-Pacific region (Blackton 1951, p.27). 
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Federation government wished to pay off the balance of the 1949 loan In order to 
pass the M$100m loan required to finance the first part of the Colombo Plan, as 
there would be criticism that Malaya had not yet paid back its previous loan while 
already asking for more (BE OV65/4, Telegram no.763 (Secret), 19th August 1951). As 
such, the loan was to be used for clearing the balance of a 1949 loan, stimulating 
further investment in Malaya, and there was insufficient credit in the Federation to 
get the whole amount – with M$32m going a long way to easing Treasury concerns 
when Malaya sought the rest from the London market. (ibid.) 
 Godsall had already approached Chartered Bank for a loan of M$32m to be 
amortised over 20 years but they had been reticent about the loan. Given the 
intransigence of the Eastern Banks in London for lending Malaya development 
funds, Henry Gurney, the Federation’s High Commissioner, remonstrated with the 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. He wanted to know how the British 
government then intended to find development money for Malaya if London banks 
were unwilling to lend (BE OV65/4, ‘Eastern Exchange Banks’ Participation in Local 
Loans’, 15th August 1951). As noted earlier, Chartered Bank had found it very 
unusual that Malaya was enjoying such a substantial budget surplus but was not 
using those funds for development. Indeed, the surplus balances were exceptional, 
at around M$300m. However, as with the Malayan Sterling balances, the Malayan 
Finance Committee strongly held the view that Malaya was very prone to boom and 
bust, due to its economic reliance on the export of raw materials, and so a large pot 
was necessary in order to weather recessions (BE OV65/4, Telegram no.763 (Secret), 
19th August 1951). 
While Malaya’s Provident Fund would have made up the difference in the 
worst-case scenario, it was considered much better to match loans on terms that 
Banks would have accepted as an issue of confidence. The idea was then put 
forward to induce the Chartered Bank to accept the M$32m figure up to 1960 with a 
sum of M$3m (ibid.). By this time however, the Malayan government received 
support from the Colonial Office saying that if the Eastern Banks did not consent to 
the loan then the Malayan government should “consider appropriate action against 
the Banks”, which was unspecified (BE OV65/4, Note by the Deputy Governor, 5th 
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September 1951). This action seemed to unsettle the Bank and the Treasury, who 
immediately called for a meeting between themselves and the Colonial Office, with 
the Deputy Governor asking specifically for Sir Herbert Brittain’s involvement as he 
considered the issue too important to be dealt with at lower levels (ibid.). However, 
before the meeting could be arranged, the Treasury contacted the Deputy Governor 
at the Bank to inform him that the M$3m inducement was put to the Chartered 
Bank, and Cockburn had said the Board would be content with that arrangement. 
(BE OV65/4, ‘Malaya: Chartered Bank’s participation in local loan’, 5th September 
1951) 
 Efforts to resolve the Emergency in Malaya were now well underway, with 
the implementation of the Briggs Plan having begun in May 1950, and static 
protection of rubber estates and tin mines beginning in 1951.113 The Briggs Plan 
required the forced resettlement of rural Chinese ‘squatters’ (around 500,000 
people, about 10% of the whole population), who made up the bulk of the 
insurgency’s support, into guarded villages where Communist supporters could be 
separated from the insurgents, who operated mainly from the jungles of Malaya, 
and the non-aligned Chinese protected from extortion (TNA PREM11/182, ‘The 
Situation in Malaya’, 20th November 1951). A report to the Colonial Office on the 
progress of the counter-insurgency campaign highlighted how important it was to 
win the Chinese population on side, acknowledging that the war was as much one of 
morale as it was of actual fighting, as such police would be extremely important 
(TNA CO537/7285, ‘Progress Report’, 15th October 1951). The novelist Anthony 
Burgess was a Colonial Officer in Malaya from 1954 until 1960 and witnessed the 
prosecution of the Emergency first hand, 
“The police force… was a specially augmented organisation 
                                               
113 The Briggs Plan was a counter-insurgency strategy devised by Harold Briggs in 1950. The plan 
called for the forced resettlement of a large section of Malaya’s rural population into so-called ‘New 
Villages’. The purpose of this was to separate the Communist insurgents, operating largely from the 
jungles, from their support among the rural population of Malaya, mainly Chinese ‘squatters’ who 
practiced subsistence agriculture on the fringes of the jungle. Around 500,000 people were resettled 
into these villages, which were guarded around the clock by soldiers and police to prevent ingress or 
egress. Briggs left the post of Director of Operations in 1951 due to ill health and was replaced by 
Gerald Templer who oversaw the full implementation of the Briggs Plan. For further and more 
detailed accounts of the Briggs Plan and the prosecution of the counter-insurgency campaign see, 
inter alia, Clutterbuck (1967), Short (1975), Carruthers (1995), Thompson (1996). 
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equipped for war as well for the keeping of civil order and it had a 
large number of police lieutenants, most of whom served in the 
Palestine Police… The war was not resolved in the Vietnam 
manner, with napalm and deforestation, but through the 
declaration of amnesties, the provision of free passages to 
communist China, the protection of rural Malaya throughout the 
creation of ‘new villages’ away from the jungle and the systematic 
freezing of supplies from the terrorists.” (Burgess 2000, p.x) 
While the counter-insurgency campaign was on track for success, it was certainly a 
burdensome campaign with considerable casualties being reported every month; 
casualties not just in the military but also rubber planters, as the insurgents targeted 
Malaya’s economic wealth. (TNA CO1022/25, ‘Response to a Parliamentary 
Question’, 6th November 1951; PREM11/182, ‘The Situation in Malaya’, 20th 
November 1951) 
 Following the UK General Election on 26th October and the return of a new 
Conservative government, the new Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, only four 
days after taking office, announced that he would be undertaking a visit to Malaya 
and Singapore on 26th November 1951 for three weeks, visiting Hong Kong also. The 
purpose of his visit was broadly to understand first hand the problems of Malaya 
and the Emergency, so that the British government would be aware of how to best 
deal with them (TNA PREM11/122, Telegram no.457, 2nd November 1951). However, 
Lyttleton made clear to the Cabinet before he left that his visit would have more 
specific goals. Firstly, he intended to reassure both rubber planters and tin miners of 
the British determination and ability to support them by all means, and to bring the 
anti-Communist campaign to a successful conclusion. Secondly, he wished to 
identify the best means of securing the involvement of the Chinese, especially those 
Chinese currently “on the fence”. Finally, he intended to resolve some institutional 
concerns: settling disputes between police and army; how to best organise and train 
the police; and who should succeed both Sir Henry Gurney as the High 
Commissioner of Malaya, and Malcolm MacDonald as the Commissioner General of 
South East Asia. (TNA PREM11/182, ‘The Situation in Malaya’, 20th November 1951) 
  184 
Lyttleton’s announcement came shortly before the Prime Minister asked for 
information on the situation in Malaya, Britain’s contribution to the Emergency, and 
Malaya’s value to the Sterling Area and Britain (TNA CO537/7285, ‘Minutes of Chiefs 
of Staff committee’, 7th November 1951). The initial response to Churchill’s request 
was that, while the Briggs Plan had been successful, “the Communist hold on 
Malaya is as strong, if not stronger, today than it ever has been” (ibid.) The report 
for the Prime Minister emphasised that the major problem was winning the support 
and loyalty of the Chinese population, on whom the insurgents relied for supplies 
and support. The conclusions of the report echoed that of the recent progress 
report for the Colonial Secretary, highlighting that the priority was to build up the 
police, to include the Chinese also to reassure the Chinese populations themselves 
and protect them from internal pressure and external attack (that would force their 
cooperation with Communist insurgents) (TNA PREM11/182, ‘Conclusions of the 
British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East)’, 15th November 1951). The 
military implications of the Emergency by the end of 1951 were that the Emergency 
was still very intense and that there could be no reduction in troops for 1952, and 
that further materiel, particularly armoured vehicles, was required for the 
successful prosecution of the counter-insurgency campaign. (TNA CO537/7285, 
‘Military Implications of the Emergency’, 19th November 1951) 
 The overall report on the situation in Malaya was provided by the Colonial 
Secretary for the Cabinet and painted a generally pessimistic picture for the colony. 
The Briggs Plan had been largely implemented by late 1951 and most of the 500,000 
‘squatters’ resettled, along with a number of rubber estates’ labourers. However, 
the next problem was not just protecting these new settlements from direct attack 
and infiltration but to provide them with the “fullest opportunities to become 
reasonably prosperous and contented communities, convinced of being much better 
off as the result of resettlement and willing, therefore, to give increasing and 
positive help to government.” The worry was that, unless this was done, the Briggs 
Plan had simply presented to the insurgents “an easy target for attack, infiltration 
and propaganda” (TNA PREM11/182, ‘The Situation in Malaya’, 20th November 
1951). 
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Of similar importance was getting the Chinese willingly involved in the fight 
against the insurgency. The Malay population had been exasperated at the 
intransigence of the Chinese in helping with the counter-insurgency and there had 
already been signficant communal tension. Chinese help was considered “essential 
not only to bring the campaign to a more rapid conclusion but also to avoid serious 
communal disorders which would place a further and grievous strain on the British 
forces. Moreover if the emergency were to end without the active co-operation of 
the Chinese, the hope of building a single Malayan people might never be realised.” 
Indeed, this specific resolution of the Emergency was absolutely necessary for 
building a stable Malayan state (ibid.). This was made abundantly clear in Lyttleton’s 
statement to the Malayan people: 
“The British believe they have a mission and they will not lay it 
aside until they are convinced that intestine strife has been killed 
and buried and that a true fusion of all communities can lead to 
true and stable self-government. The road will certainly be long 
and it runs through jungle and ravine. But we will protect it, we 
will stay, we will never quit until the mission is fulfilled… I believe 
too that even when self government has been attained, the British 
will have a place and part to play in Malaya.” (TNA PREM11/122, 
EG Cass to Barry G Smallman, 8th December 1951) 114 
Lyttleton’s final sentiment, while undoubtedly rhetorical, is one that this 
thesis believes is largely accurate. Certainly, Malaya remained important to the 
British state after 1950, and continued to be so. Malaya’s US dollar earnings in 1950 
had been US$350m, out of total Sterling Area earnings of US$1285m but, by late 
1951, rubber production had fallen significantly and some estates had even fallen 
into disuse because of terrorist activity. Particularly problematic was the replanting 
and maintenance of rubber estates, which was “virtually at a standstill, and 
                                               
114 Interestingly, Churchill recommended to Lyttleton that he also visit Rangoon, Jakarta, and Saigon 
to better understand the problems in Malaya, though this eventually did not transpire (TNA 
PREM11/122, telegram from Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 25th November 1951). Furthermore, 
Lyttleton changed the initial reference from “terrorism” in his public statement in Malaya to 
“intestine strife” as, according to Churchill’s advice, it made it sound like the “two races of Malaya 
were at each other’s throats.” (TNA PREM11/122, EG Cass to Barry G Smallman, 8
th
 December 1951) 
  186 
prospecting for tin [had] barely resumed after the re-occupation of the country 
when it had to be suspended because of the lack of law and order.” The report went 
even further to say that if tin prospecting did not resume soon and new prospects 
found, then its production could not be maintained, let alone increased (ibid.). 
Lyttleton also noted that there had “recently been an intensification of Communist 
attempts to break the economy of the country by large scale and brutal intimidation 
of labour”, with the insurgents well aware of the nature of Malaya’s importance to 
Britain. Knowing this, Lyttleton acknowledged that it seemed hard to predict when a 
reduction of military forces might be permitted but it was certainly not the case 
now, especially considering the British Defence Co-ordination Committee 
recommendation that no reduction in the total number of military units could be 
made before Spring 1953 at the very earliest. (TNA PREM11/182, ‘Conclusions of the 
British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East)’, 15th November 1951; 
PREM11/182, ‘The Situation in Malaya’, 20th November 1951) 
The value of successfully prosecuting the Emergency was well accepted even 
outside of the Cabinet. In a letter to the Prime Minister, who had requested his 
advice, Field Marshall Montgomery, while very disparaging of the handling of the 
campaign and the personnel involved, informed Churchill that there was no doubt 
about “the urgency of restoring law and order, and good government, in Malaya. It 
[was] vital from every point of view: economic, military, political, and from the 
viewpoint of the contest between East and West.” Indeed, Montgomery considered 
the Emergency in Malaya as “the most vital task today in the Empire” and that there 
was a real danger that the Emergency could quickly grow out of hand, which could 
have the most severe consequences for both Malaya and Britain. (TNA PREM11/121, 
‘Success in Malaya’, 2nd January 1952; Letter from ‘Montgomery of Alamein’ to 
Prime Minister, 4th January 1952) 115 
5.5 The Dollar Deficit Intensifies 
Newton argues that, while Marshall Aid had not been as effective as had been 
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 Montgomery had a particularly ambitious plan for South East Asia, wishing to combine the whole 
of British South East Asia into a single political unit. (TNA PREM11/121, Letter from ‘Montgomery of 
Alamein’ to Prime Minister, 4
th
 January 1952) 
  187 
hoped, the advent of the Korean War had remedied the dollar deficit.  
“By the start of 1950, with two years left to run, the Marshall Plan 
had not succeeded in closing Europe’s dollar gap; one third of 
Europe’s imports from America, which now totalled $16 billion, 
had still been financed by aid. On the termination of this 
assistance the problems of 1947 threatened to reappear… but it 
was the Korean War, which in practice changed priorities in 
Washington. In 1950 and after, as a consequence of the Korean 
War and the subsequent global expansion of the American 
military machine, dollars were pumped into the underdeveloped 
nations of the Far East. The United States’ enthusiastic 
performance as world policeman finally closed the dollar gap and 
stimulated international economic growth.” (Newton 1985, p.179) 
However, this is certainly not the case with regard to Britain. Indeed the British 
dollar deficit was the equivalent of £15.4m in the week ending 17th November 1951, 
though two further ‘one-off’ payments (US$36m to the European Payments Union 
(EPU) and US$13m to the British Celanese account) boosted the deficit to £33m. 
However, the weekly dollar deficit was now around £15m (TNA T230/177, ‘Gold and 
Dollar Deficit’, 24th November 1951). In fact, the total central reserves had been 
falling since July 1951 and in November stood at £967m, from a post-war high in 
June of £1381m. Meanwhile the dollar reserves had been falling precipitously since 
April 1951, with the November figure for dollar reserves standing at £36m (Bank 
1970). 
 This trend had been anticipated for some time, with the terms of trade 
deteriorating since October 1950, and by the end of 1951, both visible and invisible 
exports had fallen short of imports by £521m (Burnham 2003, p.11). The fall in the 
terms of trade was due to the increased price of imports combined with increases in 
the volume of imports into the UK and Sterling Area; indeed, import prices had 
more than doubled between 1949 and 1951, with the UK’s imports increasing by 
£1100m in 1951 of which over 60% was due to price rises. (ibid.) 
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 By the beginning of 1952, William Strath, the Deputy Chief Planning Officer 
at the Treasury, recommended to the Chancellor that he use the Commonwealth 
Finance Minister’s meeting on 8th January to “stress that without emergency action 
there was a real danger of the collapse of sterling” (quoted in ibid., p.38). Indeed, 
Strath further emphasises that the Sterling Area itself “cannot exist in the long-term 
on an inconvertible basis. If we don’t take action, we shall be forced into 
convertibility in conditions in which we cannot hold the value of sterling” (ibid.). The 
Bank had already been considering intervening in the New York money market in 
order to support the value of Sterling before the end of 1951, with £5m being 
suggested as the sum required to shore up Sterling’s value for the time being. (BE 
C43/31, ‘Intervention in the New York Sterling Futures Market’, 19th October 1951) 
 The UK’s gold and dollar reserves had been dwindling rapidly due to its own 
and the Sterling Area’s deficit with the EPU, which now required a 60% settlement in 
gold (BE OV46/8, ‘Future of EPU’, 14th January 1952). Sir Donald MacGillivray, then 
Deputy High Commissioner in the Federation of Malaya, suggested to the Bank of 
England that the UK and the Sterling Area impose trade restrictions on the EPU. 
While there was scope for doing this, as the trade with the EPU was not as 
important as other sources of goods, this measure would simply have shored up the 
leak, rather than reversed it (BE OV46/8, Letter from MacGillivray to Portsmore, 9th 
January 1952). 
The case before the EPU Council for de-liberalising imports became the 
necessity of maintaining the strength of sterling, which required a strong balance of 
payments position – this could only be achieved in the short term by limiting 
imports. Furthermore, since action had to be swift, domestic monetary measures 
(while better in the long run) were not appropriate and too slow to take effect 
(ibid.). The EPU had been helpful in reducing the transaction costs in trade but it 
could not continue without a huge increase in its gold and dollar reserves. An 
injection of gold and dollars was unlikely to come from the US as American aid was 
intended to decrease in 1952-1953; as such, if the EPU were to continue, it would be 
necessary to restructure the basis of intra-European gold payments since its 
constituent members could no longer afford to contribute to the EPU’s gold 
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reserves. (BE OV46/8, ‘Future of EPU’, 14th January 1952) 
The effects of this crisis were felt very swiftly in Malaya and Singapore, with 
the Department of Economic Affairs writing to the Chartered Bank to request 
cooperation from all the Malayan Exchange Bank in meeting the crisis that was 
affecting the whole Sterling Area. 
“You will not, I am sure, need us to explain the very grave 
consequences to the prosperity and welfare of Malaya which will 
follow if this crisis is not successfully overcome and if renewed 
strength and stability is not given to sterling.” (BE OV65/4, Letter to 
Sutherland from Gilmour and Spencer, 19th March 1952) 
Indeed, Oscar Spencer and Andrew Gilmour, the Malayan and Singaporean 
Economic Secretaries, were specific in their request for what assistance the Malayan 
Exchange Banks could bring to this current crisis. 
“What is necessary is that renewed economy should be exercised 
in the expenditure of foreign currencies of all kinds. The purpose 
of this letter is therefore to request all Exchange Banks to 
scrutinise with particular care all applications for credit facilities 
involving expenditure of such currency… This will apply principally 
to credits for imports, and here we emphasise that it is not desired 
to restrict imports of any goods which are clearly essential for 
consumption by the mass of the population or for the 
development or maintenance of the rubber, tin or other industries 
of the country, or for the entrepot trade.” (ibid.) 
Furthermore, they wished to minimise any possibility of resurgence in trade 
speculation, arbitrage, overtrading or the expansion of credit with regard to these 
activities unless it was absolutely essential. George Sutherland, manager of the 
Singapore branch of the Chartered Bank, confirmed that Chartered would do this, as 
would the other Exchange Banks, adding that applications for credit using foreign 
currencies was always subjected to the closest scrutiny. (ibid.) 
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 At the end of March 1952, with total reserves now at only £607m, Otto 
Clarke, Under-Secretary of the Overseas Finance Division at the Treasury, voiced his 
conclusions about the state of Britain’s current crisis. 
“We reach the conclusion that the ‘dollar shortage’ is now 
fundamentally the inadequacy of British competitive power… It is 
our own weakness, rather than the vagaries of US policy which 
creates our crisis. The Americans can help, and usually they don’t. 
But that does not avoid our basic responsibility.” (TNA T236/3242, 
‘US Dollar Shortage and UK Exports’, 26th March 1952) 
In a memo by the Chancellor, Rab Butler, on economic policy, he stated that it would 
take four years from 1952, setting aside £200m per year, to get the reserves back to 
the level of July 1951.116 Indeed, the UK could not rely on financial assistance from 
the US to help with getting the economy back on track as Marshall Aid was now set 
to end, and what little remained would be focused on defence spending. 
 “The experience of recent months has shown that United States 
aid will not only be greatly diminished in amount, but also closely 
confined to support of the Defence Programme. Moreover it is 
also clear that continued reliance on aid is in itself undesirable; it 
not only weakens our moral position vis-à-vis the United States in 
international affairs generally, but, by disguising to a greater or 
lesser extent our true economic position, tends to create the 
dangerous impression that it may be possible to avoid some of the 
more painful adjustments that are necessary.” (BE G1/123, 
‘Economic Policy – Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’, 17th May 1952) 
This was, of course, not to say that the UK could do without any assistance from the 
US, Butler wrote, but that aid would only hold value if the UK were to put itself on 
the road to recovery by its own efforts (ibid.). The draft of the Operation ROBOT 
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 Despite the Chancellor’s hopes, total reserves did not reach the level of July 1951 (£1338m) during 
the chronology of this thesis, though they did reach similar and consistent levels (around £1100m) 
towards the end of 1960 (Bank 1970, p.162). 
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announcement (though this was never actually publicly presented) echoed this 
sentiment in answering the question of why the UK needed a floating rate of 
exchange. 
“The UK is the banker of the Sterling Area. We hold the gold and 
dollar reserves upon which the whole sterling system depends. It 
is an important system, for it finances half the total trade of the 
world. Its strength and continuity are necessary not only for us but 
for the whole world. If the reserves are too small or subject to too 
great strains, then the strength and continuity of the system are 
endangered. Yet our existing external financial system in fact puts 
the maximum strain where it can least be borne and where it can 
cause the greatest damage… Our reserves are not capable of 
taking the same strain as before the war. We must, therefore, find 
a system which does not concentrate all the strain on the 
reserves. This can be secured by a fluctuating rate – that is by a 
system under which the £ finds its own level in relation to the $ 
and other currencies.” (BE G1/123, ‘Draft of ROBOT 
announcement’, 25th June 1952) 
The ROBOT plan freed up the UK’s reserves to become ‘true’ reserves rather than to 
support the balance of payments deficit. Rather than using them as a quotidian prop 
to support Sterling, the terms of trade, and British economic policy, they would only 
be used when absolutely necessary. Indeed, as the Draft Announcement made 
starkly clear, 
 “Since the war the sterling area has been subject to periodic 
crises – 1947 – 1949 – 1951. Each has been very severe. There 
must be something wrong with such a system. A major factor is 
that we have taken on too much and failed to pay our way. 
Another major factor is that our system results in periodic and 
violent adjustment.” (ibid.) 
The impact of ROBOT on the Sterling Area, however, would have been 
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limited. Exchange Controls would still have applied in the Area, with stable exchange 
rates maintained between Sterling and the currencies of the Sterling Area, nor 
would there have been any direct alteration of Sterling Balances. However, it would 
have required agreement that the Sterling Balances not be drawn down below a 
certain point in order to support the value of Sterling. (ibid.) 
A text written for the Treasury on the global dollar supply, describing the 
state of the UK’s dollar deficit and the reserve situation, declared, “reserves are at 
such a low level that they urgently require replenishment” (TNA T230/177, ‘World 
Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952).  The dollar situation was characterised as 
fundamentally based on the fact that the US had significantly increased its exports, 
while its imports had not increased proportionally. Simultaneously, capital had 
moved to the US but the dollar had not depreciated in proportion to gold in relation 
to the overall rise in prices. Gold production had been unable to finance this since 
gold production had fallen in absolute terms: $1000m before the war, and $750m 
after the war in the non-dollar world As such the US trade surplus had been 
financed after the war by large-scale loans and grants to foreign countries. (ibid.) 
On the supply side, the United States had become more self-sufficient and so 
this led to the reduction of the supply of dollars paid out for imports and other 
private transactions. Indeed, dollars paid out by the US since the end of the war had 
been around 6.5% of US GNP, which was actually below the 6.8% figure between 
1925-1929. Therefore, even bearing in mind the grants and loans provided by the US 
since the end of the war (which only reached their peak at 2.5% of US GNP) and are 
included in the 6.5% figure, the supply of dollars had not even reached the level of 
the 1920s. (ibid.) Indeed, if the US had made purchases on the same scale as in 1925 
– 1929 instead of loans and grants, the world dollar supply would have been much 
larger. This had been caused by lower levels of private investment and imports in 
relation to GNP and it was only the Korean Boom (affecting 1950 and 1951 figures) 
that took the figures above those of the 1930s. (ibid.) 
The IMF and International Bank had, comparatively, provided very few dollar 
funds after the war. The gold and dollar assets of other countries were highly erratic 
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too, and followed the pattern of Britain’s own assets: liquidation in crisis, 
accumulation during booms. It was assumed that two sources of dollars would 
decline significantly: dollars from liquidation of assets, and grants/loans from the 
US. Indeed, the proposed level of US aid for 1952/53 was $2bn and beyond that year 
there was considerable uncertainty. With the UK maintaining a dollar deficit of 
US$250m in 1954, and the RSA (along with South African gold sales) just breaking 
even, the Colonial dollar surplus (and particularly Malaya, which had contributed 
US$120m, the single largest net contribution to the Area’s dollar pool) was as 
important as ever (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control Problems in Malaya’, 16th 
September 1955). Indeed, even with the low price of rubber in this period, Malaya 
was still a consistent high dollar earner. 
Net Current Balance of Malaya 1952-1956 (£ millions) 
 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Dollar Area 71 43 37 68 51 
Other non-Sterling Area 6 -2 -6 -1 1 
Sterling Area -58 -58 -37 -24 -42 
Total all areas 19 -17 -6 43 16 
Fig.4 (Source: BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, Trade and Balance 
of Payments’, 24th January 1957) 
 The Treasury sought to predict the supply of dollars in 1956 to give a very 
general idea of the situation facing the British economy in the latter half of the 
1950s, and what action could be taken. The forecasting of supply was closely linked 
to predicting the level of demand and supply in the US, thus GNP. In 1951 prices, the 
Treasury predicted this would be about $40bn by 1956 but this was an optimistic 
figure supposing continued growth at 4.5% (TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of 
Dollars’, 25th June 1952). 
Since the war, prices of US imports had increased but volume had not 
recovered, with the ratio of volume to GNP steady between 1.9% and 2.1% during 
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1946-1949. The Korean boom raised this ratio to 2.3% and 2.2% in 1950 and 1951 
but this did not constitute a trend due to the extraordinary circumstances and the 
small sample. Indeed, it reflected the “increase in purchases, particularly of raw 
materials, for stockpiling and the increase in imports of industrial materials and 
semi-manufactures… which were temporarily in short supply but for which the 
normal source *was US+ home production” (ibid.). US imports were mainly industrial 
materials and foodstuffs that were not produced in the US – for example, natural 
rubber.117 This was exacerbated by the Second World War, making the US even more 
self-sufficient and moving the import:GNP ratio to even lower levels.  
Since the demand for imports is a ‘derived demand’, the volume of imports 
was closely related to GNP. This was borne out by figures which showed that 
devaluation and large price fluctuations had little effect on the US import:GNP ratio. 
The rise in imports due to the Korean boom consisted of the traditional imports, as 
well as some manufactures. There was some stockpiling but the chief reason was 
simply a temporary issue:  US domestic production could not keep up with a very 
rapidly rising demand. For some products home supply had been exhausted but, 
against this, rearmament and the fear of war encouraged even greater self-
sufficiency through the development of synthetic and alternative products from the 
home market (ibid.). Synthetic rubber was an example of this, with the development 
of the synthetic rubber industry during the Second World War largely concentrated 
in the US with a production capacity of over a million tons per year (White 1996, 
p.64).  This provided serious competition to Malayan natural rubber, and was a 
perennial concern for the Malayan government and rubber growers. 
There was little optimism for the import:GNP ratio to change unless the level 
of demand remained at the Korean boom level and this would only be helpful if US 
domestic production could not keep pace with demand, which was highly unlikely 
and, therefore, the Treasury forecast the import:GNP ratio at 2.2% for 1956. The text 
                                               
117 Finished manufactures comprised a minute fraction of all imports. In 1952, all imported 
manufactures made up 0.2% of US GNP, and these were largely luxury gods such as pottery, whisky, 
and watches. Devaluation did not significantly alter this and there were other factors to consider, 
including tariffs and ‘buy American’ clauses (TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 
1952).  
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also indicates how helpful it would be to have the International Bank and Export 
Bank supplying dollars to developing countries. Indeed, there was some optimism 
that UK pressure could be brought to make this a reality, and was in fact the best 
chance of increasing the global supply of dollars 
“Grants and loans to under-developed countries are almost 
certainly the most hopeful way of increasing the world dollar 
supply. The risk of social unrest and political revolt in the 
backward countries already provides strong political pressure in 
their favour… But the world dollar position will not be greatly 
improved if this merely leads to an erratic flow of dollars allotted 
by Congress every time the political position in an area becomes 
critical… It is most important for economic reasons – and for 
political reasons too – that the flow of dollars for development 
should expand at a stable rate.” (ibid.) 
However, the document makes a further caveat that to rely on dollars from the 
developing areas of the global economy would be foolish.  
The document predicted that, taking the dollar supply as an index with 1947 
being 100, 1950 being 119 and 1951 standing at 122, the global dollar supply in 
1956 would be 114. Therefore, even with an optimistic evaluation of current trends, 
the world dollar supply would actually shrink. Furthermore, “since incomes in the 
rest of the world must be expected to rise in the intervening period, and since at the 
same time rearmament may continue to divert resources away from dollar saving 
and from export expansion in third markets, the task of restraining demand for 
United States goods to this level is likely to present a substantial problem, 
particularly if the geographic distribution of dollars is taken into account.” (ibid.) 
Europe’s share of US imports had gone from 50% before the First World War 
to 30% in the inter-war period to 15% since the end of the Second World War. The 
Americas, in the same time, have gone from 34% before WW1 to 58% after WW2. 
However, US exports had not changed radically.  
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“Europe’s dollar problems can be seen as the consequence of 
Europe’s inability, partly as a result of the obstruction of East-West 
trade and the failure to find substitutes for United States products 
elsewhere, to reduce its dependence on United States’ supplies as 
rapidly as the United States has reduced its dependence on 
European produce.” (ibid.) 
There was little reason to think that this trend would reverse, as “Europe appears to 
stand little chance of increasing its exports of manufactures to the United States 
very substantially” (ibid.). If anything, there was likely to be a further fall in Europe’s 
dollar supply but this would be offset by further dollar aid to developing countries. 
 This led to further optimism that developing areas would then receive 
significant dollar aid, thus boosting the world supply of dollars. 
“With this pattern of dollar supplies it seems certain that the 
principal way in which the United Kingdom and other European 
countries will have to balance their dollar accounts is by a 
reduction in the dependence on United States products through 
the substitution of supplies from other areas. The alternative is to 
earn dollar surpluses in third countries.” (ibid.) 
This meant Canada and Latin America; however, the UK and Europe had traditionally 
had deficits with these countries since the war. The document concluded by stating 
that the problem of the dollar deficit was so fundamental to the British and 
European economies that the best option available was import substitution. 
“We must rely for a major part of the solution of the dollar 
problem on the substitution of alternative supplies for imports 
from the United States. Moreover, unless it can be corrected by 
commodity agreements or other means, the great instability of 
the dollar supply… makes it the more desirable that we should 
become less dependent on the United States for our most 
essential imports, particularly since their prices are fixed by price 
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support policies and do not move in sympathy with United States 
import prices.” (ibid.) 
 The development of Sterling Area countries, particularly developing colonies 
like Malaya, was essential to maintaining British economic policy given the 
continued and persistent problem of the limited global dollar supply. Indeed, a letter 
from the Colonial Office to Douglas Godsall in Malaya, showed that the UK was very 
concerned about development in Malaya, even showing concern about how the 
policies of UK banks had an impact upon credit availability in Malaya. Since the 
banks in Malaya were only branch banks, with central offices in London, this meant 
that the local banks did not act according to the preferences of the Malayan 
government or, in some instances, the conditions of the Malayan economy (BE 
OV65/4, Letter from Hulland to Godsall, 19th July 1952). 
Following the base rate rise in the UK on 12th March 1952 from 2.5% to 4%, 
Godsall asked the Colonial Office if Malaya should follow the UK’s disinflationary 
policy too, as the local banks were taking advantage of the difference between 
British and Malayan loan markets. If the local rates were low, the balances were 
remitted to London to get the higher rate there. But if they were too high then the 
measure of restriction might be overdone and development impeded. For both the 
Colonial Office and the Malayan governments, it was hard to determine the 
appropriate course of action. (ibid.) 
In a follow up letter from the Bank on the subject, at Hulland’s request, the 
Bank of England made clear the position on sympathy rate changes for Malaya. The 
measures undertaken in the UK to restrict credit were, it explained,  
“primarily designed to meet conditions in the United Kingdom and 
although there is an essential financial connection between this 
country and the Colonial Territories, the measures were not 
necessarily intended to apply automatically to all the Colonies. 
Credit conditions vary wildly in the Colonies and credit control, 
either restriction or expansion, is not an end in itself; we are 
naturally anxious to satisfy ourselves that any form of credit 
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control which might be pursed in the Colonies is designed in the 
best interests of the Colonies in the light of their current economic 
circumstances.” (BE OV65/4, Note on Letter from Hulland  to W 
Godsall, 1st August 1952) 
The Bank then suggested to Hulland that he ask Godsall exactly what economic 
conditions were like in Malaya currently. This was done with the particular pupose 
of discovering exactly how important banking credit was to development in Malaya, 
as well as to provide the Bank with up-to-date information on credit availability in 
Malaya also. (ibid.) 
5.6 Malayan Downturn 
The UK’s material and financial commitment to the Emergency was also 
undiminished at this time. British forces in Malaya now stood at 25,000 troops, 
along with 2,500 Fijian and African troops, and 10,500 Gurkhas. Police numbers 
were at 25,000 regular police and 41,000 special police. British casualties now stood 
at 387 servicemen killed and 705 wounded, with the totals for all service personnel 
at 1,542 killed and 2,048 wounded since the Emergency was declared. The cost of 
the Emergency to Malaya up to 1953 in its most narrow sense, according to a 
Colonial Office report, was around £80m, with Britain having paid the full cost of all 
British forces in Malaya and having given Malaya an additional £80m in aid (TNA 
CO1022/2, ‘Forces in Malaya’, 28th March 1953; TNA CO1022/2, ‘The Emergency’, 29th 
December 1953). 
 In May 1953, a report to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, revealed that 
4,008 enemy insurgents had been killed, 1,018 had been captured and 1,055 had 
surrendered so far. The report further emphasised that the counter-insurgency 
campaign was only to be successful if the non-military role of combatting the 
terrorists was successful too, which meant the economic development of Malaya 
and the inclusion of all ethnic groups within the franchise in order to develop “a 
prosperous, united nation”. (TNA CO1022/2, ‘Brief for Selwyn Lloyd’, 15th May 1953) 
 Estimates on the size of the insurgency held that there was a ‘core’ of around 
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500 insurgents and a group of direct supporters of around 5000. While it was felt 
that there was no chance of coming to terms with the core of the insurgents, the 
rest could be willing to surrender since it was believed they had been coerced or 
blackmailed into helping the insurgents. Coercion and blackmail now formed the 
basis of communist recruitment, with communist propaganda much less successful 
in recruiting than it had been in the earlier stages of the Emergency. (TNA CO1022/2, 
‘The Emergency’, 29th December 1953) 
 The figures for terrorist and friendly casualties were actually very 
encouraging, and violence was noticeably decreasing. 1952 and 1953 had shown an 
improvement in the fortunes of the counter-insurgency campaign, with a drop in 
friendly casualties and the insurgents losing (either through death, surrender, or 
capture) seven men for every death they inflicted. Furthermore, due to the success 
of the Briggs Plan and the elimination of a number of leaders of the insurgency (two 
of which were by bodyguards who subsequently surrendered), the insurgents had 
largely fallen back to the jungle interior, which had cut them off from their main 
sources of support and supply. Despite these successes, a Foreign Office intelligence 
report remained very cautious about the withdrawal of troops from Malaya, 
suggesting that to do so would encourage renewed attacks from the Communist 
insurgents. (TNA CO1022/2, ‘Figures for March/April’, 22nd May 1953) 
Malaya’s economy was undergoing a severe downturn and the cost of the 
Emergency was now becoming burdensome. The Emergency had cost Malaya 
around £30m in 1953 (around 30% of state expenditure and about 50% of the 
Federal budget) and was estimated to cost around £23m in 1954, and by 1955 was 
expected to account for 30% of state revenues and 40% of the Federal budget (TNA 
CO1022/2, ‘The Emergency’, 29th December 1953; BE OV65/4, ‘Economic impact of 
defence expenditure’, 25th October 1955). Estimates of Malaya’s budget deficit for 
1953 were around M$97m but these proved extremely optimistic (TNA CO1022/2, 
‘Malayan Budget’, 1st September 1953). While Malaya broke even in 1952 at 
M$725m, there was still a budget surplus of M$330m from previous years, in 
addition to a loan of M$100m. Budget expenditure had been M$850m for 1953, 
reducing the surplus to only M$220m, of which only half was actually expendable. 
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These financial difficulties were especially worrying as social and economic 
development was considered essential to the resolution of the Emergency; 
furthermore, the financial troubles had already resulted in pressure to resume 
selling rubber to China, which had been halted in 1951 following the Communist 
victory in the civil war (ibid.). However, it was reiterated in the Foreign Office report, 
and in a public statement to the Malayan press later that year, that the British 
government would come to Malaya’s aid if it encountered serious financial 
difficulties. (ibid; TNA CO1022/2, ‘Statement to the Malayan Press’, 11th August 
1953).  
 Britain had already provided Malaya with a grant of £6m to support its 
deficit, along with loans from Brunei and Singapore of £4.5m and £3.5m 
respectively. However, with revenues from rubber levies unlikely to exceed £10m, 
Malaya was facing a serious balance of payments problem, which might require cuts 
in social and economic programmes that were essential for maintaining the 
successes achieved in the Emergency (TNA CO1022/2, ‘The Emergency’, 29th 
December 1953). As such, given the prospect of dealing with the Emergency for the 
foreseeable future, Malaya faced a “severe economic depression” and was tasked 
with a major development programme that could not be postponed. Therefore, 
there were two options: either finding cheaper methods of resolving the insurgency, 
or seeking economic aid from outside Malaya to cover the budget deficit over the 
next few years (ibid.). Both of these options were to be implemented. 
 In early January 1954, an IBRD mission to Malaya was being arranged in 
London to arrange a development package for Malaya. Preliminary discussions 
centred on generating lists of contacts and important people within the Malayan 
rubber and tin industries for the IBRD delegation to meet during their visit (TNA 
CO1045/177, ‘International Bank Mission to Malaya’, 11th January 1954). At a 
meeting at the Bank of England later on that month, Bank officials met with IBRD 
officials to discuss the problems of Malayan development and “the need for a 
profitable economy at current prices of rubber and tin which was important both 
from the Malayan point of view and the UK point of view.” Also discussed was the 
development of Malaya’s financial market, including the establishment of a Malayan 
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Central Bank, which it was agreed would be best to plan now rather than being 
hastily drawn up just before or after independence occurred (BE OV65/4, ‘IBRD 
Mission to Malaya’, 20th January 1954; TNA CO1030/627, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 27th 
February 1958). This prompted the Bank of England to take a much closer interest in 
Malaya’s financial system and to begin planning for the eventual establishment of 
the Central Bank in Malaya, with the IBRD’s recommendation to set one up having 
been assured but not yet announced. (BE OV65/4, ‘Malayan Banking Statistics’, 15th 
September 1954) 
It was well known that Malaya depended for its economic well being on 
rubber, particularly the export of rubber, more than any other commodity, even tin. 
Indeed, from 1950-1954, rubber accounted for 65% of the value of the Federation’s 
exports. In 1952 Malayan GDP had fallen from the 1951 level of $5550m to $4693m, 
and continued to fall in 1953 to $4271m and $4208m in 1954 and finally rising in 
1955 to $4931m (Lim 1967, p.317). The years 1951 – 1955 had seen violent 
fluctuations in the price of rubber and the correlation between price changes and 
the economy as a whole was remarkably close.118 With the majority of rural Malays 
and Chinese working on a subsistence level on small rubber plantations, a large 
portion of the Malayan population was affected by the future of rubber prices. 
Unless government investment increases their consuming power, they will continue 
to be susceptible to “politicians who promise them something better” (BE OV65/6, 
‘Federation of Malaya: The Economy’, 23rd June 1959). 
Natural rubber cultivation is a lengthy process and so natural rubber prices 
tended to be much higher compared to synthetic rubber (a rubber tree has an 
economic life of 30-35 years and the first seven are unproductive). This had been 
exacerbated in Malaya due to the painfully slow replanting process that had been 
made difficult as a result of the deprivations of the Second World War, and almost 
impossible due to the Emergency. Despite this, natural rubber could actually be 
produced more cheaply than synthetic. However, that was not currently the case, 
and with many estates coming up to a big replanting period in late 1955, the price of 
                                               
118 In those years, average rubber prices were (in chronological order) 50.84p/lb, 28.34, 19.91, 20.5 
and 33.56 (Lim 1967, p.335). These figures correspond very closely to the figures for Malayan GDP. 
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natural rubber remained high, which stimulated further investment in synthetic 
rubber research and production in an attempt to reduce those costs (TNA 
PREM11/873, ‘Dispatch to Prime Minister from High Commissioner, Federation of 
Malaya’, 2nd August 1955). 
European estates were notoriously reticent to spend money to change 
practices and the smallholders were infamously improvident, with little sense of 
saving up for a rainy day. As such, government, both the Malayan and British, 
involvement was essential, and required to revitalize the whole Malayan rubber 
industry. This meant financial support in replanting, as well as reducing taxes on 
exports, in order to reduce the costs of the development of Malayan rubber. It was 
felt, by the High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Donald MacGillivray, in a letter to 
Churchill, that this would eventually reap dividends through increased yields and 
increased production (ibid.). This plea by MacGillivray was entirely successful with 
the UK offering to support the replanting process in Malaya with financial 
assistance. (ibid.) 
On 8th September 1955, the Malayan Federation announced an amnesty for 
all Communist insurgents, and the Chief Minister of Malaya, Abdul Rahman, saying 
that he was willing to meet Chin Feng, the leader of the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP). Singapore echoed this announcement with a similar amnesty for insurgents. 
However, due to the conditions of the amnesty, all insurgents who surrendered were 
to be interred indefinitely, so there was actually no increase in surrenders. Chin Feng 
stated publicly that he rejected the amnesty and would only meet and negotiate as 
an equal (TNA FO371/116941, Telegram from McGilivray to Colonial Secretary, 18th 
November 1955). Though there had already been a preliminary meeting between 
the Malayan government and the MCP to discuss the format of future meetings. 
(TNA FO371/116941, ‘Top Secret Memo’, 10th November 1955) 
The British government were wary of the amnesty but refused to accept any 
concession made by the Chief Minister on the release of the ‘core’ group of 
insurgents who might still have undertaken subversive activity in the Federation and 
Singapore, nor would the British government accept any formal recognition of the 
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MCP (TNA CAB128/29, Conclusion 37(55), 25th October 1955; TNA FO371/116941, 
Telegram from MacGilivray to Colonial Secretary, 18th November 1955). Indeed, the 
UK was actually fearful that the Malayan government was seeking early 
independence and had come to believe that independence was conditional upon 
the resolution of the Emergency and this was the true reason behind the amnesty 
and the beginning of negotiations with the MCP. However, it was emphasized to the 
Chief Minister that this was not the case and that the independence and self-
government for Malaya were not in any way contingent on the conclusion of the 
Emergency. (TNA FO371/116941, ‘Emergency in Malaya’, 22nd November 1955) 
Certainly, this seems an unusual matter for the British state to be so 
concerned about if we consider the view held by Hinds (2001) and Krozewski (2001) 
that 1953 sees the beginning of the end of the British Empire. Indeed, this concern 
emphasises continuity in the relationship from the end of the Second World War 
(and even before that) rather than a significant rupture and lack of coherence in the 
relationship between Britain and Malaya. 
Conclusion  
The chapter has claimed that the dollar was a major consideration in terms of 
economic policy and the position of the Sterling Area central reserves. Indeed, the 
situation was still very serious and the cause of the problem had not been solved, 
the global supply of dollars was limited by the terms of trade between the US and 
the rest of world, which was identified by state officials as an issue of 
competitiveness between US producers and the rest of the world. This has been 
substantiated by reference to the dwindling of UK Central Reserves, the concern 
showed by the Treasury and the Bank over the global supply of dollars after the end 
of Marshall Aid, and the continued dollar deficit of the Sterling Area. This meant 
that Malaya remained extremely important to Britain, as it was still the highest net 
dollar earner in the Sterling Area. On a very basic level then, Britain’s dominance of 
Malaya was used to the advantage of British economic and monetary policy by 
aiding in the maintenance of the UK’s reserve position. The purpose of which, 
ultimately, was to resolve the crisis affecting the global economy fundamentally, by 
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allowing for the reconstruction of the British economy, which would permit greater 
exports to the dollar area and, ultimately, a shift in the balance of trade and a return 
to an ‘equilibrium’ in the global trading system. 
The impact of the Korean War altered the nature of American aid, focusing it 
upon European rearmament, and boosted the price of raw materials. This 
highlighted to Britain that they had very limited scope in their abilities to deal with 
this problem and how much pressure was being placed on the reserves. The Korean 
War also provided a huge boon to the Malayan economy, improving its revenues 
substantially, due to the increased price of raw materials. However, this was short 
lived and the prices of raw materials collapsed, leading to curtailed GDP and export 
revenues in Malaya. 
In coming to realise that the global dollar supply remained very 
geographically contained and would continue to be so for some time, Britain had to 
look towards the development of other countries to supply dollars. Indeed, Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya is most keenly revealed in its attitude to Malayan 
development. Britain was deeply committed to Malaya and its development: 
seeking loans for Malaya, providing grants and financial support itself, and trying to 
arrange for ECA funds for Malaya before the Korean War. 
It seems difficult to support the idea that Britain’s support of Malayan 
development was confined solely to the importance attributed to its dollar earning 
potential. Certainly, this was a major factor in Britain’s commitment to Malayan 
development but not the only one. Indeed, state officials repeatedly associate the 
development of Malaya with nation-building, the resolution of the Malayan 
Emergency, the security of the Far East, and, of course, to ensure that it provided its 
maximum potential for contributing to the Sterling Area dollar pool. Also frequently 
associated with development was Malaya’s preparation for eventual independence 
from Britain, which itself contained a number of sub-goals: trying to alter Malaya’s 
boom and bust economy due to its reliance on rubber and tin production; increasing 
food production; and reducing ethnic and economic divisions. Therefore this 
relationship is a fundamentally nuanced one and reveals, effectively, a dynamic 
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relationship in which Malaya is able to benefit from the imperial attachment it holds 
with Britain. 
It does not seem reasonable to reduce Britain’s stated reasons to a single 
one of these factors, or even to emphasise one over the others. Certainly, Britain 
would benefit materially from Malaya’s economic development but this manifested 
itself in a number of ways, not simply in Malaya’s dollar contribution and this is 
repeatedly stated throughout the documents presented in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between Britain and Malaya is certainly imperial. 
Britain maintains strict control over Malaya’s economic policy, using its dollar 
earnings to support Sterling’s position as an international currency. Furthermore, we 
see that Britain seeks to create in Malaya, through its development programme, a 
state that is well suited to the global capitalist economy and will remain valuable to 
Britain for the foreseeable future, by trying to resolve issues of boom and bust, as 
well as ensuring the competitiveness of its rubber industry against synthetic 
alternatives through replantation drives, and by trying to create a state that is both 
politically and economically stable. 
One point that remains clear from this period, however, is the continuity in 
the relationship between Britain and Malaya. We see this in the persistent problem 
of the global dollar shortage, the desire to develop Malaya’s economy, and a 
complete lack of any suggestion that there is a cleavage in Bank or National 
Archives. While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, we would expect, if 
the Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001) thesis were correct, that we would see a 
noticeable shift in the official mindset towards Malaya during this period. Indeed, 
they argue that the move towards trade liberalisation in 1953 marked a clear 
discontinuity in Britain’s relationship with the Sterling Area more broadly. However, 
when looking closely at official documents of the specific relationship between 
Britain and Malaya within the Sterling Area, we find no evidence of a discontinuity. 
In fact, we see a reiteration of the great importance of Malaya to British economic 
policy. This then supports the view that there is greater analytical value to be 
derived from understanding imperialism not as a type of state, or an institution, but 
as a state strategy manifest as a relationship between states and can only be fully 
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understood in terms of bilateral relations. 
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the period 1955 – 1960, 
featuring financial and constitutional discussions over Malaya’s independence in 
1957 and Malaya’s introduction into the Sterling Area as a full and independent 
member. 
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Chapter Six: Malayan Independence, and Full Membership of the 
Sterling Area (1955 – 1960) 
This chapter provides an account of the years 1955 until 1960. The chapter charts 
Britain’s negotiations with Malaya concerning its eventual independence, including 
Malaya’s relationship with the Sterling Area, its exchange controls, membership of 
the IMF and future development of Malaya.  
 This chapter looks at Malaya’s growing sense of independence from Britain in 
this period, even before formal independence is declared. This is particularly 
manifest through Malaya’s use of its Sterling Area membership, and its value to the 
Area, as a bargaining chip in political negotiations with Britain, with Singapore 
considering not renewing its exchange controls. These negotiations are revealing for 
the fact that they exist and also the content of them is particularly interesting, 
exposing Malaya’s interests and Britain’s interests as understood by British officials. 
This chapter also sees two similar episodes; with Malaya negotiating its own level of 
expenditure in foreign exchange, rather than having it imposed by Britain and the 
negotiation of an independent dollar reserve. Each of these incidents brings into 
question Malaya’s relationship with the Sterling Area, and so too to Britain. Malaya 
(and Singapore within it, though it is Singapore’s actions which highlight Malaya’s 
importance) is aware of its importance to the UK and the Sterling Area and often 
uses its value as a net contributor of dollars as a bargaining chip to achieve certain 
political goals, whether political credibility in Malaya, early independence, or 
improved terms during constitutional negotiations. 
 The establishing of the Malayan Central Bank also sees a landmark in 
Malaya’s independence, giving Malaya the ability to manage its own monetary 
policy. This precedes the desire to accumulate its own (albeit limited) dollar reserve, 
which again brings Malaya’s relationship with the Sterling Area into question. This 
period also sees the de-escalation of the Malayan Emergency, with little violence 
occurring after 1955 and periods of total inactivity by insurgents during this period. 
The Emergency was declared over in 1960, though had been effectively over for five 
years prior to that. 
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 This chapter, as with the previous chapters, argues that Malaya’s relationship 
with Britain remains fundamentally unchanged. While Malaya begins to act more 
independently, and indeed receives formal independence, from Britain, Malaya 
simply acts more independently within the relationship that already exists, using the 
nature of the relationship to its own advantage and not actually challenging its basic 
structure. This supports the theoretical framework of the thesis in that it reveals 
that the broad structure of an imperial relationship exists: control, or at least 
significant influence, over foreign and domestic policy, extraction of raw materials, 
development of the economy, and preparation for successful insertion into the 
global economy. However, the relationship must be understood as dynamic and 
constantly generating opportunities and constraints for both parties. 
 A prominent debate in imperial economic relations literature centres on the 
relative importance of de facto convertibility of 1955, and the de jure convertibility 
of 1958. Where Schenk (1996; 2000) argues that the 1955 date was a more 
significant date, Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001) argue that 1958 saw the final 
end of coherent economic relations between Britain and its empire. Their 
approaches are broad, looking, in Schenk’s case, at the history of the Sterling Area as 
a institution for managing Sterling, and in Krozewski and Hinds’ cases, at the broader 
economic relations between Britain and its empire. These have been summed up by 
the authors themselves as distinctions between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ 
approaches to the subject: where Krozewski and Hinds see themselves as trying to 
understand British foreign relations, Schenk is trying to understand British economic 
performance (Krozewski 1997, p.850). 
This chapter of the thesis covers the chronology of these two events. The 
chapter focuses on a political crisis over exchange control in Singapore; the Financial 
and Constitutional Talks over Malayan independence; a Malayan request to Britain 
for an independent dollar reserve; and the search by 1the newly independent 
Malayan state for development funds. Each of these moments sees repeated 
emphasis placed by British officials on the continued value and importance of 
Malaya to the Sterling Area and the efforts by British state managers to maintain the 
nature of the relationship between Britain and Malaya. Furthermore, what both 
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Krozewski and Hinds both see as discontinuity in 1958, does not feature in the 
archival documentation between Britain or Malaya in any meaningful way. On the 
contrary, rather than seeing the complete breakdown of imperial economic relations 
in 1958, we see repeated efforts by British state managers to maintain this 
relationship with Malaya. 
Malaya’s own understanding of its value to the Sterling Area, and hence to 
British economic and monetary policy, reveals the nuance of the imperial 
relationship. The relationship is fundamentally ‘open’ in character. While the 
institutional arrangement provided by the Sterling Area permits Britain to centrally 
pool convertible currency reserves and for Sterling to be used as a reserve and 
trading currency by a wide variety of states, it is this arrangement that 
simultaneously permits the domination by Britain of Malaya to its own ends but also 
for Malaya not only to recognise its own value and leverage benefits from that but 
for Britain, in recognising that value, to seek to maximise it, resulting in 
development, economic growth and increased political independence. The imperial 
relationship then cannot be understood as a one-way domination of one state by 
another but a relationship characterised by the domination of one state by another 
but featuring the possibility for constraints and opportunities on both sides. 
6.1 Exchange Control Ordinances 
Towards the end of 1955, the Federation of Malaya was drawn into a dispute 
mainly between Singapore and Britain; however, given the nature of the 
constitutional arrangement between the governments of Malaya, whatever one 
government chose to do had enormous repercussions on the others. Indeed, the 
Bank considered both their economies and external trade as only fully 
comprehensible as a single whole (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, 
Trade and Balance of Payments’, 24th January 1957). As such, when the Chief 
Minister of Singapore, Saul Marshall, decided to use the collective dollar earnings of 
Malaya as a bargaining chip in future constitutional settlements, the Federation 
became drawn into that argument. Indeed, the relationship between the 
Federation, Singapore, Sarawak, and Borneo was such that the British government 
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at first treated the situation as if the entirety of Malaya were making these 
demands. Furthermore, the nature of the bargaining chip used by Marshall was such 
that it was keenly felt throughout the entirety of Malaya, and a particularly sensitive 
issue for Britain too. 
 Marshall’s action, prima facie, does not seem to be too brazen. Marshall 
merely stated his intent only to renew Singapore’s exchange control ordinances for 
six months, which was a much shorter period than was normal.119 The Governor of 
Singapore, in correspondence with the Colonial Office, believed that Marshall 
intended to use the issue of exchange control renewal as a bargaining chip in the 
upcoming Constitutional Talks in London; it was believed, by Marshall, that 
Singapore was so vital to the Sterling Area that London would not dare call his bluff. 
However, when informed by the Governor that Singapore was only instrumentally 
valuable as the entrepôt market for the Federation’s actual dollar earnings, Marshall 
was quite surprised. Indeed, the Governor believed that Marshall had a view to 
securing the dollar earnings of Malaya as well as using them as a tool to his political 
advantage. (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Extract from letter from Governor of Singapore to 
Colonial Office’, 5th November 1955) 
 Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, in a telegram in late November 
1955, relayed the implications of removing exchange controls in Singapore to Sir 
Donald MacGillivray, the High Commissioner of the Federation. 
“Quite apart however from the local effects there would be 
inevitable repercussions outside the Federation and Singapore, 
since Her Majesty’s Government would be obliged, however 
reluctantly, to take steps to protect their own interests and those 
of the sterling area. It will surely be apparent to your Ministers 
that, so long as exchange control remains necessary for the 
sterling area, it would be impracticable for one territory within 
                                               
119 The Exchange Control Ordinances had come into force on 1st January 1954 for one year. They had 
then been extended by another one-year period and would expire on 31st Dec 1955 unless renewed. 
In Council, Saul Marshall suggested a renewal of only six months because the Ordinance operated 
unfairly against Singapore. The decision was postponed. (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control’, 9th 
November 1955) 
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the area to abandon controls without undermining the 
effectiveness of the controls in the area as a whole. Her Majesty’s 
Government would therefore be obliged to take steps to prevent 
Singapore, with its highly developed financial mechanism, 
becoming a wide breach in the defence of the sterling area.” (TNA 
CO1030/100, Telegram no.164, 23rd November 1955) 
He also emphasised to MacGillivray the great threat this action posed to the 
economies of both Singapore and the Federation even if Britain did not take 
protective measures to insulate itself and the Sterling Area from Malaya’s lack of 
exchange control. Lennox-Boyd believed that, if Marshall went through with his 
threat to remove exchange controls, the Malayan economy would be prone to 
speculation on the Malayan dollar and be unable to prevent capital flight from its 
territories (ibid.). This also highlights the continuing importance of the Sterling Area 
to Britain, and Britain’s desire to protect the Sterling Area’s exchange controls. 
 The Bank of England felt that, taken in isolation, Singapore’s threat to 
abandon exchange controls was not particularly worrisome.120 However, the Bank 
was extremely concerned about the precedent that this would set in the Sterling 
Area. Their main worry was that other members of the Area would follow 
Singapore’s example, which would force Britain to either abandon all exchange 
controls within the Area, for which Britain was entirely unprepared, or else impose 
exchange controls against members of its own currency area, which seemed absurd 
and contrary to the reasons for the Sterling Area (BE OV65/4, Sterling Area: 
Abandonment of Exchange Control in Singapore (SECRET), 29th November 1955). 
However, the Bank did acknowledge that the abandonment of exchange controls 
was a necessary consequence of the move towards convertibility and the Collective 
Approach and was, therefore, ultimately a desired policy outcome. (ibid.) 
                                               
120 In this Bank document, the memo seems to be referring to Singapore by itself and not taken with 
the rest of Malaya. The Colonial Office considers Singapore’s threat dangerous simply by implication 
that it might lead the entire of Malaya to abandon exchange controls. However, it is also reasonable 
to think that the Bank were more committed to the Collective Approach than the Colonial Office and 
so were more apathetic about the desire of a small colony to, effectively, secede from the Sterling 
Area. 
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This threat from Marshall prompted the Colonial Office into action to 
consider how best to put forward the argument to Singapore and the Federation (if 
it was convinced to support Saul Marshall’s plan) to remain in the Sterling Area, 
highlighting the advantages of staying in the Area and the disadvantages of leaving. 
Malaya was, after all, still very important to the UK and the Sterling Area, being the 
highest net dollar earner to the Area at US$120m in 1954. The only other member 
of the Area approaching Malaya was British West Africa with earnings of around 
$100m/year; however, British West Africa and Malaya were unique in that Malaya’s 
own net dollar earnings were greater than the rest of the colonies’ earnings 
combined.121 Coupled with the fact that Britain itself was a net dollar spender of 
US$250m in 1954 and the Independent Sterling Area (including South African gold 
sales) only broke even, Malaya still remained extremely important to the 
maintenance of the Sterling Area, which was still vital to British economic and 
monetary strategy. (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control Problems in Malaya’, 16th 
September 1955) 
 The argument that was drawn up was based upon a memo created for a 
Colombo Plan consultative committee meeting earlier in 1955 but was never 
actually submitted or used at the time. The memo stated concern that the common 
view in Malaya was that membership of the Sterling Area had become detrimental 
to Malaya’s economy, with Malaya’s dollar earnings used solely to meet dollar 
spending of other members, or to accumulate reserves to benefit the rest of the 
Area at Malaya’s expense. The comparison between the greater freedom in dollar 
expenditure enjoyed by Hong Kong, the UK, or the independent members of the 
Sterling Area, and Malaya’s own exchange controls only provoked further anger at 
this difference. (ibid.) 
 The economic view was not straightforward either. Malaya could leave the 
Sterling Area, as its dollar earnings were large enough to change the backing of its 
currency from Sterling to the dollar easily enough and in a short period. 
                                               
121 Further, British West Africa was a collective term to refer to a number of colonies, including 
Gambia, parts of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast (which later became Ghana). As such, it 
was only collectively valuable and, unlike Malaya, its value was not concentrated in a single industry 
or territory. 
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Furthermore, with Sterling having been devalued already since the war and serious 
discussion having been given to a floating exchange rate, as well as a great deal of 
speculation about the rate of Sterling, Malaya might well have benefitted from 
basing its currency on the strongest and most stable currency in the world, the US 
dollar. Furthermore, any devaluation would be due to Britain’s balance of payments 
problems, and not Malaya’s. If devaluation did occur, Britain would benefit most 
from the boost given to the reserves, since they were held by the UK (TNA 
CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 27th September 1955). However, the 
Colonial Office responded that the issue of devaluation could be rejected on the 
basis that the UK was “sternly resolved” to maintaining the sterling-dollar rate.122 
Furthermore, if devaluation did occur, the Malayan Currency Commission had the 
power to decide whether they wished to devalue the Malayan dollar in sympathy or 
not, as Pakistan did in 1949 (BE OV65/4, ‘Malaya Currency Ordinance 1951’, 19th July 
1951). The Sterling Area required no perpetual fixity in exchange rates of its 
members’ domestic currencies, just that Sterling be used in international 
transactions (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 27th September 
1955). 
Indeed, the Colonial Office was well aware that this sense of injustice could 
not simply be dismissed as pure propaganda, or ignorance. This idea of colonial 
exploitation had become deeply embedded in the beliefs of the commercial and 
industrial sectors in Malaya and the Colonial Office were worried that the issue of 
Malaya’s membership in the Sterling Area would shift from an economic issue into a 
political one (ibid.). As such, it could become a widely held public view that the 
Sterling Area was synonymous with colonial exploitation and domination by a 
foreign power, which would be extraordinarily difficult to respond to, other than to 
                                               
122 However, in late-1955, the Bank was particularly disappointed that the Autumn Budget provided 
no “psychological support” for the value of Sterling, particularly since the threat of strikes caused by 
increased purchases taxation overshadowed the position of Sterling. Sterling, at this time of the year 
with seasonal buying of Sterling Area raw materials, would be expected to strengthen and reserves 
grow, especially coupled with the highest base rate since the end of the Second World War at 5.5%; 
however, the Budget had entirely offset this and by the end of December 1955, the foreign currency 
reserve had fallen to £38m, the lowest reserves since January 1952. To resolve this, the Bank tried to 
push Transferable Sterling up to a rate of US$2.77½ with a purchase of around US$15-20m worth of 
Sterling. By the beginning of January 1956, foreign currency reserves had gone up to £65m. (BE 
C43/31, ‘Exchange Market Tactics’, 1
st
 November 1955) 
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say that there were independent members of the Sterling Area who enjoyed the 
benefits brought by the Area (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 27th 
September 1955). This might also have lead to the belief that a dollar-based 
economy was synonymous with independence. The Colonial Office was then eager 
to develop an argument for the Sterling Area based on the idea of mutual 
confidence and partnership on an equal basis. (ibid.) 
The first point to emphasise in this vein of argument was that the Sterling 
Area was a diverse collection of economies with common interest in maintaining the 
stability of Sterling, through internal economic policies and by limiting expenditure 
external to the Area. The nature of these measures varied between countries, 
though there was a sense of complementarity present in the Area. 
“The different parts of the Sterling Area fall into two main 
categories – those that are net dollar earners and those that are 
net dollar savers. Borneo and Sarawak, for example, are net dollar 
savers owing to their oil production, because the oil they produce 
might otherwise have to come from dollar sources. Similarly, the 
United Kingdom is a net dollar saver because its exports to the 
rest of the sterling area take the place of goods which would 
otherwise have to some from the USA. To say that Malaya is a net 
dollar earner which earns dollars for the benefit of the United 
Kingdom rather than for itself is therefore an over-simplification. 
Each party benefits the other, and it is quite impossible to state in 
precise quantitative terms the benefits which each confers and 
receives.” (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control Problems in 
Malaya’, 16th September 1955) 
Since different parts of the Area had different economies, they therefore required 
different import policies. This idea of complementarity then rested on a more 
fundamental idea that each member of the Sterling Area performed a certain 
function for the rest of the Area’s members. Britain’s function in the Sterling Area 
was to manufacture cheaply and export its goods.  
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“Many of *the UK’s+ exports will contain a dollar element which is 
not charged against the receiving country’s accounts. There is, 
thus, clearly a case for the United Kingdom to purchase in the 
cheapest market the raw materials it requires for its 
manufactures. This is the reason why the United Kingdom has 
placed many of its raw material requirements from the dollar area 
on *Open General License+.” (ibid.) 
Malaya, on the other hand, produced mainly raw materials and needed to 
buy the cheapest machinery required for production. However, this machinery was 
specialised in nature and did not lend itself to an open license, which was used to 
justify the lack of dollar open general licenses in Malaya. Indeed, the Colonial Office 
argued “Malaya has never… been prevented by dollar restrictions from purchasing 
cheaper dollar equipment where this is available” (ibid.). It was argued by the 
Colonial Office that the issue was more one of difference and complementarity than 
exploitation and servitude.  
“In fact, the record of Her Majesty’s Government in recognising 
that other territories in the Sterling Area (whether dependent or 
independent) have their own particular problems which cannot 
be met by any stereotyped formula will bear the closest scrutiny. 
There is scarcely a territory, however small, in which some 
departure from standard practice is not in operation.” (ibid.) 
 This understanding of the Sterling Area and the Empire by British state 
managers lends further credence to the understanding of imperialism as a 
relationship between states, and certainly undermines understandings of the 
Empire as a monolithic institution. The Colonial Office were in fact confident that, as 
long as the issue did not become clouded with emotion, and in concert with an 
upcoming liberalisation of Sterling Area dollar imports, it was likely that Malaya 
could be easily convinced that its dollar earnings were not being used simply to 
“subsidise the extravagances” of other members of the Sterling Area; however, it 
was not the same argument as that of Malaya’s membership of the Sterling Area. 
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(ibid.) 
The best argument presented for Malaya’s retention of Sterling Area 
membership was actually an issue of reserves. Sterling Area membership meant that 
Malaya actually required less reserves than existing outside of it since it did not 
need to hold reserves in the currencies of other Area members, as all trade was 
conducted using Sterling. Furthermore, the more countries in a monetary area, the 
fewer reserves they would need since they would need no foreign currency for the 
trade between themselves. 
Given the Sterling Area’s internal trade amounted to £3354m in 1954 and its 
external trade was £3061m, the currency reserves held on behalf of members was 
therefore around half of what it would be otherwise (ibid.). This was further 
accentuated by the complementary nature of the Sterling Area’s economies – 
reserves could be even lower than they might be. Seasonal and cyclical variations in 
economies could be smoothed over, as the terms of trade varied in a 
complementary manner and, in times of austerity, substitute goods were found 
within the Area also. 
The nature of Malaya’s economy, it was argued, meant that it had a natural 
direction towards the Sterling Area. Generally, this meant that Malaya purchased a 
large quantity of goods from Sterling Area countries, particularly the UK, and sold a 
great deal of goods outside the Area (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling 
Area’, 27th September 1955). Indeed, this historically developed and unique 
relationship between Malaya, Britain and the global economy highlights all the more 
the importance of understanding the specific nature of these relationships rather 
than as aggregated under the title of an empire; furthermore, this is the official 
understanding of British imperial relations by British state managers.  
“Malaya’s trade pattern of course emerged long before exchange 
control was thought of and it developed along its particular lines 
simply because this was its natural bent. Membership of the 
sterling area thus implies a certain natural outcome of Malaya’s 
trading needs and has resulted in sterling area banks, insurance 
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companies and shipping companies developing to meet those 
needs. Similarly sterling area finance has largely contributed to 
Malaya’s development.” (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control 
Problems in Malaya’, 16th September 1955) 
Thus, if Malaya left the Sterling Area, these benefits from her “natural 
development” would be forsaken: Sterling would become a foreign currency and 
Malaya would have to develop her own reserves of both Sterling and other foreign 
currencies to overcome trade fluctuations. Furthermore, imports from Malaya and 
investment in Malaya would therefore be foreign currency commitments and 
treated accordingly. This would then make the whole system of trade and its 
ancillary features much more difficult, particularly for Malaya. 
“The effects on Malaya’s economy would not be easily calculable. 
But it is clear that, if Malaya’s own balance of payments with the 
rest of the world (including the sterling area) were adverse, she 
would have to restrict imports from all sources. This would be 
likely to happen at a time when the sterling area itself was 
moving towards convertibility and non-discrimination in trade.” 
(ibid.) 
Indeed, Malaya’s current dollar surplus meant that she must have a current 
sterling deficit. Where Malaya’s sterling deficit was not caused by dollar import 
restrictions requiring Malaya to buy sterling goods, Malaya would have to sell dollars 
to the UK to get hold of Sterling (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 
27th September 1955). Similarly, where import restrictions required Malaya to 
purchase Sterling goods, this could also exacerbate her deficit with the Area though 
it was nowhere near the whole deficit (ibid.). Certainly, in this regard, Malaya was 
definitely paying a price for membership of the Sterling Area, though the Colonial 
Office were adamant that this price was worth paying for the benefits it purchased. 
“But is it not worth it, for the freedom which she thereby obtains 
in sterling area markets for her exports and re-exports, for the 
uncontrolled import of capital she gets, for her access to the 
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London Market for the investment of her reserves, and for all the 
intangible advantages that flow from the free use of the currency 
and the trading machinery through which between 1/3 and 1/2 of 
the world’s trade is conducted?” (ibid.) 
These benefits would have been impossible for Malaya to participate in if it had left 
the Sterling Area. Furthermore, the Colonial Office emphasised the reciprocal nature 
of the Sterling Area quite clearly, acknowledging that Britain did benefit from 
Malaya’s membership but that did exclude the fact that Malaya benefitted from 
membership also. 
“We do not deny that her membership of the sterling area is of 
advantage to us: but this is perfectly consistent with it being of 
advantage to her too. Moreover as we progress towards the non-
discriminatory and convertible world which is our major objective 
the membership-fee of controls should progressively be 
lightened.” (ibid.) 
One further argument maintained that switching to the dollar might have 
made Malaya seem more appealing to dollar investment, and given the US further 
reason to protect the natural rubber industry from synthetic rubber competition 
(TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control Problems in Malaya’, 16th September 1955). 
However, the dollar area was no guarantee of investment from the US, or of 
protection from synthetic rubber. In fact, Sterling Area membership was seen as an 
attraction for US investment, judging by former deals between independent 
countries and Colonies, and Canada received no benefit from protectionism by close 
association with the dollar area, the Colonial Office noted. Not only were the 
benefits of membership of the dollar area generally exaggerated, but severing links 
with the Sterling Area would be a severe blow to Malaya’s economy and would have 
had far-reaching effects (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 27th 
September 1955). 
 “The argument that Malaya would do better in the dollar area is 
based on a mass of misconceptions. Yes, Malaya has a large trade 
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with the dollar area but her largest trade is with the Sterling Area. 
If Malaya had to join one (which she would as her currency is not 
used in international trade) then the Sterling Area would be the 
obvious choice… So long as the great bulk of Malaya’s trade is 
with non-dollar countries – whether sterling or non-sterling – it 
seems inconceivable that she would gain anything on balance by 
severing her links with the only important non-dollar currency 
used in international trade.” (ibid.) 
 With the argument prepared, or at least dusted off, the Malayan Joint 
Ministers Conference in Singapore, on 7th November 1955, saw Marshall announce 
that Exchange Control Ordinance would indeed only be renewed for another six 
months. Donald MacGillivray relayed Marshall’s realpolitik reasoning to Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary. To Marshall, the basis behind his strategy was 
entirely political. At the upcoming Constitutional Talks in 1956, he intended to press 
Lennox-Boyd for early independence for Singapore in 1957.123 However, Marshall 
expected this to be dismissed out of hand and that was why he wished to make an 
issue of Exchange Control Ordinance.  
“The only weapon to hand was the Malayan dollar surplus and so 
he proposed to use that by deliberately and openly threatening to 
deny its use to the Sterling Commonwealth by the abandonment 
of exchange control if he did not get what he wanted on the 
political front.” (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.687, 7th 
November 1955) 
MacGillivray told Marshall that this course of action was very dangerous to 
Malaya economically and even a fully independent Malaya would need some kind of 
exchange control. He further emphasised to Marshall that the British would call his 
bluff and serious damage could be done to the Malayan economy in the meantime. 
                                               
123 Marshall made clear to Sir Robert Black, the Governor of Singapore, that he sought complete 
internal self-government for Singapore by 1959, and would accept British responsibility over external 
defence and external affairs even then. He also felt that, by then, Singapore’s economic responsibility 
would be total apart from observing GATT, and Singapore would also remain in the Sterling Area. 
(TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.143, 9
th
 November 1955). 
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Marshall responded by saying that it would be impossible for the UK to call his bluff, 
even if they wished to, as the independent Sterling Area would intervene and force 
Britain to accept the terms. According to MacGillivray, Marshall said, “he wanted to 
put a loaded pistol on the table, knowing that the Secretary of State and Sterling 
Commonwealth could never let him use it” (ibid.).124 Marshall reckoned that either 
the British would be forced to accept, or the Colonial Secretary would order the 
Governor of Singapore to extend the Exchange Control Ordinance by fiat, and 
dismiss Marshall. The first would be a success and the second would reveal a 
dictatorial side to British rule and strengthen Marshall politically among the 
Singaporean public.125 However, Marshall acknowledged to MacGillivray that this 
bargaining strategy was useless without the support of the Federation, as the 
Federation was the source of the vast majority of Malaya’s dollar earnings (ibid.; 
TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control’, 9th November 1955). Both Marshall and the 
British then sought the Federation’s support. 
 Marshall had already sought Abdul Rahman’s, the Chief Minister of the 
Federation, support at the Joint Ministers Conference and, indeed, there was 
support in the Federation due to the widespread belief among the estate owners (of 
which a great number were in the Federation government) that Malaya would do 
well out of leaving the Sterling Area (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control Problems 
in Malaya’, 16th September 1955). However, his plan required the support of the 
entire Alliance Party in the Federation and this was not forthcoming (TNA 
CO1030/100, Telegram no.143, 9th November 1955). 
 At the Joint Ministers Conference, Marshall put forward a series of 
arguments in favour of his proposal for using Exchange Control Ordinance as a 
bargaining chip in Constitutional Discussions with London: 
                                               
124 A metaphor to which the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, referred as “more blackmail” (TNA 
CO1030/100, Philip de Zulueta to JB Johnston, 10
th
 November 1955) 
125 Marshall was already posturing by this point, to both the Singaporean public and the political class 
by seeking an economics adviser from the IMF to replace Loynes from the Bank. Marshall felt Loynes 
could not divorce Malaya’s interest from Britain’s and the Bank of England’s interests. It was widely 
believed in Malayan political circles that, while the Colonial Office had Malaya’s best interests at 
heart, the Bank had sectional interests and was not committed to the development of the Malayan 
economy (BE OV65/4, ‘Malaya’, 28
th
 April 1950) However, Sir Robert Black, the Governor of Singapore, 
felt that, with this action, Marshall sought to present himself as a Malayan politician, independent of 
London. (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.142, 8
th
 November 1955) 
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 Malaya as a whole lost more by exchange control than it gained;  
 The Central Bank proposed by the IBRD mission would give Malaya further 
financial independence and, following formal independence, this might help 
in finding a future away from the Sterling Area; 
 The ruling parties in both Singapore and the Federation were committed to 
independence in 1957; 
 A six-month extension would see Ordinance expire in June 1956, by which 
time Britain would have to respond to demands for accelerated self-
government; 
 Taking a hard line with the British government would politically strengthen 
the Malayan Chief Ministers and governments; 
 Singapore could not act alone. The Federation’s and Singapore’s interests 
were conjoined and Abdul Rahman’s support was vital. (TNA CO1030/100, 
‘Exchange Control’, 9th November 1955) 
These arguments put forward by Marshall were utterly destroyed by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs; however, Marshall was uninterested in the technical 
considerations of his arguments – he was solely concerned with the political success 
of his gamble.126 Furthermore, arguments from economic considerations actually 
improved Marshall’s sense of confidence, as Sir Robert Black reported to Lennox-
Boyd 
“The more we attempt to argue on financial and economic 
grounds that it is essential for Malaya to stay in the Sterling Area, 
the more convinced, of course, the Chief Minister may become 
that he has a powerful weapon and therefore he will be the more 
determined to use it politically.” (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange 
                                               
126 Interestingly, Marshall approved the one-year renewal of the Control of Imports and Exports 
Ordinance, which was complementary with the Exchange Control Ordinance. Taking the same policy 
with the Im-Ex Ordinance would have made the issue even more pressing and strengthened his hand. 
This further convinced the Colonial Office that Marshall was not seriously interested in the economic 
implications or details of his policies. (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control’, 9
th
 November 1955) 
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Control’, 9th November 1955) 
Indeed, Sir Hilton Poynton, Private Secretary at the Colonial Office, underlined this 
point, as well as the importance of the whole situation, to Leslie Rowan, the head of 
the Overseas Finance division at the Treasury. 
“I think you will agree that refusal by Singapore and the 
Federation to continue exchange control amounts in effect to the 
withdrawal (or expulsion) of Malaya from the Sterling Area. 
However alarming this may be to the UK and the [rest of the 
Sterling Area] I think it would be tactically unwise to let Marshall 
think we were alarmed on this ground since it would enhance the 
value of this manoeuvre in his eyes as a form of political 
blackmail. Moreover if the price asked is early full self-
government there would be nothing to stop Marshall and his 
friends doing whatever they want when they have got full self-
government.” (TNA CO1030/100, AH Poynton to Sir Leslie Rowan 
(SECRET), 16th November 1955) 
The next step lay with Abdul Rahman. It was considered very unlikely by the 
Colonial Office that he would agree to Singapore’s suggestion, though the Colonial 
Office was aware of the possibility. Sir Robert Black advised the Colonial Office that, 
if worse came to worst, he could reject the six-month extension, or force a further 
extension after the six months; however, he warned that both courses of action 
would lead to a constitutional crisis, and be used by Marshall to further his own 
agenda. (TNA CO1030/100, ‘Exchange Control’, 9th November 1955) 
 This then led the Colonial Office to discuss the issue with the Bank. They 
believed that there were only two possibilities in calling Marshall’s bluff. Firstly, they 
could refuse to let the Ordinance lapse. Marshall would then resign and the issue 
would then become one of public opinion; however, while the argument that seeing 
Ordinance lapse would be detrimental to Malaya’s economy was clear, making a 
good case of it in a public setting would be difficult and unlikely to be successful. 
(TNA CO1030/100, AM MacKintosh to DMB Butt, copy to Loynes, 11th November 
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1955) 
 Secondly, and the only reasonable alternative, was to stop Marshall gaining 
any support from the Federation. This could only rest on the fact that Britain would 
consent to accepting the lapsing of Exchange Control Ordinance, and that the 
consequences to Malaya’s economy would be catastrophic. The advice sought by 
the Colonial Office from the Bank was clarification as to whether the British 
government could afford to call Marshall’s bluff, or if Britain was required to stop it 
as the trustee of the Sterling Area. The Colonial Office also asked for a document 
detailing the merits of the Sterling Area, and the demerits of leaving to join another 
currency bloc (TNA CO1030/100, AH Poynton to Sir Leslie Rowan (SECRET), 16th 
November 1955). 
“What seems to us to be needed is a paper written in simple 
language for the layman, divided perhaps into two parts: the first 
would set out the very meagre advantages which would accrue to 
Malaya if she were to ally herself with the US dollar; the second 
would show the immediate and formidable disadvantage which 
would follow on severance from the sterling area. This could… be 
pitched fairly strong and include the blocking of the £300m 
Malayan Sterling Balances.” (ibid.) 
Marshall was aware that he could not use Exchange Control as a bargaining 
tool unless his ministers supported it, and, crucially, the Federation government 
supported it. Poynton then suggested to Rowan that the High Commissioner in the 
Federation and the Governor of Singapore should be pressed to convince the 
ministers in both governments to reject Marshall’s proposal (TNA CO1030/100, AH 
Poynton to Sir Leslie Rowan (SECRET), 16th November 1955). However, if they were 
unable to persuade Marshall to give up his idea before he left Singapore for London, 
then it would be made an issue in London at the Constitutional Talks. The line 
agreed between Poynton and Rowan was that the Colonial Secretary would discuss 
it but only as an economic matter. However, if Marshall persisted in the issue at 
discussion, then Lennox-Boyd would have to tell Marshall that 
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“if he insists on pursuing this course it will be necessary for the 
Governor to use his reserved power to put the necessary 
legislation through, and that in doing so he will publish a clear 
statement of the economic reasons for his action and thereby 
make it apparent that Marshall had been set upon a course which 
could not be other than gravely damaging to the interests of 
Singapore.” (ibid.) 
This worst-case scenario would then require the Governor of Singapore, the High 
Commissioner of the Federation and the British government to make a strong case 
to the Malayan public for the justifications of their actions. 
Lennox-Boyd remained hopeful that MacGillivray would see success in his 
efforts to persuade ministers not to pursue threats to abandon Exchange Control in 
Singapore, or the Federation. Lennox-Boyd telegrammed MacGillivray that he should 
remind ministers in Singapore and the Federation that economic setbacks would 
mean political setbacks (referring to independence); he also emphasised to him that 
the exchange controls of the Federation and Singapore were “of vital significance to 
the economic life of the *Sterling+ Area” (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.164, 23rd 
November 1955). However, he also asked MacGillivray to emphasise that linking the 
two subjects for political or constitutional progress could lead to catastrophe 
economically and politically (ibid.). Indeed, Lennox-Boyd told MacGillivray that even 
the minimum measures to protect Britain and the Sterling Area from a potential 
Malayan free-exchange area would have enormous consequences for Malaya. 
Outlining these measures, he told MacGillivray that controls would have to be set up 
between the Sterling Area and Malaya, as well as a restriction on Malayan 
development capital, and the severe hindrance of the traditional banking 
relationship enjoyed by Area members (ibid.; BE OV65/4, Sterling Area: 
Abandonment of Exchange Control in Singapore (SECRET), 29th November 1955). In 
essence, it would have effects that were almost synonymous with Malaya’s 
withdrawal from the Sterling Area; however, Britain was adamant that this outcome 
would not occur. 
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Above all, Lennox-Boyd was hopeful that Federation Ministers were deterred 
from Marshall’s proposed course of action by the economic arguments made, and 
that they would therefore not support Marshall’s proposal. MacGillivray wrote back 
to Lennox-Boyd two days later to tell him that he had met with Abdul Rahman. 
Rahman had told him that the Federation was extremely unlikely to support 
Marshall’s proposal, though Marshall was coming to see him on the 26th November 
to discuss the issue with Rahman. (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.745, ‘Exchange 
Control’, 25th November 1955) 
 MacGilivray also relayed that the members of the Singapore Executive 
Council had informed him they did not intend to recommend that Exchange Control 
be extended for only six months just to exert political pressure, as there were no 
good economic reasons for doing so (ibid.).127 Four days later, Exchange Control 
Ordinances were renewed by one year, rather than six months. Governor Black told 
Lennox-Boyd that Marshall justified his climb down by saying that “his bargaining 
position [was] sufficiently strong not to have to make use of the exchange control 
weapon. In the circumstances he had no option but to abandon the idea” (TNA 
CO1030/100, Telegram no.156, 29th November 1955). 
 Despite the eventual climb-down from Marshall’s initial position, both 
Malayan and British interests are brought to the fore in this short crisis in British-
Malayan relations. Britain maintains that Malaya’s membership of the Sterling Area 
is still vital both to its own economic interests and Malaya’s. Marshall’s position, 
while still political grandstanding to achieve greater political independence, reveals 
that it was in Malaya’s interest to remain in the Sterling Area; to do otherwise would 
be, if not catastrophic for the Malayan economy, then certainly very difficult to 
extricate itself from the Sterling Area and reinsert itself into another currency area. 
This then highlights the nature of this imperial relationship: both Britain and Malaya 
                                               
127 However, MacGillivray reiterated, if the Federation did recommend the limited extension, he 
would refuse to accept it and, if they wished to make a public issue of it, he would have to make clear 
to the public the reason he did so was because of the disastrous effect it would have on the economy 
of the country. There would be no need to use reserve powers in the Federation (unlike Singapore), 
as it was by order of the High Commissioner, not by Bill of the Legislative Council, that the Exchange 
Control Ordinance is extended. (TNA CO1030/100, Telegram no.745, ‘Exchange Control’, 25th 
November 1955) 
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benefitted from the current arrangement, as they both had since 1945. The 
arguments generated by the British government to support continued Malayan 
membership of the Sterling Area, and the retention of exchange controls, reveal the 
continued value of Malaya to the British (and vice versa) but the arguments do gloss 
over the fundamental basis of the Sterling Area: it is, in essence, and fundamentally, 
an institution to support Britain’s economic policy and position. However, this 
episode also reveals the dynamic nature of the relationship and proves that the 
relationship cannot be reduced to that basic quality of the Sterling Area. Indeed, 
Marshall’s gamble reveals how Malaya’s value to the Sterling Area can be presented 
as an opportunity for the benefit of Malayan (or Singaporean) policy. 
6.2 Constitutional Talks 
With the resolution of Exchange Control Ordinance renewal settled going into the 
Constitutional Talks in London in early 1956, the Talks looked set to be dominated by 
the issue of imports of synthetic rubber to Britain. The Colonial Office had been 
approached by the Federation’s Minister for Economic Affairs, who wanted to know 
why Britain was using the dollar pool to purchase synthetic rubber rather than 
simply purchasing Malayan natural rubber (TNA CO1030/58, ‘Import of Synthetic 
Rubber into the United Kingdom’, 2nd December 1955). There was some anger in 
Malaya that, for all Britain’s declarations of support concerning development, Britain 
was unwilling to support the Malayan rubber industry with its custom. The British 
government had approved an import programme for 70,000 tons of synthetic 
rubber in 1956 from the US, which corresponded to a drop in orders for Malayan 
natural rubber by 70,000 tons for that year. 
 The Treasury responded to the request by pointing out that the UK abided by 
rules common to the entire Sterling Area – dollar expenditure was acceptable as 
long as it was for essential purchases. Synthetic rubber imports were considered 
essential purchases as the efficiency and competitiveness of the UK rubber 
manufacturing industry relied on them. The Treasury maintained that the import 
programme in 1956 was not excessive and therefore was a justifiable use of dollars. 
The Treasury also refused to review the programme. (ibid.) 
  227 
 The Colonial Office sent a letter to Donald MacGillivray a few days after the 
initial Treasury response to reiterate the reasons for the synthetic rubber imports, 
and the stubbornness about maintaining them. In the letter, Lennox-Boyd 
emphasised that this policy was entirely consonant with Sterling Area rules but 
aimed ultimately at the convertibility of Sterling. This aim could not be 
accomplished until the Sterling Area’s balance of payments had been strengthened 
and the only means of achieving that was to improve the efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness of the British economy. The argument then proposed by the 
Colonial Office and the Treasury was that the import of synthetic rubber was 
justifiable in terms of Britain and the Sterling Area’s general economic policy (TNA 
CO1030/58, Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, 13th 
December 1955). 
 Average natural rubber prices in 1955 had reached a post-Korean war high of 
around 34 p/lb, which had stimulated the competitiveness of synthetic rubber 
production (Lim 1967, p.317). The use of synthetic rubber was also preferred for a 
great deal of rubber manufacturing end uses and Lennox-Boyd argued that the 
import of synthetic rubber in this instance would greatly reduce the need to import 
any more in the future. Furthermore, since European rubber manufacturing 
industries had not had access to Britain’s rubber markets, their industries were 
considerably more efficient and competitive than Britain’s own (TNA CO1030/58, 
Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, 13th December 1955). 
While Lennox-Boyd was very eager to emphasise that Malaya’s rubber and 
tin industries were essential to the dollar earnings of the Sterling Area, their 
protection could not come at the price of British and the Sterling Area’s 
development as a whole. Indeed, the Colonial Office made clear that import controls 
on essential dollar imports were contrary to the Sterling Area’s economic policy and 
also asserted that GATT obligations required that Britain should not employ 
quantitative import restrictions for protective purposes, despite using exactly the 
opposite argument in the mid-1940s to justify quantitative import restrictions 
(ibid.). The Colonial Office’s final point was to say that imports of Malayan rubber 
into Britain were of such a small amount that swapping synthetic imports for 
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Malayan imports would have little effect indeed. Natural rubber was principally 
consumed in the US market, where natural and synthetic rubber was in free 
competition (ibid.).128  
 The arguments put forward by both the Colonial Office and the Treasury to 
the Federation, and subsequently reiterated by the High Commissioner in Malaya, 
settled the matter on the specific issue of synthetic rubber imports. However, the 
concern over the issue was merely a manifestation of a more fundamental problem 
running throughout the Britain-Malaya relationship: the use of dollars earned by 
Malaya. This became the theme of the Financial Working Group in the 
Constitutional Talks held in London between January and February 1956.  
In a Bank memo, a copy of the brief for the Malayan Minister for Economic 
Affairs was discussed by John Fisher, the Deputy Chief Cashier, Sir George Bolton, 
and Lucius Thompson-McCausland in detail. Financial issues and exchange policy 
were to be discussed in relation to Malaya’s imports from the dollar area and its 
dollar spending, as well as its future financial ties with Britain and the Sterling Area. 
The Minister’s brief contained three demands, and one offer: 
 Full membership of the Sterling Area, so that Malaya will be consulted on 
matters of common policy and will be invited to attend Finance Ministers’ 
meetings; 
 Britain was to accept that Malaya’s capital requirements were to be met in 
the London market, to the tune of £20m over the next five years; 
 Malaya was to have freedom to import from dollar sources, and to have free 
access to its own dollar surplus in order to develop its economy to expand 
trade with neighbouring countries; 
                                               
128 This seemed a peculiar thing to say since the Colonial Office’s stated figure of 70,000 tons 
accounted for around 11% of Malaya’s entire rubber crop in 1956 (calculated from Barlow 1978, 
Appendix 3.1). The figure then, while not representing an amount that would have a massive impact 
on the price of natural rubber was an enormous quantity of rubber and, therefore, of great 
importance to the Malayan economy. 
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 In return for the above, Malaya would pledge full collaboration and 
cooperation on all matters affecting Sterling and convertibility. (BE OV65/4, 
‘Malaya’, 17th January 1956) 
The first demand was not discussed because it was wholly acceptable. For the 
second demand, the Treasury reported it could not assure the Malayan delegation 
that this was possible, though there were precedents for that to occur.129 The third 
demand was considered the most important and an immediate issue for the Talks, 
and saw the Bank provide an insight into divisions on Sterling Area policy within the 
state management. 
“If Malayan ministers press for freedom on dollar imports and if 
this is largely conceded (whether for political reasons or 
otherwise) it will make an irreparable breach in the wall of dollar 
restrictions around the Colonies which the Treasury seek to 
maintain – and which we are anxious to lower”. (ibid.) 
Once again, the Bank’s major concern was that it would set a dangerous 
precedent for the Sterling Area. If this were permitted, it would be difficult to deny 
similar concessions to other countries (e.g. the colonies of the former British West 
Africa) and therefore, according to the memo, the Colonial Office too would have to 
abandon its current efforts to keep all Colonies on the same exchange policy (ibid.) 
The Bank then was much more committed to the Collective Approach than the 
Colonial Office or the Treasury, who were still committed to the maintenance of 
exchange controls around the Sterling Area. However, by this point, the Collective 
Approach had been widely accepted by British state managers and the Sterling Area 
and, therefore, the Bank, as Burnham (2003, p.184) argues, was much more eager to 
act swiftly to achieve Convertibility than the Treasury (and also the Colonial 
Office).130 
                                               
129 Cyprus was allowed to seek to satisfy its capital requirements in London though very specific 
conditions came together to permit this allowance. 
130 Indeed, a memo from the Colonial Office stresses the importance placed upon the needs of the 
Colonies, which resonates well with Burnham’s (2003, p.185) characterisation of the Collective 
Approach as moving “only as fast as the slowest and least-willing country”: “We consider that 
Colonial claims on the UK must be put in a special category of their own, since the Colonies are, so to 
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 One possibility of getting around Malaya’s demand for free dollar imports 
was to use Hong Kong as a ‘back door’ through which Malaya could buy all the dollar 
goods it needed. Hong Kong’s special status was brought up by the Malayan 
delegation, since Hong Kong had much greater dollar freedom than any country in 
the Sterling Area (BE OV65/4, Letter from Emanuel to Simons (SECRET), 23rd January 
1956). However, this was because Hong Kong was an entrepot area for China, Korea, 
Macao, and Taiwan and sold large quantities of goods to these territories and in 
return received large quantities of dollars, which Hong Kong was permitted to use 
freely (BE OV65/4, ‘Hong Kong Free Market’, 26th January 1956). Hong Kong’s dollar 
earnings actually provided a net contribution to the Sterling Area, while Sterling 
accounts in the colony were restricted and the Hong Kong government enforced this 
by strictly limiting the sale and purchase of Sterling. Furthermore, the Malayan dollar 
was linked to sterling through statute but the Hong Kong dollar was a de facto link, 
with no strict basis in law. Unlike Malaya, Hong Kong was not legally obliged to back 
its currency with Sterling or to issue against Sterling at a fixed rate. As such, Hong 
Kong was seen as a very special case (BE OV65/4, ‘The Federation of Malaya – 
Constitutional Conference’, 30th January 1956). 
“A free market like Hong Kong’s is contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the Sterling Area and to HMG’s obligations to the 
IMF. The arrangements in Hong Kong are in effect a compromise 
between its two roles as an outlet for China and neighbouring 
countries and as a Sterling Area territory; they can only be 
justified because of the exceptional circumstances, which are of 
over-riding importance to the economic existence of the territory 
concerned.” (BE OV65/4, ‘Hong Kong Free Market’, 26th January 
1956) 
 It was then put to the Malayan delegation that there was no justifiable 
comparison between the Malayan and Hong Kong economies, which they were 
                                                                                                                                     
speak a part of us, and constitute a first and direct responsibility of HMG. Failure to carry out these 
responsibilities must have repercussions on the internal position of the UK itself – probably more so 
than in the case of many of our other external commitments.” (TNA CO1025/56, Memorandum on 
Overseas Expenditure by the Chancellor, 9
th
 January 1956) 
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satisfied with (BE OV65/4, ‘The Federation of Malaya – Constitutional Conference’, 
30th January 1956). John Fisher made one further point that the most basic and 
convincing argument against a Malayan free market was Malayan development. 
Malaya required stability in order to develop and, as such, fluctuating exchange rates 
would run contrary to this since they would require a barrier between Malaya and 
the Sterling Area instead of the current statutory arrangement. (ibid.; BE OV65/4, 
‘Singapore: Free US Dollar Market’, 4th February 1956) 
 Given the failure of the comparison between Malaya and Hong Kong, a 
member of the Malayan delegation approached the Chief General Manager of 
Chartered Bank, Howard Morford, to tell him that the Malayan delegation was now 
considering setting up Singapore as a free market in US dollars, as Hong Kong. 
Morford asked PL Hogg at the Bank to see if there were good arguments that could 
be mustered by either the Bank or the Treasury to dissuade the Malayans of this 
course of action (BE OV65/4, Letter from Morford to PL Hogg, 31st January 1956). 
 The purpose behind this determination to achieve free use of dollars was, of 
course, for Malaya to expand its primary and secondary industries and a free market 
was seen by the Malayan delegation as attracting overseas capital to invest in the 
Malayan economy. However, the Bank was adamant that there was no guarantee of 
this and that a free market could actually encourage instability and uncertainty (BE 
OV65/4, ‘Singapore: Free US Dollar Market’, 4th February 1956). Further, if it were 
just Singapore to become a free market then exactly the same arguments applied as 
if Malaya as a whole wished to have a free market: exchange barriers would be 
required, it would strain the link between currencies, and it was entirely dissonant 
with Malaya’s professed intention of staying in the Sterling Area and committing to 
the obligations inherent to that. (ibid.) 
 By the end of the Constitutional Talks in mid-February 1956, a provisional 
agreement had been reached about the lead-up to the Federation’s independence. 
The Talks had led to an agreement that an elected Malayan Finance Minister would 
take over all responsibility for internal and external finance from the (London 
appointed) Financial Secretary with immediate effect. Malaya would remain in the 
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Sterling Area after independence, which was scheduled for August 1957, and Malaya 
would send delegates to all future meetings of Finance Ministers. Control over the 
Federation’s dollar spending would move from Whitehall to the Federation 
government, who would then be tasked with applying Sterling Area policy to Malaya 
as a whole (BE OV65/4, ‘The Federation of Malaya – Constitutional Conference’, 13th 
February 1956). Assurances were given to Malaya that “sympathetic consideration” 
would be given to Federation borrowing in London for development purposes 
(ibid.). Furthermore, Britain pledged to give fair treatment to overseas capital 
investment in the Federation and agreed to aid in meeting the costs of the 
Emergency after independence (ibid.). The final report on the Constitutional 
Conference characterised the agreement made between Malayan and British 
delegations on the Sterling Area 
“We had a full and frank discussion of the Federation’s position in 
the Sterling Area. The Malayan Delegation indicated that it was 
the view of their Government that membership of the Sterling 
Area was to the common advantage of the Federation and the 
other members and that it was their intention to remain in it after 
attaining full self-government. There was general recognition by 
the United Kingdom representatives of the importance of the 
Federation's contribution to the strength of the Sterling Area 
through the direct earnings of dollars from rubber and tin” (TNA 
CAB129/79, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 21st February 1956). 
 A letter from Herbert Brittain, second secretary at the Treasury, to Thomas 
Lloyd, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, a week after the 
Constitutional Talks emphasised how important the colonies were to the British 
economy and how crucial it was still to maintain strict limits on dollar expenditure. 
“We cannot regard Colonial economies as ‘entirely external’ to 
that of the United Kingdom. Such description would, indeed, have 
little meaning. For years now it has been necessary to emphasise 
the inter-connectedness of internal and external problems, and… 
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vigorous internal measures are necessary to relieve the balance of 
payments… The fact remains, however, that external spending, 
even in the sterling area, has a more direct and a larger effect 
upon our reserves and the status of sterling than expenditure at 
home, and has for that reason to be examined with special care.” 
(TNA CO1025/56, Brittain to Lloyd, 20th February 1956) 
Colonial Sterling Balances had recently risen and this was helpful to Sterling’s 
position and also therefore to Britain (TNA CO1025/56 3rd February 1956, Letter from 
Lloyd to Brittain). However, Brittain emphasized clearly to Lloyd that the Colonies 
could not be permitted to run down their Sterling Balances by spending freely as 
this would still place too great a strain on the reserves, they would dwindle to 
nothing in the process, and the Colonies would suffer as much from that as Britain 
(ibid.). Britain’s dollar reserves in February 1956 were still very low at £77m, with 
gold reserves at their lowest level since June 1953 at £703m (Bank 1970, p.162). 
 Immediately following the Constitutional Talks, a new Minister of Finance, as 
per the agreement with Britain, was appointed in the Federation. Colonel Henry Lee 
was a Chinese Malay who had been bestowed the honorary rank of Colonel by 
Chiang Kai-Shek. His political activities were decidedly anti-communist and he was a 
very wealthy man, holding considerable business interests in both the Federation in 
Singapore in rubber estates and tin mines (BE OV65/4, ‘The Federation of Malaya – 
Minister of Finance’, 29th February 1956). Lee, like British officials, did not want to 
see Singapore become a free dollar market. Lee became the key figure in all of 
Britain’s financial discussions with Malaya until 1959 and during this time the same 
issues dominate Britain’s relationship with Malaya, even after independence (ibid.). 
6.3 Financial Discussions 
In early June 1956, Malayan ministers met with representatives from the 
Eastern Banks to discuss the setting up of an investment corporation to stimulate 
industrial development in the Federation to the tune of M$10m. While the Banks 
wanted a majority government share in the corporation, the Federation government 
sought to have the corporation based on majority private investment (BE OV65/5, 
  234 
‘Malaya: Industrial Development Corporation’, 8th June 1956).  The Federation was 
also using the terms of the creation of a Central Bank as a bargaining chip for the 
setting up of the investment corporation and, in a letter to the Bank of England, the 
Mercantile Bank felt that the setting up of the corporation revealed a desire to cut 
ties with Singapore (ibid.). 
While the Colonial Office admitted they were not aware of the creation of 
the Industrial Development Corporation, they informed the Bank that this was usual 
for colonies heading towards independence and there were precedents for it. 
However, they acknowledged that, ordinarily, the Colonial Development and Food 
Corporation (CDFC) would provide funds for the corporation but the Malayan 
government had not approached the CDFC for funds (ibid.). Colonel Lee also 
contacted the British government at this point to ask for financial aid for Malayan 
development; however, the Colonial Office was reticent to approve any funds unless 
the details of a specific development plan were provided but these had not yet been 
drawn up by the Federation (TNA CO1030/903, letter from J Hennings to Mr 
Johnston, 18th June 1956). 
 Certainly, the Federation was very eager to gain access to large amounts of 
ready cash to spend on development in the run up to independence (BE OV65/6, 
‘Malaya’, 20th August 1958). Indeed, by the end of June, Donald MacGillivray 
telegrammed Alan Lennox-Boyd to inform him that the Federation had asked him 
about lifting the rubber embargo against China (TNA CO1029/112, High 
Commissioner, Malaya to Colonial Secretary, 30th June 1956). The High 
Commissioner had informed Colonel Lee that the British government would require 
an end-use certificate due to security concerns about its application; however, this 
would probably be meaningless and therefore he suggested using a quantitative 
restriction instead and proposed an initial limit of 2000 tons of rubber (ibid.).131 The 
                                               
131 The Colonial Office realized that they were stuck between two difficult positions regarding end-
use information concerning Malayan rubber to China. On the one hand, the Government would be 
criticised for being inept, or naïve, by insisting on end-use information, and the trade would be lost 
since the Chinese would not agree. Alternatively, if Britain did permit the trade, there might be 
complaints from the Americans that the British were not enforcing controls on Chinese trade 
properly (TNA CO1029/112, Record of phone conversation between Edden and Rolleston, 5th October 
1956). 
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embargo on rubber exports to China was ultimately relaxed. It was too difficult to 
get end-use agreements from the Chinese government but Malayan exports assured 
Sir Robert Black that their rubber exports were used only for civilian purposes. 
These shipments constituted the first rubber exports to China from Malaya since 
1951 (TNA CO1029/112, ‘Telegram no.482: China Trade Controls: Rubber’, 9th 
October 1956). 
 By August, however, Britain was forced to deal with the repercussions of the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, an action described in the Bank as imperilling “the 
survival of the UK and the Commonwealth, and represents a very great danger to 
Sterling” (BE G1/124, ‘Sterling and the Suez Canal Situation’, 1st August 1956). A 
letter to the Governor of the Bank highlighted that the use of economic warfare 
against Egypt would be detrimental to Britain, especially to the reserves (ibid.). This 
was not catastrophic at the time, as the reserves had reached a comparative 
highpoint with dollar reserves at £137m and with gold reserves at £722m (Bank, 
p.162). However, the Suez crisis, due to both economic warfare and the effect on 
Sterling, diminished the reserves significantly. By the end of August dollar reserves 
had fallen to £88m, and by the end of November had fallen again to £47m, with gold 
reserves at £655m (ibid.) 
 By even mid-November, George Bolton, in discussion with Leslie Rowan, 
agreed that Britain could not continue to take losses as they had been and still hope 
to maintain the rate of Sterling, which was essential since if that rate could not be 
maintained, “there *was+ a grave risk of the Sterling Area coming to an end” (BE 
G1/124, ‘Discussion with Leslie Rowan’, 13th November 1956). They agreed that an 
appeal to the US to help maintain parity was necessary since “it is a major interest 
of the US to maintain Sterling and to prevent the collapse of the Sterling Area” 
(ibid.); however, this was not forthcoming and the reserve situation only abated 
with Britain’s unconditional withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, with dollar 
reserves rallying up to £166m by the end of the year (BE C43/31, ‘Exchange Market 
Tactics’, 3rd December 1956; BE Statistical Abstract no.1 1970, Table 27, p.162).132 
                                               
132
 While Treasury and Bank officials were unsure of how successful the Chancellor’s statement on 4
th
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 Against this backdrop, Financial Talks between Britain and the Federation 
were being prepared, starting on December 17th 1956. The Federation had begun to 
worry about revenues after independence, as the IBRD’s report on Malaya’s 
economic development suggested that rubber prices would fall between 1957 and 
1960 (IBRD 1955, p.48; TNA CO1030/903, Galsworthy to Monson, 3rd December 
1956). The Federation then sought further financial assistance from the British 
government but the Colonial Office was reticent to accede to, what they termed, 
Malaya’s “exorbitant demands”, considering them extremely unreasonable (TNA 
CO1030/903, Galsworthy to Monson, 3rd December 1956). 
 In communication with the Colonial Secretary, the Commissioner-General of 
South East Asia, Sir Robert Scott, reiterated the High Commissioner’s plea that the 
Colonial Office accept Malaya’s request for generous aid. He emphasized that the 
financial situation in Britain would certainly be better suited to the economic 
arguments for doing so but these arguments supported broader political ones (TNA 
CO1030/903, Letter from Commissioner-General, SE Asia to Colonial Secretary, 6th 
December 1956). While there were substantial British investments in Malaya, 
running to hundreds of millions of pounds, plus the invisible earnings accruing from 
shipping, banking and insurance, this was not the best argument for being generous 
with Malayan development aid.133 
“The main economic argument for financial aid is, quite simply, 
dollars. On the prosperity of Malaya and on the stability of its 
economy depends one of the biggest single sources of American 
                                                                                                                                     
December 1956 would in boosting confidence of Sterling, the reserves did see a boost. The Bank 
decided to hold Sterling rates at their current levels but in the event of a speculative attack, they 
were told take no action in preventing a fall in quotations of forward Sterling. However, there was 
more concern about the domestic political situation and whether this would see the Conservative 
government collapse (BE C43/31, ‘Exchange Market Tactics’, 3rd December 1956). 
133
 Sir Robert Scott makes the argument that generous aid is, in a sense, “an insurance premium” to 
cover those investments since their protection depended on a stable, friendly and prosperous 
Malaya. He also points out that British military strength east of Suez relied on bases in Malaya. The 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement legally permitted the UK to maintain forces in the Federation for 
the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations, as well as to assist the Federation in 
defending its territory. An agreement with New Zealand and Australia also made available their 
forces “to continue to assist the Government of the Federation in its campaign against the 
Communist terrorists.” (TNA CO1030/627, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 27th February 1958; TNA 
CO1030/903, Letter from Commissioner-General, SE Asia to Colonial Secretary, 6
th
 December 1956). 
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dollars at the disposal of the Sterling bloc, if not indeed the 
biggest individual source. Malaya earns some hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year, a quarter or more of the total dollars 
accruing to the whole sterling area. Surely the greater the strain 
on sterling, the greater the need to conserve such a vital source 
of dollars. If that can be done by sterling expenditure, it is cheap 
at almost any price.” (ibid.) 
 Essential to Malaya’s source of dollars was the rubber industry and Abdul 
Rahman contacted the Colonial Secretary the day after Sir Robert Scott’s letter to 
assure him that rubber replantation was the highest priority in the Federation’s 
development plan (TNA CO1030/904, Tunku Rahman to Colonial Secretary, 7th 
December 1956). 
 The Colonial Office were initially very concerned that the financial 
discussions would be focused on Malaya’s relationship with the Sterling Area and 
prepared another document detailing the value Malaya gained from remaining in 
the Sterling Area (BE OV65/5, ‘Questions affecting the Federation of Malaya in 
relation to Sterling Area Policies’, 12th December 1956). However, in conversation 
with the Bank, the Colonial Office was informed that Malaya’s position in the 
Sterling Area were unlikely to come up again since the issue had been extensively 
covered in the Constitutional Talks at the beginning of 1956; instead, the discussions 
were most likely to focus on finance for Malaya’s defence and development 
programmes (BE OV65/5, ‘Malaya and the Sterling Area’, 28th December 1956). 
 Given Britain’s weakened state following the Suez crisis, the Financial Talks 
were difficult. The Malayan delegation demanded that Britain meet half the cost of 
the Emergency,134 and help to meet the costs of Malaya’s development plan. The 
Federation then asked for a £100m grant to bridge the gap between Malaya’s 
capacity and requirements (TNA CO1030/903, ‘Note for Prime Minister’, 8th January 
1957). The British delegation responded starkly by saying that the British 
                                               
134
 The Malayans argued this was legitimate as the Emergency was not a ‘local war’ but a major part 
of the worldwide battle against Communism (TNA CO1030/903, ‘Note for Prime Minister’, 8th January 
1957). 
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government did not and could not give direct financial aid to independent members 
of the Commonwealth for development since it was considered “a normal economic 
activity in which any independent Government must stands on its own feet” and 
there was a stated suspicion among the British delegation that, if the costs were 
spread out, the Federation could meet them (ibid.). The Malayan delegation, which 
included Abdul Rahman and Colonel Lee, were extremely disappointed with this 
response from the British. 
 However, as had been agreed in the Constitutional Talks in early 1956, Britain 
would provide financial aid to meet the costs of the Malayan Emergency. This was 
not only seen as a contribution to the Emergency but also to the Federation’s 
development plan as it freed up significant resources, with the development of 
Malaya “recognized to be in itself an important contribution to the fight against 
communism” (TNA CO1030/903, Telegram no.59, 10th January 1957). Britain agreed 
to provide an annual grant of £3m each year for the following three years and, at 
the end of those three years, the British government agreed to review the 
Federation’s financial position and then decide on whether to activate a fund of 
£11m for further assistance, to be spread over the next two years (ibid.).135 In 
addition, Britain offered to use already-promised funds of £6.5m to the Federation 
to further expand its armed forces, as well as supplying equipment up to the value 
of £5.5m (ibid.; TNA CO1030/627, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 27th February 1958). These 
amounts would be in conjunction with a grant to the Federation for development 
from the unspent balance of the Federation’s Colonial Development and Welfare 
allocations at the date of independence, which was around £4.5m (TNA 
CO1030/903, Telegram no.59, 10th January 1957). In all, this amounted to grants of 
nearly £37m until 1961, about which both Abdul Rahman and Colonel Lee were very 
pleased (ibid.).136  
With Malayan capital expenditure very high at around M$260m, Malaya 
needed as much money as it could get. However, despite a recommendation in the 
                                               
135 It was to be decided at the time whether the fund would take the form of a grant, a low-interest 
loan, or a split between the two (TNA CO1030/903, Telegram no.59, 10
th
 January 1957). 
136 Abdul Rahman went so far as to say that, considering the UK’s financial position at the time, the 
terms were extremely generous (TNA CO1030/903, Telegram no.59, 10
th
 January 1957). 
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IBRD report (1955, p.212) that Malaya could seek local development loans worth 
around M$10m per year through the Malayan Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), the 
Bank of England were extremely reticent to support this notion (BE OV65/5, 
‘Federation of Malaya Post Office Savings Bank’, 30th May 1957). There would be a 
great risk of capital loss to the POSB, since there was no limit on the amount of 
government stock the POSB could purchase, the POSB’s portfolio would be 
extremely limited, and “in an economy as dependent as the Federation on the 
vicissitudes of the world markets for tin and natural rubber, the interests of 
depositors must surely be carefully watched and not sacrificed for development 
expedience” (ibid.). So while British officials were eager for Malaya to have as much 
cash as possible to spend on development, this was not the key priority – Malayan 
development was instrumental in terms of dollar earnings, but also and importantly, 
the stability of the economy and the Malayan political establishment. 
 Despite the relative distance now from Suez, the effects were still being felt 
in the British economy, including the prolonging of oil supply difficulties; however, 
both Leslie Rowan and Denis Rickett were sanguine, in a letter to Cameron Cobbold, 
about the position of Sterling due to the resolution of domestic political instability 
through Eden’s resignation at the beginning of 1957, and the boost likely to be given 
to Sterling through the seasonal effect on Sterling Area commodities (BE C43/31, 
‘Exchange Policy’, 11th January 1957). 
 With independence only four months away, Malaya began the process of 
applying for memberships of the IMF, the IFC and the IBRD. The Colonial Secretary 
forwarded to the High Commissioner in Malaya the details of the process of 
application. Since the Federation and Singapore shared a single currency, the IMF 
expected both countries to act in a unified manner and this required a single Central 
Bank for both territories, which had previously been recommended by the IBRD 
(IBRD 1955, p.652; BE OV65/5, ‘Telegram no.1065, Application by the Federation of 
Malaya for Membership of the IMF and the IBRD’, 6th May 1957). 
 By the beginning of August, less than a month before independence, the 
Committee on Malaya’s membership to the IMF recommended terms for its 
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admittance. Malaya was required to pay an IMF quota of US$45m, with a 
subscription fee of 3.5% of that payable in gold or convertible currencies 
(US$1.575m). However, since Malaya had no independent holdings of gold or 
dollars, as it was a member of the Sterling Area, it was required to hand over its 
current dollar and gold earnings to the IMF until the 3.5% subscription was met (BE 
OV65/5, Octavio Paranagua to Colonel Lee, 2nd August 1957). Once the subscription 
had been paid, Malaya would join the IMF, and the rest of the quota would be paid 
in Malayan dollars at an agreed upon value. Malaya would then have access to the 
IMF’s resources in any currency it wished up to the amount of its initial gold 
payment (US$1.575m) though the IMF would charge 1% for this service (ibid.) 
 With Malaya accepted as a member, and the details clear on how Malaya 
should proceed as a member of the IMF, the IBRD and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Abdul Rahman sent a letter to the High Commissioner in Malaya 
requesting that Britain pay the lion’s share of Malaya’s subscriptions to these 
organisations (BE OV65/5, ‘Application by Malaya to IMF, IBRD, IFC’, 19th November 
1957). Since Malaya’s reserves were held in the general pool of the Sterling Area, 
Abdul Rahman requested Britain  
“to make on behalf of the Federation the gold and dollar 
payments set out above to the Fund, Bank and Corporation 
respectively. The payments, together with any consequential 
charges incurred, should, it is suggested, be debited to the 
Federation Government Account with the Crown Agents for 
Overseas Governments and Administrations.” (ibid.) 
As such he requested that Britain pay US$875,000 for the IMF, and US$500,000 for 
the IBRD, in gold to the Bank of England, and US$277,000 in US dollars to the 
Federal Reserve Bank (ibid.).137 
                                               
137 The Malayan dollar was now at a parity of M$3.06122:US$1, and Abdul Rahman sought assurance 
from the Colonial Secretary, even after independence, that he would not intervene in the par value of 
the Malayan dollar, or commissions between exchanges of the two, unless he sought the approval of 
the Federation government (BE OV65/5, ‘Application by Malaya to IMF, IBRD, IFC’, 19th November 
1957; BE OV65/5, UK High Commissioner to PM of Malaya, 20th February 1958). 
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 With independence granted to Malaya on 31st August 1957, Malaya assumed 
a full membership of the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth (TNA CO1030/627, 
‘Federation of Malaya’, 27th February 1958). An interview with Lord Kilmuir, the Lord 
Chancellor, was arranged for the BBC to discuss Malaya’s independence from the 
British Empire and the Treasury was asked to provide some answers for the 
questions that would be asked. Most of the questions focused on Malaya’s 
membership of the Sterling Area, and the Treasury, Bank and Colonial Office advised 
the Lord Chancellor to avoid speculative answers and only talk about details if 
pressed, and then only to emphasise the benefits of the Sterling Area, from 
information which the Bank, Treasury and Colonial Office had generated numerous 
times before in persuading Malaya to remain as part of the Sterling Area after 
independence (BE OV65/5, Hennings to Charles, 10th September 1957). 
 The Bank, however, suggested to Lord Kilmuir that if the topic of Malaya’s 
dollar earnings came up, he should emphasise that Malaya’s dollar earnings could 
not be considered in isolation, as “the fact that she chooses to convert them into 
Sterling and hold her reserves in that currency instead of in dollars enables her to 
obtain the advantages of Sterling Area membership” (ibid.). This became a 
particularly pointed issue with Malaya seeking its own dollar reserves, independent 
from the Sterling Area’s general pool, following independence. 
Over a month after Malayan independence, Britain’s reserve position was 
still extremely precarious, leading the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, to make the 
following statement to the Cabinet: 
“We have been near to the edge of economic disaster. We are still 
near the edge. Over the past two months we have lost £185 
millions from our gold and dollar reserves. The reserves at the 
end of September were down to £660 millions, only two-thirds of 
what they were at the end of 1954, despite the £200 millions 
which we drew from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) last 
year and the £37 millions which we gained by not paying last 
year's interest on the American loan” (TNA CAB129/89, ‘The 
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Economic Situation’, 14th October 1957). 
While the Chancellor cited the means of supporting the UK position as the dollars 
the UK had already borrowed and deflationary domestic policies, Malayan dollars at 
this point were as crucial as ever in propping up Britain’s precarious reserve 
position, and discussions over Malaya’s position within the Sterling Area still 
retained particular significance. 
 Following independence, the Colonial Secretary submitted to Parliament his 
Annual Report, detailing the events in Malaya up to 31st August 1957. His report 
revealed that the Emergency had declined in seriousness in 1957 as it had in the 
four years previously. In fact, in July 1957, it was the first month since July 1948 in 
which the Communist insurgents did not kill anyone, there were also no reported 
casualties by the security forces in Malaya, and there were no major incidents 
relating to the Emergency (TNA CO1030/627, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 27th February 
1958). The prosecution of the Emergency was considered by the Colonial Office to 
have been extremely successful with around half of the whole country declared free 
of insurgent activity. Indeed, by 31st August 1957, the number of active terrorists 
had dropped from a peak of 8,000 in 1951 to around 1,830, with an estimated 
10,000 terrorists killed, captured of surrendered since the Emergency was declared 
in 1948; and security forces had suffered around 9,000 killed, wounded and missing 
in the same time (ibid.) 
Despite concerns over the Federation’s budget, the end of 1956 saw it turn 
out better than expected, due to the maintenance of rubber prices (though rubber 
prices did fall marginally from a high in 1955) and tin prices, as well as increased 
receipts from import duties, and expenditure being smaller than expected. An 
expected deficit of £5.7m became a surplus of £6m; though this certainly did 
nothing to calm the Federation about future revenues, or the capricious nature of 
an economy based upon the prices of raw materials (ibid.). As such, Britain had 
agreed that the Federation could seek to raise loans for development on the London 
markets after independence. Coupled with the debate over an independent dollar 
reserve, and the specific terms for the creation of a Malayan Central Bank, the issue 
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of Malaya seeking loans from the London money market became a serious issue in 
the relationship between Britain and Malaya in the immediate post-independence 
period. 
6.4 Independent Dollar Reserves, and Frantic Borrowing 
 The debate over Malaya’s membership of the Sterling Area continued even 
after Malayan independence, even when the issue had apparently been resolved in 
the Constitutional Talks in early 1956 and the Financial Talks in late 1956. Certainly, 
there did not seem to be any specific reason for the constant generation of 
arguments to remain in the Sterling Area by officials in the Colonial Office, the 
Treasury and the Bank. A letter from the Bank to the Treasury, eleven days after 
Malayan independence makes a suggestion for one further argument for Malayan 
Sterling Area membership: access to the London money market.138  
“For developing countries, this is a valuable facility even though 
access to the market needs to be regulated because of the 
general shortage of capital. The Federation are hoping to raise 
£10mn in the London market in the next four years.” (BE OV65/5, 
‘Malaya’, 10th September 1957) 
In early 1958, the Malayan Prime Minister was already enquiring with the Bank of 
England if the Federation could borrow the agreed £10m from the London market 
that year. Abdul Rahman sought the cash to cover the cost of the Emergency not 
paid for by the UK and to support the cost of development – revenues had 
continued to drop since both rubber and tin prices had fallen in consecutive years 
since 1955 (BE OV65/5, ‘Malaya – London Market Borrowing’, 24th January 1958). 
The Malayan Treasury’s general reserves were £59.75m, with £13.75 in 
Malayan dollars and the rest in Sterling.139 However, the free reserves were 
                                               
138 The letter makes the same argument made previously a number of times that there were no 
restrictions on the movement of British capital to Malaya due to Area membership: “Her natural 
resources have been developed and her trade built up largely with British money and enterprise. Her 
plantations and tin mines are still largely financed by British concerns and her trade by British 
merchant banks. All this would be upset if she left the Sterling Area because the flow of capital from 
the UK would then be restricted” (BE OV65/5, ‘Malaya’, 10th September 1957). 
139
 A currency reserve of £137m was shared with Singapore and British Borneo, with the Federation’s 
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estimated by the Bank to be at around £27.5m, which would be reduced to £5m by 
the end of 1958 due to the budget deficit, and accounted for only two weeks’ worth 
of spending (ibid.). It was believed Malaya could find around £8.5m from local long-
term borrowing to bolster its reserves but with a budget deficit in 1959 expected to 
be as high as £16.25m, the Federation required further funds. As such, the 
Federation was seeking access to the London money market, as promised to them 
by the British government in 1957, for the sum of £10m. 
The Bank and the Treasury were very reticent to let Malaya borrow from the 
London money market since they believed Malaya had not sought US aid strongly 
enough, and that Malaya would find it easier to draw on her Sterling balances in the 
near future. Crawshaw at the Overseas Finance section of the Bank was particularly 
vehement about Malaya seeking the full £10m in 1958. 
“As to being allowed – I would hope they would not while they 
have such large sterling funds (whether earmarked or not). If they 
spend all their funds, I do not think they should be given more, 
since they will have put too much strain on us already. As to 
ability – independent Malaya would be a newcomer to the 
London Market and should only borrow a modest figure (say not 
more than £3mn) on the first approach. £10mn in this year is just 
not on.” (ibid.) 
In a subsequent letter from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Britain’s High 
Commissioner in the Federation, the High Commissioner was advised to avoid the 
question of permitting the Federation to approach the London market entirely and 
echoed Crawshaw’s sentiments almost exactly.  
“We do not therefore wish to provide Malaya with access to 
additional Sterling until it is absolutely essential to meet our 
commitment under the 1957 financial settlement which provided 
for the possibility that Malaya might raise £10 million in the 
London market over five years.” (BE OV65/5, ‘Telegram no.133 
                                                                                                                                     
share earmarked at £91m (BE OV65/5, ‘Malaya – London Market Borrowing’, 24
th
 January 1958). 
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(secret), Financial Situation’, 29th January 1958) 
The reasons cited for this reticence were that British officials felt Malaya was well 
provided for with its own reserves, it would gain access to its own Sterling balances 
soon, it had already taxed Britain’s resources somewhat in recent months, and it 
had made no concrete overtures to the US for aid (ibid.). 
 The search for money to support Malaya’s budget problems was in difficulty 
at this point.140 Loans and credit from the US were not forthcoming and, according 
to the Secretary for the Federation Ministry of Finance, there was “some soreness in 
Kuala Lumpur at CDFC’s failure to secure support in the London market and at the 
apparent distrust of Malaya, which is revealed” (BE OV65/6, ‘Malaya’, 20th August 
1958). In discussion with the Secretary, Leslie Rowan emphasised that simply having 
access to a market did not guarantee access to credit and that persuading investors 
was a difficult prospect. However, he suggested that Britain could offer the services 
of the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) but had no idea of any specifics 
(ibid.).141 
Following the suggestion by the Federation that Malaya could set up its own 
money market, the Bank became extremely concerned, vociferously opposing the 
idea and prompted the Bank to have another look at the arguments for Malaya’s 
continued membership of the Sterling Area (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 14th 
April 1958; BE OV65/5, ‘Amendments to Henley’s letter on Malaya – Sterling Area’, 
18th April 1958).142 This turned out to be well timed as, two months later, Geoffrey 
                                               
140 There was even some discussion as to how far the UK would be willing to go to support the cost of 
the Emergency in Malaya even further. An inquiry to the Treasury was made by the Colonial Office 
concerning policy on British financial support for security operations in the Colonies (including 
Malaya). The Treasury responded that policy on financial responsibility for internal security 
operations was that the cost must be borne by the civil authority in that colony. This was also true of 
additional charges raised by British forces in aid of that authority. However, if it could be shown that 
it was in the interests of Britain that these forces be stationed there (e.g. in a cold war role) then 
Britain contributed to those costs. Britain would also meet those costs if the colony were shown 
unable to pay. In Malaya, no charge was raised, nor in Singapore. Therefore, Malaya could only 
receive further support if it lacked any available funds (TNA CO1030/657, William Russell Edmunds to 
John Hennings, 28th October 1958). 
141 Which prompted the observation that “once ECGD is mentioned, the whole thing seems to look 
like Christmas to our overseas friends and the frequency with which Rowan pulls out ECGD makes 
him look like Father Christmas.” (BE OV65/6, ‘Malaya’, 20th August 1958) 
142
 Indeed, Malaya seemed very reticent to listen to the Bank’s advice and had become very 
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Gould, the Principal Assistant Secretary in the Federation Treasury, approached 
Henry Jenkyns, a Treasury official, at the Conference of Commonwealth Officials to 
relay to him Colonel Lee’s intention to acquire an independent dollar reserve for 
Malaya (BE OV65/5, ‘Malayan Desire to Hold Dollars’, 11th June 1958). Gould said 
that Lee wanted the independent reserve for five reasons: other countries had 
them; prestige; to enable Malaya to “indulge in a spending spree unobserved”143; to 
make borrowing from the US easier; and as a hedge against a fall in the value of 
Sterling holdings (ibid.; TNA T236/5151, ‘Telegram no.756, Dollar Reserve, ’18th 
October 1958). 
Jenkyns immediately told Gould that the British government certainly did 
not favour the holding of independent reserves by Area members since one of the 
reasons for Sterling Area membership was centrally held foreign currency and gold 
reserves, with members holding Sterling as their reserve currency. Furthermore, he 
told Gould, the central reserves were used as much as they were able to pay for 
dollar goods (ibid.). Gould replied that, due to Malaya’s membership in the IMF, 
Malaya could only accumulate US$6m before being required to use 50% of any 
further accumulated dollars to repurchase their own currency, which Colonel Lee 
did not see the sense in (however, this turned out to be a misunderstanding of IMF 
statutes). Jenkyns considered this a minimal sum that would not be practically 
problematic but still problematic in principle (ibid.).  
 The initial response within the Bank to Malaya’s request was to accept that, 
given the eventual setup of the Malayan Central Bank, some level of independent 
dollar reserve would have to be agreed to eventually just to cover commercial 
banks’ dollar transactions, and especially because the Federation was still such an 
impressive dollar earner (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya – US Dollar Transactions’, 
                                                                                                                                     
disenchanted with the Bank’s intransigence over a number of issues. When the Bank had suggested a 
candidate for the Governor of Malaya’s Central Bank, it had been turned down and the Federation 
asked Australia for assistance (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 14th April 1958). 
143 Interestingly, Gould mentioned to Jenkyns that all dollar expenditures by Malaya still had to pass 
through the Bank of England first: “Mr Gould said that returns of authorisation for dollar expenditure 
all found their way eventually to the Bank of England. This was a surprise to me and I suppose that it 
may be a relic of war-time and early post-war Colonial arrangements for limiting dollar expenditure. 
It seems to me that unless these returns are of real importance to the Bank of England we should 
drop them because of the danger that they represent to newly-independent countries a symbol of 
continuing dependent status.” (BE OV65/5, ‘Malayan Desire to Hold Dollars’, 11
th
 June 1958) 
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19th June 1958).144 However, while a working balance of US dollars would be 
necessary, spending money on it was considered foolish by the Bank, considering 
the budgetary constraints and balance of payments difficulties the Federation was 
facing at the time, especially when this was leading them to borrow heavily from 
abroad. Furthermore, Malaya had already started drawing on its Sterling balances, 
which was putting strain on Sterling (ibid.). 
 However, in response to Crawshaw’s sentiment, Leslie Preston, the Principal 
at Dealing and Accounts Office at the Bank, disagreed that it was inevitable that the 
Federation would eventually develop some level of independent dollar reserves. He 
felt that the better option would be to permit certain money dealers in the Sterling 
Area the authority to cover exchange transactions instead of relying on Central 
Banks. This would manifest itself in Malaya as it had done previously, through 
authorised dealers in Singapore. Indeed, Preston wanted to avoid entirely the 
possibility of giving Malaya an independent reserve on the principle of the matter 
(BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya – US dollar transactions’, 24th June 1958). 
 In a letter back to Jenkyns, Crawshaw emphasised to him that it would be 
difficult to deny the Federation’s request for an independent dollar reserve since it 
was a sizeable dollar earner by its trade with the dollar area through Singapore. He 
felt that denying the request would ultimately lead to a number of problems. 
“It will be difficult to resist such a request as the Federation is a 
sizeable US dollar earner as a result of its trade through 
Singapore. If too many difficulties are made, the Federation may 
be tempted to increase its own US dollar earnings by requiring 
exports to Singapore onsold to the USA to be invoiced in US 
dollars or by trying to divert its exports to the dollar area away 
from Singapore.” (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya – an 
independent US dollar holding’, 11th July 1958) 
                                               
144 The US$6m figure was also so small that it was not worth worrying about, according to Crawshaw. 
Further, If the UK made the situation difficult for the Federation, it would be likely to invoice 
Singapore for the US dollars generated from the goods on-sold to the US (BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of 
Malaya – US Dollar Transactions’, 19
th
 June 1958) 
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However, despite the problems arising from rejecting the request, and even if the 
principle of allowing Malaya to build up its own dollar reserve were conceded, 
Crawshaw advised Jenkyns that it would be a mistake due to Malaya’s current 
budget difficulties. Furthermore, the argument based on its necessity for Central 
Bank transactions did not stand up, as the Bank’s powers of issue were to be in 
abeyance for some time (ibid.). The fact that it was a sum of only US$6m was also 
misleading since the Federation would not have been required to make purchases of 
its own currency out of reserves greater than US$6m, as those obligations were not 
applied to reserves below the country’s IMF quota, which was US$25m. So, the 
obligation to purchase Malayan dollars would only have arisen if reserves in gold 
and dollars rose above US$25m (ibid.). 
 In a statement to the press on 17th October 1958, Colonel Lee made clear the 
deficiency he felt Malaya had. 
“Every Commonwealth country in the sterling bloc has a dollar 
account in the United States. Malaya became an independent 
country only recently and it has therefore not got an account in 
the United States.” (TNA T236/5151, ‘Telegram no.756, Dollar 
Reserve, ’18th October 1958) 
Compounded by the fact that Malaya had to inform the Bank of England in order to 
spend dollars or gold due to a lack of a dollar account, and that it would be a matter 
of convenience and not affect Malaya’s dollar spending, Colonel Lee felt it was 
entirely reasonable for Malaya to have independent dollar reserves. He also cited 
Malaya’s huge contribution to the Sterling Area dollar pool, providing around 
US$300m net each year (ibid.). 
 The Central Bank of Malaya was established on 24th October 1958 and 
Colonel Lee gave a speech to mark the event in which he described the purpose for 
setting up the Central Bank. While the Central Bank’s operations would be initially 
modest with a maximum of M$60m from government deposits and M$20m from 
commercial banks’ deposits, Lee felt that the Central Bank would encourage 
Malayans in all walks of life to make use of the banks in Malaya and so contribute to 
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the funds available for investment in Malaya (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 15th 
January 1959). 
“One of the Federation’s greatest needs was to obtain sufficient 
capital to finance our development and… we could not afford to 
spend at the rate required unless funds were forthcoming from 
domestic savings or overseas borrowings. We cannot depend on 
getting outside financial help whenever we want it and, in any 
event, there must be some limit to the amount we may prudently 
borrow overseas, therefore we must do all we can to encourage 
the savings habit in our people.” (BE OV65/6, ‘Banking Bill’, 1st 
December 1958) 
Colonel Lee then saw the Central Bank, at this time, as a means of expanding the 
money supply and providing great deal of credit to sustain Malaya’s spending, which 
had been extremely difficult to come by over the past year. 
“A realm of opportunity is opening before the Federation’s banks 
as our development plans get under way – opportunities for 
expanded and more diversified business and greater branch 
representation as hitherto untapped or under-developed 
resources all over the country are converted into real wealth.” 
(ibid.) 
The legislation that established the Central Bank also provided licensing laws 
for banks to operate in the Federation. The purpose was, ostensibly, to ensure that 
the Federation had oversight on the viability and integrity of the bank in question; 
however, the true purpose was to ensure that the Federation government could 
legally ban the Bank of China from operating in its territory (ibid.).145 
                                               
145 Indeed, since independence, there had been substantial communication between the Federation 
and Singapore governments, the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the Bank about the legitimacy and 
consequences of banning the Bank of China in Malaya. The Malayan governments were convinced, 
though had no evidence, that the Bank of China was supporting Communist insurgents and acting as 
an “unofficial consulate” for the People’s Republic of China in Malaya, and therefore had to be shut 
down. (BE OV65/5, ‘Bank of China’, 10th April 1957; BE OV65/6, ‘Bank of China in Malaya’, 21st 
November 1958; BE OV65/6, Telegram no.129, ‘Bank of China’, 21
st
 November 1958; BE OV65/6, 
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“The Government has reviewed the role of foreign banks in the 
Federation as an independent country and has decided, as a 
matter of policy, that no bank which in its opinion is under the 
effective control of the Government of another country should be 
permitted to operate in the Federation. The Government feels 
strongly that with the financial resources of their governments 
behind them such banks, if permitted to operate here, could as 
they expand their activities, exercise an undue influence on the 
financial and overseas trading affairs of the Federation and in this 
way may constitute a threat to the economic and, indeed, the 
political independence of the country.” 
Therefore, for a banking licence to be granted, the foreign bank had to have a 
majority of its capital not owned by a foreign government, and a majority of its 
board could not be appointed by a government, or some agency acting on its behalf 
(ibid.). While Malaya grew into its formal independence, this did not change the 
fundamental dynamic of the relationship. The dollar reserve sought by the 
Federation was limited and did not constitute a break with the mechanisms of the 
Sterling Area for dollar pooling; furthermore, Malaya still sought substantial 
development through the Sterling Area and from the UK. 
At this point in the chronology of events, one particular moment is seen by 
both Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001) as the final cleavage between Britain and its 
Empire: the move to de jure convertibility in December 1958. Prior to and after this 
event, we would have seen a change in the relationship between Britain and 
Malaya. However, on the contrary, what we see is a clear maintenance of this 
relationship and continuity from the post-war problems to 1960. Immediately prior 
to this point, not only do we see British concern about the possibility of a Malayan 
independent reserve but also repeated emphasis about how important Malaya 
remains to the Sterling Area and to the British economy. Moreover, after 1959, we 
see a further intensification of British development aid to Malaya through a number 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Banking Bill’, 1st December 1958; BE OV65/6, Telegram no.99, ‘The Bank of China’, 19th December 
1958) 
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of channels to avoid the everyday problems that arouse from fluctuations in the 
rubber and tin markets. 
6.5 The Search for Capital 
 At the beginning of 1959, both the Bank and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office drafted reports on the state of the Federation’s political and economic 
development, and prospects for the future. The Bank was highly optimistic about 
the prospects for Malaya, having done better than the Bank hoped or expected (BE 
OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 15th January 1959). The Bank expressed some 
concern that the three main political parties were effectively “racial protection 
societies rather than political parties”, and the Government, the Alliance Party, 
comprised the right wing elements from each of the parties (ibid.).146 
 The High Commissioner in the Federation, George William Tory, submitted a 
report on Federation’s economy to the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, 
Alexander Douglas-Home. He argued, “the day-to-say fortunes of the Federation 
reflect the day-to-day fortunes of the rubber and tin markets. Even at yearly 
intervals, changes of fortune can be explained almost entirely in terms of market 
forces originating outside the Federation itself; one need not look far beyond the 
figures of output and prices for rubber and for tin” (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of 
Malaya: The Economy’, 23rd June 1959). Certainly, this was apparent in statistics of 
the Malayan economy, and therefore had a massive effect on Malaya’s finances and 
its development budget. In 1953, Malayan GDP had fallen to M$3883m from 
M$4153 in 1952 and M$5000m in 1951, where the price of rubber had been 50.84 
pence per pound in 1951, 28.34p/lb in 1952 and only 19.91p/lb in 1953 (ibid.; Lim 
1967, p.317,323).147 Malaya’s economy had been particularly vulnerable to the 
violent fluctuations in the price of raw materials during the Korean War, though it 
was still the case that Malaya’s economy was susceptible to these price movements. 
In 1957, GDP stood at M$4852m while the price of rubber was at 26.09p/lb, 1958 
                                               
146 The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) were quite broad parties in ideological terms – their names reveal 
the basis behind their constitution. The only real challenger to these parties was the Socialist Front 
party as, though small, it was growing in size (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 15th January 1959) 
147
 All figures shown at 1959 prices. 
  252 
GDP was M$4700 and rubber at 23.5p/lb and 1959 saw GDP grow to M$5411 and 
the price of rubber also jump to 30.05p/lb (ibid.). 
The yield from the rubber crop represented a quarter of national income. 
Malayan rubber production was growing steadily by 1959 having stood at 638,000 
tons in 1957, 663,000 in 1958 and 698,000 in 1959 (Lim 1967, p.329). The 
Federation then expected to produce around 850,000 tons of rubber by 1965 but 
predicted that national income would actually be lower than previous years due to 
competition from synthetic rubber forcing the price of rubber down (BE OV65/6, 
‘Federation of Malaya: The Economy’, 23rd June 1959); furthermore, there was little 
optimism for the expansion of other sectors of the economy in the meantime (ibid.). 
Improving productivity and efficiency was unlikely to contribute a great deal to the 
economy either as this required significant development aid.148 149 As such the High 
Commissioner was melancholy about the prospects for the Malayan economy in the 
next few years. 
“It seems difficult to resist the theoretical conclusion that the 
existing standard of living is unlikely to be maintained over the 
next few years, and that in all probability it will decline. The 
chances of an improvement seem extremely remote unless 
unforeseen extraneous factors, such as the outbreak of a limited 
war of the Korean pattern, force up the prices of rubber and tin to 
inflationary levels, and given the threat from synthetic rubber, any 
prosperity based on high prices for the natural product must be 
something of a fool’s paradise.” (ibid.) 
                                               
148 With population growth at 3-4% annually, at least this much growth was required to maintain 
living standards in Malaya. The Federation had allocated to its development plan around $775m for 
the period 1955-1959 but it was unlikely that this was going to improve the economy substantially in 
the next couple of years, and a much greater effort would have been required if the stated figure of 
15% of national income to be used for investment was to be achieved. This figure was based on an 
investment of 3 to 4 times the required addition to national income, so for a minimum 3-4% growth, 
about 15% investment of national income was required (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya: The 
Economy’, 23rd June 1959) 
149 The Federation had made a loan agreement with the US Development Loan Fund, a US 
government agency, for US$10m to develop a port at the Klang Straits, and another US$10m loan for 
the rehabilitation of bridges and roads in the Federation (BE OV65/6, ‘Loan Agreement’, 18th March 
1959) 
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The ‘everyday’ effects to this economic problem were likely to have a significant 
political impact too. Most rural Malays worked on a subsistence level on small 
rubber plantations and so were greatly affected by rubber prices. George Tory 
warned that, if the government were unable to change this basic problem, 
subsistence workers in the Federation would continue to be susceptible to 
“politicians who promise them something better” (ibid.). 
 Given the difficult situation that the Federation felt itself in by 1959, it came 
as no surprise that a Financial Times article entitled ‘Does £ Area Club Mean Much 
Now?’ reopened debates about the merits of staying in the Sterling Area. WH 
Wilcock, Governor of the Malayan Central Bank, wrote to Eric Haslam to inform him 
that Malayan politicians had once again begun discussing the value of remaining in 
the Sterling Area, and requested a document be drawn up by the Bank of England to 
detail the benefits of Sterling Area membership (BE OV65/6, WH Wilcock to Eric P 
Haslam, 13th June 1959). 
 Haslam responded by criticising the Financial Times article for presenting the 
Sterling Area as a ‘one size fits all’ institution when this was not the case (BE OV65/6, 
Haslam to Wilcock, 9th July 1959). There were no universally applicable advantages 
to Sterling Area membership, and it was still a very important component of the 
global economy. 
“The Sterling Area is constantly changing in its scope and 
character, in response to changing circumstances, but it embraces 
a mechanism which the world – and particularly the members of 
the Commonwealth – cannot do without if international trade is 
to expand and flourish.” (BE OV65/6, EP Haslam to WH Wilcock, 
23rd June 1959) 
The only element of the Area that could be described as truly universal was that it 
was “a voluntary association of countries who have a strong mutual interest in 
maintaining sterling as an international currency and are prepared to shape their 
monetary and foreign exchange policies accordingly” (ibid.). Indeed, what is quite 
telling is that this was the official British mindset and how imperial relations and the 
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Sterling Area were understood by the Bank: as a mechanism which managed a 
complex set of bilateral relations that had historically developed and could not be 
understood, in fact, as a unitary institution. Moreover, we see yet again Bank 
officials reiterate the continuity in the Britain-Malaya relationship even as late as 
1959. With Malaya, this was certainly advantageous, he argued, as its fortunes were 
so closely tied to the Sterling Area that the establishing of exchange controls 
between Malaya and the rest of the Area would severely weaken Malaya’s economy. 
The absence of those barriers stimulated commercial and financial transactions, as 
well as inspired confidence in the Malayan economy (ibid.).150 While exchange 
controls were likely to be relaxed in the next few years given the growing sense of 
independence the Federation had, not only from Britain but also from Singapore, 
Haslam argued that the Federation would remain in the Sterling Area and trade in 
sterling, since it was the currency in which most world trade was still conducted, 
and the vast majority of Malaya’s own trade (ibid.). 
 A meeting on 9th September 1959, between the Chancellor, Heathcoat-
Amory, and Colonel Lee took place to discuss Malayan development and the 
establishing of the independent Malayan dollar reserve.151 Colonel Lee began by 
referring to the previous offer by Leslie Rowan to take up ECGD credits to provide 
some support to the Federation’s trade; he had noted its success in India and felt 
that a similar scheme would help with the Federation’s short-term financial 
difficulties (TNA T236/5151, ‘Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor’s Room’, 9th 
September 1959). Lee went on to make two further points. Firstly, with the 
negotiations concerning Britain’s level of support for Emergency operations coming 
                                               
150 Haslam also felt that the Sterling Area offered something that Malaya from which Malaya 
specifically benefited: “In particular I should regard the unrestricted flow of short term credit and 
longer term capital as being of vital importance to a country in Malaya’s position, faced with the task 
of maintaining its existing assets and of laying the foundation for further economic development on a 
large scale” (BE OV65/6, EP Haslam to WH Wilcock, 23
rd
 June 1959) 
151 Colonel Lee was due to retire in 1959 to be replaced by Tan Siew Sin as Minister of Finance in the 
Malayan Cabinet. As with Colonel Lee, he was very wealthy with significant interests in the rubber 
industry: director of a number of rubber estates; President of the Malaccan Estate Owners 
Association; member of the Rubber Producers Council and other rubber planting associations. He 
had held a number of other business posts, and government positions, and was previously Minister 
of Commerce and Industry from August 1957. Colonel Lee went on to set up the Development and 
Commercial Bank, which became one of the largest banks in Malaysia (BE OV65/6, ‘Tan Siew Sin’, 24th 
August 1959). 
  255 
up, he wished to let the British government know that the Federation was seeking 
significant assistance from the British. Secondly, he raised the issue of Malaya’s 
independent dollar reserves and stated the new figure of a reserve of US$25m 
(ibid.).152 
The Chancellor responded by saying that, although he was sympathetic to 
Malaya’s desire to hold dollar reserves, it was the practise of the Sterling Area to 
concentrate their reserves in sterling, with gold and convertible currency reserves 
pooled centrally in London. This was essential to the Sterling Area system, he 
maintained and it was this, as much as anything else, which allowed the UK to keep 
capital moving freely to and in the Sterling Area (ibid.). As such, if Sterling Area 
members sought to hold substantial reserves in currencies other than Sterling, it 
would undermine the Sterling Area, therefore Heathcoat-Amory asked Colonel Lee 
to “keep the Malayan independent reserve to modest proportions” (ibid.).  
Colonel Lee said he sought a separation of the Exchange Control and import 
licensing machinery (and therefore the statistics relating to them) from Singapore; 
this would allow the Federation freedom from the “financial nexus” tying it to 
Singapore, which he saw as problematic if there were a change of government in 
Singapore. This separation would also highlight “that Malaya was a significant 
earner of dollars for the central sterling area reserves” (ibid.) and therefore justify 
the Federation’s request for an independent dollar reserve.153 The Chancellor 
accepted the difficulties facing Malaya but stressed that the size of net dollar 
contributions was not a factor in the decision to grant a reserve 
“Insofar as a particular Commonwealth country’s balance of 
payments position with the non-sterling world formed a basis for 
                                               
152
 In a meeting with Tan Siew Sin, the new Finance Minister, and the Chancellor, Mr Tan echoed 
Colonel Lee’s statement about building up an independent dollar reserve. The figure was still 
US$25m and it would be built up gradually. The Chancellor replied “he hoped that Malaya would 
keep the figure down to the smallest possible level. The strength of sterling and of the Sterling Area 
depended to a large extent on the pooling of reserves by its members.” (TNA T236/5151, ‘Malaya’, 
24th September 1959) 
153 Singapore, as a major entrepot port, bought a great deal of the Federation’s rubber and then sold 
it to the dollar area, it had always appeared as if Singapore were the major dollar earner in Malaya 
when in actual fact, as has been noted already in this chapter, the instrument for this was the 
Federation’s rubber supply difficulties (TNA T236/5151, ‘Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor’s Room’, 
9
th
 September 1959). 
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our policy, we would be interested in its position viz a viz the 
whole non-sterling world and not with the dollar area only.” 
(ibid.) 
This seemed particularly curious, as the basis for British policy towards Malaya had 
rested mainly on the fact of Malaya’s trade surplus with the dollar area. Therefore it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the Chancellor’s response to Colonel Lee was 
intended to distract from that particular avenue of argument due to its high 
likelihood of success. 
Lee’s agenda was stark in that he was entirely focused on finding as much 
money as possible for Malayan development, since the Malayan economy was still 
prone to fluctuations due to its reliance on tin and rubber prices. He not only 
brought up the issue of borrowing from the London money market this year, which 
the Chancellor rejected as, he claimed, conditions were not currently favourable for 
Commonwealth financing and not in Malaya’s interest to seek a loan from London 
currently (though the base rate was at 4% then, its lowest rate since early 1955), he 
also suggested to the Chancellor that a Commonwealth Bank be set up to entice 
capital investment from outside of the Sterling Area (ibid.).154 Lee also urged that 
Sterling convertibility occur as soon as possible, to which the Chancellor replied that 
it was the aim of the British government to move towards convertibility but he 
would not make any commitments unless it was certain they could be carried out 
(ibid.). 
In a subsequent meeting between the Governor of the Malayan Central Bank 
and officials from the Treasury and Bank of England, the Malayan figure for the size 
of independent reserves was set at US$25m.155 Wilcock, the Governor, implied that 
this was by far the most conservative figure that had been discussed in the 
Federation government, and would be accumulated over two years (TNA T236/5151, 
                                               
154 Lee also suggested the IBRD be given greater funds (though he was not as interested in increasing 
the funds available to the IMF as Malaya did not use their services as much). The Chancellor said he 
hoped to see an increase in resources for the IBRD (to further aid under-developed countries) and 
the IMF (because of its contribution to increase world liquidity). (TNA T236/5151, ‘Note of a Meeting 
in the Chancellor’s Room’, 9
th
 September 1959) 
155 Present: Wilcock (Central Bank of Malaya, Governor); Denis Rickett (Bank); Taylor and Jenkyns 
(Treasury) 
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‘Malaya’, 24th September 1959). It was made clear to Wilcock that the desire to hold 
these dollar securities was a “serious difficulty of principle” for the British 
government. Wilcock assured the Treasury and the Bank that there was no desire to 
diversify currency backing at this stage. The desire for independent reserves was 
because “the Government was accumulating surplus funds as a result of the high 
price of rubber and there was some lag in development spending. He had 
recommended to Ministers that they should not disturb their existing holdings of UK 
Government stocks, but should build up dollar holdings from their accumulating 
budgetary reserve” (ibid.). Wilcock also suggested that if the British government 
were totally intransigent about Malaya’s dollar reserve, the Federation would likely 
concede the issue (ibid.). 
 The Federation, according to a memo by the Central Bank’s Board, still 
sought to establish a money market and a stock exchange in Malaya as a means of 
redirecting the Federation’s well-organised banking system’s short-term investment 
towards Malaya itself; however, the development of a money market was limited 
until the Central Bank became a bank of issue and a lender of last resort (BE OV65/6, 
‘The Establishment of a Money Market and Stock Exchange in the Federation of 
Malaya, 28th October 1959). 
In late November, the House of Representatives in the Federation passed 
legislation permitting the Federation to invest up to M$75m (equivalent to US$25m) 
in securities guaranteed by foreign governments or international financial 
institutions. Tan Siew Sin introduced the bill by saying “this would not only allow the 
Government a more flexible investment policy, but would enable the Government 
to take any favourable opportunities for sound investment which might arise” (TNA 
T236/5151, ‘Malayan Holdings of US Dollars’, 27th November 1959).156 It seemed, to 
both the Bank and the Treasury, that the Wilcock/Tan Siew Sin plan explained to 
them in September was being implemented (ibid.). This did cause some concern 
within both the Treasury and the Bank that Britain was, in a sense, required to be on 
                                               
156 Tan Siew Sin also said that the Central Bank had taken up IBRD bonds, and confirmed that “since 
the Federation was in the Sterling Area, a large part of the Federation’s reserves would continue to be 
invested in sterling securities” (TNA T236/5151, ‘Malayan Holdings of US Dollars’, 27th November 
1959. 
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best behaviour with the Federation now, since if the UK upset the Federation 
somehow they might decide to press ahead more quickly to the US$25m figure, or 
increase it. Though at the time, the dangers of the Federation rushing to achieve this 
accumulation of dollar reserves was unlikely since they had much less incentive to 
speculate against Sterling than they had only a couple of years ago due to its much 
improved position (TNA T236/5151, ‘Malayan Holdings of US Dollars’, 1st December 
1959).  
In late February, the Deputy Governor informed the Treasury that the 
Federation had made its first purchase of dollars from the Bank of England, to the 
sum of US$4.5m using Sterling funds held for the Federation government, which 
was executed without question since it was accepted that the Malayan Central Bank 
had “the right to draw on the reserves by virtue of its position as a Sterling Area 
Central Bank” (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya: Independent Dollar Reserves’, 21st 
March 1960). Since the Federation’s total sterling assets were £287m and the 
quantity of dollars the Federation was purchasing was very small, the Bank and 
Treasury were happy that they were spreading out their purchases as promised (TNA 
T236/5151, ‘unknown to Taylor and Mackay‘, 25th February 1960; TNA T236/5151, 
‘Malayan Dollar Purchases’, 1st March 1960).157 However, the Bank were still 
concerned that, as there was no specific agreement between the British and 
Federation governments about the Malayan dollar reserve (only a verbal agreement 
between the Treasury and the Finance Minister), the Federation could pass fresh 
legislation at any time to exceed the M$75m limit though they were happy that it 
had some basis in law (BE OV65/6, ‘EBF’ to Hogg, 10th March 1960). As such, the 
                                               
157 Interestingly, the Treasury noted that the Bank of England was extremely reticent about providing 
figures on Malayan purchases of foreign currency (TNA T236/5151, ‘Malayan Dollar Purchases’, 1st 
March 1960). As explanation, the Bank informed the Treasury that, as the Treasury’s agents, the Bank 
was prepared to tell them the amount of a transaction but not the purpose. The Bank might not 
know officially, as either agents for the Treasury or as the Bankers for the Central Bank, why the 
purchase was made. The Treasury was entitled to receive information from the Bank in execution of 
the Bank’s responsibility as the administrators of the Exchange Control Act but passing it further 
rested with the Treasury. Informing the Treasury of customer details followed the line set by Fisher in 
1949: “information relating either to our own or other bankers’ customers individually would not 
normally be passed to the Treasury except in so far as is necessary to determine Treasury liability.” 
Furthermore, as advisers to the Treasury, the Bank was obliged to pass on information regarding the 
implementation of agreements between Governments. (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya: 
Independent Dollar Reserves’, 21st March 1960) 
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Bank hoped for some consultation between governments but there was no reason 
to assume that was going to be the case. 
 Tan Siew Sin was due to arrive in Britain as part of an official visit at the end 
of 1960. In a background note, prepared by the Bank for his visit, the Bank described 
the situation in the Federation as “buoyant” due to high rubber prices (now at 
32.16p/lb) and increasing volumes of tin exports, which meant GDP for 1960 stood 
at M$5921m (BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of Malaya’, 12th September 1960; Lim 1967, 
p.317, 329). The Federation’s official Sterling balances stood at £129m, having 
grown from £100m in 1959 and £65m in 1958, and the Federation had also acquired 
US$5.5m of its independent dollar reserve by September 1960 (BE OV65/6, 
‘Federation of Malaya’, 12th September 1960). The Federation’s budget was to see a 
surplus in 1960 due to the higher rubber prices, which permitted it to pay back a 
loan to Singapore of £3.5m that was taken out in 1953 to pay for the cost of the 
Emergency (which had also been declared as at an end on 12th July 1960). (ibid.) 
While the development programme of 1956-1960 was curtailed due to 
financial austerity, external finance had come from the IBRD, the DLF and the Brunei 
government. The CDFC lent £0.25m towards a hydroelectric scheme in the Cameron 
highlands, the ECGD signed a £2.25m credit for telecoms equipment, and the British 
government had also made CD&W allocations and grants towards the Emergency 
(BE OV65/6, Henley to CC Lucas, 25th October 1958; BE OV65/6, ‘Federation of 
Malaya’, 12th September 1960). The background note makes mention of the offer 
made by the British government for the Federation to borrow £10m from the 
London money market; however, it claims that this offer was not picked up on 
despite repeated requests by Federation ministers for the money that were 
consistently rejected by British officials and never actually used (BE OV65/6, 
‘Federation of Malaya’, 12th September 1960).  
The IBRD and the Federation government were, by that time, drafting a new 
development plan for 1961-1965, which was expected to have a budget of M$1500-
2000m – double the budget of the previous plan and would be found largely 
internally with the help of the Malayan Central Bank (ibid.). The Central Bank had 
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been gradually assuming its new role in Malaya, though individual banks themselves 
still responded to the London base rate (e.g. in June 1959, 5% to 6%, though they 
did not in January 1960). A new Currency Agreement between the Federation, 
Singapore and Borneo Territories was agreed in February 1960, which afforded a 
number of major changes to Malaya’s monetary policy: it removed the supervisory 
powers of oversight of the Colonial Secretary; provided an increase in Federation 
representation on the Currency Board; and broadened the permitted field of 
investment for currency funds to include dollar securities (though the Federation 
was not using these to purchase its dollar reserve) (ibid.). The background note 
concludes on the point that the Federation and Singapore had begun negotiations 
for a custom’s union, which would ultimately pave the way for unification (as 
Malaysia) when Singapore declared independence in 1963 though this would 
ultimately prove to be short-lived (ibid.) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the period 1955 – 1960, and looked at four 
major events in the relationship between Britain and Malaya in that time: the 
renewal of Exchange Control Ordinances; Constitutional and Financial Talks 
concerning independence; and the Malayan demand for an independent dollar 
reserve. Each of these events has also featured to some degree Malaya’s struggle to 
find large amounts of development capital. 
 Each event has brought into focus Malaya’s relationship with Britain, both 
before and after formal independence. As such, the chapter concludes that the 
fundamental relationship between Britain and Malaya does not substantially change 
following formal independence, as the relationship is still ultimately governed by the 
logic and nature of the Sterling Area mechanism as a means of managing Malayan 
economic and monetary policy to benefit Britain. Malaya remains important to the 
Sterling Area throughout this period, a fact cited by officials in the Bank, Treasury 
and Colonial Office, due to its large dollar earning capacity and the continued 
inability of the Sterling Area and Britain to balance trade with the dollar area, which 
is revealed by state managers and also through the meagre size of Britain’s (and the 
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Sterling Area’s) convertible currency reserves. 
Even after independence, when the formal vestiges of empire were 
removed, Malaya’s relationship with Britain is still managed by these same factors, 
and they continue to dominate the relationship. Britain identified in Malaya a prime 
support for the Sterling Area, which was itself a key component for the maintenance 
of Sterling as an international currency and for Britain’s economic vitality. While this 
is not to say that Malaya was essential to the British economy, or to the stability of 
Sterling, it certainly played a significant role in the strategy for maintaining the 
Sterling Area, which still remained a vital component of Britain’s international 
economic policy. Without Malaya, more stringent import restrictions on dollar area 
goods and further emergency measures, which would have required a significant 
change in the quality of life for citizens of Sterling Area countries, would have been 
necessary and they would have seriously retarded Britain’s economic recovery, as 
well as the recovery of global trade which was vital to Britain’s economy. 
The various arguments brought up by officials in the Bank, Treasury, Colonial 
and Commonwealth Relations Offices in this period concerning Malaya’s role and 
membership in the Sterling Area are convincing. They reveal, not only in content, 
but in their existence and the frequency with which they are presented, Malaya’s 
continued importance to the Sterling Area, British economic policy and the nature of 
the relationship between Britain and Malaya. While Britain certainly used Malaya to 
its own advantage, Malaya too benefitted from this relationship. The historical 
development of trade within the Sterling Area had seen Malaya hold a deficit with 
the UK and a surplus with the US (the very basis by which she was so valuable to the 
UK as a dollar earner), which meant that exiting from the Sterling Area would have 
been too costly to reasonably consider. This was recognised by Malayan state 
officials both prior to and after formal independence from Britain and ensured that 
they would continue to support Sterling Area membership due to the advantages it 
brought the Malayan economy. Hence, the imperial relationship between Britain 
and Malaya is characterised by constraints and opportunities. Britain could not 
‘mercilessly exploit’ Malaya since development was essential to its continued value 
and, indeed, Malaya did continue to be valuable to Britain due to its persistent trade 
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imbalance with the United States. Nor could Malaya simply extract itself from the 
imperial relationship since its economy depended upon the continuity of this 
relationship. 
This period particularly has been seen in terms of discontinuity.158 However, 
looking at the content of the documents in both Bank and National Archives, in 
terms of the relationship between Britain and Malaya we see a very strong 
continuity. The same reasons prevail in this period that prevailed prior, and 
throughout this period. Moments one would think of as intuitive caesuras – Schenk’s 
de facto convertibility, Hinds and Krozewski’s de jure convertibility, and the 
numerous phases postulated by the scholars of British imperial history and 
decolonisation. 
The thesis has maintained that analysis of British imperialism is actually quite 
limited due to its scope: broad and monolithic, with little account taken of the 
specific relationships that actually constituted the Empire. There is also a sense of 
formal Empire that ends with independence – particularly, Krozewski (2001) 
attributes any idea of post-independence continuity to “sympathetic elites”, which is 
itself empirically problematic when considered in light of the Saul Marshall 
controversy; however, Malaya remains in the Sterling Area, a mechanism designed 
to support Sterling, and the British economy not simply due to a pro-British elite but 
due to the historically developed relationship with Britain. As such, when we look at 
the historical record, and we critically assess what we mean by the British Empire, 
informed by an open Marxist understanding of imperialism that situates the strategy 
in terms of the nature of the capitalist state and social relations, we see that there is 
not one history of the British Empire but actually a series of particular relationships 
between Britain and other states that are historically, politically, economically, and 
geographically conditioned. 
 
 
                                               
158 See, inter alia, Darwin (1988; 2006), Hinds (2001), Holland (1984; 1985), Krozewski (1997; 2001), 
Schenk (1996). 
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Conclusion 
The intention of this thesis was to provide an empirical account of Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya from 1945 until 1960. The thesis provided an explanation 
using an open Marxist account of imperialism. The thesis concludes with the 
following remarks. 
British Post-War Imperial Relations 
The first chapter of this thesis sought to provide a context for an analysis of Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya in terms of the literature on British imperial relations after 
the Second World War. The prevailing ideas of British post-war imperial relations are 
discontinuity, decolonisation and decline. These ideas stem fundamentally from an 
understanding of the British Empire as a monolithic institution and this is manifest in 
the extant literature on the topic, which sees British imperial relations analysed as a 
whole and in aggregate. Indeed, not only is this problematic conceptually, but it was 
also understood not to be the case by British policy-makers themselves. 
 By criticising this way of thinking and analysing British imperial relations and, 
indeed, by understanding empire and imperialism from an open Marxist 
perspective, not as an extant thing, but as a strategy undertaken by states and 
manifest as a relation between states, we can see an alternative history of British 
imperial relations with Malaya. Furthermore, this history of the British-Malaya 
relationship is more intelligible as a steady and continuous relationship, rather than 
one characterised by discontinuity and disjuncture. 
 The further value of the open Marxist understanding of imperialism derives 
from its coherent account of the state and crisis situated in the exploitative and 
contradictory nature of global capitalist social relations. This has specific and 
particular value through understanding the role Malaya played in Britain’s strategy 
to mitigate the precarious situation facing the global economy after the Second 
World War. Indeed, in understanding imperialism as a strategy manifest as a 
relationship between states, and not a monolithic institution that is only understood 
as an ‘Empire’, not only are we obliged to study these specific relationships but 
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when we do, we find them unique and divergent from the history of the rest of the 
Empire: characterised by nuance, dynamic and embedded in the nature and 
historical development of capitalist social relations and the capitalist inter-state 
system.  
 The period from 1945 – 1950 saw a time when the entire of Britain’s imperial 
dominion was marshalled, with the acute nature of the crises over this period 
actually bringing a sense of homogeneity to the British Empire. Indeed there are a 
great number of communiqués headed “to all colonies”, even in files dedicated 
specifically to Malaya and Singapore, which themselves are rarely referred to 
directly during this five-year period. What is particularly curious is that the “to all 
colonies” communication is rarely found subsequent or prior to this period. 
 The acute and severe nature of the crisis led to such serious strictures at 
home and abroad that the entire Sterling Area and the complex of imperial relations 
to which Britain was tied were required to adopt stringent dollar spending 
restrictions. Certainly this period is where the chief analysis of Britain’s relationship 
with Malaya resides; however, subsequent to this, Malaya is subsumed within the 
aggregated complex of Britain’s imperial relations and so discontinuity is the 
received wisdom of both British imperial economic relations, and thus Britain’s 
relationship with Malaya, after 1950. 
 Discontinuity, however, is not revealed by a close analysis of the 
documentation from Bank and National Archives concerning British-Malayan 
relations. On the contrary, not only do we see a strong continuity but also the 
moments at which one might intuit natural caesuras in the relationship do not 
provide them. Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001) both argue that 1953 and 1958 
see profound disruption in British imperial economic relations; however, the 
Archives reveal that this description of Britain’s broader relationship with its 
aggregated empire provides little relevance to its relationship with Malaya 
specifically. Malaya’s importance to, and handling by, Britain after both of these 
moments remains consonant with and identical to the previously existing 
relationship. Furthermore, the phases of Empire as argued by Holland (1984; 1985), 
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Darwin (1998; 2006), Kaplan (1991) and manifest in the work of others, including 
both Krozewski (2001) and Hinds (2001) also finds little purchase when considering 
the relationship between Britain and Malaya in isolation. 
 The implications that derive from this observation of British-Malayan 
relations is that the history of the British Empire and the Sterling Area is not that of 
monolithic institutions but a complicated and nuanced history of the complex set of 
relations that comprise and manifest as these institutions. As such, we can only truly 
understand the history of the British Empire by developing an alternative history of 
it: a history of the relationships between the states of which it was comprised and 
not the reified institution that it is understood to be.  
British Imperialism and Malaya 
Throughout the period 1945 – 1960, Britain used its dominion over the Malayan 
state, both before and after independence, to improve conditions for capital 
accumulation in Britain itself. In a time of domestic consensus politics, Britain had 
adopted an economic strategy by which economic strain was placed principally on 
the UK’s foreign currency and gold reserves. UK commitment to keeping the base 
rate of interest low also meant that foreign funds were unlikely to accumulate in the 
UK and therefore reserves would remain low, British banks would lend elsewhere 
(where they could), but the money supply in the UK itself (of Sterling) would remain 
relatively flexible. This developed from a commitment to a Keynesian domestic 
economic policy, to allow the government and the market to borrow cheaply, but 
had a constrictive effect on external economic policy, upon which the stresses and 
strains of domestic policy were concentrated. 
The UK held that the Sterling Area was a vital and necessary component of 
the international trading system and its own economic policy, and, therefore, 
required maintenance. The source of the UK’s benefit from this relationship lay in 
Malaya’s trade surplus with the United States, which provided it with large 
quantities of US dollars. Due to the mechanism of the Sterling Area, these dollars 
were pooled centrally in Britain’s own reserves and rationed out to those with the 
most need. These dollars were not used solely to support Britain’s own imports from 
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the United States but as a means of maintaining the Sterling Area, itself the principal 
prop to Britain’s economic recovery and growth, and the means through which 
Sterling was maintained as an international currency. It is also worth considering the 
role of the Sterling Area as an imperialist institution, an imperial cat’s-paw for the 
British state. Created by the British state as a means of managing its international 
trading role, and simultaneously run by the British state yet presented as a neutral 
economic institution for the maintenance of Sterling and international trade, these 
two purposes were to the benefit of the British state and made the Sterling Area 
inherently an imperialist institution. 
Britain, in this manner, acted to resolve a global economic crisis manifest as a 
dollar shortage through the actions of state managers to solve Britain’s own 
economic problems. The ultimate goal of British state managers was to improve 
Britain’s economic performance. With the relative failure of both the ERP and the 
AAFA, the only sustainable way of achieving this was to increase the global supply of 
dollars through increasing exports to the United States. Malaya’s role then, as the 
largest single supplier of dollars in the Sterling Area, was to provide a stop-gap 
measure to the broader problem, and permitted greater quantities of US goods into 
the Sterling Area, which were necessary for reconstruction and the maintenance of 
the UK reserve position. The thesis has sought to argue for continuity in British 
relations with Malaya. Even after 1955, the dollar situation was still serious. The 
balance of trade with the United States was still in deficit for Britain, and the reserve 
position was still weak. As such, Malaya’s role within the Sterling Area remained 
fundamentally the same, as Britain still gained great benefit from its dollar earnings 
and Malaya still found advantage to remaining in the Sterling Area.  
Malaya did not wish to divest itself immediately of the Sterling Area upon 
independence, but used its importance to the Sterling Area (and thus Britain) as a 
means of securing more generous terms both financially and economically. Even 
when the British state was effectively ‘blackmailed’ by the Singaporean First 
Minister to grant independence earlier, the bluff was called as Malaya refused to 
back this strategy since it would have done great harm to both Malaya and 
Singapore had Saul Marshall actually carried through his threat. However generous 
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the terms might have been, Malaya was entirely dependent on the Sterling Area for 
trade and economic development. This dependence was historically developed and 
was to the advantage of Britain and Malaya, and pointed out repeatedly to the 
Malayan governments. Malaya was, on independence, bought cheaply at twice the 
price. 
The thesis has also argued that Britain did not mercilessly exploit Malaya – 
that it was not a one-way relationship with the sequestration of Malayan dollars and 
capital away from the colony to Britain. While Britain dominated Malaya, and used 
the colony as a means of supporting its own economic and monetary strategy, which 
was ultimately to the benefit of the UK, the thesis has also shown that this 
ultimately depended on Malayan social stability, economic vitality and development. 
Malaya benefited from this relationship through British commitment to suppress the 
insurgency, along with material and financial support in reconstructing and 
improving the rubber and tin industries, as well as provisions being made for 
investment into the Malayan economy. Furthermore, Malaya itself could not simply 
‘opt out’ of this relationship, even if it were deemed an exploitative one, as Malaya 
had historically developed a deficit with the Sterling Area along with its surplus with 
the dollar area. It had become, in effect, economically integrated into the UK’s 
trading bloc, which provided not only the disadvantages of dollar sequestration and 
import control by the British government but came hand-in-hand with the 
advantages of using Sterling as an international trading and reserve currency, access 
to a large international market, and an inherent interest by the UK in ensuring that 
Malaya’s economy was both stable and growing.  Indeed, it is certainly worth noting 
that the prevailing view of state managers in the Archives is not of British villainy 
seeking to exploit the Malayan but is entirely concerned with the daily business of 
running a state. British imperial strategy was, in effect, to support domestic 
economic strategy through the manipulation and development of foreign states and 
markets, of which Malaya was a particularly important instance. 
As Burnham (2003, p.185) notes, the origins of the crises of the late-1960s 
and the 1970s lie in Britain’s response to the post-war economic crisis, which was 
itself a result of the state’s response to the crisis of the inter-war years and Britain’s 
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relative economic decline at the end of the 19th Century. The devaluation of 1967 
ultimately led Britain to unilaterally withdraw from, and thus cause the total 
collapse of, the Sterling Area. However, certainly up to 1960, we find the 
mechanisms of the Sterling Area still in use with regard to the particular relationship 
Britain held with Malaya, which continued to pool its dollars in the Sterling Area’s 
reserve. 
The thesis has focused on a period in British politics that is well analysed and 
understood but has sought to use that as a backdrop to an international relationship 
that has had very little scholarship dedicated to it. Characterisations of the Britain-
Malaya relationship are few in number and impressionistic in nature. The thesis has 
argued for continuity and commitment in this relationship where other accounts 
have argued for periodisation and disengagement. The thesis has also sought to 
characterise the relationship theoretically and has developed a theoretical 
framework based upon an open Marxist understanding of imperialism that avoids 
the problems associated with other accounts of imperialism. 
Imperialism and Accummulation 
As Simon Clarke (1994) has pointed out, the fundamental contradiction upon which 
capitalism is based is that between the production of use-value and exchange-value, 
and the supremacy of the latter over the former. The global overproduction crisis 
that characterises the early- to mid-20th century stems directly from this 
contradiction. From this contradiction, capital seeks ever-greater means of 
increasing productivity from which to capture additional surplus value, leading to 
competition between capitals. Those capitals that are successful and out-compete 
their rivals remain in the market, while the circuits of their rivals are destroyed. This 
process leads to productive capitals producing ever more use-values beyond the 
consumptive powers of the marketplace, beyond the capacity of society to actually 
purchase these commodities at a profit. Without an outlet for this commodity form 
of capital, without their purchase, there exists a glut of commodities – they have 
been overproduced, hence an overproduction crisis. This is the exact nature of the 
crisis between Eastern and Western hemispheres during this period – capital in the 
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US had, much prior to the Second World War, become the most competitive capital 
in the world and was substantially out-producing the productive capital in other 
territories, becoming a prolific and speedy supplier of essential goods domestically 
and internationally. Due to the creation of monetary and trading blocs in the inter-
war period, this overproduction crisis presented itself as, prima facie, a currency 
shortage that was identified as a trade disequilibrium. The creation of trade blocs in 
the inter-war period was intended to safeguard the capitals of national states from 
foreign competition; however, due to the global nature of capitalism, this merely 
provided a stopgap measure and, ultimately, the over-production crisis presented 
itself yet again albeit in a different form, as a dollar shortage, which persisted into 
the early 1960s (Burnham 2003, p.175). 
The role of the state in regulating the circuit of capital, both domestically and 
internationally, is vital to the reproduction of capitalist social relations. The national 
state acts as a ‘processing node’, essential to the maintenance of global capitalist 
relations (and vice versa). The action of the national state is essential for the 
maintenance of international economic vitality. It achieves this through avoiding or 
resolving the periodic crises that beset capitalism and act as ‘blockages’ to the 
circuit of capital, taking a variety of forms. The state acts to resolve these crises 
through actions both domestic and international. One such strategy is imperialism. 
Imperialism is not to be understood as some fantastical activity pursued by a specific 
type of state but a possible activity available to all states, depending on historical 
contingency. It is this historical contingency that needs to be explored and analysed 
in order to fully understand imperialism. This thesis has attempted to understand 
the particular historical relationship between Britain and Malaya during a period of 
acute political economic strain in order to understand how imperialism has 
manifested and been conditioned by the historical, economic and geographical 
contours of this specific relationship. 
The potential for imperialism is, in effect, an aspect of the state that cannot 
be separated from its nature as a capitalist state. Furthermore, the implementation 
of an imperialist strategy reveals the nature of the international state system and 
how it is characterised by global capitalist social relations. The value of an open 
  271 
Marxist approach is that it seeks to offer a totality of social relations: imperialism, 
crisis and the state-form all spring fundamentally from the same contradiction and 
the same set of social relations. They are all fundamentally capitalist in nature.  
The global movement of capital is highly revealing and illustrates the nature 
of the problem. The highly productive US was booming though ultimately in just as 
much trouble as the rest of the world if the trade imbalance continued. While 
various ‘aid’ remedies (AAFA, ERP, Korean War) were attempted, they did not prove 
successful in the long-term and acted merely as a palliative to the fundamental 
problem, which actually required the reconstruction of the British economy to the 
extent that its exports were capable of competing with US goods both 
internationally and in the dollar area. With US dollars being increasingly 
concentrated in the ‘dollar area’, US trade was effectively dwindling and ultimately 
would have realised itself in a major world crisis even worse than the one presented 
in this thesis. As it is, the various attempts to improve European and Eastern trade 
with the US succeeded, with Malaya being one element of that struggle. 
Final Remarks and Implications 
The thesis deals with a number of issues that have not been developed due to the 
particular focus of the thesis’ study. Particularly noteworthy is the concept of 
money, which this thesis has unfortunately been unable to develop due to practical 
constraints. The dollar drain episode reveals the fetishisation of money by global 
capitalism – the US dollar is seen as a commodity that needs to be accumulated, 
pooled and preserved. British economic strategy is based upon having enough US 
dollars to weather the problems arising from its persistent balance of payments 
deficit. An open Marxist theory of money, which would find basis in the Marxist 
commodity theory of money, would be a particularly interesting avenue for 
research. This theory would have to take into account the idea of money as an 
abstraction of concrete surplus value. The dollar represents, in effect, a claim to 
surplus value. This surplus value is produced within the US but further productive 
application is sought for this surplus value in order to be valorised again. Without 
dollars, Britain cannot develop its economy and conditions for capital accumulation 
  272 
are unfavourable. Furthermore, despite the value of the dollar:Sterling exchange 
rate being set, the dollar is certainly more valuable than Sterling since it is not just in 
shorter supply but it is the means through which particularly necessary commodities 
can be purchased, and capital accumulation can be resumed in earnest. 
The thesis hoped, in some small way, to move forward the use of open 
Marxism in empirical terms with the use of the concept of imperialism, rather than 
depoliticisation as has been the principal means of the empirical application of open 
Marxism previously. However, it seems interesting to note that uses of open 
Marxism have used an additional concept to ‘operationalise’ the theory. ‘Thicker’ 
uses of open Marxism, such as that characterised by Richard Gunn (1992b) seem 
currently difficult to apply in empirical terms, since they eschew ideas of social 
theory and historical materialism. This is not to suggest that such conceptions of 
Marxism are flawed but certainly problematic in terms of their implications for 
future research. 
The role of agency is a further consideration for empirical research in two 
ways: Malayan agency and British political agency. While the thesis has focused on 
the role of British state managers, the role of ‘the imperialists’, as it were, an 
interesting and valuable avenue of research would be the study of Malaysian 
archives on this period to analyse how the Federation government conceived of its 
own interests internally. While the British archives at Kew and Threadneedle Street 
are inclusive and offer a very good account of the events of the period, it would still 
be stimulating to discover how Malayan interests were formed and developed from 
accounts within archives in modern-day Malaysia.  
The role of agency in terms of British political parties is also of great interest. 
While the thesis can find no strong evidence to suggest that this played much of an 
issue at all, indeed the thesis argues there is strong evidence for continuity even 
between different governments, this is not to say that the pursuit of an analysis into 
party politics and imperialism is not a valuable course of research. On the contrary, 
research on British political parties and the colonies has been undertaken prior to 
this thesis and has generated considerable scholarship. The thesis does not argue 
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that British party politics played no role in the Malayan-Britain relationship, merely 
that there is a stronger case for continuity, in this era of well-acknowledged 
consensus politics, for British relations with Malaya, which is governed principally by 
the nature of the state as a form of capitalist social relations.  
While certainly the thesis would have been enriched by a greater analysis of 
the role of agency, time and financial constraints prevented that being incorporated 
into the final argument. There would also have been a reasonable critique that the 
study would then have been too broad, and altered in focus: theoretically, the thesis 
would have had to incorporate some idea of agency into its theoretical framework, 
which would require a marriage of open Marxism, a totalising theory of social 
relations and a pluralist or Westminster model understanding of British politics. This 
may not have been conceptually possible. Empirically, the thesis would have been 
required to do a greater amount of work in the same amount of space and perhaps 
done a disservice to both the structural and agential aspects of this period. 
One final remark would be to suggest that the thesis offers an opportunity to 
look at other examples of British imperialism, in this period and even further in the 
past. Certainly it may have been possible to provide a comparative analysis within 
this thesis, comparing different examples of British imperialism (e.g. between 
Malaya and Ghana); the focus on Malaya was intended to provide as specific an 
analysis as possible. To include other case studies would have diffused the research 
focus and limited the analysis and conclusions of this thesis; however, further 
analysis of those case studies would be fruitful as specific analyses of British 
imperial relations are uncommon. As such, future research projects in characterising 
British imperialism, and relating it to this particularly episode in British imperial 
history, would be particularly valuable. 
 
Appendices 
List of Persons 
These details have been gathered from a number of sources, including National 
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Archive and Bank documents, as well as Burnham (2003), White (1996), and Fforde 
(1992). They are not exhaustive of every character mentioned in the thesis but are 
intended to provide a reference for the most frequently cited names. 
 
Viscount Addison   
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947) 
Sir Robert Black 
Governor, Singapore (1955 – 1957) 
George Bolton  
Executive Director of the Bank of England (1948 – 1957) 
Henry Bourdillon  
Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office (1947 – 1954) 
Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office (1954 – 1959) 
Deputy UK Commissioner for Singapore (1959 – 1961) 
Sir Edward Bridges 
Cabinet Secretary (1938 – 1946) 
Permanent Secretary to Treasury (1946 – 1956) 
Harold Briggs 
Director of Operations, Federation of Malaya (1950 – 1951) 
R.A. ‘Rab’ Butler  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1951 – 1955) 
Sydney Caine  
Deputy under-secretary of state, Colonial Office (1947 – 1948) 
Third Secretary to UK Treasury (1948) 
Head of UK Treasury and Supply Delegation to Washington (1949 – 1951) 
Thomas Catto 
Governor, Bank of England (April 1944 – Feb 1949) 
Allen Christelow  
Under-Secretary, UK Treasury and Supply Delegation to Washington  
R.W.B. ‘Otto’ Clarke  
Under-Secretary, Overseas Finance Division (1947 – 1953) 
Cameron Cobbold 
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Deputy Governor, Bank of England (1945 – 1949) 
Governor, Bank of England (1949 –1961) 
Sir William Cockburn  
Chief General Manager, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (1940 – 1955) 
Arthur Creech-Jones   
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1946 – 1950) 
Sir Stafford Cripps  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1947 – 1950) 
Philip Cunliffe-Lister   
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1952 – 1955) 
Hugh Dalton   
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1945 – 1947) 
Alexander Douglas-Home  
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1955 – 1960) 
John Fisher 
Deputy Chief Cashier, Bank of England (1950 – 1959) 
Chin Feng  
Secretary-General of Malayan Communist Party (1947 – 1955) 
Oliver Franks    
British Ambassador, US (1948 – 1952) 
Hugh Gaitskell   
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1950 – 1951) 
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil  
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1952) 
Sir Gerard Gent 
High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya (1946 – 1948) 
Andrew Gilmour  
Financial Secretary, Singapore (1946 – 1949) 
Seconded for Special Duties, High Commissioner’s Office, Federation of Malaya 
(1949 – 1951) 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, Singapore (1951 - ?) 
Sir Franklin Gimson 
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Governor, Singapore (1946 – 1952) 
William Goode 
Governor, Singapore (1957 – 1959) 
William Gorell-Barnes   
Personal Assistant to Prime Minister (1946 – 1948) 
Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office (1948 – 1960) 
Jim Griffiths    
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1950 – 1951) 
Sir Henry Gurney  
High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya (1948 – 1951) 
George Hall    
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1945 – 1946) 
Robert Hall  
Director of the Economic Section, Cabinet Office (1947 – 1953) 
Economic Advisor to UK Treasury (1953 – 1961) 
Sir Edmund Hall-Patch 
Chairman, Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1948) 
W. John Harriman 
United States Coordinator, European Recovery Program (1948 – 1950) 
Sir John Hay     
General Manager, Guthries (1930 – 1963) 
UK and Colonial Delegations to International Rubber Conferences (1946 – 1957) 
Derick Heathcoat-Amory  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1958 – 1960) 
Sir Thomas Ingram Lloyd  
Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office (1947 – 1956) 
Hastings Ismay  
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1951 – 1952) 
W. John Kenney 
Chief of Mission, European Cooperation Administration (1948 – 1950) 
Chief of Operations, European Recovery Program (1950 – 1952) 
Colonel Sir Henry Lee 
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Minister of Finance, Federation of Malaya (1956 – 1959) 
Alan Lennox-Boyd   
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1954 – 1959) 
Oliver Lyttleton   
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1951 – 1954) 
Malcolm MacDonald   
Governor-General, South East Asia (1946 – 1948) 
Commissioner-General, South East Asia (1948 – 1955) 
High Commissioner, India (1955 – 1960) 
Sir Donald MacGillivray 
Deputy High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya (1952 – 1954) 
High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya (1954 – 1957) 
Iain Macleod    
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1959 – 1961) 
Harold Macmillan  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1955 – 1957) 
Sir Alec Newboult 
Officer Administrating Government of Malaya (date) 
Sir John Niccol 
Governor, Singapore (1952 – 1955) 
Philip Noel-Baker   
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947 – 1950) 
Sir John Paskin  
Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office (1948 – 1954) 
Kenneth Oswald Peppiatt  
Chief Cashier, Bank of England (1934-1949) 
Sir Hilton Poynton  
Private Secretary to Colonial Secretary (1943 – 1959) 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office (1959 – 1966) 
Leslie Thomas George Preston 
Assistant Principal, Dealing and Accounts Office, Bank of England (1948 – 1953) 
Deputy Principal, Dealing and Accounts Office, Bank of England (1953 – 1957) 
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Principal, Dealing and Accounts Office, Bank of England (1957 – 1968) 
Abdul Rahman  
Chief Minister of Malaya; Malaysia (1955 – 1970) 
Leader of Alliance Party (1953 – 1970) 
Bernard Rickatson-Hatt 
Press Officer, Bank of England 
Leslie Rowan    
Second Secretary, UK Treasury (1947 – 1949) 
Second Secretary, Head of the Overseas Finance Division (1951 – 1958) 
Ernest Rowe-Dutton   
Third Secretary, UK Treasury (1948 - ????) 
Oscar Spencer 
Economic Secretary, Federation of Malaya (1950 – 1955) 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Federation of Malaya (1955) 
Economic Adviser and Head of Economic Secretariat, Federation of Malaya (1956 – 
1960) 
Oliver Stanley    
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1942 – 1945) 
Sir Gerald Templer  
General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command (1950 – 1952) 
High Commissioner and Director of Operations, Federation of Malaya (1952 – 1954) 
Chief of Imperial General Staff (1955 – 1958) 
Lucius Thompson-McCausland  
Advisor to the Governor of the Bank of England (1949 – 1965) 
Peter Thorneycroft   
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1957 – 1958) 
G.W. Tory    
High Commissioner, Malaya (1959 – 1960) 
Patrick Gordon Walker   
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1950 – 1951) 
Sir Henry Wilson-Smith  
Second Secretary, UK Treasury (1948) 
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UK Overseas Trade with USA 1938-1960 (£ millions) 
 
Year Imports Exports Re-exports 
1938 118.2 20.5 8.3 
1939 117.5 28.4 8.1 
1940 275.5 33.0 4.9 
1941 409.0 31.8 1.1 
1942 535.6 26.0 0.3 
1943 1103.8 20.4 5.0 
1944 1391.4 19.0 4.0 
1945 610.3 19.2 3.5 
1946 229.6 35.5 4.2 
1947 297.2 48.0 13.3 
1948 183.2 66.2 4.6 
1949 222.1 57.1 5.5 
1950 211.4 113.1 14.3 
1951 380.0 136.7 16.9 
1952 314.6 146.3 34.8 
1953 252.7 159.0 13.2 
1954 282.4 150.4 10.4 
1955 420.0 183.1 15.8 
1956 408.0 243.2 15.9 
1957 482.5 244.3 14.6 
1958 351.7 272.7 20.9 
1959 370.7 360.8 21.3 
1960 565.8 325.5 17.2 
Source: Mitchell & Jones (1971, p.140) 
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Indices of the Volume of UK Overseas Trade 1947-1960 
 Year Imports Domestic Exports 
1950 = 100 1947 89 62 
 1948 93 78 
 1949 100 86 
 1950 100 100 
 1951 112 101 
 1952 103 95 
1954 = 100 1950 89 101 
 1951 100 100 
 1952 92 94 
 1953 99 96 
 1954 100 100 
 1955 111 107 
 1956 110 113 
 1957 114 116 
 1958 114 111 
 1959 122 116 
1961 = 100 1956 81 92 
 1957 84 93 
 1958 84 90 
 1959 90 93 
 1960 102 98 
Source: Mitchell & Jones (1971, p.141) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indices of UK Terms of Trade 1938-60 
 Index Numbers of  
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Average Values 
 
 
 Year Imports Exports Net terms of Trade 
1950 = 100 1938 30 38 79 
 1947 77 84 92 
 1948 86 92 93 
 1949 87 95 92 
 1950 100 100 100 
 1951 133 117 113 
 1952 129 124 105 
1954 = 100 1950 85 85 100 
 1951 113 100 113 
 1952 111 105 106 
 1953 101 101 100 
 1954 100 100 100 
 1955 103 102 101 
 1956 105 106 99 
 1957 107 111 96 
 1958 99 110 90 
 1959 98 109 90 
1961 = 100 1956 110 95 87 
 1957 111 100 89 
 1958 103 99 96 
 1959 102 98 96 
 1960 102 100 97 
Source: Mitchell & Jones (1971, p.141) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derivation of Malayan real gross domestic product 1947-60 ($ million) 
Year 
Malayan GDP  
(current market prices) 
Retail Price Index 
(1959 =100) 
Malayan Real GDP  
(1959 market prices) 
1947 2654 89 2982 
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1948 2494 83 3005 
1949 2391 79 3027 
1950 4137 85 4867 
1951 5550 111 5000 
1952 4693 113 4153 
1953 4271 110 3883 
1954 4208 102 3949 
1955 4931 98 5032 
1956 4999 99 5049 
1957 5046 104 4852 
1958 4841 103 4700 
1959 5411 100 5411 
1960 5921 100 5921 
Source: Lim (1967) 
 
Tin prices (London, Standard 
Cash, Average) by years (£ per 
ton) 
Year Price 
1925 261 
1926 291 
1927 289 
1928 227 
1929 204 
1930 142 
1931 118 
1932 136 
1933 195 
1934 230 
1935 226 
1936 205 
1937 242 
1938 190 
1939 226 
1940 286 
1941 262 
1942 277 
1943 277 
1944 302 
1945 302 
1946 323 
1947 428 
1948 552 
1949 606 
1950 745 
1951 1077 
1952 964 
1953 732 
1954 719 
1955 740 
1956 788 
1957 755 
1958 735 
1959 785 
1960 797 
Source: Lim (1967) 
 
London yearly average natural rubber prices (/lb) 
Year s. d. 
Price (in old 
pennies d.) 
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1925 2 11.06 35.06 
1926 1 11.75 23.75 
1927 1 6.88 18.88 
1928 0 10.75 10.75 
1929 0 10.25 10.25 
1930 0 5.94 5.94 
1931 0 3.5 3.5 
1932 0 2.31 2.31 
1933 0 3.25 3.25 
1934 0 6.25 6.25 
1935 0 6 6 
1936 0 7.75 7.75 
1937 0 9.5 9.5 
1938 0 7.22 7.22 
1939 0 9 9 
1940 1 0.06 12.06 
1941 1 1.59 13.59 
1942 1 1.75 13.75 
1943 1 6 18 
1944 1 6 18 
1945 1 6 18 
1946 1 4.88 16.88 
1947 1 0.34 12.34 
1948 1 0.91 12.91 
1949 0 11.78 11.78 
1950 2 9.28 33.28 
1951 4 2.84 50.84 
1952 2 4.34 28.34 
1953 1 7.91 19.91 
1954 1 8.5 20.5 
1955 2 9.56 33.56 
1956 2 4.59 28.59 
1957 2 2.09 26.09 
1958 1 11.5 23.5 
1959 2 6.09 30.09 
1960 2 8.16 32.16 
Source: Lim (1967) 
 
 
 
 
 
Pan-Malayan rubber and tin export and total export income 
  285 
 Sources of export income ($ million) Per cent. of total export income 
Year From rubber  From tin All sources Rubber (%) Tin (%) 
Rubber 
and tin 
(%) 
1925 757 175 1290 58.7 13.6 72.3 
1926 718 186 1273 56.4 14.6 71 
1927 523 207 1069 48.9 19.4 68.3 
1928 331 191 852 38.8 22.4 61.2 
1929 435 182 931 46.7 19.5 66.2 
1930 241 124 658 36.6 18.8 55.4 
1931 118 84 401 29.4 20.9 50.3 
1932 78 56 323 24.1 17.3 41.4 
1933 121 89 373 32.4 23.9 56.3 
1934 280 97 544 51.5 17.8 69.3 
1935 259 117 570 45.4 20.5 65.9 
1936 303 141 628 48.2 22.5 70.7 
1937 485 193 897 54.1 21.5 75.6 
1947 780 108 1320 59.1 8.2 67.3 
1948 876 216 1764 52.6 12.2 64.8 
1949 732 276 1728 42.4 16 58.4 
1950 2448 468 4020 60.9 11.6 72.5 
1951 3948 576 6072 65 9.5 74.5 
1952 1883 516 3924 48 13.1 61.1 
1953 1265 391 3024 41.8 12.9 54.7 
1954 1318 415 2986 44.1 13.9 58 
1955 2322 433 4158 55.8 10.4 66.2 
1956 2054 476 4167 49.3 11.4 60.7 
1957 1946 448 4171 46.7 10.7 57.4 
1958 1790 281 3726 48 7.5 55.5 
1959 2582 298 4391 58.8 6.8 65.6 
1960 2567 506 4708 54.5 10.7 65.2 
Source: Lim (1967) 
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Malayan rubber estate and small-holding acreage and production 
 Planted acreage (1000 acres) Production (1000 tons) Estate 
Year Estate Small-holding Total Estate Small-holding Total 
% of total 
acreage 
% of total 
productio
n 
1929 1820 1124 2971 245 212 457 61 54 
1930 1876 1173 3049 237 215 452 62 52 
1931 1934 1218 3152 239.4 195.5 434.9 61 55 
1932 1939 1276 3215 240.1 177 417.1 60 58 
1933 1947 1261 3208 241 218.8 459.8 61 52 
1934 2010 1272 3282 262.4 217 479.4 61 55 
1935 2016 1163 3179 242.3 134.5 376.8 63 64 
1936 2015 1205 3220 232.6 130.9 363.5 63 64 
1937 2021 1268 3289 313.9 187.2 501.1 61 63 
1938 2026 1254 3280 245.7 113.8 359.5 62 68 
1939 2100 1326 3426 244.4 115.7 360.1 61 68 
1940 2113 1351 3464 333.6 213.6 547.2 61 61 
1946 1908 1500 3408 173.8 229.9 396.7 56 44 
1947 1945 1580 3525 360.5 285.9 646.4 55 57 
1948 1964 1582 3546 403.6 294.6 698.2 55 58 
1949 1983 1584 3567 400.8 270.7 671.5 56 60 
1950 1977 1587 3564 376.7 317.4 694.1 55 54 
1951 1975 1593 3568 328.8 276.5 605.3 55 54 
1952 2009 1600 3609 341.7 242.5 584.2 56 58 
1953 2041 1606 3647 341.8 232.6 574.4 56 60 
1954 2028 1629 3657 345.5 241 586.5 55 59 
1955 2025 1650 3675 352.5 286.2 628.7 55 56 
1956 2017 1686 3703 351.6 274.4 626 54 56 
1957 2020 1710 3730 368.9 268.9 637.5 54 58 
1958 1989 1766 3755 390.1 272.7 662.8 53 59 
1959 1950 1841 3791 408 289.8 697.8 51 58 
1960 1942 1906 3848 414.1 294.3 708.4 50 58 
1961 1945 1986 3931 429.5 307.2 736.7 49 58 
1962 1933 3994 3994 439.2 312.4 751.6 48 58 
Source: Lim (1967) 
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Rubber acreage new planted and replanted on Malayan estates and small-
holdings 
(Pan-Malayan but Singapore figures are negligible) 
 
Acreage New Planted (1000 
acres) Acreage Replanted (1000 acres) 
Year Estate Small-holding Total Estate Small-holding Total 
1939 92.4 47.7 140.1 36.2 11 47.2 
1940 19.9 3.5 23.4 49 14 63 
1941 10.2 n.a. 10.2 34 n.a. 34 
1946 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.7 n.a. 6.7 
1947 1.3 0.1 1.4 24.8 4.4 29.2 
1948 6.6 2 8.6 45.5 2 47.5 
1949 7 2 9 52.8 2.4 55.2 
1950 5.8 3.5 9.3 44 3.5 47.5 
1951 14.8 5.5 20.3 58.2 3.8 62 
1952 7.2 6.8 14 51.6 4.2 55.8 
1953 4.7 6.3 11 29.8 29.5 59.3 
1954 7.1 3.3 10.4 39.1 22.6 61.7 
1955 10 8.1 18.1 57.6 25.3 82.9 
1956 14.7 13.1 27.8 78.4 46.5 124.9 
1957 16.1 11.3 27.4 76.3 49.8 126.1 
1958 13.9 10.8 24.7 64.8 59.7 124.5 
1959 14.4 20.9 35.3 68.2 69.1 137.3 
1960 21.7 25.1 46.8 75.2 69.5 144.7 
1961 17.7 67.4 85.1 70.5 57.3 127.8 
1962 10 82.5 92.5 63.1 96.2 132.3 
Source: Lim (1967) 
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United States Balance of Payments 1874-1950 
 1925-1929 1932-1933 1935-1939 1947-1950 
Balance of Goods and 
Services -1092 370 562 6719 
Unilateral Transfers -366 -211 -180 -4473 
Long-Term Capital -653 167 372 -2456 
Gold and Short-Term 
Capital 152 -393 -1152 -529 
Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952 
 
US GNP and imports  (Prices in 1952) (in $billion) 
 Price Indices (1939 = 100) 
Year 
Gross National 
Product Imports 
Imports as per 
cent of GNP GNP Imports 
Imports 
/GNP 
1929 103.8 4.4 4.2 121 158 131 
1930 90.9 3.1 3.4 116 129 111 
1931 75.9 2.1 2.8 105 100 95 
1932 58.3 1.3 2.2 94 78 83 
1933 55.8 1.4 2.5 91 78 86 
1934 64.9 1.6 2.5 96 91 95 
1935 72.2 2.0 2.8 98 91 93 
1936 82.5 2.4 2.9 98 98 100 
1937 90.2 3.0 3.3 103 109 106 
1938 84.7 1.9 2.2 101 98 97 
1939 91.3 0.3 2.5 100 100 100 
1940 101.4 2.5 2.5 102 107 105 
1941 126.4 3.2 2.5 110 115 105 
1942 161.6 2.6 1.7 125 133 106 
1943 194.3 3.4 1.8 133 144 108 
1944 213.7 3.9 1.8 136 155 114 
1945 215.2 4.1 1.9 140 158 113 
1946 211.1 4.6 2.3 153 176 115 
1947 233.3 5.7 2.4 169 216 128 
1948 259.0 7.1 2.7 181 240 133 
1949 257.3 6.6 2.6 179 227 127 
1950 282.6 8.7 3.1 183 247 135 
1951 326.8 11.1 3.4 196 309 158 
Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952 
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World Supply of dollars as percentage of US GNP 
Dollars paid by the United States 
 Private Payments   
 Goods Services 
Capital (including 
unilateral transfers) Total 
Government 
Grants and Loans Total 
1925-1929 4.2 1.2 3.4 6.8 - 6.8 
1932-1933 2.5 1.1 - 3.6 - 3.6 
1935-1939 3.0 1.1 -0.1 4.0 - 4.0 
1946 2.5 0.9 0.4 3.8 2.4 6.2 
1947 2.6 1.0 0.5 4.1 2.5 6.6 
1948 3.0 1.0 0.6 4.6 1.9 6.5 
1949 2.8 1.0 0.4 4.2 2.3 6.5 
1950 3.4 1.0 0.6 5.0 1.5 6.5 
1951 3.6 1.0 0.4 5.0 1.4 6.4 
Dollars from other sources 
 IMF IBRD 
Liquidation of Gold and 
Dollar Assets Total 
1925-1929 - - -0.5 -0.5 
1932-1933 - - 0.8 0.8 
1935-1939 - - 1.3 1.3 
1946 - - 0.9 0.9 
1947 0.2 0.1 2.0 2.3 
1948 0.06 0.07 0.3 0.5 
1949 0.04 0.02 - 0.06 
1950 -0.01 0.01 -1.3 -1.3 
1951 - - - -0.03 
Source: TNA T230/177, ‘World Supply of Dollars’, 25th June 1952 
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Malayan (Federation and Singapore) Exports 1955 (£ thousands)  
 
United 
Kingdom 
Rest of 
Sterling Area 
USA and 
Canada 
Exports of rubber including re-
exports 67667 208883 59267 
Re-exports other than rubber 3383 4783 2333 
Domestic exports other than 
rubber, tin and petroleum 10850 10850 1167 
Tin 2100 3617 32200 
Petroleum  17267  
Total 84000 57400 94967 
Source: BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, Trade and Balance of Payments’, 
24th January 1957
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Pan-Malayan and Federation Imports and Exports 1934-1956 
 Federation (in Million Malayan Dollars) Malaya (in Million Malayan Dollars) Ratio of Federation of Malaya (per cent) 
Year Imports Exports Total Imports Exports Total Imports Exports Total 
1934  293  460 544 1004  54  
1935  309  467 570 1037  54  
1936  352  506 628 1136  56  
1937  529  680 897 1577  59  
1938    551 571 1122    
          
1947 610 835 1445 1367 1295 2662 45 65 54 
1948 847 1116 1963 1786 1724 3510 47 65 56 
1949 926 1179 2106 1897 1677 3574 49 70 59 
1950 1311 2608 3919 2915 3961 6876 45 66 57 
1951 1869 3379 5248 4756 5996 10752 39 56 49 
1952 1660 2134 3794 3873 3802 7675 43 56 49 
1953 1451 1598 3050 3238 2909 61447 45 55 50 
1954 1319 1625 2944 3139 2986 6125 42 54 48 
1955 1548 2358 3906 3822 4041 7863 41 58 50 
1956 1751 2262 4013 4153 4011 8164 44 56 49 
Source: BE OV65/5, ‘Federation of Malaya: Sterling Assets, Trade and Balance of Payments’, 24th January 1957 
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Source: Bank of England Statistical Abstract 1 (1970)
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Source: Bank of England Statistical Abstract 1 (1970)
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